Livelihoods and the articulation of space by Haan, L.J. de
Table of Contents  
 Acknowledgements vi 
 Introduction, 
Paul Hebinck, Sef Slootweg and Lothar Smith 
1 
 
Themes and Motives 
 
1 Tales of Development: Ton van Naerssen in perspective through 
themes and motives 
Ernst Spaan 
5 
   
 
Critical Geography and Social Space 
 
2 Critical geography in post-modern times 
Huib Ernste 
21 
3 Land reform, scripts and social space: emergent properties in rural 
South Africa 
Paul Hebinck 
33 
4 Livelihoods and the articulation of space 
Leo J. de Haan 
51 
5 Revisiting peripheral capitalism in Zambia 
Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht and Rudolf Scheffer 
61 
6 Knowledge development, SNV’s impact on world history 
Sef Slootweg 
79 
   
 
Migration Trajectories 
 
7 Return migration and development: a complicated arriage 
Tine Davids and Ruerd Ruben 
93 
8 People, borders, and trajectories 
Martin van der Velde 
111 
9 Remittances versus migrants: disjointed flows in a globalizing 
world 
Joris Schapendonk and Lothar Smith 
123 
10 Door-to-door cargo agents: cultivating and expanding Filipino 
transnational space 
Marisha Maas 
135 
   
 
Acting on Globalisation 
 
11 African art and the Dutch art world – a reflective practitioners’ view 
Ankie van de Camp and Ben Janssen 
149 
12 Rocks and hard places: development research between neoliberal 
globalism and global neoliberalism 
159 
Frans J. Schuurman 
13 Global governance, NGOs and the politics of scale 
Bas Arts 
 
173 
14 A tale of two countries: perspectives from the South on the 
coherence of EU policies 
Paul Hoebink 
187 
15 The geopolitisation of natural resources in an era of global 
transition:  the EU response 
Cor van Beuningen 
205 
   
Redefining Regions and Identities 
 
16 Walking the middle path: contested democracy in Thailand 
Luuk Knippenberg en Saskia van Bruchem 
217 
17 Associationalist regionalism: from ‘powers of association’ to 
‘associations of power’ 
Bas Hendrikx and Arnout Lagendijk 
227 
18 Urban governance for development. recent trends in Latin America 
Paul van Lindert 
239 
19 Environment and health in an urbanizing world 
Franςoise Barten and Geert Tom Heikens 
251 
  
 
About the contributors 
 
 
262 
Acknowledgements 
This book would not have been possible without inspired contributions from its 
authors. Coming from a wide range of backgrounds as academics, practioners 
and even art gallery holders, they each have a unique link with Ton, often linked 
to particular moments in history and one of the many themes recurrent in the 
work of Ton van Naerssen. We would like to thank each and every one of these 
authors for their contributions. Together their work very well represents the 
broadband of Ton's academic and personal engagement. 
 
The editors kindly acknowledge the financial contributions of the following 
institutes, groups and centres:  
Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN), Radboud 
University, Nijmegen  
Research Group on Governance and Places, Nijmegen School of Management, 
Radboud University, Nijmegen 
African Studies Center, Leiden  
Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan and Developmental Studies (AMIDSt), 
University of Amsterdam 
Forest and Nature Policy group, Wageningen University 
Rural Development Sociology group, Wageningen University. 
 
Introduction 
‘Tales of Development: People, Power and Space’ has been written to mark forty 
years of commitment to the field of development geography by Ton van 
Naerssen. To understand the importance of his contribution to human geography  
and development studies we borrow his own words. In 1997 Ton van Naerssen 
wrote: 
I, for one, hold as basic belief […] that human geographers who occupy themselves 
with the developing countries are most interested and engaged in matters of poverty, 
exploitation and dependency, and their counterparts emancipation and 
'empowerment'.(Van Naerssen, 1997: xix). 
Through 19 essays, all concomitant with Ton van Naerssen’s words by taking an 
engaged and academically critical perspective, this book reflects on a number of 
important themes. These themes concern: the role of critical theory and the need 
for academics to position their contributions in public debate; the importance of 
civil society for development; the implications of changing identities as related 
to an articulation of space; the role of globalization on people’s lives and 
livelihoods; and the significance of migration. In this manner this edited volume 
contains an insightful set of critical tales of development. 
Ernst Spaan opens this book by elaborating on the themes recurrent in the 
work of van Naerssen over the years. These themes more or less constitute the 
backbone of development issues and this book.  
The first theme covered by the book deals with ‘Critical Geography and Social 
Space’. Huib Ernste extensively reviews what critical studies and geography in 
particular means. Like many others in this book, he sketches the need to know 
the ontology of one’s theoretical starting point. This starting point is formed by 
the beginning of an academic career. Paul Hebinck takes this one step further by 
elaborating a critical perspective on land reform with the central argument that a 
sound understanding of social development and action requires going beyond 
structural models of development. De Haan takes a similar perspective by 
showing that in popular livelihood analyses there is little attention for spatial 
dimensions of development.  
Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht and Rudolf Scheffer take us back to the 
seventies when development in the South was understood in terms of peripheral 
capitalism. Poor empirical evidence at that time made the authors leave Marxist 
inspired theories. But a confrontation with the situation in Zambia today makes 
them consider trying it again. Sef Slootweg narrates in his contribution about the 
soul searching within SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, which 
sought to recapture the relevance of its development aid interventions. In a 
perhaps somewhat unusual style, he depicts the usefulness of internal debates 
about measuring one’s impact. 
The second set of chapters ‘Migration Trajectories’, deals with migration, and 
return migration. The latter is discussed by Tine Davids and  Ruerd Ruben. They 
debate on the unhappy marriage between migration and development within the 
context of stricter controls of European states to control the influx of migrants. 
Martin van de Velde takes this discussion further by attempting to model 
migration, particular with regard to East-West migration patterns. One of the big 
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questions we face is what to do when we take constitutions serious as this may 
mean that borders become meaningless. Joris Schapendonk and Lothar Smith 
build on the prior contributions by focusing on the contradictions between the 
opportunities given to migrants to travel the world and the flows these migrants 
create –notably remittances- to do the same. With regard to transnational flows 
established by migrants Marisha Maas discusses the particular case of Philippine 
migrants in The Netherlands, zooming in on the dynamics of cultural dimensions 
through transnational exchanges.  
The theme ‘Acting on Globalisation’ discusses actions by groups and 
individuals to change the world. In their contribution Ankie van der Camp and 
Ben Janssen explain what art means in a global context. This chapter is 
significant in being more than a tribute to artists in Southern Africa by also 
attempting to carve out a relevant political space for social action. Frans 
Schuurman, in his typical style, critically positions development studies within 
the dynamic and changing context for development and academia. Therein 
development studies for whom, and for what, remain the key questions 
academics need to ask themselves. Bas Arts follows this argument of global 
acting through by taking us into the forest. His argument is that we need to move 
beyond global governance as a political practice to embrace the notion of politics 
of scale. Paul Hoebink debates the dynamics of foreign aid by addressing the 
critical issue of coherence. He argues that the debate lack on foreign aid 
continues to lack voices from the South. In his chapter he therefore discusses 
some of the Southern perspectives on the coherence of European policies vis-à-
vis developing countries. The finally contribution to this theme is by Cor van 
Beuningen, who discusses the meaning of increasing scarcity of raw materials, 
energy and food for global economic relationships, leading to a possible 
redrawing of the geopolitical world map. He wonders whether we are we moving 
from a unipolar to a multipolar world. 
The final theme of ‘Redefining Regions and Identities’ specifically deals with 
regional issues. Luuk Knippenberg en Saskia van Bruchem debate the 
relationship between development dynamics and democracy in Thailand. Bas 
Hendrikx and Arnout Lagendijk discuss the meaning of regional development in 
the context of growing global integration and increasing global economic 
competition. In their view regional governance will become a key issue to 
consider in contemporary regional development. Paul van Lindert focuses on 
current trends of decentralisation and urban governance in Latin America. 
Although it is often maintained that traditionally local governments are the 
weakest link in the public sector, he argues how Latin America is showing a 
growing variety of promising and innovative initiatives at local levels that may 
lead to improved urban governance. The last contribution of Franςoise Barten 
and Geert Tom Heikens describe the unprecedented challenge posed by rapid 
urbanization and the deepening inequalities in health conditions presently rising 
within and between urban settings in the South. Their plea is to arrest this 
development through interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. 
 
 
Paul Hebinck,  
Sef Slootweg  
Lothar Smith 
 Themes and Motives 
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Tales of Development: Ton van Naerssen 
in perspective through themes and 
motives 
Ernst Spaan1 
Introduction 
After readily agreeing to write this introductory chapter for this liber amicorum 
for Ton van Naerssen, I realised that I had no easy task. Not only does Ton boast 
nearly 40 years of experience in the field of geography, resulting in an 
impressive amount of publications, his work is quite varied, covering a range of 
world regions and various themes in development geography. This includes 
topics such as development theory, regional development, industrialisation, rural 
development, urban planning and governance, health and environment, urban 
social movements and empowerment, development cooperation, globalization, 
tourism, international migration, migrant entrepreneurship, transnationalism and 
diaspora organizations. From my reading of several of his publications and 
through my experiences and conversations with him, in the following I try to 
piece together his development as a geographer and highlight some of his 
influences, key thinking and themes, albeit that this will always be somewhat 
fleeting and impressionistic. I can only hope this overview will do justice to him 
and to his original and valuable work. 
Institutional embeddedness and developments 
Ton van Naerssen studied Social Geography and Physical Planning at the 
Catholic University Nijmegen until his graduation in 1970. After working for the 
United Nations Organization for Technical Cooperation in Iraq as expert in 
regional planning he became research fellow at the Nijmegen Institute of 
Geography and Physical Planning in 1973. Ten years later he received his PhD 
in Social Sciences which was supervised by Kleinpenning and de Bruijne and 
based on a study on regional development and industrialisation in Malaysia. 
Development geography in Nijmegen from the early 1970’s, to which van 
Naerssen greatly contributed, was never limited to the geography of The 
Netherlands, always having a much broader geographical horizon, therein taking 
a regional-geographical perspective (de Bruijne, 1997: 429). This is partly due to 
Jan Kleinpenning who, in 1965 started lecturing on the social geography of 
Spanish and Portuguese language countries. From the early 1970s on, attention 
was broadened to the underdevelopment and social geography of so-called Third 
World countries. In 1973 a specialized task group was set up within the 
Department of Geography to deal with issues of ‘underdevelopment’, a theme 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Frans Schuurman and the editors for useful comments on this chapter.  
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which had gained popularity among geography students (Kleinpenning, 1996: 2). 
Ton was part of the core staff of this group from its inception. In 1977 this group 
culminated into the unit Social Geography of Developing Countries (SGO), 
established under the leadership of Kleinpenning. In 1983 the original focus on 
developing countries, was expanded to underdeveloped regions in Europe (Laag-
Ontwikkelde Gebieden in Europe-LOGE). In the 1990s, following budget cuts, 
institutional restructuring, staff changes and declining numbers of geography 
students, the specialized unit SGO was eventually phased out. By 1997 the unit 
had closed down, despite being assessed as excellent by an external committee in 
that same year. As a consequence, Ton remained the only lecturer in social 
geography at Nijmegen to cover the developing countries. 
While his initial fieldwork experience as student was in Chile, Ton developed 
an interest in the issues of (under)development in Southeast Asia. Thematically 
he continued to explore issues around urban development and social movements. 
His work has left an undeniable mark on the research programme of the 
department. The various research projects initiated by the department in 
Southeast Asia often held the following characteristics: 
• a strong emphasis on economic geographic issues 
• a focus on regional analysis, planning and development policy, in particular 
concerning rural development (Indonesia), industrialization, health, urban 
public housing development and urban governance (Malaysia, Singapore, 
The Philippines) 
• a strong linkage with advocacy groups and civil society organisations in the 
field of development cooperation.  
 
In 1997 van Naerssen became co-ordinator of the research programme ‘Urban 
and Regional Development’ and the master programme ‘Globalisation and 
Development’ at the Faculty of Management Sciences (FM), Radboud 
University Nijmegen (RU). He participates in the Faculty Research Programme 
‘Governance and Places’ (GaP) and is attached to the Nijmegen Centre of Border 
Research.  
Beyond his work for the faculty he participated in various research 
programmes such as: ‘Incorporation and Countervailing Forces’ for the School 
for Comparative and Cultural Studies (NICCOS) at Nijmegen (1989-1993), 
‘Territorial strategies’ of the Faculty of Policy Sciences, Nijmegen University 
(1994-1996), ‘Metropolitan management in Southeast Asia’; ISEAS, Singapore 
(1993-1995), ‘Diversity and Development’ of the School for Comparative and 
Cultural Studies (NICCOS) (1994-1999), and ‘Urbanisation and 
Industrialisation’ of the national Research School CERES (Centre for Resource 
Studies for Human Development) (1996-2001). 
Development geography van Naerssen-style 
It should be noted that ‘development geography’ as a separate academic 
discipline is not common; rather the research field concerned with the 
developing world is generally subsumed under regional geography or, more 
generally, under development studies. In this sense development geography is a 
typical Dutch phenomenon (van Naerssen, 1997). Within this unique academic 
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discipline Ton van Naerssen has developed his own specific view and field of 
work.  
The critical development geography Ton van Naerssen stands for is manifested 
in his firm belief that ‘human geographers who occupy themselves with 
developing countries are most interested and engaged in matters of poverty, 
exploitation and dependency, and their counterparts emancipation and 
‘empowerment’.’ (van Naerssen 1997b:xix). This constitutes the core of 
development geography. However, in his view such developmental issues are not 
restricted to the developing world, but manifest themselves in developed 
countries. Developmental issues are not restricted by national boundaries and 
problems with migrant integration and alienation cannot be understood without 
knowledge of underdevelopment in the countries of origin. Hence, studying 
these issues in the developed world is the task of development geographers (van 
Naerssen, 1997a:25). Because developmental processes such as economic 
diversification, agricultural commercialisation or globalisation, to name a few, 
attain different meaning and manifestations in different spatial contexts Ton 
advocates the comparative nature of development geography. Development 
geography, notably when it takes on a regional approach, makes it possible to 
study the way humans live, interact and transform the places and regions where 
they live, within the context of wider processes of socioeconomic development. 
Human geographers have the meaningful task to ‘stress the geographical 
evidence and only those with an open eye for regional specialisations can do so.’ 
Ton thereby sees the task of development geographers as follows: ‘issues of 
poverty, dependency and emancipation need to stay on the geographical agenda, 
and the same applies to their regional dimensions and diversity’ (ibid.:xix). 
Thus, not only does the subject matter of Ton’s interpretation of development 
geography encompass regions around the world, it is characterized by an open 
stance that takes into account regional differences and development issues of 
both the developing and the developed world, and focuses on possible linkages 
between these.  
Furthermore, van Naerssen has the conviction that science is not value free and 
should be engaged with pertinent societal issues and contributes to the 
improvement of the conditions of the poor and vulnerable in society. This 
engagement manifests itself in the choice of his research themes and in his work 
for civil society and his public support for various critical manifestos. 
Capita selecta in Van Naerssen‘s work 
Ton van Naerssen’s critical view on development was influenced by various 
historical events and fieldwork experiences. These include the Indonesian coup 
d’etat of 1965 with the subsequent purge of (alleged) communists, the Vietnam 
War, his first fieldwork experience in politically volatile Chile before 1970, and 
his work for the UN-Organisation for Technical Cooperation in Iraq. These 
experiences planted the seeds for his politicised, critical thinking on 
(under)development and the asymmetrical links between developed and 
developing countries (van Naerssen, 1997a:16). His engagement with Vietnam 
came back in a contribution for the Atlantic Commission (van Naerssen, 2005b). 
The works of Wertheim (1971) on Asia, showing an optimistic view on bottom-
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up driven emancipation of the masses, and neo-Marxists (Amin 1970, 1976) and 
dependencia theorists (Andre Gunder Frank, Paul Baran), with their focus on 
imperialism, incorporation of peripheral areas and resulting processes of 
marginalisation and underdevelopment, have been influential for his early work 
and his interest in (urban) social movements and emancipatory processes (van 
Naerssen 1976; 1979; 1982; 1987a; 1987b; Meeuws et al. 1982). Later on, 
theorists such as Manuel Castells (1983; 2000) and Saskia Sassen (1991; 2001) 
left their marks too, particularly in his work on urban governance (cf. Hogenstijn 
and van Naerssen 2004; van Naerssen 2001d; van Naerssen 2001e). 
Development theory remained a major focus in his work (van Naerssen and 
Galen 1984; van Naerssen and van Driel 1992, van Naerssen 1979, van Naerssen 
and Schuurman 1983; Spaan et al. 2005; van Naerssen, 2006; van Naerssen et 
al., 2008b).  
In the 1970s leftist, neo-Marxist ideas and theory gained popularity among 
certain staff members and students in Nijmegen. Their ideas and research results 
found their way into journals such as Zone, Politiek & Ruimte (Politics and 
Space) and Derde Wereld (Third World) and in the publications of the Anti-
Imperialism Working Group (AI-Cahiers), to which van Naerssen contributed. 
Thus, a study of imperialism and unequal development was published in this 
series (van Naerssen, 1979). Typically, one of the aims of these publications was 
to provide material for anti-imperialism advocacy groups (aksiegroepen) and 
contribute to the debate on capitalism and uneven development by shedding light 
on the international division of labour and asymmetrical relations between 
peripheral and developed countries.  
Aspects of incorporation, spatial inequality and underdevelopment were thus 
prominent themes in his early work and in this work the ‘centre-periphery’ and 
articulation of modes of production concepts were often pivotal. Authors such as 
Friedmann (1966) and Raul Prebisch (1971) were influential in this respect. 
Friedmann (1996:xv) defined the centre-periphery model as ‘a conceptual model 
that divides the space-economy into a dynamic, rapidly growing central region 
and is periphery. The growth of the centre is viewed as being subsidized by the 
periphery’. This concept can be used for the analysis of sub-national regional 
development (and planning) and applied to the geography of underdevelopment 
or the relationship between developing and developed countries within the world 
system (Wallerstein, 1979, cf. Dietz et al., this volume).  
The influence of dependencia, centre-periphery and world-system theory is 
reflected in Ton van Naerssen’s structuralist perspective on articulated space 
(van Naerssen, 1979; cf. De Haan, this volume), whereby the development of the 
global economy is interpreted as constituting a system of regions, the modes of 
production of which became increasingly interdependent through a process of 
asymmetrical development between centre (developed region/country) and the 
periphery (developing region/countries). The regional approach to development 
shows in van Naerssen’s work on regional development and industrialisation in 
general and in the context of Malaysia (van Naerssen 1976; 1983; 1990; 
Meeuws,, et al. 1982).  
His PhD project thus focused on industrialization in Malaysia and the impact 
of this process on regional development and Malaysia’s position in the wider 
world economy (van Naerssen ,1983). Regional planning thereby became a main 
focus in his work, bringing him to other countries in the region, notably the 
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Philippines and Indonesia (van den Ham and van Naerssen 1990). Thus, during 
1986-1988 van Naerssen acted as supervisor for a project concerning regional 
planning of the uplands around Lake Toba on Sumatra. This was a collaborative 
project between the Universitas HKBP Nommensen (Medan, Indonesia), 
Services Overseas (PSO) and the Department of Geography for Developing 
Countries (Nijmegen). From this project emanated a number of publications 
concerning regional planning and development in North Sumatra (Hagens and 
van Naerssen, 1990; Eijkemans and Van Rooij, 1990; Eijkemans, 1995; Spaan et 
al., 1995). 
A major critique of structuralist theory with its emphasis on historical macro-
level economic processes has been that it is too deterministic and abstract (see 
Hebinck, this volume). Specific socio-cultural and local contexts are often 
glossed over and individual actors are reduced to passive pawns endlessly shifted 
around a global chess-board. This ignores the way individuals are able to cope 
with, resist and even influence these (exploitative) processes of development. In 
reaction to structuralist theories the actor-oriented approach was propagated 
(Long 1992b) in which the role of human agency in development processes 
received much more attention, focusing on the ways in which individuals and 
communities wrought to achieve changes from below, i.e. through individual 
action and community based development projects (Long, 1992a).  
The focus on ‘bottom-up’ development can be found in van Naerssen’s work 
on urban social movements (van Naerssen 1989; 1992; 1999), and later work on 
the role of diaspora organisations in development (Schapendonk et al. , 2006; 
van Naerssen, 2008a). These publications illustrate van Naerssen’s belief in the 
possibility (and necessity) of social change ‘from below’. This is well illustrated 
with the following quote taken from one of his studies:  
‘Much has been written about the problems accompanying rapid urban growth, such 
as the spread of squatter settlements and urban poverty, deterioration of the physical 
infrastructure and the increase in violence. Naturally, it is the poor in particular who 
are suffering from the worsening conditions in the cities. Yet in spite of the many 
problems they face, the poor also perceive cities as environments that offer 
opportunities to pursue their strategies for coping with poverty. Contrary to analyses 
based on ideas of the 'culture of poverty' (Lewis 1965), the poor are not merely 
passive recipients of urban problems. During the past decades, it has been 
demonstrated in many countries that the poor are able to organize themselves, for 
example by squatting land and building their own shelters’ (van Naerssen, 
2001c:677)  
After the International Habitat Year (1987), during which attention focused on 
urban poverty and associated problems of slum housing, poor public 
infrastructure and rural-urban migration, Ton van Naerssen published a reader 
with Frans Schuurman reflecting on collective action and issues of territoriality 
of urban social movements (Schuurman and van Naerssen, 1989). Such 
movements, whereby the urban poor organize themselves in a quest to influence 
and improve their physical environment, provide an alternative mode to top-
down urban development policies. This reader was one of the first to present a 
comparative body of evidence on the existence and impact of such emancipatory 
social movements in various parts of the Third World. This publication was 
followed by a number of publications focusing on the specific situation of the 
urban poor, as a marginalised group, and their empowerment, in Metro Manila, 
The Philippines (van Naerssen, 1989; 1992; 1999).  
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This paradigmatic shift, together with the later debate on the eroding effect of 
globalization on the power of nation-states for governing global issues, put the 
limelight on the role of non-state actors in political and development processes 
(cf. Arts, this volume). Thereby analysis of processes of governance shifted to 
sub-national, local levels.  
Thereafter, urban governance and planning became a prominent theme in 
Ton’s work. Within the research programme on Governance and Places (GAP) 
he focused on Healthy Cities in developing countries and urban governance and 
city planning in The Philippines. Exemplary for the latter is his study of Cebu 
city in The Philippines (van Naerssen, 2004; 2002), in which, while he examined 
urban governance and participatory development, while linking his insights to 
theories of globalization and global cities (the influence of Castells and Sassen 
being notable here). Hereby he showed the limitations of urban planning and 
governance and how these incite all kinds of processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. Here, as is the case in his work on healthy cities and migration (see 
below), van Naerssen makes the connection between local level processes and 
the actors involved in these, and economic, political and policy developments at 
more global levels. Yet, while he sees participatory approaches and 
empowerment as prerequisites for sound, realistic policies that seek to improve 
urban environments and living conditions, he warns against any application of 
uniform models; variations in local contexts, the strength and diversity of civil 
society, and levels of cooperation with governmental agencies in planning and 
decision-making, make this impossible.  
Environment and health  
There has been a traditional rift between physical and social geography, which 
shows up in the separate curricula and institutional setups at universities. Among 
Dutch development geographers, environmental factors have long been glossed 
over in the explanation of underdevelopment. However, more recently, more 
attention has been placed on ecological aspects of (under-) development, which 
has translated into more cooperation between the two sub-disciplines. In this 
sense van Naerssen took on the role of trailblazer in being one of the first to 
focus on the role of environmental issues in urban areas, and the ramifications of 
these issues for the vulnerable and poor (van Naerssen and van Rooijen, 1980; 
van Naerssen ,1990; van Naerssen, 1993; van Naerssen and Muller, 1993). 
In the view of van Naerssen health issues are strongly linked to the 
environment. This became a prominent topic in his research. At a time that the 
severity of environmental and health problems of the urban poor, was beginning 
to become recognized, particularly following the WHO launch of their Healthy 
Cities Movement in 1986, van Naerssen was already working on a book project, 
together with Francoise Barten, containing case studies of several healthy city 
projects for the UNDP/WHO (van Naerssen and Barten, 1995; 1996; 1999; 
2002; van Naerssen, 2001a). Therein the extent to which healthy cities 
programmes succeeded in putting health issues on the agenda of urban 
development policies was examined, and how civil society play a role in 
processes of policy formulation. On the basis of the cases discussed, van 
Naerssen and Barten advocated a participatory approach for municipal health 
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policies that fully engages grass-roots organisations in the formulation of project 
aims and their implementation (van Naerssen and Barten, 2002). Their work led 
to the initiation of the Nijmegen Urban Health Group, a group involved in 
applied research concerning issues such as urban health management, 
environmental epidemiology and occupational health.  
From the perspective of the development of geography, Van Naerssen’s work 
on urban poverty, emancipation and health issues, went against the trend in the 
1990s whereby within economic and urban geography more attention has been 
given to spatial analysis and structures instead of human issues, a trend lamented 
by some geographers (Kleinpenning, 2002).  
Globalization, migration and transnationalism 
Globalization has replaced imperialism as prominent catchphrase and issue in the 
present world: with an ever intensifying flow of capital, commodities, 
information and human beings, different parts of the world have become 
increasingly interdependent of one another. While migration is considered to be 
as old as mankind, in the current globalizing world, it has come into limelight, 
largely as a concern for policymakers, academics, migrant organisations and the 
general public (see Davids and Ruben, this volume). As van Naerssen and van 
der Velde (2008) note ‘Migration is a global issue that is here to stay. Dealing 
with increasing flows of migrating people is one of the major issues of the early 
21st century’. The current political and academic debates concerning East-West 
migration in and to the enlarging EU and its effect on the labour market, public 
safety, social cohesion and governance attest to the importance and 
contentiousness of the issue.  
The linkages between globalization, human mobility, issues of identity in the 
context of relations between countries of origin and destination 
(transnationalism), has become a prominent feature of van Naerssen’s work in 
recent years. In his view, globalization has led to a new type of immigrant who 
carries multiple identities and attachments, thus challenging the classical 
representation of immigrants:  
‘The classical image of an immigrant is that he or she makes a home in a foreign 
place, adapts to another environment, and then assimilates the culture of the 
receiving country. Linkages and ties with the home country gradually fade away and 
what remains is perhaps the (unlikely) dream of returning upon retirement. If it was 
ever true, however, this picture has lost much of its relevance. (…) Globalization not 
only has led to an increase in long-distance migration, it has also intensified this 
transnationalism. Time-space compression, internet, and e-mail have brought 
‘home’ within easy reach wherever one stays in the world. This applies not only to 
international tourists, but migrants across national borders as well. The migrants of 
today carry their imagined communities with them to an even greater degree than 
before and actively use these new communication opportunities in constructing and 
maintaining their identities despite spatial dispersion.’ (Madsen and van Naerssen, 
2002) 
Van der Velde and van Naerssen (2008:145) distinguish two approaches within 
human geography to the study of (east-west) migration. The first, more 
quantitative tradition is mainly concerned with analysing and forecasting the 
volume of migration, the underlying processes and impacts on labour markets 
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and social welfare systems. The second approach, which generally employs 
qualitative methodology, deals more with governance, discourse and the process 
of de- and re-bordering within the context of human spatial mobility. Typically, 
van Naerssen joined this second, ‘social constructivist’ approach (van de Velde, 
this volume).  
An example of his involvement in the second approach is the research on 
processes of (b)ordering and othering (van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002) and 
the linkage between cross-border migration, identity formation and the 
disjuncture between political and cultural borders (Madsen and van Naerssen, 
2003). These processes deal with narratives on migrants and borders and the way 
these are conceptualised, de-constructed and redefined, under the influence of 
prevailing (policy) concerns, the actual configuration and dynamics of migration 
and individual level rationality and choice. It involves the marking out of and 
empowering of the self against an ‘other’ (whether an individual person or 
group) who is conceived as inferior, deviant or threatening. Borders thereby 
become means with which to construct, sustain and enforce identities. The 
phenomenon of (b)ordering and othering, informed by the general publics and 
policymakers apprehension of large scale immigration and subsequent economic 
and societal impacts is thereby not limited to the EU but manifests itself in many 
countries around the globe, e.g. Malaysia (Spaan et al., 2002), Mexico 
(Martínez, 1994; Vila, 2003) and Africa (Adepoju and van Naerssen, 2008). 
In the current globalizing world, characterized by increasing mobility of 
capital, commodities, information and manpower, the way migrant labour is 
incorporated in the receiving economies and society have become contentious 
issues. Factors considered important for the successful integration of migrants 
are their degree of access to formal labour markets in receiving countries, their 
inclination to entrepreneurship, and their ability to mobilize and sustain their 
social networks (cf. Maas, this volume). These are themes which have been taken 
up in recent work of van Naerssen (Spaan, Hillmann and van Naerssen, 2005; 
Sie and van Naerssen, 2004; Essers et al. 2004). Again, the perspective taken is 
not simply one of determining a subject’s position (in this case migrants) from a 
macro-level, but rather using a perspective that emphasizes how actors cope 
with, and seize opportunities, within the constraints of prevailing socio-political 
configurations.  
The position of migrants in society is an issue of concern to Ton van Naerssen, 
fuelled in particular after the rise of the right-wing Fortuyn movement in the 
Netherlands, which sparked a heated debate on immigration and integration and 
xenophobic tendencies. Rather than focusing solely on problems of integration, 
he turns the spotlight on the contribution migrants make to countries of 
destination and origin. In addition, added to his publications discussing the 
economic activities of Asians in Europe, he worked on the issue of identity 
formation and the position of Indo-Europeans and Indonesians in society (van 
Naerssen, 2005a; De la Croix et al., 2007).  
Although the theme of international migration and development is not 
altogether new in development studies, in recent years the debate on the impact 
of large scale population migration on the development of migrant sending 
countries has regained impetus, partly as result of the attention the World Bank 
has put on the volume of remittances and its potential role as source for 
development. To counterbalance the economic bias in this debate, in two readers 
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published on the issue (Spaan and van Naerssen, 2005, van Naerssen et al., 
2008), attention was drawn towards the social-cultural, institutional and political 
dimensions of the migration and development nexus, next to the economic 
linkages. A recent research project funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs was that on ‘International migration 
and national development: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of 
origin’. This resulted in an international conference and subsequent publication 
(Adepoju et al., 2008). 
Bridging academia and wider society 
Rather than confining himself to theory and academic treatises, Ton van 
Naerssen has clearly transgressed the boundaries of academia to bridge the gap 
with wider society. From early on in his career he involved himself with 
solidarity and advocacy groups, and with NGOs working in the field of 
development cooperation, in a bid to contribute to a better world. Examples of 
research conducted by van Naerssen in this field are his involvements with 
development cooperation in Southeast Asia (e.g. van Naerssen 1981), his work 
on migration and the role of diaspora organisations in development (van 
Naerssen 2008), and his various consultancies (e.g. van Naerssen, 1991; 1995). 
This consultancy work included, inter alia, themes such as water management 
(van Naerssen, 1991), NGOs (van Naerssen, 1995), urban development (van 
Naerssen, 1996), young development professionals (Hounkonnou and van 
Naerssen, 2003) and the ‘Healthy Cities’ programme (UNDP/WHO, 1995-2000).  
Furthermore, Ton van Naerssen was active on the (advisory) boards of various 
academic institutes, NGOs like Oxfam-NOVIB, and editorial boards of scientific 
journals (TESG, Derde Wereld), next to being member of professional 
associations such as the Organisation of Dutch Development Geographers (part 
of the Royal Dutch Association of Geographers KNAG) and the Research 
School for Resource Studies for Development (CERES). 
Final remarks 
Throughout his career, Ton has dealt with a wide range of themes and he has 
thereby gained research experience in various parts of the world. The space 
available here only permitted me to highlight a few facets of his work. However, 
despite his work in various areas of the world (e.g. Latin-America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East and Southeast Asia), his regional specialization has always remained 
Southeast Asia (or, perhaps more accurately: the Malay world), with an emphasis 
on The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. His work in Southeast Asia has 
mainly focussed on regional development, urban governance and social 
movements, and more recently migration and development. 
A defining characteristic of his work is its interdisciplinarity through a wide 
range of topics. He has not confined himself to what one might call ‘economic 
geography’, but also linkes up with other disciplines in both theory and subject 
matter, which is perhaps what might be expected of a social geographer. Indeed, 
as van de Velde (this volume) observes, progress in science depends in part on a 
willingness to cross disciplinary borders. Thematically, spatial aspects of 
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demographic and economic development feature in Ton’s work, but he has 
expanded this focus to incorporate issues such as the empowerment of 
marginalised populations, urban health, the role of civil society in development 
and planning, ethnic entrepreneurship, identity formation and transnationalism, 
using insights taken from various disciplines.  
Ton van Naerssen’s academic work cannot be seen in isolation from his 
societal and political engagements; his work always had the intention of focusing 
attention on issues of poverty, underdevelopment, exploitation, political conflict 
and social justice, but always sought to provide options to resolve these issues. 
His academic career is concerned with practical issues in development 
cooperation and is linked to the grass-roots through work for NGOs and migrant 
organisations. This engagement with largely institutionalised segments of civil 
society is a typical dimension of the kind of development geography Ton 
practised, in research or in more practical involvement with squatter movements, 
farmer, migrant or environmental organisations. 
In conclusion, I have shown that Ton van Naerssen has remained faithful to his 
conviction that development geographers must deal with issues of poverty, 
exploitation, dependency and ways how to combat these: by emancipation and 
empowerment. More generally scientific researchers, in his view, should not 
practice in a void but always be geared towards applying their insights for the 
benefit of society, notably the more vulnerable and less privileged, both in the 
developing and developed world. 
Ton is not the kind of person to boast about his achievements –whether 
scholarly or more practical. However, this book attests to the way he has inspired 
geographers, other social scientists and development practitioners in their subject 
matter and thinking. It is good news for all of us that Ton will continue doing 
research, inevitably providing further contributions to the benefit of science and 
society. 
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Critical geography in post-modern times 
Huib Ernste 
Introduction 
Many young academics, having their first research experiences in the field of 
human geography, often struggle with finding a suitable theoretic framework for 
their research. One part of this struggle is the ambition to make their research 
matter in a practical, societal context (Massey, 1984). How can one derive 
practically and politically relevant conclusions from one’s own research? From 
this perspective, it often does not seem to be enough to just understand current 
practices. It is also felt as a necessity to make some kind of recommendations for 
change to create a better future, or at least have the feeling that one’s research 
leads to something. This ambition is usually deeply rooted in the motivational 
structure of human geographers, even if they are not always very explicit about 
it. Human geographers, somehow, tend to want to improve the world, to put their 
understanding of the world to some use. It is therefore also no coincidence that 
human geography has always been closely linked to different realms of applied 
science. This has always been a very strong tradition in geography, especially in 
the Netherlands1. On the one hand, this practical ambition can be associated with 
a critical stance towards existing societal practices. This critical attitude is also 
the basis of what is called ‘critical geography’ (Bauder and Engel-Di Mauro, 
20082). On the other hand, the close relationship between applied research and 
powerful external principals, is sometimes also seen as direct threat for a free 
critical attitude in research (Fuller and Kitchin, 2004). 
Another part of the struggle of finding a suitable theoretical framework is 
linked with the multitude of different theoretical approaches one can choose 
from, and the lack of own experience with most of them. In recent times it has 
often been claimed that there are no dominant research paradigms anymore 
(Feyerabend, 1975), that we live in a multi-paradigmatic world (Weichhart, 
2000) and that we lack specific criteria on how to choose a suitable approach for 
one’s own research. Increasingly theoretic approaches are irrational scientific 
fads rather than that they are reflected and deliberate choices. As fashions they 
are the children of their times (Peet, 1998). In the current ‘postmodern’ times this 
seems to be more so than ever before. Under these circumstances many young 
scholars choose their specific theoretical approach on the basis of the 
(unreflected) inspiration they get from these approaches or the social acceptance 
they can gain from it. And who would blame them? Only if one experiences the 
changes of time, and the related changes in fashions and approaches one can 
seriously look back and consciously reflect on the specific differences and 
                                                          
1 For a more historic overview of the development and different approaches in Dutch human 
geography see also (Ernste, forthcoming). 
2 See also: ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies: www.acme-journal.org 
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similarities between these approaches and on the historical contingencies of their 
fate. 
From this perspective, I briefly would like to reflect, in this contribution, on 
how to be critical and how to make human geography matter in the current, 
postmodern times. I will roughly follow the development of critical geography 
from its early beginnings to its current state in postmodern times, and loosely 
add my personal reflective comments and questions to it. Finally I will derive 
some personal conclusions on how it is possible to be constructively critical 
today and in the future. Maybe this can even serve as source of inspiration for 
young scholars searching for their theoretical position on the research questions 
they face. 
The origins of critical thinking 
In the 1970s, two new approaches, behavioural geography and humanistic 
geography, of which the latter subsequently formed the basis of the action-
theoretical approach in human geography (Werlen, 1992), emerged as a direct 
critique of the spatial analysis approach which was developed in the years 
before. Spatial analysis was inspired by a positivist and empiricist approach in 
human geography and focussed on the explanation and representation in 
quantitative models of aggregate patterns in space and in spatial interaction. 
Spatial analysis, as such, is largely abstracted from individual human behaviour 
and human actions which might play a role behind these spatial patterns. Both 
behavioural geography and action-theoretic geography gave primacy to human 
agency - although each in a different way - rather than to aggregate patterns of 
flows and human activities. The first adhered to the positivist approach but 
focussed on individual human behaviour and the cognitive information 
processing mechanism behind it. The spatial situation in which people behave 
was still seen as the main stimulus for and the main structural force behind 
spatial human behaviour. The second, however, was much more inspired by 
phenomenological and existential philosophy and assumed the origin of spatial 
human action and experience in human intentionality, instead of only in the 
situation. In this view the individual human being is perceived as a self-directing, 
creative force. For the action theoretic approach in human geography, society 
and all its spatial patterns is the sum of individual decisions and choices. 
Soon both behavioural and humanistic geography were criticised, from a more 
structuralist perspective because they supposedly failed to take into account the 
material context in which human actions took place. Structuralism in general 
claimed that individual activities could only be understood with reference to 
impersonal social forces and to rules and logic of (hidden) social structures in 
society. Within the social sciences this structuralist approach found its origin in 
the work of Durkheim, Comte, Montesquieu, Althusser, Lévy Strauss and 
foremost in the work of the (Swiss) linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1966)3. It 
3 Saussure claimed that, at that time, the conventional view of language as a neutral medium for 
representing the world was wrong. Traditionally the meaning of a word was determined by the 
relation this word had to a specific concept in human mind, which in turn would derive its meaning 
from the correspondence to the existence of an object in the real world. In contrast Saussure 
conceptualised language as a complex system of signs whose meanings lie in the arbitrary 
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aimed to discover the universal laws that govern the functioning of social forms 
and which are founded in unconscious mental structures. It was proposed, that 
‘underlying the social surface, with its seeming contingency, randomness, and 
individual freedom, are universal structures that operate independently of 
individual will to create order and social coherence. Indeed, the self or individual 
is, in this perspective, little more than a vehicle for the unconscious structural 
codes to enact their logic’ (Seidman, 1998, p. 218). 
It is often forgotten, that these intellectual perspectives also have a history and 
a geography of themselves (Blomley, 2008). In this case, for example, the 
structuralist movement is strongly rooted in the French context. Parallel to a 
nationally centralised government and power structure, the French intellectual 
culture is also centred around a few great universities and research centres led by 
dominant general ‘patron-scholars’, as Seidman (1998, p.214) calls them, who 
are expected to draw on a broad (disciplinary overarching) scientific body of 
knowledge in order to engage in social and political developments. Intellectual 
debates in the French culture have, therefore, always been strongly politicised 
and focussed on the cultural conflict between a more humanistic and structuralist 
world view. The typical French focus on the structuralised aspects of daily life 
can be understood from its specific French institutional context. Even the short 
upturn of humanistic and existentialist approaches in the after WWII, inspired by 
the war resistance movement, can be explained as the reconstruction of national 
pride and structural power (Kurzweil, 1980). Structuralism gave expression to a 
particular French view of the world at that time. General de Gaulle promised 
neither reform nor revolution but rather a stable growth-oriented society 
focussed on rebuilding the economy and national culture. In addition, the 
emerging super-powers of the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to 
offer few possibilities beyond manoeuvring within a fixed structural framework. 
‘With the heroic spirit of existentialism dimming and with the revelations of the 
horrors of Stalinism dampening the ideological [and revolutionary (HE)] vigour 
of the French Communist Party, structuralism took central stage’ (Seidman, 
1998, p. 219). 
Without taking into account the implicit historical and geographical 
contingencies of this kind of thinking, in practice, geography picked up several 
ideas from a wide variety of these structural thinkers. Foremost, the historical 
materialist thinkers - Marx, Althusser and Lefebvre - played an important role. 
They proposed that the world can only be understood with reference to the 
historically unfolding political and economic relations that structure social life. 
Accordingly, the world is shaped by deep structures of capitalism in which class 
relations reproduce and sustain people’s behaviour and are the driving forces of 
history. Short (Hubbard et al., 2002, p. 44): the prevailing mode of production of 
material life [the (economic) structural base, HE] determines the general 
 
relationship between different signs. So words and concepts get their meaning in the particular ways 
in which they differ from other words and concepts in a specific language system. Meanings are thus 
not fixed but based on social constructions and conventions about these relationships. The meaning 
of the word ‘man’ is, for example, not determined by any intrinsic properties that summon up the 
concept, but rather because it contrasts to the way the word ‘woman’ is used. Thus, language systems 
are dynamic, social structures which shape our thinking, our saying and our doing. From this 
structural point of view, society can be seen as a kind of super-language (Seidman, 1998, pp. 216-
218). 
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character of the social, cultural, political and other processes of life [the 
(cultural) superstructure, HE]. Thus Marx thought that it is not people’s 
consciousness that determine their being but, on the contrary, the social-
economic being that determines their consciousness. ‘For Marx, there is no such 
thing as an individual human nature – the kind of person one is and the kind of 
things one does are determined by the kind of society in which one lives. This 
theory is inherently teleological, in the sense that it sees events as stages in the 
movement towards a preordained (and socially just) future, and functional in the 
sense that it subsumes the individual to the logic of the capitalist system’. This 
capitalist system was based on the unequal (power) relations between the 
bourgeois owners of the means of production and the exploited proletariat. On 
the one hand, the class of labourers was responsible for creating the added 
wealth, or surplus value, through their labour. On the other hand, this crucial 
contribution also put them in a position to collectively bring down the capitalist 
system and make it inherently unstable. These kind of class differences also had 
a clear spatial aspect, separating the elite from the exploited and making 
capitalism into an imperialist enterprise securing the continuing supply of cheap 
labour (Harvey, 1982; Castree, 1999). 
By the identification of class differences and the inherent alienation of the 
labourers as a driving force of modern capitalism, Marxist inspired structuralism 
also contains a clear humanist and critical thrust. It defined human beings as 
structurally seeking liberation from alienating labour conditions and striving 
towards developing and unfolding human capacities and creative potentials 
(Ollman, 1976). As such, structural Marxism focussed on the emancipation of 
the proletariat and on a critique of existing capitalist structures. But at the same 
time, it also assumed capitalist structures and the way towards full emancipation 
as pre-given and following an ‘iron law’: 
 ‘History is an immense natural-human system in movement, and the motor of history 
is class struggle. History is a process, and a process without a subject. The question 
about how “man makes history” disappears altogether. Marxist theory rejects it 
once and for all; it sends it back to its birthplace: bourgeois ideology4’ (Althusser, 
1976, pp. 83-84, quoted in Peet, 1998, p. 123). 
Or as Kevin Cox (2005, p. 21) paraphrased Karl Marx: ‘People make history, but 
not under conditions of their own choosing’. 
Critical theory and critical geography 
Critical theory, in general, and critical geography, in particular, were formulated 
in the early 1970s as a direct response to structural theories of those days. 
‘Critical theory as developed by the original Frankfurt School attempted to 
explain why the socialist revolution prophesied in the mid-nineteenth century by 
Marx did not occur as expected’ (Agger, 1991, p. 107). Representatives of the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, 
tried to develop a new understanding of capitalism which would take into 
4 The term ‘ideology’ as used here resembles the currently more fashionable term ‘discourse’ in the 
sense that it is seen as a system of ideas and representations and a system of meanings that dominate 
people’s minds, their thinking and doing. 
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account the transformed situation in the emerging twentieth century 
(Horkheimer, 1972). They thought that capitalism was developing coping 
mechanisms, against its own contradictory powers and against a possible 
proletarian uprising, thus continuing and reinforcing its domination in modern 
society. In their eyes, this domination was based on a combination of external 
exploitation and internal self-disciplining of the labour class. People internalise 
certain values and norms that induce them to participate effectively in the 
capitalist system. More concretely, people believe that they can achieve modest 
individual improvement in their situation by complying with certain social 
norms, which, at the same time, make more structural social changes less 
probable. They thus exchange their substantive interests in liberation of 
exploitative relations for the freedoms of consumer choice. In today’s terms if 
people can enjoy the purchase of the newest iPhone and cheap flight to the 
Maldives, they will continue to play their role in the capitalist system. The 
critical school thus identified a number of cultural, political and ideological 
mechanisms which stabilised and even deepened the dominance of the capitalist 
system. They held the combination of the enlightenment ideology with the 
positivist ideology particularly responsible for this increasing dominance by the 
system (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). While enlightenment helped to 
demystify the structural powers of religion and mythology, it also made the 
positivist science into a new mythology and ideology in the sense that through 
this new ‘religion’ people everywhere are taught to accept the world ‘as it is’, as 
a quasi objective scientific fact, instead of what it could be. Positivism suggested 
that one can perceive the world without questioning the assumptions about the 
phenomena under observation and thus that knowledge simply represents the 
world as it is. Positivist thinking leads to an uncritical identification of reality 
and rationality, and to the inability to view the world in terms of its potential for 
being changed, beyond simplistic and reduced patterns and cause-and-effect 
relationships (Jay, 1973). Even Marxist theory, in the eyes of the Frankfurt 
School, was, in that sense, too positivist and too reductionist and failed ‘to secure 
an adequate ground in voluntarism, instead falling back on the fatalism of 
positivist determinism’ (Agger, 1991, p. 110). In contrast to structural Marxism, 
the Frankfurt School concluded that human beings make their own history, 
instead of being exclusively subjectified by the structural capitalist mode of 
production. 
A further important step forward was made by the second generation Frankfurt 
School critical thinker Jürgen Habermas (1984) who tried to reconstruct critical 
theory to find a better balance between the (positivist) knowledge gained from 
causal analysis and knowledge gained from critical self-reflection. He 
acknowledged that next to the anthropologically deep seated technical interests 
in domination of nature and the material reproduction other practical interests 
also play an important role in any human practice (Peet, 1998, p. 92), namely 
socio-cultural reproduction, especially through the mechanism of intersubjective 
understanding5. He thus conceptualised the process of rationalisation in a much 
broader way, comprising not only technical-instrumental, but also moral-
practical and aesthetic-expressive dimensions of rationalisation. Rationality, 
conceived in this way, would then also bear the potential for critical reflection 
5 As I have shown elsewhere, it can be argued that these additional aspects of human practice are also 
firmly anthropologically rooted (Ernste, 2004). 
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and would also enhance and extend the project of modernity, towards a better 
future. In his theory of communicative rationality, making use of theory of 
speech acts, he also detailed the ideal-typical but contra-factual societal 
mechanisms of communicative rationalisation of these different kinds of 
knowledge6. In doing so, he shifted the focus of critical theory, from a more 
substantive and essentialistic view on differences within society to a more 
procedural view on the mechanisms to criticise and reconcile these differences 
(Zierhofer, 2002). Habermas thus shifts critical social theory from the paradigm 
of consciousness to the paradigm of communication, as in all Western 
philosophy, enabling workable strategies of ideology-critique, community 
building and social-movement formation (Agger, 1991, p. 110). The task of 
critical theory then is to critically look at the real processes, and explain why and 
how they divert from the communicative rational ideal and criticise them from 
this procedural point of view. In this way Habermas did not only offer a broad 
theory of society, but also a vision of a good society and a template for 
constructive critique of oppressive practices. Nevertheless, no specific societal 
classes or positions are privileged in Habermas’ critical theory and the historical 
and geographical contextuality of the different frames of knowledge are 
recognised. 
Again, we can notice that the critical theory of the Frankfurt school is closely 
related to the historical and geographical conditions in Germany. Their focus on 
the human agency, instead of on societal structures, can be traced back to 
German idealism and (neo-)Kantian traditions (Therborn, 1978, pp. 88-89), but, 
especially for the second generation Frankfurt School scholars, such as Karl-Otto 
Apel and Jürgen Habermas is also rooted in the catastrophic experience of the 
Second World War in Germany, which made clear that, in the interest of 
humanitarian values, there is and must be space for critical resistance against the 
overwhelming power of fascist political institutions (Reese-Schaefer, 1990). In 
the face of these experiences it is almost seen as ethically reprehensible and 
irresponsible to assume the ‘death of the subject’ and, on the contrary, a moral 
obligation to search for ways through which a better world could be created 
peacefully. At this point the scholars of the Frankfurt School continued to rely on 
the central idea of ‘rationality’ as formulated and identified as a core concept in 
the capitalist system by Max Weber (1978, 1958) in a German idealist fashion. 
Taking this contextuality into account, one could of course ask in how far these 
theoretical viewpoints – the French structuralism and the German idealism – 
although formulated as universal grand narratives, should not instead be valued 
from their respective contexts as small and local narratives. ‘To be “critical” 
means different things in different places’ (Blomley, 2008, p. 290). 
With Jürgen Habermas’ non-essentialistic critical theory, a step was also made 
in the direction of what Joe Painter (2000) designates as a more pluralistic 
critical human geography, which shares not only the interests of Marxist 
geography in relations of inequality and oppression, but also includes many other 
6 It is important here to acknowledge that Jürgen Habermas never assumed that this communicative 
rational ideal actually existed. He only noticed that empirically, human beings to a certain degree in 
their inter-actions, always assume this communicative rational ideal while in reality many disturbing 
factors occur. This ideal-typical framework, however, makes it possible to reflect critically on this 
real situation and to identify the real causes of systemic domination of the one-sided technical and 
economic rationality in capitalistic societies. 
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kinds of oppression, which do not need to be of a material nature (Cox, 2005, p. 
6). In general, one could characterise critical geography as the endeavour not just 
to understand the world from a geographical perspective, but to also change it by 
combining science and politics7. This kind of critical geography is often 
differentiated from applied forms of geography that uncritically serve the 
interests of the state or business (Fuller and Kitchin, 2004, p. 5; Pain, 2006, p. 
253). The emergence of these critical approaches is closely related to the 
political and social changes that occurred at that time. The post-war social calm 
abruptly came to an end in Paris in May 1968 when student revolts ignited a 
sweeping cultural shift, in which moderate democratisations of traditional 
institutions did not suffice anymore. It was a general revolt against any kind of 
authority. A totally different kind of society was demanded. This was not limited 
to universities and students were soon also supported by blue-colour workers 
which resulted in a general strike on May 13. As a consequence, France came to 
a virtual standstill8. Although the revolt ended quickly, the cultural movement it 
ignited continued in vigour and developed critical perspectives on consumerism, 
sexuality, gender, the typical middle-class family life, environmental 
degradation, third-world famine, colonialism, the cold-war, etc. etc.. After 1968 
France was no longer the same. In addition, new theories of society were needed. 
Social activism and the experience of fast changing institutions and cultural 
values made structuralism look irrelevant. Existentialism lacked a convincing 
social and political theory. Althusser’s Marxism neglected all the differences 
which were not class based (Seidman 1998, p. 220-221). 
Although France was one of the main hot spots of this movement and as we 
will see further below it also invoked a typically French response, this movement 
also spread across many other Western countries. It was against this backdrop 
that human geographers were increasingly dissatisfied and demanded that 
geography come up with a much more relevant contribution to the many social 
problems. Geography should matter! However, ‘[…] geography at the time 
appeared to be populated by practitioners who were constructing models and 
theories in splendid ignorance of the problems of those living in the world 
beyond the “ivory towers” of academia’ (Hubbard et al., 2002, p. 46). In this 
situation, the focus shifted from the pre-given determining material side of 
society to culture as an autonomously shifting and unstable system of meanings 
through which people make sense of the world. Similar to Habermas’ insights, 
culture is not seen as the dependent of economic processes anymore, but as the 
very medium through which social change is experienced, contested and 
constituted (Cosgrove and Jackson, 1987, p. 95 quoted in Hubbard et al., 2002, 
p. 60). Critical geography was not limited to the examination of the role of 
capital in shaping society anymore, but focussed on a whole series of different 
dimensions of power and difference, which are held responsible for all kinds of 
social, economic and spatial differences. In this guise, critical geography 
subordinates the economic to the cultural and the material to the ideal, as well as 
structure to agency. Fragmentation in society, according to Kevin Cox (2002, p. 
7-8), is now assumed to take a different form: ‘The particularities of context, 
7 For more extensive definitions and debates about them, see also the special issue of Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space. Vol. 16, No. 3. 
8 In the United States, these movements found much sympathy and also a general discontent was felt 
but took much more the form of an Anti-Vietnam movement. 
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combined with the will to power, forms the humus for the construction of 
distinct social worlds, for Difference, and the identification of seemingly 
multiple Others to exclude and marginalise’. Exploitation, he continues, as well 
as any practices of exclusion and discursive construction of others, is not seen as 
a necessary feature of capitalism, but as typical features of particular places at 
particular times, depending on the circumstances. As such, critical geography 
lacks a unitary theoretical framework and almost dissolves in the genuine but 
rather non-critical general interest of geographers in processes of spatial 
differentiation. This development coincides with the development of the 
typically French post-structuralist thinking to which I will turn in the following 
section. 
Critical theory in post-modern times 
The development of post-structural theories was directly related to the upsurge in 
the late 1960s in France. As Seidman (2002) convincingly shows the post-
structural thinkers emphasised rebellion and deconstruction rather than social 
construction: ‘Like their activist counterparts on the barricades of the streets of 
Paris, these Parisian intellectuals offered few proposals for a good society 
beyond slogans and rhetoric’ (p. 221). In the same way, it is difficult to identify a 
coherent post-structural theory of society. What is usually designated as post-
structuralism is a rather eclectic collection of theoretical positions, of which most 
authors would not even identify themselves as post-structuralist. Post-
structuralism, as it developed in France, was clearly rooted in French 
structuralism and some would even say that it actually is its consistent extension 
(Frank, 1989; Münker and Roessler, 2000, p. ix). Post-structuralism, for 
example, shares with structuralism a strong anti-humanism. The autonomous, 
rational self is replaced by discursive structures without a subject or agent. In the 
post-structuralist view, it is language which forms individual subjectivity, social 
institutions and the political landscape. Meanings are derived from relations of 
difference and contrast in the dominant discourse. Similar to the classical 
structuralist approach, society is explained by reference to (discursive) structures 
which can not be changed by an agent in a deliberate way. People are thus 
determined by prevailing societal structures9. However, post-structuralist 
thinking clearly differs from the classical structuralist approach in the sense that 
they do not assume a fixed and universal structure to exist. On the contrary, they 
emphasise that discursive structures are inherently unstable, unremittingly on 
drift, and dependent on the specific historical and geographical context10. This 
contingency and subjectivity of discursive structures also makes it highly 
9 Most post-structuralist thinkers, similar to structural-fuctionlist theorists such as Parsons and 
Luhmann, see the subject as vanishing in the self-governing technical and semiotic relational 
networks. In our current media dominated world the subject is lost in the ecstacy of communication 
and is imploding into the masses (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 128). Jameson (1984) characterises the 
subject as fragmented, disjointed and discontinuous, while Deleuze and Guattari (1987) celebrate the 
schizoid, nomadic dispersions and finally the pulverisation of the modern subject. 
10 The post-structuralist thinkers agreed with Saussure (see footnote 3) that meanings are determined 
by relations of difference, but in contrast to structuralism, assume that these meanings are not fixed 
but are in constant flux. 
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political and contested. While in structuralism one would try to discover the 
general social structures, without examining its political implications, in post-
structuralism it is exactly the political dimension of the establishment of 
discursive meanings, which are of central interest. Derrida (1976), for example, 
claimed that ‘whenever a linguistic and social order is said to be fixed or 
meanings are assumed to be unambiguous and stable, this should be understood 
less as a disclosure of truth than as an act of power, the [implicit] capacity of a 
social group to impose its will on others by freezing linguistic and cultural 
meanings’ (Seidman, 2002, p. 222). For example, the way one thought about 
immigration and integration in the 1970s in the Netherlands was not something 
of one’s choosing, but was at that time ‘in the air’ and determined how people 
reacted to foreigners and how integration was institutionalised. Looking back, 
one would now characterise this as the ‘multi-culti’ age. Today, a totally 
different political regime seems to rule, in which immigrants are comparatively 
more marginalised and ‘multi-cultural society’ is seen as a curse (Scheffer, 2000; 
2007). According to post-structural thinkers this is not to be seen as the result of 
a rational process of deliberation but rather as the effect of shifting discursive 
meanings, which determine one’s thinking and doing. The subject, in their view, 
is to be conceptualised as radically de-centred and seems to disappear in 
discursive relations (Zima, 2000). 
Post-structuralism aims not so much at construction of social order, but rather 
at deconstructing seemingly closed patterns of meaning, and linked social 
orderings by uncovering its ambiguities, its contingency and by tracing it back to 
a will for power. As such, this was a strategy of subversion of any kind authority 
and discursive force. On the one hand, it thus carries a strong critical surge. On 
the other hand deconstruction is not a project of reversing the value or position 
of discursively marginalised social groups. It only questions the validity of any 
kind of hierarchy and authority. Derrida e.g. never formulated a social and moral 
vision that could guide the deconstructive project. Deconstruction therefore 
remains a very limited critical strategy as it does not really aim to change 
hierarchical societal structures. This is also the basis of Habermas’ critique of 
post-structuralism. He accuses it of being inherently conservative (Frank, 2005; 
Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 246f; Wolin, 1987) because its lacks any criteria for 
making choices and thus for igniting a transformation of reality. ‘The critical 
spirit of post-structuralism is not joined to a positive liberationist programme’ 
(Saidman ,2002, p. 225). The post-structural project, as Lyotard (1984, p. xxv) 
states, is mainly aimed at disrupting traditional or totalising conceptual meanings 
and conceptual innovation. Its value lies neither in producing liberating truths 
nor socially useful knowledge, but rather in making people more aware of 
differences, ambiguities, uncertainties and conflicts. It therefore ‘refines our 
sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable’11. Many critical thinkers would say that this is too shallow to 
serve as a critical project which aims at improving the fate of those who are 
oppressed or dominated. The repudiation of humanism by post-structuralist 
11 In this respect, despite the dismissal of the subject, most post-structuralist theory is highly 
subjectivistic. They privilege a subjective politics of performativity, spontaneism and anarchism, 
which fits the events of May 1968 in Paris. They celebrate desire, fragmentation, and libidinal ways 
of being while disqualifying intersubjectivity, reason, social identity, and harmony (Best and Kellner, 
1991, p. 290). 
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thinkers, without reconstructing its core values, strips the subject of any moral 
responsibility and autonomy and makes a moral language in the interest of 
repressed people impossible. Political action then can also not be legitimised 
(Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 291). Of the many post-structuralist thinkers only 
Laclau and Mouffe seem to have attempted to reconstruct a liberal politics, 
although it is uncertain weather their approach strengthens liberal capitalism or 
radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
In this brief contribution I could not go into more detail although there is much 
more to say on the subject. In general one can conclude that post-structuralism 
has great difficulties in formulating a positive notion of the social, of community 
or solidarity, and post-structuralism also seems to lack an adequate theory of 
agency, of an active creative self, mediated by social institutions, discourses and 
other people (Best and Kellner, 1991, p. 283). This makes it difficult to keep up 
critical attitudes without becoming entangled in all kinds of contradictions 
(Weichhart, 2008). For practical critical geography as far these issues are 
concerned, have hardly seemed to be a real problem which is, as stated in the 
introduction of this contribution, probably due to a lack of reflection and to a 
rather selective-eclectic human geographic praxis (Gelbmann and Mandl, 2002) 
in which not the whole post-structuralist theoretic building is taken on board or 
taken in full-consequence but rather only parts of it as a kind of selective-tool-
box for critical analyses (Gibson-Graham, 2000). This, however, as I have tried 
to show in all its brevity, also leaves many flaws and contradictions which are 
still to be solved. It will be up to our human geography students of the future to 
further explore the possibilities of a deepened debate about the possibilities to 
critically make geography matter and to look for what is next, after post-
structural geography (Dixon and Jones III, 2004) and it will be the task of critical 
geographers such as Ton van Naerssen, to teach them, how to do so. 
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Land reform, scripts and social space: 
emergent properties in rural South Africa 
Paul Hebinck1 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to come to grips with what happens on land reform farms in 
contemporary South Africa. Understanding and conceptualising land reform is 
not only important for the ordering and interpretation of empirical data, but a 
good, empirically well grounded view of land reform may also help identify 
areas for improvement. When I began to engage with my own data, those of my 
South African students (Modishe Mosike, Limpho Taoana, Malebogo Phetlhu, 
and Francois Marais) and the current literature about land reform in South 
Africa, one of the conclusions was that only some of the phenomena and 
situations that we encountered could be explained by theoretical literature. A 
range of practices (i.e. emergent properties) led us to pursue other avenues to 
explain our data about the dynamics of land reform. This chapter explores one of 
those avenues and looks at the notions of ‘script’, ‘arena’ or social space as 
potentially useful theoretical concepts for examining and unpacking land reform. 
The iterative search for an analytical framework is part of a journey that 
started a long time ago and which owes much to my interactions over the years 
with Ton van Naerssen, particularly at the time of my early intellectual 
development. I was part of a cohort of geography students in Nijmegen who 
were introduced by Van Naerssen to the early beginnings of critical development 
theory. At the time the dominant modernist theories for explaining the 
particularities of development processes in the South were being critiqued. Our 
understanding of developments was gradually enriched with centre-periphery 
perspectives and later (neo-) Marxist theories including unequal exchange and 
dependency theories (van Naerssen, 1979). Van Naerssen argued that there were 
other and more relevant tales of development; tales that required different 
epistemologies if we were to understand unequal social and spatial development 
in the South. Gradually we were put on a critical theory path leading us to read 
books like André Gunder Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America. I was particularly impressed by Samir Amin’s Développement Inégal. 
My first publication Kongo en de Tam-Tam van het Kapitaal [Congo and the 
drums of capital] was the product of that intellectual engagement and dealt with 
the articulation of modes of production theory applied to the Congo (Hebinck, 
1978). 
Unlike today geography was in those days a discipline that did not interact 
much or well with anthropology and rural development sociology. The exposure 
to new thoughts, epistemologies and methodologies took place after most of our 
                                                          
1 I wish to thank Norman Long, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg and Brian Jones for their comments on 
earlier drafts. 
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cohort had graduated and had branched into careers as practitioners, teachers, 
policymakers or academics. For me, ending up in academia, this meant a second 
journey, but one which surely would not have been possible with the first. 
A theoretical positioning: neo-liberalism, political economy, script 
and space 
The search for a more appropriate analytical framework began with the 
conceptualisation of land reform as a state or planned intervention that is 
designed and implemented to facilitate social change. This was what the South 
African State set out to do after Apartheid was dismantled. A range of policy 
documents led to the acceptance of the White Paper on South African Land 
Policy (DLA, 1997). This document was formally published in 1997 but certain 
aspects of land reform were already implemented as early as 1993. Empirical 
research documenting experiences with land reform in South Africa (Walker, 
2005; Wegerif, 2006; James, 2007; van Leynseele and Hebinck, 2008) and 
elsewhere (for Peru: see Long, 2004 and van der Ploeg, 2008) already pointed at 
an primary important ingredient for alternative analytical framework: the State 
cannot prevent social actors transforming and translating land reform policies in 
ways different from how they were planned and designed by its institutions and 
experts. Land reform as ‘seen by the State’ (Scott, 1998) is subject to reworking 
and redesigning. Land reform cannot properly be understood by following 
linearly how policy objectives, with the use of the prescribed means and 
instruments, are translated and implemented in a given context. 
Land reform in South Africa. and most probably elsewhere as well, poses a set 
of questions that can only be answered by pursuing a paradigm shift from so-
called (post-)structural approaches of social transformation to more actor-
oriented types of analysis (Long, 1977, 2001). The practice of land reform 
requires that we consider other factors; factors that are beyond the reach of 
structural, linear perspectives of social change.  
In the next subsections I explore the usefulness of the notion of script. The use 
of script is subject to debate as a result of the work by James Scott (see 
Greenhouse, 2005). The angle I pursue here is that the notion of script is useful 
only when understood not (simply) in (post)structuralist terms. It is imperative to 
analyse a script in such way that one is able to capture multiple outcomes and 
realities or heterogeneity. Following this route enables us to unpack land reform 
for what it perhaps really is: complex, ambiguous, contradictory and involving a 
myriad of social actors each with their own views, strategies, interests and 
cultural norms and values. 
Understanding land reform as a script in this mode of interpretation entails at 
the same time positioning vis-à-vis the paradigmatic perspectives that are 
dominating the current debate about land reform in South Africa: a neo-liberal 
perspective and the radical political-economy school of thought. Although these 
are from almost opposite ideological positions, there are striking similarities 
between the two schools of thought. Despite the fact that different concepts are 
employed, they share a structural and linear interpretation of processes of (rural) 
transformation progressing along predetermined trajectories: from 
traditional/feudal societies to modern/capitalist societies (Long, 1977, 2001). 
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They consequently share the view that development unfolds like a teleological 
script that is one with a predetermined outcome. They differ, however, on the 
dynamics of (smallholder) agriculture. Whereas a neo-liberal perspective would 
emphasise the virtues of the small family farm model (van Zyl et al., 1996), 
political economists point out that this would facilitate class formation rather 
than promote social equality in the rural areas (Sender and Johnson, 2004; 
Bernstein, 2003, 2007). 
Neo-liberal perspective 
The neo-liberal approach stipulates the need for market assisted land reform 
coupled with expert views on how agriculture should look like in the future 
(Deininger, 1999). Land reform is to be implemented as the script has laid out: 
assisted and stimulated by the market and related market reforms as well as 
training of (emergent) farmers in more sophisticates ways of farming. If this 
script is indeed followed, then land reform will be successful. Casting it in actor 
network concepts (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1993): land reform is successful as long 
as the configuration of the several elements (e.g. land reform grants, business 
plans, post-settlement support) that together constitute the plan is maintained.  
The State has taken a leading role in initiating and implementing land reform. 
But land reform is more than just an economic modernisation project; it as much 
as a political project to increase the political participation of communities with a 
view to facilitating access to the State and its resources, distributing land more 
equally and providing employment for the rural poor. Land reform thus 
combines the transformation of land ownership with an ongoing modernisation 
of agricultural production. Such a development script hinges on the knowledge 
and qualities of the agricultural expert system consisting of private consultants, 
agrarian scientist and agricultural researcher and a continuous State support to 
ensure the continuation of a modern agriculture which is firmly embedded in the 
global economy. Land reform will be successful if it follows and executes such a 
script. The reality is that land ownership, in many cases, is nominally transferred 
to land reform beneficiaries without any effective change in current land use and 
production patterns. The policy directive to stimulate Public-Private-Partnerships 
follows the same rhythm and dynamics and may be positioned as preventing 
dramatic changes in land use. This has been referred to as the ‘same car, 
different driver’ principle strongly supported by the ‘telephone farmer’ lobby 
(van den Brink, 2003:20). Furthermore, since 1994 when land reform began to 
be implemented, private consultants2 have played a key role in the design and 
implementation through compiling feasibility studies and writing of management 
and business plans. The consultant’s role is to assess the economic feasibility of 
the ‘project’ and to draft a plan for knowledge transfer (implicitly assuming an 
absence of knowledge among the beneficiaries). Thus in this way experts and 
their knowledge play a role per excellence in the ordering of the future of 
modern agriculture in South Africa. Characteristic of the expert system and State 
policy directives is paternalism; it prescribes land use by fixing land reform 
2 It appears that most consultants where former employees of the various Department of Agriculture. 
They resigned after 1994 and became private knowledge brokers. This is explored in some detail in 
Hebinck and Fay (2006). James (2007) also points at rather similar continuities. This is an aspect, 
however, of the expert system that has not received sufficient critical attention. 
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subsidies to forms of land use that fit with the category ‘commercial agriculture’ 
(see also James, 2007).3 
In most instances, however, the sophistication of the business plan is not 
synchronised to the needs and wishes of beneficiaries; hence implemented plan 
often does not correlate with the approved plan (Marais, 2008; Mosike, 2008). 
This signals in turn that land reform is not necessarily unfolding in the ways 
designed by the experts. A conservative commentator like Philip Du Toit (2004) 
uses this as an entry point to list and document the ‘scandals of land reform’. 
Lahiff (2007), however, rightfully points out that post-settlement support, which 
have been influenced by the market-led approach, up until now serves to 
discriminate against the very poor. 
Political economic perspectives 
Bernstein (2003, 2007) has argued that over the years the focus of political 
economic analyses of agrarian questions has shifted from an understanding of 
these as a question of capital to questions of labour. The emphasis is now on an 
essentially fragmented labour force which pursues strategies in its struggle for 
re-production through various combinations of wage earning and self-
employment (agricultural and non-agricultural petty commodity production). 
These multiple livelihoods, of course, are typically differentiated by social 
relations of gender, generation, and ethnicity. The promise that land reform 
would transform the structural basis of racial inequality or that it would create 
conditions for an improved re-production of labour has remained unfulfilled. 
During the first decade of post-apartheid, land reform has fallen far short of both 
public expectations and official targets. The radical, political economy 
perspective (Lahiff, 2007; Hall, 2004, 2007) ventilates the argument that land 
reform has so far failed and that it unfolds in such a way that the class basis of 
rural society remains unchanged. Land reform has pursued a limited de-
racialisation of the commercial farming areas rather than a process of agrarian 
restructuring. Most fundamentally, land reform has not yet provided a strategy to 
overcome agrarian dualism in the country. 
The recent shift in land policy, from a focus on the rural poor to emerging 
black commercial farmers, is consistent with changes in macro-economic policy 
and reflects shifting class alliances (Hall, 2004, 2007). For authors like Bond 
(2000), land reform turns out to be an ingredient of strategies of the new elite 
assisted by the State to gain access to key resources within the context of a 
globalising economy. Driver (2007) refers to the South African land reform 
programme as a ‘pet project’ of the World Bank to wipe out the peasants farmers 
by only promoting entrepreneurial ways of farming. He points, like many other 
observers, to the fact that the programme is rather slow and South Africa has 
been unable to meet its own targets. It is ethically and ideologically wrong to 
expect victims of apartheid to contribute financially to buying back land 
previously alienated (“not punishing white farmers for stealing land”, Driver, 
2007:64, op cit.). The market orientation will not assist the poor. Furthermore, he 
argues, land reform is entrenched in a global capitalist ideology of individual 
property rights, which by its very nature discriminates against the poor, marginal 
3 There is a remarkable continuity here with the Glen Grey Act of 1894 that evolved into Betterment 
Planning practices that dictated and attempted to change land use patterns in the ‘native reserves’. 
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groups, and women. Greenberg (2003) concluded that the nature of the existing 
land reform policy is not different from the policies of the apartheid government 
due to the fact that commercial agricultural sector through the agribusiness lobby 
(AgriSA) still plays a major role in policy development, which means that land 
transfer to, and support for, black farmers is occurring under the influence of 
white and black emergent, commercial farmers. Land reform and agrarian 
policies are strongly condemned for benefiting new and old elites while ignoring 
the marginalized and poorer sections of society (Jacobs et al. (2003; Davis et al., 
2004; Greenberg, 2003; Wegerif, 2004; Lahiff 2007). The latter certainly 
includes rural women (Hall, 2007). 
Although there is certainly evidence that elite formation is taking place 
through the formation of Private-Public-Partnerships clause in the land reform 
programme (notably through the emphasis on Black Economic Empowerment), 
that other aspects of elite capturing takes place, and despite the fact that the 
World Bank has played a key role in the design of the programme, it is 
empirically and theoretically inadequate to understand such outcomes of land 
reform as inevitable, as masterminded by the State, World Bank and the elite. 
The outcomes of land reform are far more complex and diverse than such 
teleological explanations of land reform predict. 
Land reform as a development script 
Land reform as a script builds upon insights gained through constructionist 
approaches to development and social change. It is inspired by social science 
traditions - such as actor oriented analyses (Long and Long 1992; Arce and 
Long, 2000; Long, 2001) and actor-network kind of analyses (Callon, 1986; 
Latour, 1993) - that postulate that social action is not predetermined by structure. 
Structure (may) shape social actions and artefacts (like land reform) may 
structure the form and contents of their practices, but this do not necessarily 
determine action. Akrich (1992) discusses this with regard to technology and the 
study of innovations (see also Hebinck, 2001). The similarity of the study of 
technology and innovations and land reform is striking and allows us to link the 
design and implementation of land reform programmes to action. 
‘When technologists define the characteristics of their objects, they necessarily make 
hypotheses about the entities that make up the world into which the object is to be 
inserted. (...) A large part of the work of innovators is that of ‘inscribing’ this vision 
of (or prediction about) the world in the technical content of the new object. (...) The 
technical realisation of the innovator’s beliefs about the relationships between an 
object and its surrounding actors is thus an attempt to predetermine the settings that 
users are asked to imagine for a particular piece of technology and the prescriptions 
(...) that accompany it’ (Akrich 1992:207-208). 
Perceiving land reform as a development script permits us to follow land reform 
from design - and thus documenting the views of the policy community - to 
practice, recording views and experiences of land reform beneficiaries. This then 
will help us to understand how and why land reform unfolds in expected and 
unexpected ways. This implies unpacking land reform by examining the land 
reform beneficiaries and policy community in terms of networks, network 
builders, network nodes, but also their differences in opinion and emerging 
conflicts. By following these actors, we will able to see – referring to some of the 
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adagios of actor network theory - whether and how land reform becomes subject 
of translation. This in turn enables us to ask questions about what kind of actors 
are enrolled in forging networks that aim to prevent modification of the plans, as 
well as how beneficiaries are sanctioned or not. The data we have collected, and 
the available documentation in the form of published articles and reports, 
legitimises an investigation of how this script is actually unfolding, in what 
direction and in what way(s). 
Land reform as script has a certain grammar (Rip and Kemp 1998) or is 
embedded in a certain language of development (Arce and Long, 2000) but it is 
also a certain ritual which can only be understood when properly historicised and 
contextualised. The grammar or language of the designers (i.e. the polity and 
policymakers) as much as the rituals of land reform are important ingredients to 
understand the dynamics that land reform brings about. The background of land 
reform is not simply undoing the injustices of the colonial and apartheid past (the 
1912 Land Act, the unification of the South African State by reintegrating the 
homelands). Land reform is more than the redistribution and/or restitution of 
lands to those that have been denied ownership or have been forcibly removed 
from their ancestral lands. The ritual of the return of land by the State to land 
restitution beneficiaries is a politicised event which is known in restitution terms 
as the ‘settlement celebration’, a definitive moment in the resolution of land 
rights issues whereby claimants are handed a copy of the settlement agreement. 
It symbolizes the finalisation of the compensation of historical land rights by the 
Land Claims Commission and leads the way for resettlement of the ancestral 
land by the claimant group. It also marks the beginning of a new stage in land 
restitution when resettled claimants are faced with the question of how to 
develop their ancestral land (van Leynseele and Hebinck, 2008). Land reform is 
also about modernisation of land tenure and the social relations of production 
and simultaneously about the sophistication of land use according to modern, 
scientific insights. Land reform than becomes couched in terms of a conventional 
transfer of knowledge development paradigm encircled with expert-consultants, 
mentorship programmes and reordered (or transformed) institutional 
arrangements to allow the ‘emergent’ farmers to move beyond subsistence 
farming and access markets, technology and capital. Land reform is at the same 
time about Black Economic Empowerment and poverty alleviation. Reforming 
relations to and use of land is derived from the prospect that small-scale farming 
is supporting nothing more than a life of poverty. 
Land reform moreover does not appear as a clear cut script, as one that is 
written and implemented, but politically (re)negotiated and hence rewritten by 
the so-called ‘policy community’ (Arce and Long, 2000). The script has been 
(re)designed in the context of consultations and negotiations between the various 
representatives of State institutions, politicians and political parties, non-
governmental organisations, bilateral foreign aid donors, World Bank, private 
consultants, and agribusiness companies. A range of studies have argued that 
there is not necessarily a consensus within the policy community about the future 
and direction of land reform (van den Brink, 2003; Lahiff, 2003, 2007; Hall, 
2004; Cousins, 2007). The State as a result of internal and political debates has 
refocused its policies from a more populist approach, emphasising human rights 
and mirroring citizenship as well as gender and racial equity principles, (during 
Hanekom) to a more neo-liberal and paternalistic approach (during Didiza and 
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prolonged by the current minister Xingwana) that favours productive use of land 
redistributed and Public-Private-Partnerships. This refocusing is known as the 
shift from Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which provided grants of 
Rand 16,000 for people to access land even if monthly income was below Rand 
1,500, (Williams, 1996:15) to Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD) demanding own contributions from potential land reform beneficiaries 
(DoA, 2001; Wegerif, 2004).4 LRAD has initiated ex post audits (replacing 
lengthily ex ante audits) and monitoring to make sure that its objectives are met 
(DLA, 2008: 2). More than ever, however, the State sanctions projects or 
elements of projects before, as well as after project establishment. Another 
example of ex post control is by means of allocating or refusing of the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) grant (CASP 2003-
2005). A so-called ‘situational analysis’ of the financial situation, training 
attended, farming activities, etc. is made by consultants or officials of the 
Department of Agriculture  and compared with the approved business plan to see 
if the project is still on the ‘right track’. The LRAD policy emphasizes the 
possibility that land may be subdivided: ‘the permission to subdivide … will be 
effective immediately upon the launch of LRAD’ (DLA, 2008:8), and that ‘the 
ability of participants to subdivide existing large land units will be critical to the 
success of LRAD’ (ibid:12). 
Cousins (2005:7) explains the shift as a result of key policy makers being 
influenced by the commercial farming lobby and economists advocating a 
somewhat stereotyped, linear understanding of agricultural development. There 
is, however, also evidence of differences of opinion within the State (read DLA 
versus economic affairs) but often also between the State and experts that are 
called in to assist implementation about whether or not to subdivide farms into 
smaller units (Hebinck and Fay 2006; Marais, 2008). 
An examination of case material collected on land reform projects in South 
Africa, particularly in the three Cape Provinces (Western, Northern and Eastern) 
gives rise to the conclusion that land reform is an ambiguous and less linear 
process than the State would have us believe. Land reform sometimes unfolds 
perhaps as planned. Land after all has since 1994 been transferred through 
restitution and redistribution, albeit little as many commentators reason (Lahiff, 
2007; Cousins, 2007; Hall, 2004; CDE, 2005, 2008), but production has not 
expanded. On the other hand, as Moyo and Hall (2007:150) argue it is an 
inherently ‘conflictual process’. Land reform unfolds in many directions and 
creates a range of emergent properties to which we soon will turn to. Land 
reform is thus providing space(s) for multiple and often contrasting realities and 
practices to emerge. The case material collected points at a convergence of a 
range of strategies (or rather the interlocking of actor projects). The outcomes of 
these interlocking projects are examples of some of the emergent properties of 
land reform which have received little attention in the South African literature on 
land reform. 
4 LRAD now provides grants from Rand 20.000 to Rand 100.000, depending on the own contribution 
of beneficiaries’ in kind (machinery already possessed), cash, or in terms of labour. To access a Rand 
20.000 grant, the own contribution should be at least Rand 5.000. In order for the applicant to claim 
that own labour will constitute the full Rand 5.000 towards the own contribution requirement, the 
(approved) business plan must show evidence that the applicant intends to devote a significant 
amount of own labour towards the establishment and operation of the project (DOA, 2008:4). 
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The argument developed here is that these emergent properties result from 
strategies that hinge on using the (social) space created by land reform, often 
leading to new and unexpected social configurations. The question that now 
poses itself is what then produces this social space? Does the State land reform 
policy, like a development script, linearly create room for manoeuvre for 
particular, intended social action? Or does a land reform that is being unpacked 
and redesigned by the range of social actors involved (including land reform and 
non-land reform beneficiaries, agribusiness, policymakers and experts) whose 
interaction generate a multiplicity of outcomes? Coming to grips with these 
multiple, social realities analytically involves that one situates the potential for 
social action in many locations in society, and not simply embedded in the expert 
system and/or the State. Land reform beneficiaries are not simply passive 
recipients of knowledge and land reform technologies, such as business plans, 
land use zoning and new objects of labour. The State and experts may attempt to 
direct and prescribe the course of events, but they certainly do not have the 
power to structure (or determine) the behaviour of a range of social actors in the 
agricultural and related sectors. Examining the agency of social actors 
irrespective of their level of operation (‘micro’, or ‘macro’; local or global) and 
the nature of the interactions between, we may be able to understand the gaps 
between expert and local knowledge(s) and between policies and practices. Such 
an analysis requires an epistemological standpoint as outlined by Long 
(2004:15); one that acknowledges ‘the existence of “multiple realities”, (i.e. the 
coexistence of different understandings and interpretations of experience)’ 
questioning in turn the ‘ontological realism of positivist science (i.e. of a “real 
world” that can be discovered)’. 
Applying this to land reform implies that land reform policy documents, its 
technologies, institutional arrangements and so on are socially constructed which 
in turn implies that we need to approach the construction of such policies and 
their implementation as embedded in everyday life. This will allow us to 
(re)construct and document the planned and intended outcomes of land reform in 
South Africa. Similarly, situating land reform in everyday life also allows us to 
depict a range of practices and emerging social interactions that are triggered of 
by land reform and the transformations it has set out to achieve. These could be 
labelled unintended consequences of land reform. Methodologically this would 
entail an ethnographic approach to analysing how land reform lands in rural 
everyday life. 
Land reform as social space 
A preliminary examination of the data reviewed in the context of this chapter 
proposes the analytical usefulness to conceptualise land reform as a socially 
articulated space in which different actor projects interlock (Long and van der 
Ploeg, 1994). Land reform has created new and enhanced spaces, or room for 
manoeuvre, for a range of social actors that are directly and indirectly benefiting 
from the social transformations initiated by it. Towards the end of this chapter I 
will identify some of these beneficiaries and what they do. I will also show, 
however, that the actions of the social actors involved are not necessarily driven 
by motivations to achieve consensus about the nature and direction of social 
development. It is thus more useful to conceptualise land reform not simply as a 
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neutral social space but rather as an arena in which social actors strategise and 
cooperate but also struggle and negotiate over access and use of key resources 
and their meanings. Land reform is along these lines viewed as an articulated 
social space that is the result of interactions between and among a range of social 
actors. Land reform’s emergent properties are a kaleidoscope of various sets of 
interlocking projects. 
The study of land reform as a script and space has benefited from and builds 
upon an approach that zooms in on social actors; one that values the importance 
of documenting everyday life and the encounters vis-à-vis a land reform project. 
Such an approach as Long (2001:24) summarises, pays attention to and has  
‘a concern for the ways in which different social actors manage and interpret new 
elements in their life worlds, [..] analyses how particular groups or individuals 
attempt to create space for themselves in order to pursue their own ‘projects’ that 
may run parallel to, or perhaps challenge government programmes or the interests 
of other intervening partners, and […] attempt to show how these organisational, 
strategic and interpretive processes influence the broader context of power and 
social action’. 
The methodological device of starting from ‘lived experience’ (Long, 2001:14) 
is of central significance for such a study. Documenting and analysing the 
strategies employed by the actors involved, as well as their discursive means, 
appeared indeed as useful and insightful. It provides first hand evidence for the 
need to sub-divide land beneficiaries in much greater detail. Some of the 
beneficiaries appear as owners co-owning the farm; others come into play as 
shelter and social security seeking representatives of the poor. Again others 
(some of them belong to the old and the new rural elites) are making use of 
failures of land reform projects and lease parts of the resources of the project or 
purchase farms after they have been handed back to the State. Land reform 
certainly is a new element in many rural peoples’ lives and has created space and 
opportunities for some of them to change their lives... 
Studies like these then contribute to what Long (2001:25) has set out to do 
with regard to State intervention generally: ‘deconstructing it so that is seen for 
what it is – an ongoing, socially constructed, negotiated, experiential and 
meaning-creating process, not simply the execution of an already existing plan 
of action with expected behavioural outcomes’. This implies to not just paying 
attention ‘from above’; but as much to actions and practices initiated ‘from 
below’. Outcomes of land reform are shaped by the interactions among the 
various participants. Perceiving land reform in this way allows one to focus on 
what Long (2001:26) refers to as ‘the emergent forms of interaction, procedures, 
practical strategies and types of discourse, cultural categories and sentiments 
present in specific contexts’ (see also Long, 2004). 
Co-existing emergent properties in rural South Africa 
The land reform script produces, or rather contributes to, a range of emergent 
properties. These are reflections of various interlocking actor projects and, 
signify, that agricultural and rural development in South Africa will be diverse 
and will continue to co-exist and interact in certain ways. These are briefly 
summarised below adding to the conceptual perspective that land reform is best 
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to be understood as a kaleidoscope of experiences and actor projects. The 
intention of this overview is not to quantify but to qualify the social nature of the 
processes triggered by land reform.  
Important for the analysis of emergent properties is that land reform begun to 
be implemented when a broader integration in the global networks of food and 
agriculture began to take place. On the one hand, one may argue that land reform 
programme has created space for such integration to take place. The 
implementation of Public-Private-Partnerships between South African 
agribusiness and land reform beneficiaries was designed to prevent production 
losses in high value commodity sectors (notably fruits and nuts) at the same time 
securing and strengthening the embedding in global networks. On the other hand, 
one may also make the case that global food companies (or food empires) are 
continuously looking for spaces to expand their operations. 
New social categories 
Land reform has also led to the formation of new social categories in the urban 
and rural landscapes of South Africa: land reform beneficiaries and non-land 
reform beneficiaries. These categories are political and policy induced categories 
that only become real in land reform situations. Land reform beneficiaries are 
identified and grouped as black ‘emergent farmers’, the rural poor looking for 
employment, as well as communities that had been forcefully removed form 
their ancestral land.  When one succeeds in accessing grants and/or being 
incorporated in a land purchasing group or when one can prove in the Land 
Claims Court that one was forcefully removed from ancestral land, individuals 
and groups are labelled as land reform beneficiaries. Non-land reform 
beneficiaries are those that do not qualify for land reform grants or have not been 
incorporated into a collective bid for a land reform farm. Given the number of 
conflicts among and between land reform beneficiaries in the cases that are 
documented by Mosike (2008), Marais (2008), Taoana (2008) and Phetlhu 
(2008), it is difficult to speak of consensus and harmony among the new land 
owners. Many land reform projects are managed by only a small proportion of 
the listed beneficiaries while the majority remains in the townships. Evidence is 
accumulating of conflicts between those on the farm and those living and 
working elsewhere. Conflicts over electricity bills, use of credit and who benefits 
from the sale of produce (if any) are rife and stifle initiates. This raises questions 
about the efficiency of key mechanism of South African land reform: land 
reform beneficiaries pooling grants (as part of SLAG) to form Common Property 
Associations (CPAs) to acquire farms. These ‘rent a crowd’ associations have 
not produced social cohesive forms of cooperation and have contributed to what 
Du Toit (2004) and CDE (2008) understand and label as the ‘failures’ of land 
reform. 
The very practice of land reform has also contributed to the next layer in social 
categories in rural South Africa as, after a while, a number of disenchanted land 
reform beneficiaries have left their projects due to the low performances of the 
newly acquired farm, the conflicts between fellow land owners, the hard work 
and exposure to risks. In almost all of the documented cases, the majority of land 
reform beneficiaries returned to their previous residences. Given the fact that 
they did not disconnect from their townships and that they have not given up 
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land reform totally by selling their shares, signals that land may not be as 
assumed to be an important livelihood source and/or that farming remains a 
means of last resort in case urban employment opportunities worsens (Taoana 
2008). This ties-in with an aspect of land reform dynamics that has not been 
covered widely in research: the role of the younger generation. Little is known 
about why the youth is hardly present in land reform projects. The majority of 
land reform beneficiaries are older people combining land ownership with old 
age pensions. This raises questions about the future of land reform and the nature 
of agriculture initiated by land reform. There is a need to consider the extent to 
which, for many (especially young men), demand for land arises from a failure in 
the wider economy to generate employment rather than from a prospect of small-
scale farming supporting something better than a life of poverty (see also 
Walker, 2005). 
New social relationships 
Empirical research has also shown what happens when these political social 
labels become real in social action and leading to a set of new and perhaps 
unexpected and unwanted social relations whose characterisation is important, 
analytically as well as politically. The cases of Gallawater A farm (Mosike 2008) 
and the Gugulethu project (Marais, 2008) document in detail the practice of 
everyday life encounters in land reform projects. They show that the objectives 
of land reform and non-land reform beneficiaries interlock in many ways. In 
Gallawater A this interlocking is sparked off by the need and wish to attract 
services to the ‘project’ (electricity, schools, health clinics, roads, etc. ) and more 
people living on the farm (even the so-called non land reform beneficiaries) 
helps to increase the pressure on the State and service providers to deliver these 
services. It is, however, also triggered by the rural elite, i.e. land reform 
beneficiaries with large numbers of sheep often combined with other assets (such 
as Taxis and Government jobs), with the demand and searching for cheap labour. 
In return for shelter and a small piece of land to grow crops for own consumption 
and limited selling at nearby urban markets, non-land reform beneficiaries5 
provide labour-in-kind to such rural elites. This raises questions as to what is the 
nature of these new, emerging social relations in rural areas. The evidence so far 
suggests that these relationships resemble those of the labour tenants during 
colonial times and Apartheid but with far less rights to land and a future.6 The 
political importance of this analysis is that the land reform project of the State 
was specifically designed to modernise agriculture including the agrarian social 
relationships; the outcome of which is the emergence of new forms of 
exploitation which from a social point of view is dramatic. 
Emergent farmers fail to emerge 
The political objective of land reform to create a group of black entrepreneurs 
has only become real to a limited extent (CDE, 2008). This is, however, difficult 
5 It is difficult to tell whether the dynamics involved with groups or individuals that seek some form 
of security in land reform projects is associated with the phenomena of increased numbers farm 
workers being evicted form the farm (see Wegerif et al.2005). 
6 Contemporary Zimbabwe shows signs of similar processes (Moyo, pers. comm. June 2008). 
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to quantify because of lack of data and the explanations of this ‘failure of land 
reform’ are many fold; one being that agriculture currently does not guarantee 
quick and secured returns on investment of capital and labour. The focus of the 
new elite seems to be to move a way from the rural as a productive space to more 
urban employment (notably government positions) and ownership or executive 
positions in urban based enterprises.  
Decreased agricultural production 
Another issue, closely related to the previous issue, is that agricultural 
production has not increased substantially; the claim is even made that output in 
some sub-sectors has declined (CDE, 2008). Whether this is the case, and if so 
how this can be linked to land reform or whether  the ‘squeeze on agriculture’ 
that increases risks and reduces profit margins in farming is attributable, needs 
serious investigation. 
Bankruptcies and corporate control over land 
Land reform has also created opportunities for white ‘commercial’ farmers to 
sell their under-capitalized farms and property to government for land reform 
purposes. These ‘willing sellers’ were keen to sell their farm to the State and thus 
transferring the backlash in maintenance of capital, fields and buildings to the 
new, rather inexperienced owners. These new owners (in some cases the former 
farm workers; in other cases a CPA formed by a group of land reform 
beneficiaries pooling their grants together) quickly ran in trouble; partly because 
of lack of skills but also because DLA, DOA and also Land Bank were late in 
supplying the necessary credit to (re)finance capitalisation (referred to as ‘red 
tape’). This has triggered bankruptcies leading to farms being sold to the State 
for a next or even third round of land redistribution. This in turn has sparked off 
land being bought by companies, some of which are part of international food 
companies (food empires; see van der Ploeg, 2008) searching for space for 
production of global foods. Rainbow, a poultry firm, has managed to expand its 
operations in this particular way. This raises questions such as to what extent 
(the failures of) land reform has set off a new phase in land ownership and 
related land use. 
Land for consumption 
Another phenomenon, much documented in the literature, is that land reform has 
enabled people to acquire funds for the construction of (new) homes. Land 
reform fitted in with the search for social security and assisted people in 
becoming rural and urban people access to cheaper accommodation. For some 
this meant being closer to the urban areas and thus in this way land reform 
enabled the search for employment rather than land for productive purposes 
(James, 2007; see for instance the Mandlazini case documented in van Leynseele 
and Hebinck, 2008). Land reform facilitating settlement goes hand in hand with 
agriculture combined with off-farm work (notably migration). Land reform in 
this way has smoothed the continuation of betterment, like land use patterns, or 
has at least not managed to break with past patterns of development linking the 
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urban to the rural and visa versa. For example, a large farm just outside the city 
of Polekwane is now collectively owned. The farm is reworked in such a way 
that cultivation is individually organized on separate fields while livestock 
production is collectively managed. This land use pattern is a good example of 
the extension of ‘home land’ agriculture into former white farm areas. 7 
Hidden actor projects 
Many land reform projects provide evidence of ‘smaller’ actor projects to be 
implemented. Whereas the grandeur of many policy documents is to facilitate the 
so-called ‘emergent’ farmer, land reform often provided space for small groups 
of women, and sometimes men, to engage in commercial production on a limited 
scale. Carving out a vegetable garden somewhere on the farm and making use of 
the available resources (electricity and water for irrigation and cattle manure for 
fertilisation) and working on it collectively allowed them to improve their 
livelihood. Women in particular found a way to earn cash income independently 
of their spouses. This dynamic is not without structural problems such as 
accessing markets and securing transport. 
Elite capturing  
Land reform projects also show evidence of privileged access to State resources. 
Extension officers for instance ´renting in a crowd´ like their extended family to 
form a Common Property Association. The privileged access of extension 
officers to information of how and when best to obtain assistance and credits are 
prime examples of what resembles ´elite capturing’ (ref. Platteau 2004; see also 
Phetlhu, 2008).  
Re-peasantisation 
There are examples of groups of potential land reform beneficiaries taking 
control over land reform themselves. Not waiting for the State to provide land 
and deliver services is proof of people being unwilling to wait any longer 
(Wegerif 2006). The potential importance of this ‘taking-control-over-land-
reform’, irrespective of the limited scale in which it occurs, is that we may 
expect to see land use patterns that are more in tune with people’s cultural 
repertoires and experiences. Such land use and development scenarios are 
potentially challenging the current script of the agricultural expert system in the 
country and perhaps stands for a counter-modernity development strategy that 
analytically can be labelled as re-peasantisation (van der Ploeg, 2008; Hebinck, 
2007; Hebinck and van Averbeke, 2007). More empirical research in this 
direction is being planned in South Africa as well as in the region o examines the 
dynamics and outlook of peasant responses to government interventions. 
7 Wolmer (2007) explores the South Eastern Lowveld in Zimbabwe from a similar point of view. 
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Future Trajectories 
At a more abstract level these emergent properties can be captured as four major, 
different but co-existing trajectories of development and which are directly and 
indirectly related to land reform.  
Firstly. Without doubt, large scale and capital intensive forms of agriculture 
will continue to exist. It may be expected that ownership structures may change 
in the long term (because of AGRIBEE and overall black economic 
empowerment), but the social and technical nature of agriculture (scale, 
technology, farm workers and managers) and the firm embedding in global 
markets will not change dramatically. This form of agriculture provides 
employment to a quite a number of rural residents. Such continuation may only 
partly be explained with reference to agro-ecological conditions.  
Secondly. Ownership of land may shift in the direction of food empires. 
Ownership of valuable land by internationally embedded and worldwide 
operating food companies may increase their control over land and agriculture. It 
is likely to expand beyond the current existing level. South Africa’s natural 
resources and neo-liberal political and economic environment already attracts 
substantial foreign capital investments. South Africa’s rural areas run the risks of 
the value of land and resources being externally defined rather than by local 
interests and local cultural repertoires. Poverty alleviation by providing rural 
employment in production and value adding is not necessarily a political concern 
of foreign capital. 
Thirdly. Land ownership and agrarian social relationships may also evolve as 
an ‘African feudalisation’ of the rural.8 Pre-apartheid and apartheid trends of 
socially unequal development may continue to evolve irrespective of land 
reform. In turn giving rise to the emergence of new agrarian relations defining 
social categories such as new rural elites and rural residents on farms without 
rights (the new labour tenants) as well as low paid farm and seasonal workers. 
The continuation of ´traditional´ tribal authority structures hinging on Chiefs and 
Kings (Ntsebeza 2005; Oomen, 2005) does in my view not necessarily challenge 
processes of ´feudalisation´. 
Finally, ‘Peasant’ like solutions and patterns of land use emerge and have 
existed for a long time and it may only be expected that that these will expand. 
These peasant-like practices represent powerful and dynamic alternatives to 
entrepreneurial forms of agriculture (Van der Ploeg 2008). Peasant forms of 
agriculture are land and labour intensive agriculture. Boserup (1981), Lipton and 
Lipton (1993) and Van der Ploeg (2008) have pointed out that it is intrinsically 
driven by increasing the value added on the farm or field and thereby using both 
increasing rural employment and an expansion of the local agrarian economy. 
Peasant agriculture hinges too on finding new and novel ways to reduce costs; 
re-orienting the way resources are mobilised (understood as ‘regrounding’). A 
similar argument is explored by Hebinck and Van Averbeke (2007) and Moyo 
(2007). This resembles the ‘African’ way, as one of the informants at the 
Gallawater A farm expressed it, of farming and rural life continues to evolve. 
8 Strictly speaking the characterisation of feudalism does not fit the historical conditions of Africa. 
One way to legitimise using feudal relations to characterise social relations is to refer to an attempt of 
Coquery-Vidrovitch (1977) to argue for a distinct African mode of production next to the Asian and 
other pre-capitalist modes of production. 
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The ‘African’ stands for multi-functional agriculture involving harvesting from 
the natural environment and not exclusively on the production of crops and 
livestock (also referred to as ‘broadening’ the rural economy). It also stands for 
culturally embedded agriculture and the re-production of cultural values and 
symbols (McAllister, 2001; Shackleton et al. 2001, Cocks and Wiersum, 2003; 
Ainslie, 2005). The ‘African’ way also stands for multiple livelihoods based on 
straddling economic sectors as a strategy that connects the urban to rural forms 
of production (e.g. ‘regrounding’) and livelihoods. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that land reform is not to be perceived as a uni-linear 
process or a one-dimensionally of which the impact can be simply measured by 
linking policy objectives directly to observed outcomes. A key ingredient of the 
search for an adequate analytical framework was to look for concepts and 
interpretations beyond structural models. The notion of script has proven to be 
useful provided one interprets script as unfolding in many different ways and 
directions. In this way we have a much better grasp of the dynamics of the 
emergent properties of the land reform script in South Africa. Emergent 
properties that reflect some of the unequal social and spatial developments in 
South Africa but at the same time opportunities and novelties. 
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Livelihoods and the articulation of space 
Leo J. de Haan 
Introduction 
Livelihood studies aim to understand and contribute towards an improvement of 
livelihoods, primarily those of the poor. However, the spatial dimension of 
livelihoods is often overlooked, which results in a local bias and an 
overemphasis on the place, to the detriment of space. Linking up with the recent 
‘spatial turn’ in social science, this paper attempts to determine the relationship 
between contemporary livelihoods, i.e. livelihoods in the current era of 
globalization, and the articulation of space. It starts with a short description of 
globalization, followed by an overview of the origins of the modern livelihood 
approach and its roots in geography. These sections serve as points of departure 
for a discussion of the contemporary articulation of space. Instead of adopting 
van Naerssen’s (1979) structuralist perspective on articulated space, the paper 
takes an actor-oriented perspective, with the section on the ‘spatial turn’ in social 
science discussing present-day views on space and place and the position of 
livelihood studies in the light of globalization. A preliminary conceptualization 
of the contribution of livelihood networks to the contemporary articulation of 
space then follows. 
Globalization 
Globalization is not just a process of internationalization but a characteristic of a 
‘global system’ in which each particular entity has to be understood within the 
framework of the world as a whole (de Ruijter, 1997). Globalization means, first 
of all, an increased homogenization and interdependency in the world. Clearly 
identifiable centres are giving way to nodes that differ in time and dimension. 
For some, the driving force is mostly socio-political but for others it is primarily 
economic and stems from production and markets. However, the trend towards 
global markets and politics is usually mirrored by growing diversity and an 
increased importance of regionalism and community, i.e. a trend towards 
localization. Thus, in addition to homogenization, globalization also implies 
greater fragmentation, for example cultural fragmentation with the reinvention of 
local traditions and identities, as an answer to the loss of identity through 
homogenization. Robertson (1995) strikingly characterized globalization as 
‘glocalization’, i.e. confronting trends of both homogeneity and heterogeneity in 
time and space. 
This view of globalization as a process not just of internalization but primarily 
as increased interdependency of a world system is similar to the way van 
Naerssen (1979) characterized the world at the end of the 1970s. He considered 
it an interdependent system of regions, resulting from a worldwide articulation of 
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modes of production. The essential driver was economic, i.e. the development of 
forces of production, and spatially localized in the centre. Asymmetrical 
economic relations, in addition to political and social relations stemming from 
these economic relations, have resulted in unequal development and an 
articulated space of interdependent centres and peripheries. 
Nowadays, interdependency can still be considered a common denominator of 
the world system but other drivers, mainly social, cultural and political, in 
addition to economic are also taken into consideration. The spatial picture of the 
1970s has become fragmented and fuzzy and today it is more difficult to mark 
out clear centres and peripheries. And although a clearly bounded Third World 
no longer exists, large parts of the world population still remain excluded from 
economic and social progress (de Haan, 2000a). This exclusion does not relate to 
countries and regions as a whole but instead to social groups within these areas. 
All this also requires a re-examination of the present articulation of space. In the 
following section, therefore, recent views on the articulation of space are 
explored in addition to the spatial outlook of an actor-oriented perspective as an 
alternative to a structuralist perspective. However, the geographical roots of the 
livelihood approach need first to be explained. 
Geography and livelihoods 
After the impasse of the structural perspective of ‘dependencia’ and neo-Marxist 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s (Schuurman, 1993; Booth, 1985), a more 
productive actor-oriented perspective emerged. It recognized inequalities in the 
distribution of assets and power but, above all, it stressed that people make their 
own history. This new standpoint was concerned with the world of ‘lived 
experiences’, the micro-world of family, networks and communities, and a 
micro-orientation with a focus on local actors, often households. At the same 
time, the household also came into vogue in a more practical sense, being seen as 
a convenient unit for the collection of empirical data. Many so-called household 
studies drew pessimistic conclusions, showing that poor households were being 
increasingly excluded from the benefits of economic growth, and were thus 
becoming marginalized (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005). 
The 1980s was the era of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), a 
macroeconomic recipe to reduce debt and eliminate poverty. However, SAPs 
were too narrowly macroeconomic and did not pay sufficient attention to the 
often adverse consequences of proposed adjustment measures for the poor. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, a more people-sensitive approach was needed. At the 
same time, a new generation of more optimistic household studies was 
conducted – namely livelihood studies – showing how people were surviving. In 
its optimism, the livelihood approach was an expression of Zeitgeist but was also 
a direct response to the disappointing results of former attempts to devise 
effective policies to eradicate poverty (de Haan and Zoomers, 2005). 
Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway, themselves drawing on insights from 
previous research on food security and agro-ecological sustainability, are widely 
acknowledged for having put livelihoods – then usually called ‘Sustainable 
Livelihoods’ – centre stage. In fact, Chambers brilliantly embraced the 
momentum of the then-current environmental sustainability discussion, 
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interpreting sustainability as a matter of trade-off for poor people between 
(mostly environmental) vulnerability and poverty. In the early 1990s, the UNDP 
contributed to the renewed debate on poverty with its annual Human 
Development Reports. A major impetus to the further development of the 
approach was the 1997 election of the new Labour government in the United 
Kingdom. The pro-active, self-help image of the Sustainable Livelihoods 
approach in improving the lives of the poor fitted very well with the image ‘New 
Labour’ and Tony Blair’s administration wanted to project. Sustainable 
Livelihoods became an important theme in the UK’s development policy, with 
DFID initiating numerous research projects and policy debates on the subject. 
The World Bank finally jumped on the bandwagon with its ‘Voices of the Poor’ 
report (Narayan, 2000), in which Chambers also had significant input. 
Apparently, the Bank wanted to seize the momentum but in fact never gave any 
clear follow-up. 
Livelihood is usually defined as comprising ‘the capabilities, assets (including 
both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living’ 
(Carney, 1998, based on Chambers and Conway, 1992:7). According to Long 
(1997), who has been influential in the Netherlands, livelihood ‘best expresses 
the idea of individuals and groups striving to make a living, attempting to meet 
their various consumption and economic necessities, coping with uncertainties, 
responding to new opportunities, and choosing between different value 
positions’. Increasingly, a holistic conceptualization of livelihood became 
generally accepted. This is best reflected in Bebbington’s (1999:2022) 
formulation: ‘A livelihood encompasses income, both cash and in kind, as well 
as the social institutions (kin, family, village), gender relations, and property 
rights required to support and to sustain a given standard of living. A livelihood 
also includes access to and the benefits derived from social and public services 
provided by the state such as education, health services, roads, water supplies 
and so on.’ 
The livelihood approach thus proved attractive to a range of social scientists, 
geographers included. De Haan & Zoomers (2003: 351), following de Haan 
(2000b:346), identified the notion of ‘genre de vie’ (a way of life) in early 
twentieth-century French geography as the first conceptualization of livelihood 
in modern geography. For anthropologists, the concept of livelihood became 
familiar a few decades later when Evans-Pritchard (1940) used it when 
describing Nuer strategies for making a living, and pointed to its mainly 
economic resource base. Economists recognize their livelihood roots in more 
recent household studies in the 1980s, which are usually identified as ‘household 
economics’ and in Polanyi’s (1977) attempt to develop an economic science that 
was holistic and human-centred as opposed to being mainstream (formalist) 
economics. 
Returning to geography and the conceptualization of livelihoods, it is 
interesting to note that when geography was recognized as an academic 
discipline in the nineteenth century, a great deal of attention was paid to the 
landscape and the strong belief in the moulding power of the physical 
environment on human activities. This interest in the physical features of the 
landscape lasted a long time, even though increasing attention was paid to human 
agency and man’s capacity to choose between a range of possible responses to 
physical conditions. De Haan and Zoomers (2003:351) explain how ‘Vidal de la 
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Blache was the first to introduce the concept of livelihood, or “genre de vie”, to 
explain that within a specific geographical setting there is a “highly localised, 
rooted, stable and socially bounded connection between people and the land” 
called the “pays”’ (Johnston et al. ,2000:294). After World War II, livelihood as 
a concept almost completely vanished from geography due to the dominant 
structural perspectives of ‘dependencia’ and neo-Marxist approaches. Once these 
lost their appeal, a much more actor-oriented post-Marxist approach emerged in 
development geography. While it continued to put the emphasis on inequalities 
in the distribution of assets and power, it acknowledged that people make their 
own history, though not independently of structural imperatives. It also drew 
insights from other approaches such as feminism, for example with respect to 
power relations (Johnston,1993:233-34). Post-Marxist development geography 
focused on local development as ‘the world of lived experience, the micro-world 
of family, network and community’ (Johnston, 1993:229). In geography, 
therefore, attention increasingly turned to issues of poverty, vulnerability and 
marginalization at ‘the geographical scale of experience’, as Taylor (1982) called 
it. 
 ‘It is from this position that the revitalisation of the livelihood approach in 
geography started. Its orientation on actors and agency and its view on local 
development is best explained by Johnston (1993:236-245) who showed that 
Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory gave way to a view of the “locale”. This 
provides on the one hand the setting of human interaction and on the other hand 
is the subject of transformation by this interaction. According to Giddens, a 
particular ‘locale’ provides resources and knowledge on which actors can base 
their action and at the same time it constrains human actions because it binds 
them to the resources and knowledge provided. The concept of locale became 
known as “locality” in British geography: the everyday working and living space 
of actors. Johnston (1993:243) summarised it as follows: the structuration of 
social relations in daily life contains many similarities but leads to different 
outcomes in different places, recognising the uniqueness of the place without 
denying causation and general operative processes. Focusing on place prevents 
the structure-agency view of becoming either voluntaristic or deterministic: 
everyday life provides both the context for people’s actions and is re-created by 
those actions. Local differences are reflections of cultural variations, which 
refute economic determinism. However, local differences do not challenge the 
existence of general operative processes.’ (quoted in De Haan and Zoomers, 
2003:351).  
The spatial turn in social science 
As the instigator of the spatial turn in social science, Lefebvre (1991) argued that 
space is not a neutral container within which social relations occur but is a 
constitutive element and active former of those social relations (Cornelissen 
2007:119). Moreover, Lefebvre made it clear that space must be regarded as an 
on-going production of social relations rather than an inert, neutral or pre-
existing phenomenon. Consistent with his neo-Marxist background, Lefebvre 
maintained that the reproduction of social relations of production within this 
space will lead through necessity to the dissolution of old relations and the 
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generation of new relations. However, unlike the neo-Marxist theories discussed 
by van Naerssen (1979) that postulated the hegemony of the capitalist mode of 
production, Lefebvre emphasized the possible emergence of ‘new spaces’. In his 
view, the spaces of modernity or ‘abstract space’ are created by trends of 
homogenization, hierarchization and social fragmentation in capitalism, which at 
the same time curb variations in local culture, history and natural landscape. 
Spaces of modernity are the spaces of private property, markets and labour. 
However, new spaces may appear – the so-called differential spaces – that will 
resist forces of homogenization and emphasize differences. In fact, Lefebvre 
(1991) had a dialectical perspective of the conflict between abstract and 
differential space. 
In political science, the spatial turn invited different conceptualizations of the 
state as a manifestation of collective spatial imaginings, which are not 
necessarily territorially bound. It also led to changed understandings of political 
concepts like deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Cornelissen, 2007) to 
come to grips with seemingly diverging processes under globalization. As 
Lefebvre (1991) already made clear, this did not mean that studies of locality 
became irrelevant, quite the opposite in fact. Appadurai (1996), another architect 
of the spatial turn, called for more studies on the ‘production of locality’ and 
pointed at the relevance of area studies, assigning them the task of studying the 
historically uneven course of globalization, but not necessarily resulting in 
homogenization. In his view, different societies appropriate modernity in diverse 
ways so studies of areas, with their different geographies, histories and cultures, 
are extremely relevant. Appadurai ‘stresses that locality itself is a historical 
product and subject to the dynamics of the global. Areas put in this way 
represent sites for the analysis of how localities emerge in a globalizing world, 
how colonial processes underlie contemporary politics, and how history and 
genealogy inflect each other’ (Al-Zubaidi, 1998:1). 
However, what is often neglected by Zeitgeist and its awareness of agency is 
the asymmetry of global relations. The uneven course of globalization, 
heterogeneity etc are connected with the exclusion from economic and social 
progress of hundreds of millions of people in large parts of the world.  
Against this broader theoretical background, the modern livelihood perspective 
must clarify its understanding of contemporary globalization. Despite the 
importance of locality, the one-sided local orientation, which is still prominent in 
many of today’s livelihood studies especially those with an interest in natural-
resource exploitation, is outdated. A new conceptualization of the articulation of 
space along the lines indicated by Lefebvre and Appadurai stands out, through a 
focus on the asymmetry of the global-local nexus or glocalization, as mentioned 
above. 
This means that the general geographical interpretation of development 
characterized by Kleinpenning (1997:13) ‘as an in time and space varying, but 
always complex ensemble of generically heterogeneous factors on various spatial 
levels of scale: natural and social, internal and external, historical and actual’ 
remains unchallenged. But it also means that one should carefully compose the 
analysis, i.e. no local without the global, no natural without the social and, 
something that is apparently the easiest to neglect as Kleinpenning (1997:15) 
explains, no contemporary without the historical. Attention to the global-local 
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nexus must assure that the geography of livelihoods does not become diverted 
into the study of local customs and (folk)lore.  
The emergence of livelihood networks 
Livelihoods in the era of globalization are increasingly organized in networks. 
This trend has been encouraged by the interrelated and accelerated processes of 
individualization, multi-tasking and mobility. 
In modern livelihood studies the poor are no longer regarded as victims but 
play an active role in shaping their own livelihoods. This focus on the active 
involvement of people in responding to change and also enforcing change 
corresponds with an increased awareness of the trend towards individualization. 
For a long time, ‘family’ or ‘household’ used to be the unit of analysis in actor-
oriented development studies, with households seen as decision-making units 
maximizing their welfare with respect to a range of income-earning opportunities 
and resource constraints (Ellis, 1998:12). They were usually defined as co-
resident groups of persons, who shared most aspects of consumption, drawing on 
and allocating a common pool of resources, including labour, to ensure their 
material reproduction. From this awareness of intra-household relations comes 
the realization that globalization has impacted on the characteristics and 
functions of households. Instead of pursuing an optimal balance in a harmonious 
domestic unit, individuals now pursue their own methods to improve their 
situation, for example by diversifying their livelihood or moving to a new 
location to exploit new opportunities. In many cases, traditional solidarity-based 
principles of pooling incomes, consumption and labour within households have 
become weaker or at least changed. Thus, although individuals remain members 
of domestic units (families or households), they are increasingly acting 
independently. Extended families are breaking down into nuclear families; 
nuclear families are disintegrating further; and single-person households are no 
longer limited to industrialized societies. In many parts of the world, the number 
of female-headed households has risen and the elderly have increasingly become 
a separate and often isolated group, no longer cared for in extended families (de 
Haan and Zoomers, 2003:354). 
The second trend is multi-tasking or diversification. Livelihood diversification 
is ‘a process by which .... households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio 
of activities and assets in order to survive and to improve their standard of 
living’ (Ellis, 2000:15). ‘Today, few among the poor derive all their income from 
just one source or hold all their wealth in the form of just one single asset. In 
many cases, the bulk of income of the rural poor no longer originates from 
agriculture, and it is no longer realistic to classify the population as small 
farmers or the landless poor. At the same time, among the urban poor, part of the 
population is now involved in urban agriculture, which provides additional food 
supply’ (de Haan and Zoomers, 2003:356). 
People have various motives for diversifying their assets and activities. Multi-
tasking is seen as a way of compensating for insufficient income or temporary 
crisis situations. It is a strategy to escape poverty, cope with insecurity or reduce 
risk. It is also becoming increasingly clear that diversification is persistent and 
enduring in the sense that the phenomenon occurs everywhere and does not 
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appear to be temporary. Diversification does not mean having an occasional 
income in addition to a main activity; it means multiple income sources and it is 
a distinguishing feature of the poor (Ellis, 2000:4). It is poverty that induces 
households to intensify their income-generating strategies, using any available 
labour or resources as fully as possible. They adjust, cope, create and recreate 
their livelihoods under the impact of macroeconomic circumstances, climatic 
variability and institutional change (Ellis, 2000:14-15). 
Individualization and multi-tasking are joined by a third process, namely a 
rapid expansion in people’s mobility as a result of improvements in 
communications and transport technology. Increasing numbers of people are 
now living on the edge of urban and rural life, commuting from the countryside 
to the urban centres. Poor people too supplement their incomes by travelling 
large distances to earn additional money as temporary migrants. Finally, there is 
the considerable group of transnational migrants. However, one should not fall 
into the trap of ‘immigration paranoia’, which is so prevalent in western politics 
at the moment. Most migration, in fact, takes place within regions of the 
developing world and not from developing to industrialized countries. But on the 
other hand, the impact of remittances and flows of information generated by 
migration should also not be underestimated. The relevant issue here is that the 
focus should not be on migration as it is the combination of individualization, 
diversification and mobility that matters.  
As a consequence, individuals are no longer organized as co-resident groups 
concentrated in space but resemble individual nodes that are connected to each 
other by livelihood networks along which remittances, information, ideas, goods 
and people flow. These multi-local networks of livelihoods have spread quickly 
around the globe. And the question is what this means for livelihood studies in 
the future. Livelihood networks deserve closer scrutiny by a new generation of 
livelihood studies because the ‘network transformation’ has not yet been 
properly researched as the focus is too limited to migration per se. 
One interesting question would be if livelihood networks mirrored the network 
society, as conceptualized by Castells (1996). He has pointed at the emergence 
of a new type of firm – the new network enterprise – which is based on the space 
of flows, so characteristic for contemporary information networks. However, the 
components of these network enterprises are located in places. Castells (1989: 
69-70) showed that the more organizations depend upon flows and networks, the 
less they are influenced by the social context associated with the places of their 
location. But people on the other hand do live in a physical world, the space of 
places. However, because of this tension, people risk losing their sense of Self 
and, as a consequence, are trying to remodel their identity (Castells 1996). 
Clearly, the remodelling of identity by migrants is partly captured by the 
contemporary conceptualization of transnational communities, but the challenge 
of conceptualizing the livelihood component as a flexible network firm or 
enterprise is not taken up. In either case, the asymmetry in relations through the 
working of ‘power relations’ calls for further attention.  
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To conclude 
The modern livelihood perspective offers interesting prospects regarding the 
conceptualization of contemporary articulation of space. From an actor-oriented 
viewpoint, livelihood studies tend to favour locality or place but analysis of the 
global-local nexus has shown that this nearsightedness can be overcome.  
The impact of the emergence of livelihood networks – trigged by the 
combined processes of individualization, diversification and mobility – on the 
articulation of space has yet to be explored. It has been argued that the outlines 
of this conceptualization should be linked to the debate on the network society. 
Finally, attention to the asymmetry of relations, i.e. analyses of power relations, 
should be a key element points of view. This cannot be overemphasized. Only 
then will it become clear how large parts of the world’s population remain 
excluded from economic and social progress. 
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Revisiting peripheral capitalism in 
Zambia 
Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht and Rudolf Scheffer 
1 The harvest of a coincidence: fieldwork in 1975, graduation in 
1976, and a book, a conference, and a Zone publication in 1977 
Introduction 
Studying geography in Nijmegen in the early 1970s was a fascinating 
experience.  Two of us had combined the ‘research training’ stream of geography 
(under Piet Kouwe), with a Dependencia course at CEDLA in Amsterdam 
(under Geert Banck; see Dietz and Van Haastrecht, 1974), and we wanted to 
apply our new insights in a fieldwork setting somewhere in the ‘Third World’, 
preferably in a (somewhat) radical setting. One of us followed the ‘planning’ 
stream, and wanted to prepare for a job in development co-operation. Ton van 
Naerssen was the obvious person to go to, and he happened to know a young 
Dutch geographer who worked as a geography lecturer at the University of 
Zambia, Leo van den Berg.  
Zambia? Africa? We hardly knew anything about it. Yes, Kaunda was one of 
the new African leaders who, at the time, happened to be in a process of 
designing a ‘third way’, in between capitalism and Russian-style communism, 
calling it ‘humanism’, or ‘African socialism’. We were also aware of Zambia’s 
role as frontier state against the Rhodesian and South African atrocities. It might 
be an interesting place to test the dependencia theory, and the workings of 
‘peripheral capitalism’, and to find out what the impact had been of big 
(capitalist, ‘growth pole’) investments in a (formerly) rural environment. 
However, finding literature about Zambia and about its economic geography was 
cumbersome, and when we presented our research design to a possible funding 
agency (WSO) they told us that our design was too meagre. Of course, we saw 
this as evidence of exclusion tactics by Utrecht development geographers, who 
indeed were quite influential in using this Fund for their own students. Together 
with the Free University in Amsterdam, under Ad de Bruijne and Jan Hardeman, 
the Utrecht geographers under Jan Hinderink and Jan Sterkenburg spearheaded 
the establishment of separate sub-departments of ‘human geography of 
developing countries’ (SGO), and they might have seen a move by Nijmegen in 
the same direction as undesirable competition. Grudgingly we went back to the 
library of the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam to find more convincing 
background literature, and it seems we did, because our second submission to 
WSO was successful. 
We spent five months in Zambia, between March and August 1975, and wrote 
our combined English-language Master’s thesis during the rest of that year. We 
62 
graduated in February 1976, and while two of us got a job at the geography 
department of the University of Amsterdam, Rudolf got a chance to summarise 
our findings for a publication in the Nijmeegse Geografische Cahiers (Scheffer, 
Dietz and Van Haastrecht, 1977). In May 1977 we were involved in the 
organisation of a ‘working congress’ of the new Dutch radical geographers’ and 
planners’ journal Zone, together with the people around the Danish radical 
geographers’ journal Fagligt Forum. The congress was entitled ‘Imperialism and 
the spatial analysis of peripheral capitalism’ (in English), and had keynote 
lectures by David Harvey, Mogens Buch-Hansen, and David Slater (Zone, 
1977). Annemieke also presented a paper on our Zambian results, which, later 
that year, was published in Zone (van Haastrecht, 1977). And that was the end of 
our Zambian adventure.  
It took until 2008 before Rudolf went back (to Lusaka), while Annemieke and 
Ton looked at Zambia from the other side of the border at Victoria Falls. 
Revisiting that country in virtual space was easier, though, and that is what we 
did for this tribute to our supervisor, Ton van Naerssen. But first we will give a 
summary of our findings, particularly based on the ‘Zone’ article. 
 
Box: Ton van Naerssen visits Zambia: Livingstone please!!!  
At the end of our fieldwork period Ton van Naerssen visited us and, together 
with our daily supervisor Leo van den Berg, we discussed our fieldwork 
findings. For Ton it was his first African trip, and some of his experiences there 
probably supported his decision to further specialise in Southeast Asian affairs. 
After the ‘formal’ part of his visit (in Lusaka) we invited him to accompany us to 
Zambian tourist spot number one: Livingstone and the Victoria Falls which we 
would reach by train. We arrived early at the train station and Ton proposed that 
he would buy our train tickets. He therefore stood first in line at a yet to be 
opened ticket counter. Gradually he was joined by a large group of Zambians. 
When the counter opened they all pushed forward and Ton, not the tallest of 
persons, was overwhelmed and soon found himself the last one in what was no 
longer a line. Nobody noticed him calling  ‘Livingstone Please!! ‘ When the train 
was about to depart he still had a long queue before him. When we discovered 
his plight, we decided to get him out of the queue and board the train without 
tickets. We would wait and see what would happen. Indeed after a while the train 
conductor appeared to check our tickets. When we explained what had happened 
to us at the station he gave a big smile in reply:  ‘Ohhh, you now have a major 
problem! There will be a very big fine. But because you have been soooo 
unlucky, I will make a deal: you will get the tickets from half way the trip [still 
far away], and I add the fine; together that will be the amount you should have 
paid. But please, I will not give you the receipt for the fine. And, please, next 
time [looking at Ton van Naerssen], you push a little harder! ‘  
Peripheral capitalism, the basics 
Among the various theories debated about ‘third-world’ countries until the mid-
1970s, the theory of peripheral capitalism was a prominent one, with Samir 
Amin and Raúl Prebisch as its most iconic scholars at the time (Amin, 1973; 
Amin, 1976; Prebisch, 1976; also see Slater, 1977, and Senghaas-Knoblauch, 
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1975). In short, peripheral capitalism was thought to have two basic 
characteristics (van Haastrecht, 1977: 37-40).  
First, capitalist structures (firms, the organisation of the market for goods, 
finance and property) were seen as being dominated by foreign parties (often 
multi-national companies). This left little room for either national capitalists or 
state agencies at the national or local levels. Compared to ‘central capitalist’ 
economies a relatively high percentage of the generated ‘surplus’ was thought to 
leave the peripheral country towards the ‘centre’, and of what was left, a 
considerable part would be used for the luxury consumption of the company’s 
managerial class (often foreigners, and their ‘state lackeys’ and ‘comprador 
bourgeoisie’). Most of the production of the capitalist sector in peripheral 
economies was meant for export to world markets. For the capitalist sector 
working in these peripheral conditions there would be no need to develop a 
market for consumer products, and hence no need to create a large working class 
with enough income to become a large-enough consumer class for a thriving 
local production sector of ‘mass consumption goods’.  
Second, capitalist structures functioned in a social formation (as it was called) 
that was heterogeneous, with a strong presence of non-capitalist relations of 
production in peasant and ‘feudal’ agriculture and ‘petty’ handicraft production, 
which were seen as subsidising the capitalist sector (Baumgärtner and Poppenga, 
1975; Rey, 1976; Senghaas, 1972). The subsidy was thought to take various 
forms. The most important form was the fact that family members of workers in 
capitalist enterprises (and workers in their free time) produced a major part of the 
goods and services these workers and their families used for their reproduction. 
This was thought to enable capitalist firms to pay wages below family 
subsistence levels, and sometimes even below individual subsistence levels of 
the wage labourers. In addition it was thought that costs made to feed, clothe, 
house and educate labourers before they became wage labourers had been 
provided by the non-capitalist sector. Again when wage labourers left their jobs 
or were fired their upkeep would be provided by the non-capitalist sector. 
Colonial and post-colonial states provided services to capitalist firms (like 
educating their future labourers and keeping them healthy, but also building 
roads and other infrastructure), for which they did not get enough funds from 
these capitalist firms in the form of taxes and levies, but by taxing the non-
capitalist sector (called ‘tribute’ in some diehard Marxist literature). This would 
enable capitalist firms to maintain very low wage levels and pay very low taxes, 
and hence this created possibilities for cutthroat competition at international 
levels, or for extra (‘surplus’) profits. The low economic multipliers related to 
capitalist production in these circumstances were seen as a major contributing 
factor to underdevelopment (Kay, 1975). 
Characteristics of peripheral capitalism in Zambia until the mid 1970s 
In Zambia, we encountered a situation in which British colonialism (until 1964, 
when the country changed its name from Northern Rhodesia to Zambia) had left 
a strong, foreign-owned, copper mining sector, with a railway line connecting 
the Copperbelt through Zambia’s capital city Lusaka with the harbour city Beira, 
in Portuguese-dominated Mozambique.  Along that railway line a few thousand 
white farmers produced maize, which formed the staple food (nchima) of the 
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Copperbelt workers and for anyone else buying their staple food at the market. 
The copper industry produced more than half of the available ‘surplus’ in the 
capitalist sector of Zambia (Seidmann, 1974), but employed relatively few 
workers, most of them coming from the north-eastern Bemba community. Also 
the sector of large-scale capitalist agriculture employed only a minority of the 
available rural workers in Zambia, mostly from the Tonga and Chewa 
communities in the central and eastern parts of the country. According to 
Lombard and Tweedie (1974), the percentage of rural households in Zambia that 
could be described as ‘peasant households’ (without access to a wage income in 
the capitalist sector) was more than 85 until well into the early 1970s. However, 
especially when compared with other African countries, Zambia had a relatively 
large urban population (close to 50%; mainly located in the Copperbelt region 
and in Lusaka). Within this urban population many households did not have 
access to wage jobs, and in the 1960s and early 1970s so-called squatter areas in 
the urban environment experienced an explosive growth. Peasants were 
subsidising the meagre earnings in the urban ‘petty commodity production and 
distribution sector’ (later referred to as the ‘informal sector’; see Bienefeld, 
1975).  
However, Zambia in 1975 was also in a process of so-called Zambianisation, 
and experienced an attempt to create a state-owned economy. Under its first 
President Kaunda the Zambian state had succeeded in claiming a higher 
percentage share of the copper profits, a great source of income revenue in the 
first decade following Zambia’s Independence, which would dwindle rapidly 
afterwards. In 1968 the Zambian state also acquired a 51% share in the 
ownership of 26 formerly private companies in the building, trade and transport 
sector. In 1969 the Zambian state took over all copper and other mining 
companies. This was followed, in 1970, with the acquisition of insurance and 
real estate companies.  
Thus, when we visited the country in 1975, all major companies in the 
capitalist economy had been taken over by the state, with the exception of the 
banks and large agricultural farms (the latter often owned by white ‘colonists’). 
Zambia had also succeeded to attract considerable amounts of ‘development aid’, 
carefully playing out the East-West controversies, and it was one of the first 
countries in Africa to get major (and economically crucial) support from China, 
which built an alternative railroad for Zambia’s copper, the so-called Tanzam 
railway to Dar es Salaam in ujamaa-socialist Tanzania. 
The expansion of Zambia’s state ownership over a major part of the economy 
was also possible because between 1966 and 1970, and again in 1973, copper 
fetched very high world-market prices, the income of which was invested in 
Zambian state ownership of many companies, in new productive initiatives of 
the State’s Industrial Development Corporation INDECO (which included some 
foreign participation), and in the rapid expansion of Zambia’s education and 
health sector and its government apparatus. In 1972 INDECO’s 22,000 labourers 
made up 45% of all labourers in productive industries in Zambia. INDECO’s 
gross profit of 27 million Kwacha from a total turnover of 286 million Kwacha 
in 1972 was distributed in a way which gives a good picture of ‘surplus 
distribution’: 12 million was provided to the Zambian state, 8 million to its 
foreign partners, while 7 million was reserved as capital for future investments 
(van Haastrecht, 1977:42-43, based on INDECO 1973; KIT, 1973; SBW, 1976).  
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The Zambian state also tried to curb the power of non-Zambian capitalists 
working in the country. Many of these foreigners were of Indian origin. Hence in 
1972 foreigners were no longer granted permission to set up shops, wholesale 
businesses nor transport companies. In consequence a part of the Indian 
population decided (and succeeded) to get the Zambian nationality. A few 
hundred others were forced to close and sell-off their shops in the country 
(Tordoff and Molteno, 1974). Furthermore, foreigners could no longer borrow 
money for productive purposes, in contrast with aspiring Zambian entrepreneurs, 
who could, quite easily, get such loans from the new Financial Development 
Corporation, a state-owned development bank. The state also tried to pressure 
nationalised enterprises into recruiting more Zambian managers, while also 
rapidly expanding the number of Zambians in decision-making positions within 
the government bureaucracy.  
On the other hand, Zambia’s ambitious economic and political goals also 
demanded the influx of considerable numbers of advisors and consultants from 
abroad, many sponsored with development aid. Thus the University of Zambia 
was a rather cosmopolitan community of scholars, and a thriving place for 
radical leftwing and ‘third way’ debates (until staff and students began to clash 
with the government). The general atmosphere in Zambia among intellectuals 
was one of optimism. The state budget had increased seven-fold between 1964 
and 1970; although later on growth rate did slow down. The number of people 
working for the government (excluding the development corporations) had 
grown from 22,000 in 1963 to 54,000 in 1971. Real wages and salaries in the 
state sector (including the development corporations) had almost doubled in the 
few years before 1975. Luxury imports of food had increased from a total value 
of 14 million Kwacha to 50 million Kwacha since Independence. Indeed, 
President Kaunda complained that it might even be necessary to replace the 
agricultural implements in the national emblem with the Mercedes Benz symbol 
(Africa, 1975-77). 
In summary: the Zambian state was in a process of challenging the 
characteristics of peripheral capitalism, created by colonialism. It tried to 
nationalise ownership and management of the major capitalist enterprises; it 
created a state-driven process of industrialisation; it increased the real wages of 
labourers in the large-scale sector; and it increased its tax base, based on 
enterprise profits (adding foreign aid gifts and loans to fund its rapidly growing 
public investments). It tried to integrate the isolated countryside and the marginal 
urban population in ‘development’ by massive investments in education and 
health care. Yet, however ambitious this project, it failed to economically 
integrate the majority of Zambians, although the structural heterogeneity of 
Zambian society no longer seemed to function as a necessary way of subsidising 
the (state-) capitalist sector. Furthermore, Zambia’s economic expansion plans 
entirely depended on its copper production and the world market for copper. 
During the first ten years of Zambia’s Independence copper exports had never 
fallen below 90% of total export value. 
Fieldwork in Zambia: Kafue and Mazabuka 
Part of Zambia’s ambition was to industrialise the countryside. Two areas along 
the Kafue River, south of Lusaka, were major targets. In Kafue the government 
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created a New Town, around basically two growth pole industries: Nitrogen 
Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ), producing fertiliser and explosives to be used in 
the mines and Kafue Textiles of Zambia (KTZ), producing cloth, based on 
cotton. In Mazabuka the Zambian government also built a sugar factory around 
the new irrigated Nakambala Sugar Estate. NCZ was started in 1969 as an 
INDECO company (with only 1% of all shares in the hands of another owner, a 
Japanese firm) and when we did our fieldwork in 1975 it had grown to a 
company of 700 labourers. Unfortunately we could not get permission to do any 
research there.  
KTZ also started off in 1969. INDECO had 55% of all its shares; other owners 
were a company in Liechtenstein (20%), the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation from the UK (15%) and Barclays Bank (10%). By 1975 KTZ had 
1470 labourers and we interviewed almost 200 of them. INDECO also owned the 
majority of shares of the Nakambala Sugar Estate (51%), with UK-based 
multinational Tate and Lyle being the major other shareholder and having its 
management contract. The sugar estate had started off in 1966. By 1975 7,000 
hectares had been planted with sugar cane, and the company employed 4,400 
labourers, the majority of them cane cutters recruited from the western Lozi 
community, usually for eight months per year. We interviewed almost 200 of 
these labourers. In addition we gathered information at the level of the company 
management and spoke to various informants in Kafue Town and Mazabuka.  
 
Box: Turmoil in Nakambala after the fieldwork; the ethics of engagement 
We had a nice time in Nakambala. We could make use of the staff club and its 
dining and sports facilities (where staff would aggressively ring table bells to 
order food and drinks) and we were frequent guests of a Dutch-Rhodesian couple 
who lived in a very luxurious house, and whose swimming pool was a delight. 
They were amused about our romantic left-wing ideas, and we were tormented 
by, what we regarded as racist and upper-class attitudes. With the labourers we 
had long discussions about labour rights, and wage levels, and as long as we 
were there we experienced heated debates among them, but no ‘action’. Later, 
back in the Netherlands, we heard that soon after we had left there had been a 
spontaneous strike, demanding higher wages and better treatment. When the 
police came to arrest the agitators some people were shot dead, and the strike 
was over. We have always felt guilty for creating turmoil, and not being there to 
face the consequences.  
 
Kafue Textiles of Zambia spent 22% of its expenditure locally in 1974-5. Most 
of that was spent on wages and salaries (3.6 million Kwacha of 18.2 million total 
expenditure). We estimated that 2.5 million Kwacha (14%) was paid to INDECO 
and the Zambian state, as profits and taxes. Most of the other expenses went 
abroad: to buy cotton from Tanzania, cloth from Egypt, salt from Kenya, other 
products, interest and profits to the UK, Japan and the USA. Only a meagre part 
of all expenses went to other Zambian producers (10%, and even that was for 
products whose inputs also came from abroad). The company had 18 foreign 
employees in 1975 (average salary: 11,000 Kwacha) and 67 Zambian salaried 
staff (average salary: 7,000 Kwacha). The more than 1300 labourers earned an 
average of 753 Kwacha during that year (van Haastrecht, 1977:45 and 49) and 
spent most of this income on goods and services, produced in the large-scale 
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sector. The subsidy thesis, so central to the theory of peripheral capitalism, was 
impossible to prove for the KTZ labourers, as wages earned were high enough to 
pay for own basic consumption, their household members, and sometimes also 
other dependents. Forty of the interviewed labourers combined their KTZ 
income in 1974-5 with other sources of income, adding an average 250 Kwacha 
to their annual cash income. Some related these activities to KTZ, selling cloth 
they had acquired cheaply elsewhere to their fellow labourers, or lending money 
to fellow labourers, asking high interest rates for these loans. Others engaged in 
petty-capitalist activities: selling fish, charcoal, or agricultural produce (van 
Haastrecht, 1977:52-53). 
Nakambala Sugar Estate spent 35% of its expenditure locally. This included 
wages and salaries, which were 21% of Nakambala’s annual turnover of 10 
million Kwacha in 1974-75. In addition, 9% was spent on local building and 
transport contracts, and on buying sugar cane from outgrowers, and 5% on food 
to be sold to labourers in company shops. Thirteen percent of the company’s 
expenditure went to the Zambian state as taxes and payments to INDECO. Of the 
other 52% the majority were purchases of inputs from abroad, sometimes via a 
refinement process (e.g. oil from Ndola). In 1975 Nakambala employed 78 
foreigners, who earned an average of 7,000 Kwacha each. The Zambian salaried 
staff (135 of them) earned an average of almost 1,800 Kwacha each. And the 
more than 4,000 cane cutters and other labourers received an average of 440 
Kwacha per year (van Haastrecht, 1977:45 and 49). Each year, about 1000 
seasonal labourers (most of the cane cutters) were collected in the far-away 
Western Province, and for them the wages were only 160 Kwacha per year. Of 
the interviewed seasonal labourers only 35% said that they would succeed to 
bring anything home; the other 65% said they just survived for the period they 
were in Nakambala, and could not save anything for people back home. For 
these labourers it is clear that they are being subsidised by their rural people, 
when at home during the four months in which they could not work at the sugar 
estate (a seasonal enterprise). Asked about their job history, 131 out of 186 
Nakambala workers said that they had been jobless for at least half a year since 
they were sixteen years old, and in those periods they had to rely on support 
from their rural families, and 30% said that they occasionally worked in 
subsistence agriculture. Fifteen percent of the interviewed Nakambala labourers 
did have other sources of cash income, besides their wages from the sugar estate: 
cash gifts, sale of fish, sale of tobacco and other agricultural produce, and small 
trade (van Haastrecht, 1977:52-54). Indeed, providing subsidies to labourers by 
the non-capitalist sector was a plausible proposition for the poorer labourers. But 
for the majority of the labourers this was not a very realistic assessment; with 
their salaries they could rather easily pay basic necessities, not only for 
themselves, but also for household members and sometimes even for others.  
When we surveyed the shops and markets where labourers bought their daily 
necessities, we found that most products came from the large-scale industrial and 
agricultural sector. Again this was evidence, which did not support the argument 
of necessary structural heterogeneity. The number of wage labourers for whom 
the argument was more plausible, had already begun to dwindle, especially in 
relative terms, in the years prior to our fieldwork. Seasonal labour became less 
important. For the company the recruitment of seasonal labourers constituted a 
major burden each year as their reliability was low: there was a high turnover, 
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and this segment of the labour force often contained ‘revolutionary’ elements, 
leading to occasional problems for the management. Efficient (state-) capitalist 
production demands a stable and reliable labour force above all, even if this is 
achieved at the expense of higher average wages.  
 
Box: the scientific reception of our work 
With the current tools of valuation of scientific work, it would have been rather 
easy to find out what other scientific authors had done with our work, and we 
would also have tried to increase the ‘impact’ by publishing the major results in 
influential journals. In 1975-77 that was not at all at stake yet, and we had the 
idea that an English-language working paper, an English-language conference 
paper, and a Dutch-language article in a journal like Zone would already be a 
major accomplishment. None of us thought we should do a PhD as a follow-up 
of the Zambian material, although all three of us got a job at a University, Rudolf 
at the Free University of Amsterdam and Annemieke and Ton at the University 
of Amsterdam. It was ironic that the UvA job can be seen as the result of writing 
the Dependencia article, of which the Zambia study proved to be rather sceptical. 
So we wanted to move in other directions. Nevertheless, the publication in the 
Nijmeegse Geografische Cahiers, was widely distributed in Zambia, got a price 
in Nijmegen, and was cited at least two times in an established geography 
journal (both by Ettema, in 1979 and 1983), as an example of critical 
development geography, and fruitful use of the centre-periphery perspective. 
However, the Zambia experience had made us wary of theoretical approaches 
with meagre empirical foundations, and indeed had pushed us away from the 
type of work, which Ton van Naerssen continued to do for some time. And this 
is the first time we find the occasion again to write about our experiences in 
Zambia . 
2. Zambia 1975-2008: demographic turmoil, failed state monopoly 
capitalism, and deepening poverty 
Population growth and aids 
When we were in Zambia, in 1975, it was already clear that the rapid 
improvement of health services, and the better availability of food and water, 
was in a process of creating a population explosion: with more than 3% annual 
increase Zambia’s population was thought to double before the Millennium. This 
was a process that had already started during the 1950s, still under Colonial 
government, but that dramatically increased after Independence. Not only did it 
mean that the number of mothers using modern health facilities during 
pregnancy and breast feeding periods had increased rapidly, and that the number 
of young children of school-going age had reached very high numbers in 1975, it 
would also mean that the number of young adults entering the labour market 
during the 1980s was expected to explode. The expanded public services in 
education and health already had difficulty to cope with the increases in 
demands. But the structure of peripheral capitalism was thought to be completely 
inadequate to make sure that all these additions to the labour market would get 
paid jobs in an expanding economy.  
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Of course nobody knew yet about HIV/AIDS, the scourge that would shake 
the demographic foundations of many African countries, and Zambia would be 
one of the worst affected. Many of the youth of the 1970s would not make it into 
the 1990s, and the demographic drama created an urge for those surviving to get 
as many children as possible, creating a very volatile demographic situation, and 
undermining the social-cultural and economic foundations of the country.  In 
2003, an estimated 1.2 million Zambians out of 11.3 million were HIV positive, 
with between 19 and 22% of all adults aged between 15 and 49 years infected 
with the virus. However, Zambia’s population was not yet shrinking, although its 
annual population growth had gone down to only 1.5%. Infant mortality was 
extremely high for world standards (102/1000) and under-5 mortality among the 
worst in the world (182/1000). Life expectancy at birth had gone down to 36 
years only (IFAD, 2008).  
The collapse of the world market for copper, the collapse of the Kwacha: 
Zambian peripheral capitalism in crisis, 1975-2003 
In an analysis of Zambia’s economic prospects, UNCTAD (2006: 2) noted:  
‘Until three decades ago, Zambia was one of the most prosperous countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Today it ranks as one of Africa’s least developed‘. Zambia’s 
bold (and naïve) attempt to build a state-driven industrial society (‘state-
monopoly capitalism’) during the late 1960s and early 1970s was based on 
windfall profits of its main link with the world market: copper mining. This 
resulted in ownership of 80% of all companies in Zambia by the state by the late 
1980s (UNCTAD 2006: 4). In a study about Chile, another major copper 
producing nation, Hernández (2005) reconstructed the long-term trends in world 
market prices for copper. After the Korea war in the 1950s copper prices had 
been in the range of 1.50 to 2 US$/lb (using 2004-price levels), but they went up 
to levels beyond 3 (and even up to 4) in the years between 1963 and 1970, when 
the Zambian state planned its state-driven expansion of the economy. However, 
the oil shocks of the early 1970s created major fluctuations, and after 1975 the 
price plunged down to 1.80 to 2 US$/lb around 1980, down to 1 between 1980 
and 1987, up a bit at the end of the 1990s, to reach its lowest level in the year 
2000 (0.70 US$/lb).  
When we did our fieldwork in 1975, the Kwacha was a strong currency. For 
one US dollar we could only get 0.65 Kwacha at the time and for a Dutch guilder 
only 0.24 Kwacha. Soon afterwards the Kwacha became weaker, following the 
collapse of the world market price for copper. In 1987 there were already 11 
Kwachas to the dollar, in 1995 956, in 2000 2780 and in 2004 (at its worst for 
the Kwacha) 4645 (and one could get 6337 Kwachas for a Euro). (Oanda, 2008; 
Schuler, 2008).  
As a result, the Zambian economy and society experienced a rapid 
deterioration, made worse by droughts during the 1980s, and 1990s, and a 
massive drought in 2001-2002. Also the civil wars in Angola, and Congo-Zaire 
had major negative impacts on the economy. Food riots in 1986, and political 
clashes afterwards did result in so-called multi-party elections, in 1991, ending 
the official ‘state of emergency’. It made an end to the 27-year presidency of 
Kenneth Kaunda. However, the economy did not recover. The second president, 
Chiluba (1991-2001), adopted drastic austerity measures, a major liberalisation 
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of the economy and the dismantling of the state’s hold on the industrial sector: 
the final breakdown of Zambia’s state-monopoly capitalism. UNCTAD wrote in 
2006:  ‘Governments since 1991 have enacted comprehensive market 
liberalization policies‘ (UNCTAD, 2006: xi). To no avail, or worse: it brought 
the economy to a further stand still, and government corruption became a major 
element in withholding development aid from time to time, also under the third 
president, Mwanawase. Under close guidance from the IMF and World Bank, 
the Government introduced tough reforms resting on three main policy planes: 
removal of subsidies; economic liberalization and stabilization; and privatization 
of public sector enterprises. Price controls were removed, the exchange rate was 
unified and became market-determined, capital controls were abolished, interest 
rates on loans were liberalized, and regular auctions of treasury bills were 
initiated. Agriculture input and output markets were also opened up to private 
sector entry, and import controls were abolished with very few exceptions. The 
privatization process moved faster and by 2002, almost all the parastatal 
companies were privatized. However, it is noteworthy that the largest companies 
in vital economic sectors such as utilities, oil and finance are still state-owned. 
By April 2002, 257 state enterprises had been privatized from a total of 284. Of 
the privatized companies, 65 percent were sold to Zambian individuals, 29 
percent to foreigners while 6 percent were wound up. The country had become a 
‘normal’ peripheral-capitalist country, although one with a very weak capitalist 
sector, and a mass of people toiling at very low levels of productivity in the rural 
and urban non-capitalist sector.   
Thus from a country in the middle range of middle-income countries in the 
early 1970s, according to World Bank classifications, Zambia had sunk into the 
ever-deeper ends of the list of low-income countries in the early 2000s (with 380 
US$ as its GNI/Capita in 2003; IFAD, 2008). In 2005, UNDP positioned Zambia 
at the 166th rank out of 177 countries ranked for the Human Development Index 
(UNCTAD, 2006: xi). 
In 2003, 86% of all Zambians were classified as poor, and during the drought 
of 2001-2002 2.7 million Zambians required food aid (Nations Encyclopaedia, 
2008). In 1975 Zambia had one of the most urbanised populations of Africa; in 
2003 more than 60% of all Zambians lived in rural areas, and it is quite likely 
that the urban poor relied for part of their food on direct linkages with the 
countryside. In 2005, only 400,000 Zambians were employed in what was 
known as the formal sector (Klerk, 2008), a wage labour participation rate of less 
than 8% of its adult population. Of all Zambians 64% had to survive on less than 
one dollar a day in 1998, and 87% on less than two dollars a day. Poverty levels 
are so high that height for age indicators for children under five in the country as 
a whole indicated 47% malnutrition (weight for age 25%) and 49% of the total 
population was regarded as undernourished (IFAD, 2008). On the other hand, 
investments in education from the 1960s onwards – a priority for President 
Kaunda, and supported by development aid ever since – had resulted in an 
educated population: 80% of all adults in 2002 were regarded as literate, and 
89% of all school-age children indeed went to school (Ibid).  
The collapse of the Zambian economy was the more painful because one of the 
reasons for Zambia’s predicament in the 1970s, being a frontier state in the 
struggle against Rhodesia and Apartheid-South Africa (with its border with 
Rhodesia closed from 1973 until 1978; and experiencing an air raid by South 
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Africa’s armed forces in 1986), was resolved as far as Rhodesia was concerned 
in 1980 (when it became Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe), and as far as South 
Africa was concerned in 1990-1994, when De Klerk handed over to Mandela. 
But the ‘pacification’ of relationships with Zimbabwe and South Africa did not 
bring much happiness. In fact Zambia’s economic liberalisation programmes, as 
a forced response to pressure from IMF and World Bank, following its dramatic 
economic downfall in the 1980s, created the conditions for a flooding of 
Zambia’s shops with South African produce in the 1990s, killing whatever 
(protected) local industrial and agricultural development had taken place in the 
years before.  
In 2003 Zambia was a poverty-stricken country, with a dramatic HIV/AIDS 
problem, and a government that heavily depended on development aid. In 2002, 
Zambia adopted its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which became the 
key document for support by World Bank and other donors (World Bank, 2005). 
In 2003 Zambia’s economy had a value of 4,335 million US$, of which 940 
million US$ was earned as merchandise exports: copper (and cobalt) still 
leading, but also cotton lint, sugar, and tobacco. Government expenses were in 
the range of 750 million US$, but the Zambian state received 560 million US$ as 
development aid. In the first part of the 2000s, Zambia could best be described as 
an aid-dependent protectorate of IMF, World Bank and UN institutions, and of 
major aid agencies.  
Oriental rescue after 2004? 
Since copper became the dominating sector, in the 1920s, Northern Rhodesia’s 
and later Zambia’s fate has always been closely linked to what happened at the 
world market for copper. We have seen that Zambia’s bold expansion plans 
could be financed initially when world market prices for copper had reached all-
time highs, in the late 1960s. We saw that Zambia’s peripheral position in the 
world market meant that when the world market for copper collapsed, Zambia’s 
economy collapsed even more, although it lasted another decade before the 
Zambian state dismantled (or: was forced to dismantle) its ownership of major 
parts of the economy. The very low copper prices until about 2003 meant a deep 
economic crisis, and widespread poverty. Then, in 2003, things suddenly 
changed, and the copper price on the world market started to improve. In 2004 
copper was sold for 1.50 US$/lb, twice the level of 2003. In 2005 the price 
doubled again, to 3, and towards 2008 the price started to stabilise at a level of 
close to 4 US$/lb (Purchasing, 2008; LME, 2008). 
In 2004 the Zambian Kwacha also reached a turning point. Its value gradually 
(albeit with ups and downs) began to appreciate again when compared with the 
US$, but also the Euro. Hence by 2008 one US dollar could get you 3136 
Kwacha (and no longer 4645 as in 2004), and one Euro would fetch 4878 
Kwacha (was 6337 in 2004). Suddenly there are many signs of revitalisation of 
its impoverished economy, and it is not difficult to find the reasons: China, and 
the world energy situation.  
In 2004 the Zambian economy suddenly started booming again. In 2004 and 
2005 annual economic growth rates were above 5%. Its GDP had gone up from 
3.2 billion US$ in 2000 to 5.4 billion (and its GDP/capita from 317 to 471 US$), 
and exports had risen from 746 million to 1,067 million US$. Average 
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investment levels more than doubled between 2000-2002 and 2003-2004: from 
92 million US$ to 253 million US$ per year (UNCTAD, 2006: xi; 3). 
After years of economic contraction, the copper industry suddenly grew again. 
As a result of this, copper production was projected to increase to over 500,000 
tons in 2006 from 398,000 in 2004 and a low of 228,000 in 1998 (UNCTAD, 
2006:5). In addition, foreign investment increased in the banking, 
telecommunications, and tourism sector, while also investments in agriculture 
(sugar, fruit, flowers, horticulture) and manufacturing increased. Investors came 
from all over the world (with the UK in the lead, if we look at the background of 
the companies profiting from Zambia’s privatization programme), but with 
increasing interest from investors from South Africa, Zimbabwe and China. 
Current data are not yet available, but UNCTAD (2006: 8-9) shows that in 2000-
2002 40% of foreign direct investments came from Southern Africa, and 21% 
from China. Probably China now is the most important investor: in 2007, a 
Zambia-China Economic and Trade Corporation zone was established, offering 
tax exemptions to Chinese companies in return for $800 million of investment in 
manufacturing over three years (Klerk, 2008). In 2006, UNCTAD (2006:61) was 
optimistic: ‘Prospects are good as world demand for copper and prices 
increased considerably in 2004 and are expected to stay at a higher level for 
some time due to increasing demand for copper from growing economies such as 
China‘. In the most recent period, Zambia’s potential as a major producer of 
sugar cane for ethanol production is highlighted by various sources, as a result of 
the world wide urge to increase the production of agro-fuels. 
We may conclude that, after years of economic contraction, the capitalist 
sector in Zambia is expanding again, answering to the increased demands for raw 
materials and (bio)energy, spearheaded by China’s economic growth. However, 
it will be very questionable if the poor and HIV/AIDS infected population in 
Zambia’s huge non-capitalist sector will profit a lot. The growing export 
possibilities of copper and other products (like sugar- and cotton-derived 
products) will result in some extra employment, and in benefits for the state, 
probably diminishing some of the poverty in the country. However, the sheer 
size of the non-capitalist economy, and its very low productivity, demands a 
much more massive change of the Zambian economy (and probably other 
policies) than is likely in the near future. But there is more optimism now than 
during the last three decades, and that optimism may translate in more bold 
government policies in tackling the immense poverty and health problems in the 
country. 
3. Kafue and Nakambala-Mazabuka 1975-2008 
Kafue: a mirror of Zambia’s downfall  
The proud Kafue New Town, with proof throughout its realm of state-driven 
import-substitution industrialisation established in the 1970s, has dwindled to a 
poverty-stricken area of broken promises in recent years. By 2000 the town held 
46,000 inhabitants, many of them unemployed, living in squalor. In addition, the 
Town’s industries were polluting the Kafue River downstream in ways that were 
thought to be detrimental to people’s health. Around 2001, an environmental 
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NGO, ARE, was trying to force Nitrogen Company of Zambia, Bata Tannery 
and Lee Yeast of Zambia (old acquaintances of us in 1975) to improve its 
environmental standards (Blacksmith Institute, 2008). By 2002, the two leading 
companies, Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia and Kafue Textiles of Zambia were 
on the verge of collapse, as the new President, Mwanawase admitted:  ‘On the 
NCZ and KTZ, the President explained that when he took over office [in 2001], 
he found the two companies on the verge of collapse, but that the New Deal 
administration had managed to keep them afloat ‘ (All Africa, 2008). It was the 
time that the government had succeeded to get the Universal Mining Group to 
invest in a major iron and steel plant in Kafue, which was thought to provide 
jobs to 6,000 labourers, including former labourers of KTZ and NCZ, although 
the President indicated that he was not happy with the fact that Kafue had 
become an opposition stronghold (Ibid.). 
In 2003 Kafue Textiles of Zambia had been offered for sale by the Zambia 
Privatisation Agency, and when no buyers were forthcoming, it had to close in 
2004, and more than 700 workers lost their jobs (AAIW, 2003 and 2004). Years 
of cheap imports of second-hand clothes from Europe, and years of ‘bad 
management’ had undermined the survival of what was meant to be one of the 
leading import substitution companies in Zambia, despite the fact that ever more 
of its raw material, cotton, was being produced in Zambia itself, and no longer in 
Tanzania. However, according to UNCTAD (2006:8) KTZ was actually sold in 
2005, but we don’t know what happened afterwards.  
In 2002, in a study about private sector development in Zambia, NORAD 
wrote that NCZ, the fertiliser company, had collapsed (NORAD, 2002:21), 
although not completely so it seems. However, in 2008, NCZ still was in deep 
trouble. The Lusaka Times reported about angry labourers blocking the streets.  
‘Police in Kafue this morning blocked a peaceful marching procession by 
Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) workers who wanted to walk to Lusaka as 
they continue to demonstrate over their non payment of four months salary 
arrears. Over 200 workers only marched up to the Kafue steel plant on their way 
to Lusaka to petition government at the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
over the non payment of salaries and government’s neglect of the plant by not 
funding it and paying for fertilizer it produced in November last year. The 
workers were intercepted by a team of paramilitary and police officers who 
ordered them to retreat and disburse‘ (Lusaka Times, 2008a). In June, the 
problems had not yet been solved:   ‘Traffic on the Kafue-Lusaka road in Kafue 
today came to a standstill after scores of Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) 
workers and their families blocked the main road as they demonstrated 
demanding that government should immediately address their plight ‘ (Lusaka 
Times, 2008b). 
Nakambala: steady growth, under new owners, and now with great hopes 
In July 1994 it was Nakambala Sugar Estate’s turn to be privatised. Tate and 
Lyle (later part of Booker Tate) and CDC, already partial owners, increased their 
shares in the Zambia Sugar Company to 70%, with an investment of 37 million 
US$. Recently South Africa-based Illovo Sugar, a company with 51% UK 
ownership (Associated British Food), took over most of the shares; which are 
now part of the Lusaka Stock Exchange. In January 2007 Zambia Sugar 
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announced that it planned to raise sugar output by almost 70%, from 260,000 
tonnes to 440,000 tonnes in 2011, and that it plans to start producing ethanol at 
its Nakambala Estate plantation, using a by-product of sugar production, 
molasses (currently used as stock feed and exported to South Africa). The 
plantation would increase from 11,000 to 17,000 hectares, and cane production 
from 1.8 million tonnes to 3,3 million tonnes (Reuter, 2008). The expansion 
plans created some tension with the company responsible for Zambia’s 
electricity supply, as it was feared that the irrigation water used by Nakambala 
would jeopardise the volume of water that could be used by the hydro-electricity 
works downstream (Chirwa and Bupe, 2007). This source also added that the 
Zambia Sugar Company’s plans would mean an investment of 840 billion 
Kwachas (more than 200 million US$). It would make Zambia the second largest 
producer of sugar in Africa, after Sudan (Ibid.). In September 2007 Zambia’s 
President, Mwanawasa officially launched this plan of expansion, and also said 
that Nakambala would become fully self-supporting in energy, and that the 
country would not only be known for exporting copper, but also sugar 
(Chishimba, 2007).  
In 1995 FAO included Nakambala Sugar Estate in a study about the impact of 
HIV/AIDS, and included some information about its state of affairs (FAO, 1995: 
Ch. 5 p. 1). It writes:  ‘The Estate has experienced several periods of expansion 
and now has a nominal capacity of 140,000 tonnes of sugar per year with some 
10,000 hectares under cane cultivation. In addition, 1785 hectares of sugar cane 
is provided by the Kaleya Smallholders Scheme, where 140 smallholders manage 
560 ha, and the remainder is run as an estate. Two neighbouring farmers own 
450 ha of sugar cane which they deliver to Nakambala for processing ‘. This 
means that between 1975 and 1995 the area of cane cultivation had almost 
doubled. The number of permanent employees had remained almost the same as 
it was in 1975, but the number of seasonal and temporary employees had 
strongly increased, to almost 5,000 people, still mainly coming from Western 
Province. Compared to 1975 the number of female employees had increased, 
especially in lowly paid jobs (although still low at 12% of the total labour force). 
It was estimated that in total 32,000 people derived their livelihoods from the 
estate. The number of foreigners among the salaried staff had gone down to only 
fourteen. The company had reached a very high profit level in 1992/3: according 
to FAO (1995, Ch. 5.8) total expenditure was 24.9 m. US$, of which 30% on 
labour costs. But total sales were almost 50 m. US$, which meant a gross profit 
of 23.7 m. $. So, it seemed that Nakambala had escaped most of the economic 
horrors that had been so damaging for the rest of Zambia, and prospects are 
good. 
UNCTAD (2006: 43) wrote:  ‘There is considerable scope for increasing 
sugar production and expanding the range and improving the quality of sugar 
products such as bagasse for generating electricity …Presently, Illovo of South 
Africa with some minority foreign partners is the main sugar producer, selling 
65 percent of the refined sugar domestically and exporting the balance to the 
region‘. In 2007, Nakambala Sugar Estate was reported to have 5,102 workers, 
about 3,346 of them as seasonal workers during the cane-cutting period. This 
would mean that more cane was produced, on more land, but with fewer laborers 
compared to 1995. The percentage of white sugar produced for the Zambian 
market had further decreased (to 50%). Ten percent of its white sugar was 
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exported to the European Union under a preferential sugar export treaty, while 
the rest was exported to other southern and east African countries (Reuter, 2008). 
In 2005, a critical article was published in the Times of Zambia about the 
company’s labor situation, attributed to ‘arrogant behavior’ of the new owner 
(but not far from what we had experienced in 1975):  
‘In the first few years of Illovo on the scene, massive infrastructure and state of the 
art plant machinery worth millions of dollars has actually been invested in the firm. 
This was equalled to the ever-improving quality and quantity of the product being 
produced… However, a darker and more depressing scenario amid this success 
story has been unfolding…Most contentious of all is the quality of life on the estate 
which according to some workers who preferred anonymity for fear of reprisals from 
management has deteriorated… A household is only allowed to keep one dog while 
all other forms of domesticated animals such as chickens are banned. The growing 
of backyard vegetables or maize is also outlawed. The residents of the estate have 
also been given an unconstitutional curfew time where anyone found driving or 
walking after the prescribed time unless so permitted is charged… incidences of 
racial slurs against the indigenous Zambians are also on the increase… They 
alleged that most of the jobs that were Zambianised even over a decade ago were 
slowly being reclaimed by expatriates‘. Also there were  ‘numerous complaints from 
the town’s business association and individual suppliers about how indigenous 
Zambian suppliers have been systematically phased out from supplying big contract 
goods and services with the firm opting for South African firms‘ (Mataka, 2005).  
Revisiting peripheral capitalism 
When we did the analysis for our thesis project in 1975, we were confused about 
the relevance of the theories of peripheral capitalism for what we found in our 
empirical work. Of course, Zambia’s economy was in a peripheral position with 
regard to world capitalism (and in fact to all - isms), and its dependence on the 
world market for only one product, copper, was overwhelmingly clear, 
particularly when the party was over. However, the applicability of core 
elements of the theory of peripheral capitalism, such as the importance of foreign 
ownership and management and subsidies from the non-capitalist to the capitalist 
sector to keep wages low, on Zambia’s situation around 1975 was questionable. 
In the ZONE publication, (van Haastrecht 1977) an attempt was made to at least 
leave some of its relevance intact, for instance by arguing that for many of the 
poorest laborers, the seasonal cane cutters of Nakambala, wages indeed had to be 
supplemented by their families back home; and indeed, behind the veil of 
‘Zambianised management’ the real power was often in the hands of foreign 
personnel and advisors. But on the other hand, what we witnessed was a bold 
(now we would say naïve) attempt by the Zambian state to build a state-owned 
economy, against all odds. Between 1964 and 1968, the public sector’s share of 
the economy rose from 14% to 80% (NORAD, 2002:20). It took the 
‘Washington consensus’ more than a decade to break it down, and yet another 
decade to turn Zambia into a country that was much closer to elements of the 
theory of peripheral capitalism than in 1975. What had remained of the (state) 
capitalist sector in 2003 had largely turned into dependencies of foreign 
companies, with an increasing proportion of management again being foreign, 
and with wages often so low, and working conditions so bad, that workers partly 
rely, we assume, on their families beyond the capitalist sector for their survival. 
And otherwise the country was an HIV/AIDS stricken poverty camp, with 
appalling living conditions for the majority of its population.   
We no longer apply the language of Marxism and theories of peripheral 
capitalism, however increasingly we might need to consider trying it again and 
this includes Zambia from 2003 onwards. Yet there are very few scholars who 
are making such attempts at present. It is clear that a country like Zambia still 
faces the downside of global capitalism (or better: of its lack of full-scale 
participation in globalization; and massive reliance on non-capitalist forms of 
production and circulation). The recent economic miracles in some parts of the 
world, spurred by China’s appetite for everything raw (including copper), and 
the world’s panic over its energy supply, are increasing opportunities for Zambia 
and creating much optimism, over its situation, though this is probably, and once 
again, naïve. Zambia may well turn from a western periphery into an eastern 
periphery, but peripheral to the global economy (capitalist, or otherwise) it will 
probably remain for a long time to come.  
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Knowledge development, SNV’s impact 
on world history 
Sef Slootweg 
Introduction 
In 2002, SNV Netherlands Development Organisation launched an internal 
discussion about its organizational strategy. The road to a new strategy was 
paved with documents like What do we want to be good at? (April 2003); What 
do we want to be better at (July 2003) and SNV knowledge – the rough guide 
(September 2003). SNV had positioned itself as a knowledge organisation for 
capacity development. The main question it tried to answer was how its advisory 
services promoted capacity development and thereby could have ‘impact’ on the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. This contribution should be 
read within this context.  
What follows are messages1 I posted on the ‘D-group’2 for SNV network 
leaders and the D-group of SNV West-Africa local governance advisors between 
18 September and 7 October 2004. I made some changes to make them easier to 
understand for outsiders. I thank Rinus van Klinken (SNV Tanzania) for starting 
this discussion and Jörg Schaeffer (SNV Burkina Faso) for pushing me further.  
Prologue : Do we recognize that we are failing? 
In September 2004, Patrick Chabal (King's College London) and Gerard Prinsen 
(ex-SNV Mozambique) facilitated a Learning Platform workshop for SNV 
advisors from East and Southern Africa. At the workshop, Chabal put forward 
the key message of his book Africa Works (Chabal and Deloz, 1999): that Africa 
works in its own ways; ways that are not really compatible with development as 
we, westerners – and especially those in the development sector – conceive it. 
His general argument goes as follows:  
‘Although there are obviously vast differences between countries in this respect, we 
would argue that what all African states share is a generalized system of 
patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high 
level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalization, a 
general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a 
universal resort to personal(izes) and vertical solutions to societal problems’ 
(Chabal and Deloz, 1999: xix).  
                                                          
1 As these are my edited comments, I have left out the reactions of my colleagues. I wish to thank 
Anne Slootweg, Patrick Chabal and Lara Yocarini for their valuable remarks. I take all responsibility 
for the text however. 
2 ‘D-group’ Development through Dialogue is a forum for discussion groups for development 
organisations on the internet: http://www.dgroups.org/.   
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In other words: ‘… in most African countries, the state is no more than a 
décor…’ (ibid:16). Decentralization is often seen as a solution for a weak state. 
Chabal states elsewhere: ‘… the success of decentralisation ultimately rests on 
the quality of State governance’ (Chabal, 2005). Can civil society provide a 
solution for a weak state? No, according to Chabal: ‘Our argument is that the 
emergence of a properly institutionalized civil society, led by politically 
independent citizens, separate from governmental structures, is only possible 
where there is a strong and strongly differentiated state’ (Chabal and Deloz, 
1999:21). The workshop participants were in shock since the core business of 
SNV is to provide capacity strengthening services to local authorities and civil 
society organisations in states that could be classified as weak. Rinus van 
Klinken, trying to catch the emotion of many present, wrote to his fellow 
network leaders:  
‘How do we account for forty years of development co-operation in Africa? Do we 
recognise that we are failing? (…) how are we envisioning how to create 
that impact? By doing more of the same? By doing what everybody else is already 
doing? Doing what we have been doing, but trying to do it better? Or should we look 
for something different? (…) Can SNV really play a part in capturing that Africa, 
that works, and make it productive for the modernisation and the development of the 
continent?’  
This message inspired me to reflect on the role of planning and planners and 
their belief in the possibility of ‘creating a better world’. It also led me to think 
about possible explanations for why development in many parts of Africa 
continues to lag behind. I would like to present two possible explanations for 
this. The first is that not enough people take up the challenge to develop 
themselves3. The second is that development aid has given rise to perverse 
incentives; it pays to show poverty and misery instead of performance and 
opportunities. Since ‘people respond to incentives’ as William Easterly 
(2001:xii) writes, this may help explain why development projects and 
programmes do not work.  
This brings us back to the challenge of how to measure impact. I draw a 
parallel with German history in the first half of the 20th century. Could SNV have 
prevented two world wars, supposing we had been there with our capacity 
development services? My conclusion is that we, in SNV as elsewhere in the 
development business, need to be humble in our goals, we can not change the 
world. But, we all play a little role in world history. 
Monday, September 20th 2004, 9:19 AM – The Science of Muddling 
Through 
This workshop reminds me of the old days, the discussions we had at university, 
back in the seventies. I studied urban and regional planning. We arrived in the 
middle of an academic debate. The new paradigm in planning theory was 
‘process planning’. It was a reaction to the ‘blue print’ planning experience of 
the fifties and sixties and Lindblom's ‘muddling through’ notion of planning 
3 I don’t mean to say Africans generally don’t work. My experience is most Africans work more and 
harder then Europeans with less rewards.  
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(Lindblom 1959). The staff in our department, led by Prof. G. Wissink, applying 
process planning, had in 1972 finished the report Ruimtelijke Ontwikkeling van 
het Stadsgewest Nijmegen tot 1985 (Planologisch Instituut Nijmegen, 1972). By 
1976 the department felt frustrated because the result had stranded in red tape. 
What was going on? Like in Klinkens’ question: ‘do we recognise that we are 
failing?’, academics and practitioners alike, we discovered that society could not 
be engineered. We would make nice plans but according to our teachers 90% of 
new constructions in the built environment had been realised without a proper 
development plan. New constructions were approved based on small ‘stamp size’ 
plans, or excepted as an ‘exemption’ to the valid general plan. As students we 
made a trip to Poland. Poland at the time was a ‘state planned economy’, where 
we thought not a single brick could be placed or moved without proper planning. 
At least that was the theory. It was 1976, and we had long discussions with our 
Polish colleagues. It appeared that even there, constructions in the existing city 
were mostly realised based on ‘coincidental’ decisions of the authorities. We 
were astonished, that even in a planned economy, planning was not really 
planning, but mainly an effort to prevent undesired outcomes, often without 
result. Well, not a very stimulating experience for planning students. Did this 
chase us from the planning faculty? No, we had listened to Bertold Brecht and 
recognized that we cannot change the world with a plan: 
‘Ja mach nur einen Plan  
Sei nur ein großes Licht!  
Und mach dann noch 'nen zweiten Plan 
Gehn tun sie beide nicht’ (Brecht, 1975:111) 
 
The world turns, the society changes and the plan follows, and is by definition 
always too late. We as students had Angst im Kapitalismus (Duhm, 1972). Due 
to Vietnam we understood Lacoste, explaining La Géographie, ça sert, d’abord, 
à faire la guerre (1976). We posed The Urban Question (Castells, 1977), our 
choice was to fight for Social Justice and the City (Harvey, 1973). We embraced 
‘Advocacy Planning’ like Cockburn (1977) did, which meant, taking position for 
those who are victim in the struggle for space and public services. We ended up 
After the Planners (Goodman, 1972), asking ourselves Participation or 
Manipulation with the Dutch ‘Werkgroep 2000’ propagandist of community 
planning Eisse Kalk (1971). Old fashioned? Outdated? Read: The Action Guide 
to Advocacy and Citizen Participation (VeneKlasen, 2007). 
Back to our problem. I think that the development industry never left the stage 
of social engineering. We want ‘to make a difference’. It is even worse; we think 
that SNV can have a direct and visible impact on the reduction of poverty and 
the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals. If not worldwide than at 
least in a country, or may be only in a province, or may be just in a village or a 
neighbourhood4. And if that goal proves itself too big and complicated, we shift 
our change effort to a social sector like the health system, or education, or we try 
to support the development of a specific market chain like cashew nuts or cotton. 
Time and again we try to show the impact of our efforts to support those who 
‘pursue their own sustainable development’ 5 But we fail to perform. Have we, 
the blue print planners of the sixties, the process planners or advocacy planners 
4 SNV’s 2007-2015 strategy is called: Local Impact, Global Presence (SNV, 2007) 
5 From SNV’s mission statement. 
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of the seventies in fact just ended up ‘muddling through’ the eighties and 
nineties? Society has changed and not as we, planners of a better world, had 
thought or wished. We have good hopes for Latin America and Asia, but for 
Africa we are really pessimistic. But can we attribute the success of the Asian 
Tigers, of China, India and Brazil to the efforts of the development industry? 
Why is it that those countries in Asia that developed best, were the ones that 
received relatively little development assistance?  And why do we not see much 
progress in Africa, where much of the development efforts were concentrated?  
In my second year at university we already discovered the answer: ‘Aid does 
not work’ (Onderwijskern, 1972). Our conclusion as students then was not 
‘abolish aid’, but ‘make it work’. In order to make it work we have to understand 
what works and what not and why. As Hounkonnou explains, we have to Listen 
to the Cradle (Hounkonnou, 2001) to understand what works. He defends SNV’s 
‘process approach’ as practiced in the nineties. He urges us to listen to people in 
villages and neighbourhoods to understand how they survive and create their 
own future. We need to carefully support these efforts without destroying them 
with an overdose of log frames and development money. And this means SNV 
can only play a modest role in the development of the continent. We have to 
abandon the presumption that SNV (or the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, or the World Bank) can develop a continent. This continent will develop 
itself. With all the ‘mistakes’ that go with it: war, famine, diseases, religious 
hatred, ethnic cleansing, racial tensions and nationalism. But is this not 
something that we recognize so well from Europe’s, America’s and Japan’s past? 
When we manage to overcome our past, there is hope for Africa too. It will take 
more than the lifecycle of an SNV mission statement, I'm afraid. 
Sent: Saturday, September 25th 2004, 10:34 AM – It Is The Mentality  
“Do you think it is possible to write a good article that shows the good things of 
our new SNV approach and why we think changing mentalities is the most 
important factor to make it work? I think more and more this is the keyword. We 
are not directly and may be even not indirectly contributing to the reduction of 
poverty or to achieving other Millennium Development Goals. We work in order 
to change mentality. We raise awareness for the idea that it is in the first place 
the people in communities, villages and cities who are responsible for their own 
development. Not the mayor, the government or the ’international community’. 
All support is in vain when development does not come from the internal forces 
of a society.  
A small example from a colleague: Boukoumbé, a rural municipality in the 
north of Benin is twinned with a municipality in the Netherlands. The Boukombé 
Development Plan had revealed that the health centres are underused. The reason 
being that trained and qualified staff do not want to live in Boukombé. Therefore 
finding and accommodating qualified staff is one of the development priorities of 
the municipality. In May 2003 the Dutch sister municipality promised to finance 
the education for three Boukoumbé girls to be trained as a nurse in Parakou, a 
town in a different region of the country. Motivated girls who wanted to become 
nurses were found and their parents agreed to send them there. All that was left 
to do was to arrange some formalities. The registration deadline was September, 
but neither the municipality nor the parents took the necessary steps to register 
the girls in time. Their application was therefore submitted too late, and their 
admission denied. The municipality promised the Dutch partner and the girls that 
they would not miss the next opportunity. But this year again, they are late. One 
of the girls could travel to Parakou for the application form but the municipality 
did not manage to send the completed forms back to Parakou in time. They asked 
SNV to help. And of course this is what SNV did. But will it really help? 
What can we do? How can we let Boukombé discover that its future is in its 
own hands? Should SNV deny this service and not organise the admission 
procedure for them, in their place? Should we stress it is their own responsibility 
to seize opportunities: ‘Stop the complaining and the requests for help. When you 
choose not to use the chances you get offered, live happily forever with your 
Tchoucoutou6 and stay in your poverty’. Nobody, and certainly not our SNV 
staff, will talk like this. I am one of the few who bring this up. But it appears that 
some of my friends from Benin share my opinion. I work with one or two 
mayors that take up the challenge. They have great difficulty in convincing their 
population and voters. Voters choose a candidate because they expect him to 
solve their problems, not to hear that they themselves are responsible for finding 
solutions. 
A second example. Yesterday I accompanied the wives of the European 
ambassadors to ‘les Aguèguès’, a beautiful municipality in the south of Benin.  
 
 
 
M. le Maire des Aguèsguès, Jonas Aklé, avec Mesdames les Ambassadeurs 
(Photo by Sef Slootweg) 
                                                          
6 Tchoucoutou is a thick, sweet local beer brewed in the North of Benin. 
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As this is a municipality situated in Lake Nokoué we visited the three 
arrondissements of les Aguegues by boat. We received a warm welcome from 
the local authorities and various women groups with music and dance. And of 
course the women grasped the opportunity to explain their situation. Everywhere 
we heard the same story: ‘we are poor, we need help’. In one arrondissement the 
ambassadors’ wives also met a women group that had started a chicken farm, 
grew vegetables and was planning a fish breeding business. They were 
successful in selling their products to major supermarkets. But even they focused 
on telling their stories of poverty and the help they needed.  Jonas Aklé, the 
mayor, was asked why the women were not proud of their achievements and did 
not show confidence in their chances for success. He answered: ‘It is the 
mentality’. He explained that these women were ‘conditioned by the successive 
support programmes to believe that it paid to show poverty. When you show 
strength and confidence you do not qualify for support’. He gave the example of 
a recently started World Bank Programme for ’community-driven development’. 
The first selection criterion for a community to qualify for participation in the 
program was the level of poverty. ‘How then can you expect people to build on 
their strength?’ The mayor felt practically alone in his fight to encourage pride 
and self respect.  
How on earth can we get this changed? That is the fundamental question I’d 
like our network to talk about. And that is why I want to involve our local 
governance D-group in the search for what works and what not and why. 
Sent: Wednesday, October 6th 2004, 4:37 PM – People Respond To 
Incentives 
“Yesterday I saw a wonderful film Das Wunder von Bern (Wortmann, 2003), 
dealing with the way a German family (and Germany as such) tried to get back 
on its feet again, back in the fifties of the last century. The story used the 1954 
football world championship as a metaphor. The film explained how a destroyed 
person, family, country, can regain its self-respect and the respect of the world. 
And again this tells me about development as well. Africa is in this respect not 
different from Europe. But it has a long way to go. I want to get away from the 
moral side and more into the realistic side, which means to me always, start from 
practice, learn from practice, turn it into theory and apply that into practice again 
(Mao Tsetung, 1971 and Mao tse-Toeng, 1971).  
I read also a formidable book, from William Easterly: The Elusive Quest for 
Growth or Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Easterly, 
2001). He is a former World Bank employee and his thesis is: ‘people respond to 
incentives’ (ibid:xii). Easterly explains that many development projects and 
programmes just do not provide the right incentives, and therefore they don’t 
achieve results and even make matters worse. ‘Free’ gifts, and rewarding non 
performance (by ‘listening to the heart' and by 'helping the poorest of the poor’) 
are no good incentives.  I want to go on with my practical observations like in 
Boukoumbé and les Aguégués and try to formulate why ‘aid’ does not work. I 
believe that ‘good’ incentives do exist and that we in SNV can help to develop 
them. This means with Easterly we have to challenge the prevailing paradigm of 
development theory. So African and European practitioners unite! You 
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remember the expression ‘philosophers have only interpreted the world, (…) the 
point, however, is to change it’ (Marx, 1970:30). 
Sent: Thursday, October 7th 2004, 8:35 AM – Measuring Impact 
“Indeed, one of our concerns is how to measure impact. Currently we promote 
decentralisation. Because we presume that this will bring politics and the 
responsibility for development closer to the citizens. That is why we, in our role 
as practitioners, want to know: does decentralisation (and what kind of 
decentralisation and how introduced) has an impact on poverty reduction? The 
back of our business card says: ‘SNV is dedicated to a society where all people 
enjoy the freedom to pursue their own sustainable development. Our advisors 
contribute to this by strengthening the capacity of local organisations’. Do our 
SNV advisory services have impact on poverty alleviation and ‘good 
governance’? Do we free people to pursue their own development? 
Suppose a small organisation like SNV would have worked between 1900 and 
1950 in Europe in Germany with the mission to strengthen the capacity of local 
organisations to promote democracy and ‘good governance’. Could this small 
organisation have claimed impact? Few will answer positively. We would not 
have been able to prevent wars, the killing fields, or the destruction camps. 
Would our efforts have been in vain? This in fact is the dilemma we face in 
many African countries. Yet many inside and outside Germany have tried hard to 
change the course of history at that time. And I believe that this struggle was the 
cradle of success for Germany in the second half of the 20th century. And when 
finally the Wall tumbled in Berlin, the optimism about the course of history was 
so immense that Fukuyama predicted the End of History and the Last Man 
(1992). However, history proved Fukuyama wrong, the introduction of the 
market economy and the introduction of liberal democracy is not enough to 
change the world in a paradise for mankind. He wrote Trust (Fukuyama, 1995) 
building on Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (1993) about the importance of 
civic traditions for development, to stress some years later the importance of the 
central state for development in: State-Building (Fukuyama, 2004).  
I do agree that we do not live in 20th century Germany but in 21st century 
West Africa. I want to make visible why it makes sense what we do. That it is a 
support for people who want to develop themselves. And so we must be specific 
about the effect and impact we like to achieve with our support. What is it that 
our clients know better? (1) What is it that they do differently with this 
knowledge? (2) And what is the outcome of these actions in services to people? 
(3) And do these services lead to a longer and richer life? In other words what is 
the impact on realising the Millennium Development Goals? (4) We might go as 
far as measuring the first and maybe the second point. The third and fourth 
appear only measurable in the very long run, if we are lucky. That is, if our 
impact is not annihilated by the impact of other events like the political, social, 
economic, ecologic conflicts at country, regional or world level.  
 
Exhibition poster Valkhof Museum 2000 
 (all rights: Wunderbar Visuele Communicatie, Nijmegen) 
Epilogue, Nijmegen, January 8th , 2008 – Hope for Planners 
It was the final day of the exhibition: De Seventies in Nijmegen, Tien Krejatieve 
Aksiejaren in the Valkhof Museum in Nijmegen. A debate was held to mark the 
end of the exhibit. The main subject of the debate was the impact of the 
‘Socialistiese Studentenbonden’7 on society. Ton van Naerssen took the floor 
and explained: ‘These “Creative Action Years” left no trace whatsoever on the 
university. Today’s university would not operate differently without the actions 
of the student groups of that period. But this does not mean that these years 
made no sense’. He referred to the effect these years had on the individuals who 
participated in it and studied, worked and agitated for a better world8. Again the 
                                                          
7 The socialist student leagues had been established in 1970 and 1971 in many Nijmegen University 
Faculties, and were united in the ‘6 October Group’ from October 6th , 1971. 
8 Ton himself is a product of the action years of the sixties and seventies. He was known for his 
leading role in actions against the invitation for Suharto minister Seda to address the 1968 Nijmegen 
Lustrum Congress (Koster, 1979:103). When he applied for a post, the Geography Department was 
not keen getting this rebel on board. The student representatives in the Faculty Council together with 
the staff of the Planning Department voted for his appointment at the Nijmegen ‘Interfaculteit 
Aardrijkskunde en Préhistorie’, end of 1972. I am proud to have been a member of the council that 
year. 
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same question. Does it make sense what we do and strive for? What has changed 
between the early seventies and today? And in how far has it been a result of our 
actions? Has Africa changed between 1972 and today?  
In 1972 the ‘Onderwijskern Geografiek’ published its short course development 
geography for high school called: Wie zwijgt stemt toe… (who remains silent 
agrees).  The chapter ‘Is there a solution for the problem of underdevelopment?’ 
starts like this: ‘We have seen that despite development aid, the poor countries 
have not improved. Aid does not help’ (Onderwijskern, 1972: 43). ‘Aid’ is not 
meant to help the poor, it helps the rich, was the message. The message about 
what might work was the principle ‘Not Aid But Trade’ (Onderwijskern 
1972:xiii). Surprisingly modern, has nothing changed? Is there a solution? And 
what is the answer? Easterley, in his quest to blame the planners formulated this 
as: ‘the only Big Answer is there is No Answer’ (2006:30,382) and ‘the best plan 
is to have no plan’ (2006:5). Is there no hope for planners?  
In 1973, a group of students prepared a theme about The effect of the political-
ideological developments on the situation of underdevelopment in China and 
Indonesia. One of them was me. Our idea at the time was that China with its 
‘great cultural revolution’ was on the good road. One quote: ‘China (…) is not 
tempted to become at all cost a welfare state in order to surpass the capitalist 
countries in an attempt to proof the superiority of socialism with the production 
of an abundance of consumer goods’ (Slootweg, 1974:22). Authors with name 
and fame had convinced us: ‘By the year 2001 she (China, ssl) will be a powerful 
industrial socialist State’ (Suyin, 1967:231). I believe history proved us wrong. 
We are 35 years sadder and wiser. China (now 20% of the world population, 
then near 25%) has developed into a world power, indeed, as we thought 35 
years ago. But the success was not caused by ‘the cultural revolution’. China is 
defeating the West exactly by producing an abundance of consumer goods. And I 
cannot withdraw from the idea that having a long term vision; formulating 
strategies; learning from mistakes; setting goals and defining actions to achieve 
them, has had to do something with China’s success. There still is hope for the 
planners. 
Post script: And SNV’s Impact? 
The e-mail discussion of which these messages were part continued in the SNV 
Learning Platform in 2005, 2006 and 2007, again with Patrick Chabal and 
Gerard Prinsen. Altogether some 58 SNV advisors used their free time to read, 
discuss, research and reflect on their practice. The result can be found in 36 
research papers of which 16 are presented in the 2005 and 2007 AEGIS and the 
2006 ASAUK international Africa academic conferences (van Klinken et al. 
2007, Slootweg 2007)9. Have a look, you’ll be surprised.  
9 Individual papers can be downloaded from 
http://www.snvworld.org/en/regions/esa/ourwork/Pages/ESA-Publications.aspx and 
http://ecas2007.aegis-eu.org/FindAbstractsByPanel.aspx?TrackID=74 
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 Migration Trajectories  
 
7 
Return migration and development: a 
complicated marriage 
Tine Davids and Ruerd Ruben 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been increasing attention for the potential contribution 
of migration to “development” in migrant-sending countries (Özden and Schiff, 
2007). Return migration takes a somewhat special and ambivalent place in the - 
often assumed - unilateral relationship between migration and development. On 
one hand, return migrants have traditionally been attributed a crucial role in 
stimulating the possible local process. They are often expected to generate 
braingain or, more generally, contribute to social and cultural linkages that 
enhance the availability of capital and knowledge resources that might provide a 
significant development impulse to the society of origin (de Haas, 2005). If the 
rhythm of development in their country of origin takes a positive turn, migrants 
are likely to be amongst the first to join in and recognise such new opportunities, 
thus reinforcing these positive trends through investing and/or returning to their 
origin countries (de Haas, 2007). Consequently, sending countries are believed to 
benefit from the return of their migrants, who’s financial and human resources 
are believed to contribute to development. 
On the other hand, especially within Europe where immigration policies have 
become stricter (partly in response to growing xenophobic attitudes), remigration 
becomes more and more related to the shift and changing perspectives in 
immigration policies, which have led to a growing emphasis on (forced and 
voluntary) return rather than integration (Black and Gent 2004:4-5; Blitz and 
Marzano, 2005:182-183). In the Netherlands, for instance, in this context of 
growing interrelatedness between remigration and restricted immigration, policy 
memoranda were formulated by the Dutch ministry for Alien Affairs and 
Integration, suggesting that development cooperation should be used as a 
strategy to contain the influx of migrants (Verdonk, 2003). While the minister of 
Development Cooperation stated at the same that - although containment of 
migration and international cooperation are not the same - they are indeed linked 
together, implying that an effective return could be favoured through 
international cooperation (Ardenne, 2003). In addition, sustainable return could 
contribute to local development processes. Return and remigration - forced or 
not - thus became part and parcel of a political discourse of which NGOs 
working with migrants, refugees and development were very reluctant to take 
part, rendering remigration and return a highly problematic phenomenon from a 
development perspective (PON, 2004).  
In this article we provide a reflection on the phenomenon of return migration 
based on extensive field research on the sustainability of remigration processes 
under forced returnees, carried out by staff of the Radboud University Nijmegen 
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Centre for International Development Issues (CIDIN).1 We argue for the 
importance to consider return migration as a process of mixed embeddedness and 
depart form an understanding of remigration within the framework of the politics 
of belonging. We demonstrate that such an approach leads to new insights 
regarding the complex interfaces between social, economic and psychosocial 
factors influencing local embeddedness processes, and we identify major 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors that influence this process of mixed 
embeddedment. Most importantly, the study reveals that prospects for better 
local embeddedment of return migrants in their countries of origin strongly 
depend on the loving circumstances provided to them in the host country. 
In so doing we share an approach in line with, and certainly inspired by Ton 
van Naerssen’s own approach concerning the relation between migration and 
development and his keen interest for international entrepreneurship, where the 
concept of mixed embeddedness originates from. In particular since he always 
advocates that it is a common mistake to equate development with economic 
growth and loose sight of the human dimension in development: “However the 
issue of development is much more complex and includes social, cultural and 
political aspects” (van Naerssen in Nijenhuis et al., 2007:15).  
Returning, development and belonging 
From a research and policy perspective, the link between return migration and 
home country development is not new. The Western European experience with 
“guest workers” from Morocco and Turkey provides early examples. In the 
1960s and 1970s, both sending and host-country governments considered their 
stay as temporary. They were generally expected to return after a few years and 
to deploy their financial resources and newly acquired knowledge for the 
economic development of their home countries. In particular after the 1973 Oil 
Crisis, receiving countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands 
experimented with policy incentives to stimulate return migration. The general 
image is that such policies failed and that the majority of migrants became 
settled in Western Europe, triggering a process of chain migration through 
family reunification and family formation. Low return migration coincided with 
the increasingly pessimistic views on the development potential of migration 
(Entzinger, 1985, Penninx, 1982, de Bree et al., forthcoming). 
More recently, within the renewed attention for remigration, return is 
increasingly considered as the natural thing to do for migrants, while at the same 
time, many positive influences for the country of return are attributed to it (see: 
Black and Gent 2006). Return is thus seen as an indicator for the maturing of a 
state and a way of contributing towards peace processes in post-conflict 
1 The research is based on a pilot study from 2006 among a total of 131 voluntary and involuntary 
returning migrants from Western Europe and relocated migrants from mainly Angola, Guinea, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia and a standardised monitoring study from 2007/2008 on 
assistance to 178 involuntary returning irregular migrants rejected asylum seekers and ex refugees in 
six different countries in three different continents: Sierra Leone, Togo, Armenia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Vietnam. In this study, quantitative methods (such as standardised 
surveys, factor and regression analysis) were used in combination with qualitative methods (such as 
in-depth interviews and life history analysis). 
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countries or (in the case of former Yugoslavia) to reverse ethnic cleansing (Black 
and Gent, 2004, Black, 2001, Eastmond, 2006). The most recent buzz word 
emphasising the bright side of return migration is that it could trigger the 
development of the home country. European policy makers have been quick to 
embrace this viewpoint and readily incorporate it in the new migration policies.  
In this discourse where migration policies are articulated with development 
policy, return is all too often and to easily considered as simply ‘going home’. 
As if it would be possible to just take up life where one has left. Although the 
post-return experiences of migrants are relatively understudied, empirical 
evidence shows that return is almost never simply going home (Ghanem 2003, 
Hammond, 1999, Pedersen, 2003). Let alone that going “home” would simply 
contribute to local development (Van Houte and De Koning, 2008). 
Consequently, many of the real experiences of (re)migrants do not fit into the 
dichotomous categories produced in the discourses that oppose “returned” vs. 
“settled” migrants (see also: Snel et al., 2004).  
Within this dichotomy, return implies smooth (re-)integration into the country 
of origin, which is - especially in the case of forced returnees - almost never the 
case. Not only is the dichotomy of returned versus settled not adequate to 
understand the remigration process, the term integration also falls short in 
capturing under which conditions migrants arrive to some form of settlement and 
acquire a sense of belonging. Integration within the public and political discourse 
on migration usually goes accompanied by connotations of adaptation to 
dominant norms in society. This suggests that the receiving country is one of 
social cohesion where existing cultural, ethnic, class or other difference are fully 
neglected (Anthias, 2006). Research has shown that in reality this process is far 
more complex. Returnees have to negotiate all these differences from a different 
predisposition after their migration experience, which contradicts the idea of 
simply fitting in because they arrive a gain in their country of origin (de Bree et 
al. forthcoming). Approaching (re)migration from such an integration 
perspective constructs newcomers in receiving countries foremost as the ‘others’, 
thus ignoring the predispositions from returnees or just considering that they can 
easily blend.  
Furthermore, in particular in the case of forced migrants, remigration often 
implies returning to a changed country, where social relations, political 
structures and economic conditions are not what they used to be when the place 
was left. Confronted by such difficulties and given the sometimes difficult 
conditions of (re)settlement, the relation with development becomes very fragile. 
Expecting returnees that did not have the intention to return in the first place, to 
invest in a society where they do not want to be, turns out to be a strongly 
overestimated perspective.2 It remains largely neglected how efforts for trying to 
gain some sort of belonging on behalf of returnees might counteract (at least in 
the short run) with their eventual attribution to the development of their countries 
of origin. Articulating remigration programs with development policies - as 
described above – tends to disguise the critical relation between individual sense 
of belonging and the politics of belonging as part of that same development 
process. Politics of belonging refers to specific political projects that try to define 
the boundaries of those who belong to a certain group or nation and those who 
2 In contrast to what NGOs and policy makers refer to as ‘voluntary return’, in this article, those 
migrants who did not manage to obtain a permanent permit to stay, or returned outside their own 
personal desire, are referred to as involuntary or forced migrants. 
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cannot exercise this belonging. Restricted national migration policies, citizenship 
arrangements or return projects are all critical aspects that can contribute (or not) 
to the re-construction or reconstitution of such boundaries and differences 
(Yuval-Davis et al., 2006).  
Returnees have to actively negotiate these boundaries and differences upon 
their return, trying to construct a new sense of belonging and to formulate an 
identity. In studying the return process and its possible relation with 
development, this process of belonging has to be taken in consideration and 
needs to receive more emphasis and exploration than it has received so far within 
development studies. In order to do so and to avoid the negative connotations of 
the concept of integration as described above, we opted for using the alternative 
concept of mixed embeddedness for exploring whether return can be sustainable 
or not. 
Embeddedness 
Why mixed embeddedness? 
Embeddedness is a concept originally developed and used within the context of 
institutional economics, launched in 1985 by Granovetter to identify trust as part 
of social networks that are crucial for the successful transactions of companies. 
Mixed embeddedness has also been used by Aldrich (1995), Aldrich and 
Waldinger (1990) and Kloosterman (2006) in exploring immigrant 
entrepreneurship. The basic idea of this concept refers to the process in which a 
person, organisation or company is able to participate in a given society 
depending heavily on the identity dimension (see also: Davids and van Houte 
,forthcoming). Although it may argued that embeddedness is just another word 
for integration, it is important to bear in mind that in trying to conceptualise this 
process differently (from the way it is used in public integration and migration 
discourses) by using new or different concepts and metaphors can help to open 
new avenues for understanding the complex nature of society-group interactions.  
Translated to remigration research, (re-)embeddedness entails a 
multidimensional concept that refers to an individual finding his/her own 
position in society and feeling a sense of belonging to and participating in that 
society. It consists of economic, social networks and psychosocial dimensions 
that are interrelated and could reinforce each other. As such, it takes remigration 
to be an ongoing process distinguishing different grades of participation and 
belonging to a society, which can be applied equally to migrants and non-
migrants. Embedding is not simply measured by adaptation to dominant norms. 
Nor can re-migration be considered isolated from other stages in the migration 
cycle; it involves the experiences of dis-embedding in the country of origin when 
leaving, as well as the experiences of embedding in receiving countries.3  
In contrast to departing from the predisposition that constructs migrants as 
‘others’ in receiving countries and re-migrants as ‘alike’ in sending countries, the 
concept of mixed embeddedness proposes to explore in what way and in how far 
re-migrants are considered to be ‘others’ or construct themselves as ‘others’ or as 
3 See also Boyd and Griego (2003) who distinguish different stages of the migration cycle. 
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‘alike’. The dispositions with which a re-migrant arrives in the country of origin 
cannot be taken as given but need to be explored based on the everyday 
epistemologies of the returnees themselves. Following this approach, the 
operationalization of mixed embeddedness implied a mixture of quantitative 
methods (such as standardised surveys and regression analysis) that can be used 
in combination with qualitative methods (such as in depth interviews and life 
history analysis).  
Mixed Embeddedness and Sustainable Return  
Black et al. (2004:25) distinguishes between three elements of sustainable return: 
the subjective perspective of the returnee, the objective conditions of the 
returnee, and the aggregate conditions of the home country. Building on the 
concept of embeddedness, this means that not only measurable socio-economic 
indicators are taken into account, but also the importance that returnee attribute 
to these different elements plays a role. This approach furthermore assumes that 
individual sustainability is needed to guarantee a contribution to the stability of 
the home society.  
The economic dimension of embeddedness refers to questions whether a 
returnee can rebuild a sustainable livelihood. Chambers and Conway (1991:6) 
define a sustainable livelihood as follows: A livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets (i.e. stocks of resources, claims and access) and activities 
required for making a living. In practice, a livelihood comprises the extent to 
which an individual owns, or otherwise has access to resources and assets, such 
as income, housing, land, livestock, transportation, education and health care. 
Moreover, it encompasses the livelihood capabilities which individuals can 
maintain and expand with these assets. Livelihoods are sustainable when they 
can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance their 
capabilities and assets, provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for next 
generations, and guarantee net benefits to other livelihoods both at local and 
global levels and in the short and long term (Chambers and Conway 1991; De 
Haan et al., 2004; De Haan and Zoomers, 2003). 
Social networks represent another dimension of embeddedness. Boekestijn 
(1988, 89) stressed that social relations provide migrants with the feeling of 
being accepted, and that social acceptance is a crucial factor for migration 
success. Social networks are important for acquiring information as well as 
sharing personal and intimate relations. In a more dynamical sense, social 
networks can add to social capital. Social capital refers to the features of social 
organisation, reciprocity, networks, information flows and social safety nets that 
emerge from social contacts between individuals in the society. This could lead 
to a more efficient and stable position of the individual in society. Whether 
returnee can benefit from social capital depends on the type of social networks 
they maintain. Not only the quantity and frequency of individual social contacts 
are important. Social contacts become valuable when there is some sort of 
‘closeness’, the feeling that one can really rely on the other. According to 
Cassarino (2004:275), social networks are crucial for understanding the ways in 
which returnees can mobilize their resources while at the same time being 
involved in creating and maintaining cross-border social and socio-economic 
networks. For sustainable embeddedness, these networks need to be responsive 
to specific pre- and post-return conditions. 
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In addition to material wellbeing, psychosocial wellbeing is equally essential 
for finding one’s place in society, and to acquire a sense of belonging to that 
society. An important aspect of this psychosocial well-being refers to the ability 
to construct and express one’s identity. It provides an individual with a place in 
society, and at the same time establishes the connection between the self and that 
society (Ter Maat, 2002:15). Being free to construct one’s identity and having 
this identity accepted in a wider society, leads to a feeling of belonging and 
attachment to certain localities, although these attachments and the way in which 
returnees position themselves may at the same time be highly trans-local (see 
also Anthias 2006, de Bree at al. forthcoming). 
Identity is always dynamic, multidimensional and contextual (Giddens, 1991; 
Hall, 1991). Identity is not a fixed and given character of a person. Rather, it is a 
dynamic process: a changing view of the self and the other. It is constantly 
influenced by different – sometimes opposing - processes (Ghorashi, 2001:22). 
The process of migration and remigration represent such processes (Nagel and 
Staeheli, 2004). Changes in geographical and cultural settings can lead to 
dramatic identity changes. In additional, returnees may also construct a 
transnational identity, which comprises a set of new hybrid cultural forms 
combined out of different cultures (Appadurai, in Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002:4; 
Brah, 1996; Dwyer, 2000). Upon return, a complex situation is likely to emerge. 
The returnees’ new hybrid identities do not necessarily fit into the home society 
that has likely also undergone significant changes. In the ideal situation, the 
migrants will combine the best of both worlds and could benefit from this 
(Ghorashi, 2003:5). However, this situation can also create a feeling of ‘in-
betweenness’ for the returnee; the feeling that they do not belong anywhere 
anymore (Ghorashi ,2001:119). The reaction of each individual returnee could be 
found somewhere between these two extremes.  
It will be clear that all these dimensions of embeddedness are highly 
contextual and may differ consequently amongst countries. Notwithstanding 
these differences, in the research project carried out by CIDIN, we tried to 
analyse the influence of assistance provision (by governmental or non 
governmental organisations) on the prospects for re-embeddedment of migrants 
in their countries of origin. We especially considered the influence of the 
migration policies in the host country on the process of sustainable return 
migration.  
Findings 
The most important findings in exploring remigration as a process of mixed 
embeddedness indicate that (a) there is considerable diversity amongst the 
experienced levels of embeddedness amongst return migrants, and (b) individual 
return migrants experience wide varying degrees of economic, social and 
psychosocial embeddedment. In the majority of the cases concerning involuntary 
return, the returnees have barely been able to construct a sustainable livelihood 
(see also Van Houte and Davids, 2008 forthcoming).4  
4 See also Van Houte and de Koning (2008) Towards a better embeddedness? Monitoring assistance 
to involuntary returning migrants from Western countries. Research Report. Nijmegen: CIDIN, 
Cordaid and AMIDSt, and Van Houte and Davids (2008m forthcoming) ‘Development and Return-
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Economic embeddedness 
On the economic dimension of embeddedness, many returnees who participated 
in the survey managed to meet their basic daily needs, such as accommodation 
and a certain amount of income, but their situation is often unstable. House 
ownership was very low and consequently most returnees had to live with 
relatives, sometimes causing tensions due to overcrowded houses. Also in terms 
of income, most returnees remain in an unstable and dependent position. In the 
sample of the 2007 return migration study, 50 percent fully depended on sources 
of income other than their own income generating capacities, such as allowance 
from relatives, remittances, loans, public relief, or humanitarian assistance.  
Not having control over their own income, or depending on unstable sources 
of income puts these returnees in a very vulnerable position. The migrants that 
manage to generate a somewhat more independent income through salary or 
revenue from trade (50 per cent) are not necessarily in a sustainable income 
position either. Only 30 per cent of those with stable employment report that 
their income is sufficient to support themselves and their dependents. In sum, 
returnees are often worse off in terms of access to independent housing and 
income compared to their pre-migration situation. 
 Although for voluntary returnees the economic situation is different and not as 
fragile as for involuntary returnees, their return is not always economically 
successful either. Often, these migrants depend on ‘Old Age Pension’ (AOW) or 
´Occupational Disability Insurance´ (WAO). In addition, 45+ returnees can 
sometimes make use of an occupational disability insurance provided under the 
´Remigration Act´ (REM) (de Bree et al. forthcoming). This arrangement 
encourages return by covering returnees´ travel expenses and monthly living 
costs. Returnees that are most successful in economic terms are those who 
voluntary returned, were well-prepared and without any assistance. In the case of 
Suriname, for instance it was registered that people who returned independently 
and without any assistance were better prepared than those returning within the 
government-sponsored program for return, as this financial incentive for return 
often leads to too quick decisions (Bredewold, 2006; Huis in ‘t Veld, 2006).  
Social Embeddedness 
For fulfilling material needs, it is critical to find meaningful social contacts. Only 
42 per cent of the return migrants stated that they could rely on their social 
contacts for material support (mainly accommodation). Living with family 
members not only implies having access to shelter, but also sharing in the 
household’s other assets and income. Furthermore, having access to meaningful 
networks could also bring them into contact with their relations, who could 
provide returnees with employment or in another way help them rebuild their 
livelihoods. However, only returnees from privileged socio-economic 
backgrounds seemed to have access to these kinds of social relations. In less 
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wealthy families, as returnees stretch the already limited budget of the 
household, they tend to cause a major burden. This explains part of the 
frustration that relatives sometimes express towards their returnee relatives. It 
may be no surprise that relatives in already unstable wealth cannot be a source of 
material assistance to returnees, since - as many returnees state - : ‘they do not 
have anything themselves’. 
Most returnees have, for a number of reasons, only a small network of people 
on whom they can really rely. Mostly, these are members of their nuclear family. 
This puts returnees again in a rather vulnerable position. Returnees who lost 
these relations or for any other reason, do not have enough contacts on whom 
they can rely for their material (and emotional) needs, run the risk to become 
isolated. Social capital is thus of vital importance both for involuntary as for 
voluntary returnees upon and after return, to become part of local networks for 
information provision, access to resources and exchange networks (see also 
Casarino 2007).  
Psycho-social embeddedness 
A majority of involuntary returnees could rely on their social contacts for 
emotional support. This includes being able to confide in their social contacts, 
feeling trust towards and comfort with their contacts, sharing experiences and 
spending time together. Married respondents highly depend on their spouse to 
find emotional support and for sharing their problems. Three quarters of the 
sample state, however, that they changed during their time abroad and that they 
sometimes face difficulties in the country of return because of their modified 
identity. As returnees have often stayed abroad for many years, they have 
adopted some of the norms and values of the host country, and this influences 
how returnees perceive and behave towards the home country. 
The way returnees are perceived by the society in the country of return 
strongly depends on the extent to which a returnee had a ‘successful’ migration 
experience. When a returnee was forced to leave the host country and, or did not 
manage to bring back money or assets, return is frequently seen as a failure. 
Consequently, these returnees are often stigmatized, excluded and discriminated. 
Differences in attitudes or behaviour from the dominant patterns are usually not 
accepted as being positive. This makes it difficult for them to construct a feeling 
of belonging. As a result, almost 40 per cent of the respondents claimed that they 
had trouble in expressing their identity as a returnee, and some of them preferred 
to conceal their ‘returnee’ status in trying to adjust to the dominant culture again. 
Behaviour that deviates from the norm is generally not well received and 
frowned upon. 
In contrast, those returnees with a positive and successful migration experience 
were happy to be back and gained status from their newly acquired skills. As the 
experienced socio-economic changes also led to something meaningful for them 
and their family members, their behaviour was also generally better tolerated. 
This illustrates that different dimensions of embeddedness are interrelated and 
reinforce each other. 
This also holds true for voluntary returnees: the more successful the migration 
experience the better re-embedded in the country of origin. However, it does not 
mean that all returnees easily adapt to their country of origin again. In the case of 
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Morocco, for instance, it became clear that in constructing a sense of belonging 
returnees apply transnational practises. They are not exclusively embedded in the 
local context of their communities of origin, but generally feel strong needs to 
maintain a number of economic, political and socio-cultural transnational 
practices (de Bree 2007; de Bree at al. forthcoming 2008). These return migrants 
uphold in varying degrees their Moroccan-Dutch or a Dutch-Moroccan identity. 
The transnational practices they exercise in constructing such an identity are 
highly dependent on motivations for return, gender and generation. Especially 
for former male labour migrants the incorporation of transnational practices in 
their lives is critical for establishing feelings of post-return belonging, whereas 
such practices were less relevant for their wives. Instead, they prefer to return to 
the Netherlands to improve the lives of their children, who feel uprooted in 
Morocco despite the transnational practices they hold. 
Other aspects of the psychosocial dimension of embeddedness refer to 
psychological condition and the feelings of (un)safety. In often post-conflict 
societies where migrants migrated from, this is a key issue in itself. Furthermore, 
the migration experience can cause a feeling of cultural bereavement, which may 
include the loss of social structures, cultural values and self-identity. This may 
cause serious psychological disorders such as depression, phobia and 
schizophrenia (Bhugra and Becker, 2005). Psychosocial embeddedness in (post-) 
conflict countries depends very much on the feeling of safety. Physical un-safety 
is often still experienced in post-conflict countries due to lasting disputes and 
social and/or political tensions. This affects the mobility and limits the choice of 
place of residence for the returnees, who are restricted in returning to or visiting 
their pre-war homes or communities Furthermore, in almost all countries, a lack 
of general safety feelings was reported due to unstable economic conditions and 
fragile livelihoods.  
The majority of all returnees proved to be in vulnerable psychosocial 
positions. Psychological problems and a rejection by the home society of certain 
elements of their identity and the related pressure to adjust to dominant norms 
and values, affect their psychosocial embeddedness. However, these hardships 
do not prevent 64 per cent of the respondents to feel at home in the community 
of return. Presence of family and friends, home ownership and personal 
identification with the country were indicated as most important reasons for this.  
Influencing factors 
As mentioned above, the process of embedding and re-embedding is highly 
contextual and depends on diversified socio-economic opportunities. In a post-
conflict country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, favouritism among different ethnic 
groups played a significant role in the process of embedding. Notwithstanding 
these differences, we would like to discuss briefly the influence of two particular 
factors on the re-embedding process: (a) the position of the returnee in the 
migration cycle and (b) the impact of different types of assistance provision on 
the prospects for enhancing embeddedness. 
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Migration Cycle 
The experiences gained in the migration cycle of the returnee migrants plays a 
crucial role in their possibilities upon return. Especially, the circumstances under 
which one came to and left from the host country, and which living 
circumstances were experienced abroad, proved to have an essential impact on 
psychosocial embeddedness, thereby strongly influencing social networks and 
economic embeddedness upon return.  
All respondents from post-conflict countries stated that insecurity and un-
safety were important reasons to flee. In addition to these macro factors, there 
are always other - often personal - reasons at the micro level that provide the 
direct trigger for leaving the country. The caseload proved that motivations to 
flee or move are never one-dimensional but always involve a complex 
combination of different factors and motivations. As van Naerssen argues: “ the 
fact that people migrate is often taken for granted, however when interviewing 
migrants it becomes clear that the decision to migrate is in most cases not taken 
deliberately” (van Naerssen in Nijenhuis et al., 2007:15). A migrant from Angola 
(interviewed in the Netherlands) stated that he wanted to migrate already for a 
long time for economic reasons. After the outbreak of the conflict that was 
internationally recognized he was supplied with legitimate grounds for migration 
and a refugee status. Another female migrant from Somalia who fled to another 
part of the country and eventually left because she did not belong to any clan 
which affected her identity and safety in the new pro-clan policy, declared that at 
the same time she escaped from her husband who she did not want to see 
anymore. Here, a combination of ethnicity, safety and gender-related reasons 
represented the basis to out-migration. There are many examples of situations 
where the conflict was an important reason to leave the country, but seldom was 
it the only driving force.  
Cross-section analyses of surveys and life histories can unravel the ways in 
which macro and micro factors in a complex connectivity work together in 
stimulating a person to become a migrant or refugee. Motivations and stimuli 
that appear in large scale surveys easily as mainly economic or political, in 
reality are far more complex and interwoven. The reasons and events that caused 
people to migrate are also related to the expectations they have regarding their 
stay in the host country. It appears that if migrants go with the intention to 
eventually return and are better informed of what they can expect during their 
stay in the host country (i.e. temporary protection until return once the conflict 
had ended), this contributes to returnees being psychologically better prepared to 
accepting their return and to rebuild their lives once returned. Furthermore, 
migrants who expect they would have to return eventually invest substantially 
more in maintaining their transnational social networks. The extent to which 
these initial motives and practices play a role before return takes place, has a 
decisive effect on the way returnees can accept being back. 
Additionally, the living circumstances provided in the host country also play a 
crucial role. Migrants often spend a significant period of their lives in the host 
country. Actually, the majority of the forced migrants become (more) depressed 
because of the insecurity and the problems they face during their stay in the host 
country. This applies especially to migrants that did not have any chance to make 
themselves useful with work or study in the host country. A forced migrant 
interviewed in the host country says: ‘I don’t like thinking too much, because I 
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almost get sick. (…) Too much pressure what will happen tomorrow. I am 
exhausted’ (Knoben, 2006).  
Returnees, who managed to maintain independent living circumstances abroad 
through work, having access to independent housing and by maintaining broad 
social contacts are on all dimensions significantly better embedded than those 
who did not have these opportunities. Although migrants without a permanent 
permit to stay are often engage in low-skilled jobs below their qualifications, and 
the skills or knowledge necessary for these jobs were often not very relevant for 
finding employment upon return, they greatly benefited from the possibility to 
work in a number of ways. First of all, it gives them the opportunity to save 
some money which they save to take back after return or send back to their 
country of origin, thus strengthening their social networks. Both savings and 
remittances contributed to the returnees’ economic and social embeddedness. 
Moreover, being incorporated in a working environment abroad and generating 
one’s own income gives migrants the possibility to remain their self esteem and 
develop their survival skills.  
Social contacts, independent living circumstances and the possibility to work 
allowed migrants to take control over their own situation and lead an active life 
without depending fully on asylum centres and social benefits. In contrast, 
migrants are held in asylum centres and depend on social welfare, often do not 
manage to take control over their lives upon return and thus face a disadvantage 
regarding their prospects for becoming embedded. Even while the more 
independent conditions abroad did not cause a large improvement in living status 
compared to the life one prior to migration, it prevents the degradation of self 
esteem and enables the maintenance of survival skills that are critical for creating 
embeddedment upon return.  
A final influencing factor within the migration cycle refers to the conditions 
under which return takes place. The legal status of migrants at the point of return 
influences the agency they have in the decision to return. Migrants who returned 
due to pressure or force from authorities expressed their frustration for ‘not being 
ready yet’, both mentally and practically. Furthermore, it has an impact on the 
way returnees were perceived by the people in their home society. For example, 
in Sierra Leone, it became quickly known when a forcibly deported returnee 
arrived handcuffed and under the supervision of policemen, and these people 
were often severely stigmatised, thus affecting their psychosocial embeddedness. 
The specific individual characteristics of returnees combined with their position 
in the migration cycle represent a returnee’s complex background that should be 
taken into account when considering the type of assistance provision suitable for 
the returnees. 
Return Assistance 
The biggest challenges for migrants upon return are (a) building an independent 
and sustainable livelihood, (b) gaining trust and respect from social networks, 
and (c) developing a feeling of belonging. Considering the obstacles that many 
returnees face, it is of interest to see to what extent assistance can help to 
overcome these obstacles. We distinguish between different types of pre- and 
post-return assistance and also consider the relative effectiveness of public and 
voluntary (NGO) agencies and private networks. 
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Pre-return preparation assistance, with the aim of facilitating a free and well-
informed choice to return, has a positive contribution to all dimensions of 
embeddedness, especially when provided by friends or family. When migrants 
could make use of accurate information on the situation in their country of origin 
from people they trust, it gives migrants the feeling of having a real say in the 
return decision. This effect was, however, not found when the information was 
offered by (public) institutions that migrants conceived as the actors that were 
merely pushing them out of the host country. Moreover, while returnees initially 
did have confidence in the sincere intentions of NGOs, many of them stated to be 
rather disappointed in them after return, as the high expectations that were raised 
about the possibilities in the home country, did not come true. This is not 
necessarily the result of purposefully given false information, but rather of 
unclear and under-defined communication about assistance possibilities. For 
example, this is can be the case when NGOs communicate with their clients 
through third parties, who may not share the same vision on return. In the return 
migration monitoring study of 2007, the communication between the NGO and 
the returnee took place through a governmental organisation that had more 
interest in the return of migrants and therefore may have given a brighter image 
of the available assistance to encourage their agreement to return.  
Incorrect or sometimes misleading information that is meant to ‘convince’ 
migrants to return causes returnees to feel tricked into agreeing to do so. The 
frustration, disappointment and the feeling that their return is a result of an unfair 
procedure, prevents returnees to accept being back. Therefore, pre-return 
preparation and information assistance can only have a positive impact when it 
contributes to return (a) being based on a well-informed choice and (b) being 
followed up by effective post-return assistance. Most NGOs have not been able 
to make use of this potential dual role in trying to provide assistance to returnees. 
Post-return assistance is the most direct way to try to respond to returnees’ 
needs. Two thirds of the interviewed returnees in the 2007 return migration 
monitoring study had at least to some extent, access to institutional assistance 
services after return. While a large variety of assistance facilities are available 
after return, the focus is usually on financial assistance which can be 
unconditional sums of money, monetary assistance for starting a business, 
providing money for (temporary) housing or for medication for a certain period 
of time. Less tangible forms of assistance, such as information and psychosocial 
counselling, are scarcely provided. From the perspective of support agencies, 
giving financial assistance is often the easiest, quickest and best measurable 
method; especially in situations where many people return simultaneously to 
their country of origin and need coordinated assistance. Also from the 
perspective of the returnee, the primary needs after return are material. Monetary 
assistance that is given to the returnees is rarely monitored and therefore often 
spent on other purposes than it was aimed for. This unmonitored and incidental 
financial assistance provided in cash or in kind, proved to have limited effects 
for enhancing sustainable livelihoods.  
In contrast, more focussed assistance for setting up own-account business or 
service activities significantly and positively contributes to embeddedness. An 
explanation for this lies in the fact that it is a more conscious process aiming at 
generating an independent income. This support is often provided in stages, 
starting with planning and some non-material guidance to help the returnees 
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decide in what area they would like to engage in a business and asking them to 
take active steps towards this goal. While financial assistance is certainly 
important, it is the combination with human guidance aimed towards an 
independent sustainable livelihood embedded into social networks, which makes 
business assistance successful.  
As an alternative to business assistance, recent initiatives are providing 
assistance in finding wage employment through subsidised work programmes 
where returnees are hired for six months by a local firm. These programmes 
recently started but it remains questionable if, in a country of high 
unemployment, participants will keep their job after the subsidy has expired. 
However, the strength of the initiative is that it recognises the fact that not every 
individual returnee has entrepreneurial skills and can be expected to run a 
business. It is important to follow the developments of these projects, to see 
whether the concept can work.  
Additional to material assistance, practical information is also essential after 
return. At the moment, returnees often get lost in bureaucratic requirements that 
they do not know. In none of the studied countries, however, an information 
package for returnees was available that guided them through the practical 
resettlement and legal procedures. Local partner organisations could prepare 
such an information package for returnees. In addition, in certain contexts of 
(post) conflict, access to psychosocial assistance is crucial. The virtual absence 
of this types of assistance has a strong negative influence on embeddedness.  
Most important actors in (after return) return assistance are host-government 
programmes (mainly implemented by the International Organisation for 
Migration/IOM) and activities by local voluntary organisations funded by 
Western NGOs. There exist clear differences in the scale and approach between 
these two different actors. Government-funded institutions like IOM have an 
advantage in scale and budget. For returnees from host countries that have a 
programme with IOM and who qualify for their assistance, a substantial amount 
of money available. However, local organisations that are funded by NGOs have 
a better potential to contribute to embeddedness through their small-scaled, more 
personal-tailored and flexible approach. This gives them more room to respond 
to specific needs of individual returnees in the assistance provision. 
Nevertheless, this potential is not fully realised, largely due to budget and staff 
limitations, but also related to the limited abilities of the partner organisations 
that are often not specialised in issues of return migration. Therefore, NGOs that 
work in this area do not optimally use the added value that local organisations 
could provide. In addition, the flexible and informal character of return 
assistance also become a weakness when there are no clearly defined boundaries 
about what returnees can expect and what an NGO has to offer.  
Compared to the contextual factors and the migration cycle, assistance plays a 
much smaller role in the process of embeddedness of return migrants. This 
confirms other findings in the Magrheb region where less than one out of ten 
return migrants declared having benefited form the support of the public 
authorities after return (Cassarino, 2007). Moreover, the potentially positive 
influence that assistance can have is not always fully operationalised. While the 
challenges of building a sustainable livelihood mostly only partially addressed, 
other equally important dimensions of embeddedness such as building social 
networks and gaining a feeling of belonging are often left aside. An integrated 
approach is required, where both material and human assistance needs are 
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addressed, and which can be rely on the social networks structure of the 
returnees. This implies that assistance activities need far more careful 
implementation within a framework of reinforcing diverse, multi-activity and 
multi-location livelihood strategies. 
Outlook and Policy Implications 
Even for voluntary returnees, return migration does not signify simply going 
home. Processes of embedding are a key prerequisite for assessing whether 
return migration can be sustainable and eventually lead to a contribution to 
development. While achieving sustainable return for the individual returnee is 
thus already an enormous challenge, it cannot be expected from these returnees 
that they contribute to development. Rather, the opposite is true: returnees often 
represent a burden to the household budget and put high pressure on already 
limited employment, health care and education facilities in the country of return. 
In contrast to the common thinking and discourse on migration and development, 
our sample analysis of involuntary returnees experiences points to high risks of 
deprivation and exclusion for the individual, the household and eventually the 
community of return. 
We also registered a direct and transnational interconnectedness between 
restrictive living circumstances provided in the host society and their often 
negatively affect on the possibilities towards re-embeddedment after return to 
their country of origin. This implies that there are major inconsistencies in 
current Western European migration policies. While the intention is expressed 
and budgets assigned to enable return migrants to contribute to development in 
their country of origin, this intention is severely undermined by extremely 
restrictive migration policies that constrain the rights of migrants during their 
stay in the host country. Especially irregular migrants and refugees are 
constructed as citizens in between states, left with no substantial ways to 
participate in society or earn a position in that society, (in a sense as 
‘superfluous’). After spending years in these circumstances, too much damage is 
done to a returnee to be able to fix this with assistance programmes, which are 
furthermore too limited in size and duration to be able to make a difference. 
Encouraging migrants to contribute to development can not merely be 
accomplished by means of these post-return assistance programmes, but should 
start with constructive pre-return engagement. This illustrates the strange 
paradox of expecting return migrants that at a certain stage of their migration 
process are conceived as superfluous, to transform themselves into actors who 
can rebuild their societies at a subsequent stage of their remigration process. 
Finally, (inter)national citizenship arrangements that are intrinsic part of the 
current multidimensional development process easily get lost when captured in 
the static dichotomous opposition of returnees versus settled migrants in the 
migration discourse on development. Instead of considering these different 
stages as interconnected phenomena forming part of the same chain, the current 
migration discourse on development tries to construct them as separate and apart. 
This renders the already complicated and problematic marriage between return 
migration and development a very fragile one. Expectations are that this may 
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further deteriorate with the latest restrictive policy measures agreed upon in the 
European Union.  
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People, borders, and trajectories 
Martin van der Velde 
Preamble 
Last fall Ton and I ‘finally’ completed an edited volume on East-West migration 
in Europe. This volume provides the results of on of the workshops of the 
seminar ‘Mind the GaP’, organized in the summer of 2004 at the occasion of 
further profiling the research program ‘Governance and Places’ of the Nijmegen 
School of Management, in which both of us are participating. This workshop 
focused on differing approaches towards east-west migration research employed 
in policy and social sciences, particularly in human geography. 
My contribution to this Festschrift consists of the epilogue of this volume. 
This seems to me very appropriate in several respects. First of all a liber 
amicorum is meant as a kind of showcase of the contribution of the honoured to 
science in general and scientific development of the authors in particular. This 
co-authored epilogue serves both. First of all it develops the concept of 
‘thresholds’ in several phases of a (potential) migration process. To my 
knowledge this is still a quite new approach. Secondly this piece for me also is 
the culmination of my fruitful (but too short) cooperation with Ton. Due to him 
we were able to enhance the ‘threshold of indifference’-model, which was 
already developed within the realm of border studies in the Nijmegen Centre of 
Border Research (van Houtum and van der Velde 2004), to include more 
‘geography’ in the form of the spatial routing of mobility processes. 
Furthermore the first part of the title of this epilogue, Borders, People and 
Trajectories, is also very appropriate to serve as the title of my contribution. 
Scientific cooperation and its success for a large part are based on people, 
disciplinary borders and development trajectories. To paraphrase Shakespeare’s 
quote on the city1: “What is science but for the people”, science and scientific 
progress need good scholars. Cooperation is all about being able and willing to 
cross disciplinary borders. And thirdly the way and direction this cooperation 
evolves can be expressed in development trajectories. 
By including the epilogue2 in this volume, this specific part of the work of Ton 
will gain attention of scholars other disciplines as wel and thereby hopefully also 
be serving as a source for further debate on the important issues surrounding 
trans- and international migration. 
                                                          
1 “What is the city but for the people”, Shakespeare, 1623, Coriolanus. 
2 The epilogue was slightly adapted where it concerns the reference to other chapters in the volume. 
The full bibliographical reference is: B.M.R. van der Velde & A.L. van Naerssen, 2007, People, 
Borders and Trajectories: a Model to Approach Migration in the Enlarged European Union, in A.L. 
van Naerssen & B.M.R. van der Velde, Migration in a new Europe: People, Borders and trajectories, 
(IGU-Home of Geography, 8). Rome: International Geographical Union / Sociteta Geographica 
Italiana. Pp. 145-154. 
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A model to approach migration in the enlarged European Union 
The enlargement process of the European Union has raised a considerable 
number of academic, political and public debates on a wide variety of related 
issues ranging from European governance and citizenship to environment and 
public safety. Perhaps the most controversial debate in this respect concerns the 
issue of east-west migration after enlargement, equally feared and desired in and 
by the old (EU 15) member states. On the one hand it is argued that, due to the 
greying of the population and certain niches in the labour market, migrant labour 
is needed. On the other hand, most of the old EU countries are putting 
restrictions on the flow of migrant workers from the new member states. In the 
UK, which was an important exception and which allowed free entry of workers 
from ‘the East’ after the enlargement of May 2004, policy makers changed their 
mind and were considerably less liberal towards the (expected) flow of new EU 
members of January 2007. 
There are different approaches towards east-west migration research employed 
in policy and social sciences, particularly in human geography. Some researchers 
limit themselves to the analysis of current processes, which can be done in a 
quantitative way using available statistics and qualitatively by in-depth 
interviewing. Other methods, which are primarily quantitatively oriented, 
elaborate on ‘positivist’ forecasting and impact studies, estimating future flows 
of migration and their influence on labour markets and/or social welfare systems. 
Wallace (2007) exposes the weaknesses of the available statistics. Her forecast of 
‘non-massive migration flows’ within the enlarged European Union is based on 
arguments regarding state regimes and migration motives. While these imply a 
free movement of labour within the enlarged EU, Delsen (2007) argues that the 
(future) volume of immigration from East Europe to West Europe is usually 
underestimated. Moreover, he questions the economic advantages of migration 
for both the sending country and the host country. In this respect, it is interesting 
that Iglicka in her contribution argues that Poland is in the process of transition 
from a labour-exporting country to a labour-importing country. In such a fluid 
situation it would be all the more interesting to see how the balance between 
positive and negative impacts is evaluated. 
Researchers who position themselves within a more qualitative tradition tend 
to make use of a ‘social constructivist’ approach to scrutinise the de- and re-
bordering of the European Union with regard to migration and mobility. This is 
the approach by Geisen et al. (2007) focusing on constructing ‘the other’ and 
Pijpers (2007), with the latter questioning migration forecasts. She reaches the 
conclusion that the social construction of borders in the European Union is 
ongoing and so will most likely be the efforts to border labour immigrants. 
Narratives on ‘the other’ might be more powerful on having an impact on 
policies than quantitative models. We will join the ‘social constructivist’ 
approach, while using the umbrella of the duality of structure and agency as 
coined by Giddens. In the enlargement process of the European Union, 
institutional (re)borderings are involved, which have an impact on the mobility 
strategies of (potential) migrants. To capture the individual spatial migratory 
behaviour we will propose a model constituted of the three basic components: 
people as agents who decide to migrate; borders that are constructed as barriers 
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or de-constructed to facilitate mobility; and trajectories as the routes people use 
to cross borders. 
How people decide to move 
Often when studying actual and potential migration, migrants are reduced to 
anonymous atomised entries, ‘moving bodies’, functioning in a ‘force field’ of, 
for instance, population growth, supply and demand on the labour market and 
regional economic disparities. Such approaches to mobility depart from 
assumptions that were already formulated in the 1880s by Ravenstein (1885), 
who considered regional wage differences as the basic principle underlying 
labour migration and distance as a determining variable. In later years, new and 
more complex explanatory models came into use, the most popular ones located 
into the ‘push and pull’ framework. Push concerns the factors that force or 
motivate people to leave home. They are mostly economic such as poverty, open 
and hidden unemployment, and small farm sizes but could be social as well, for 
example, lack of educational or health facilities, political climate and so on. Pull 
factors mirror the pull factors and they refer to higher wage levels, employment 
opportunities, the availability of good health and educational facilities, and 
democratic space. Although admitting ‘intermediate factors’ such as state 
interventions, the framework is basically within the neo-classical economic 
tradition, based on the decision-making individual that acts as the ideal homo 
economicus. Moreover, people’s decision-making is considered as structurally 
determined. 
To cope with the shortcomings of the neo-classical approaches, Simon (1982) 
introduced the notion of bounded rationality, stating that people in their decision 
to migrate or not cannot be economically rational since they simply do not have 
all the information they ideally need to take a fully rational decision; even if they 
do, part of the information will be distorted. Other dimensions and concepts were 
included, for example the influential idea of human capital (Becker 1962) that 
links the labour decision to migrate to investments in education or learning 
experiences that could be profitable in the long run. Again another notion is 
transaction costs, which states that all kinds of transactions and, as a 
consequence, decisions involve indirect costs, relating partly to another culture, 
as well to different legal procedures, and so on. The new economies of labour 
migration pioneered by Stark (1982) and originally conceived for rural-urban 
migration in developing countries, conceptualise the origins of migration as an 
effort by households to overcome market failures that constrain local production 
and shifts the focus of migration modelling from individual independence to 
mutual interdependence among members of households, families or even 
communities. The idea is that the collective unit collaborates with the individual 
to take the migration decision, with the aim of migration as a means to spread 
economic risks of the family, community, and so forth. 
However, even when these aspects are included, the explanation still departs 
from an economically based push-pull framework. To start with, the push-pull 
framework often overestimates the level of labour mobility. For example, we 
need to realise that within the EU – both the old and the new – immobility is still 
the rule. Logically, we then reach the conclusion that we should focus less on 
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factors that make people move and more on factors that make them stay. This is 
the reason why Straubhaar and others (1988) developed the so-called insiders 
advantage approach (Straubhaar 1988; Tassinopolous and Werner 1999; Fischer 
1999), which tries to attach an economic value to being immobile, by 
introducing ‘keep’ factors. Examples are the work experience or competences 
built up by workers in practice. If an employer on the other side of the border is 
not interested in such skills, a worker has to weigh the profit he/she can make 
when he/she moves against the loss of his or her competences. When a worker is 
strongly socially embedded in a region and, moreover, feels happy to live there, 
these could be reasons to stay in the home area as well. This ‘feeling of wellness’ 
can be linked to the concept of ‘psychic income’ introduced by Greenhut (1956). 
In addition to such ‘keep’ factors, we can also include ‘repel’ factors. These 
factors are linked to the potential destination region, for example, when that 
region is characterised by traditional resentment towards foreigners, or when the 
region has an unfavourable regional image, for example because of high crime 
rates. Such repel factors might prevent people from going there. However, again, 
an approach, which includes keep and repel factors, still fits into the tradition of 
rational choice approaches. It presupposes actors who are constantly in a process 
of deliberation, who are engaged in weighing the pros and cons of different 
places or regions. In other words, it supposes that these actors are willing and are 
able to evaluate between the ‘here’ and ‘there’, in our case the area on this side 
of the border and the area on the other side. 
However, migrants are not soulless, overly rationalistic objects, that can easily 
be put in mathematical models explaining and forecasting the flows between 
countries and different parts of the world. Such is the approach of Faist when he 
argues that social networks explain why people stay or move to become 
transnationals (2000). His book focuses on Turkish-German linkages but it can 
be easily applied within the European Union, as Dikkers (2007) demonstrates in 
the case of Eastern European Roma, who – both for economic and social (read 
discrimination) motives – have reason to migrate to Western Europe but they do 
not. Also, how can we explain the dominance of Poles in de migration flows to 
and from (mainly) Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? Migrants should 
certainly be seen as real human beings with a world view, perceptions, stories 
and so on, that have to be included in the analysis in order to understand what is 
happening and to be better prepared for what might happen in the (near) future. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that of the Polish migrants in the 
Netherlands less than half mention finding a job as the major motive for leaving 
Poland. Family reasons (family creating, reuniting or co-migrating) are also 
important for about 30 per cent of them (Ecorys 2006). Of course, a part of this 
flow would not come into existence if the job-related migrations had not 
materialised but nevertheless it puts the potentiality of migrant flows into a 
different perspective. We will return to the question of motives and decision-
making after having clarified the character of the two other components of our 
conceptualising East-West Europe migration. 
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Borders 
The importance of reflecting on the nature of borders and its impact on policies 
becomes particular clear in Geisen et al (2007). What are borders? An easy 
definition states that they are lines demarcating units that differ or are supposed 
to differ, and in that way, they reveal their ‘Janus-faced character’ (Van Houtum, 
Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005): existing and/or imagined. This section touches 
upon the various manifestations of such a duality. 
At the structural level, a first distinction is between interpretations of borders 
as stemming either from ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’; as innate or learned phenomena 
(Storey 2001). In Western countries, the former interpretation has a fairly long 
tradition stemming from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia demarcating sovereign 
states with a territorial line. It reached its summit in the romantic nationalist 
movements of the early 19th century, which imagined states as nation-states, and 
gradually seemed to lose credibility in the final decades of the 20th Century. The 
idea of borders as created and socialised by human actions is a more accepted 
one in Central and Eastern Europe but the events after 1989 with new territorial 
units and borders showed the strength and force of the nation-state idea. The 
same ambivalence certainly exists in de post-colonial states of the non-Western 
world, where as a rule demarcations were imposed by colonial powers and 
continued after independence. Imagined communities (Anderson 1991) are 
needed to make borders acceptable but there are still many examples of cross-
border movements based on pre-colonial loyalties and traditions, such as in Sub-
Sahara Africa where crossing national borders is ingrained in the lifestyle of 
traders and nomads (see for example Bilder and Kraler 2005). To make matters 
even more complicated, in the wake of the 9/11 events there is a trend to posit 
again a kind of natural world ‘order’ that is accompanied by ‘natural’ 
demarcations. 
Another interesting interpretation sees the border as fuzzy or amorphous rather 
than fixed with a binary character. In fact, in the final decades of the 20th 
century the two just-mentioned seemingly contradictory functional 
interpretations of the border were fused by the conceptualisation of the border as 
a selective filter. Where borders used to be filters for all (or most) of the cross-
border interactions, they now increasingly control and fence off certain forms of 
interactions and processes. A clear example is the US-Mexico border, which in 
the wake of the NAFTA agreement lost a considerable part of its control function 
for goods, but reinforced its control function for people who intend to cross the 
border, especially when entering the US. While globalisation and liberalisation 
have led to a free flow of capital and an increasingly free flow of goods, where 
people are concerned, the trends are contradictory. For example, an increase in 
temporary cross-border movements for tourist reasons is encouraged, while 
border control has been sharpened with regard to workers and asylum seekers. In 
general, there is a greater contradiction between the existence of (inter)national 
sovereignties and territories in a world that is increasingly cosmopolitan and 
transnational. Concerning possible futures for the EU, Zielonka (2001) foresees 
two development paths: the EU either as a Westphalian superstate, with clear-cut 
outer and eradicated inner borders, or as a neo-medieval empire in which loyalty 
and sovereignties can shift easily, not only in time, but also depending on the 
issue. 
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At the level of the individual human agent, one can distinguish the idea of the 
naturalness of borders and the assessment of the border as a ‘natural’ 
demarcation of personal action spaces on the one hand, and the border 
functioning as a barrier to activities on the other hand (Van der Velde 1999; Van 
Houtum 1998). A negative correlation characterises the two interpretations. 
When a border is regarded as something that demarcates in a natural way and the 
natural limits of action spaces coincide with the location of territorial borders, 
there is less need to cross the border, and the border is not considered or 
experienced as a barrier. Borders may be conceived as guardians against threats 
from ‘the other side’. This functional interpretation of the border connects to the 
individual assessment of the border as something that is natural and logical. 
Conversely, borders can be regarded as creating differences between the adjacent 
territories, differences which, in turn may create opportunities such as cross-
border price differences. This functional view of the border concurs with the 
individual assessment of the border as a barrier when intended actions to 
utilising these opportunities are obstructed by the same border. It is clear that 
with increasing globalisation this view is gaining in importance. The duality of 
borders logically follows. They are either the instrument to reach certain goals, 
or the final outcome itself, or, both simultaneously (Williams and Van der Velde 
2005). From an EU perspective for example, the outer border serves as an 
instrument in the migration policy, especially as some kind of filter. It can also 
be considered some kind of an outcome of the whole discussion on the essence 
of European (Union) identity. It is the territorial demarcation of this identity. 
Finally, we want to distinguish a more static interpretation versus one that 
stresses dynamic aspects. In the first interpretation the border indicates the more 
or less stable outcome of demarcation practices. The border itself is the centre of 
interest, compared to the more dynamic practices and processes of bordering. 
Thus a distinction can be made between boundary studies, in which the ‘where’ 
is stressed, and border studies in which the ‘how’ is much more important (Van 
Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005). The distinction that Paasi (1996) makes 
between borders as morphologies (borders on the ground) versus borders as 
representation or interpretation (borders in the mind) is similar to these two 
interpretations. It is in this perspective that we have to evaluate the border issue 
in and around the EU: within the EU the borders are conceived as imagined, 
nurtured and open for erosion, while the outer EU borders are considered as 
‘natural’ or, in the case of the admission of Turkey to the EU, as a demarcation 
of ‘West’ from the ‘East’. But as the debates make clear, this view of the 
Turkish-EU border can change and as such shows processes of (de- and re-) 
bordering. 
Trajectories 
People move or stay, they cross borders or not. If they move they follow routes, 
which are often already explored by predecessors and/or are organised and 
exploited by smugglers who are specialised in human trafficking and need to be 
hired. Pang (2007) explains how Chinese undocumented migrants pay 
substantial amounts of money to ‘snakeheads’ who transport them to Central 
Asian states, from there to Russia and then to Eastern Europe and further, usually 
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to the UK The journey is disjunctive and it can take months before it is 
accomplished. On the way to the West there are certain central points or ‘hubs’ 
that serve as transfer points: Istanbul is a well-known hub, serving people from 
the Middle East and Iran; several places in Morocco and in the northern states of 
Africa are other ones, serving African migrants (Brachet 2005; Moppes 2006). 
In the migration literature, it has been acknowledged that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to distinguish countries of destination, origin or transfer. In 
the case of the study of Chinese immigrants in Belgium (Pang 2007), is Belgium 
a country of destination or transfer? Many undocumented migrants say that they 
were hindered from making their way to the UK. In the same way, anecdotal 
evidence reveals that people from Central Asia, the Middle East, the Far East and 
even Sub-Sahara Africa are immigrants in the new member states of the EU 
although it remains to be seen whether they consider themselves as permanent or 
temporary migrants. In the latter case, they will sooner or later move to one of 
the old EU countries or the United States. At the conceptual level this implies 
that the inner EU borders although of considerable significance bear an 
insignificant meaning for these migrants. 
Trajectories are meant to bridge the distance between places (localities, 
regions, countries) of origin and places of destination. This distance is not 
measured in space only; it is also a mental construct since it equally involves 
motives to stay or go such as the perception of the labour markets that can act as 
a strong or weak pull factor, and the institutional setting of borders, including 
border controls. 
Thinking international migration differently 
In the foregoing we explained three components of a geographical 
conceptualisation of cross-border mobility. In the first place, international 
migrants take strategic decisions to move or stay. Their decision is not overly 
rational, if only because they are not fully informed about all alternatives and 
depend on social networks. In the second place, at the individual level borders 
are ‘natural’ or created. The perception follows the actors’ discursive 
interpretation of structures (Pijpers and Van der Velde 2007). Third, trajectories 
as spatial routes connecting place of origin and places of desired destination 
constrain or facilitate the movement of the actor in space. We will now proceed 
with a model of factors influencing spatial behaviour in international migration. 
Instead of focusing on mobility, we start with the concept of threshold of 
indifference to explain labour immobility, as developed by Van Houtum and Van 
der Velde (2004). This concept is based on the idea and rationality of belonging 
and the importance for people to belong to somewhere or to feel at home in a 
specific locality or region. This concept is related to that of psychic income as 
used by Greenhut but – again – it expands the latter idea beyond the realm of 
economic rational choice approaches. The consequence of using the notion of a 
space of belonging is that a mental distance is created between places on both 
sides of the border. At someone’s own side of the border a space of belonging is 
created, with ease and comfort, where mental nearness to the other inhabitants 
exists: ‘we’ in the ‘here’. The other side is not a space of ease or comfort, it is 
another ‘world’: ‘they’ in the ‘there’. 
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The consequence of this process is that a space of indifference is created; a 
space that impacts on the decision to cross borders. It creates (consciously or 
unconsciously) a threshold that has to be overcome before the ‘there’ is included 
in the search for a job (Van Houtum and Van der Velde 2004). One of the 
fascinating aspects of this concept is that it explains why social networks are that 
important in rejection or disregarded in a cross-border movement: it is the 
existence of transnational communities or of ‘here’ in ‘there’ that allows, 
facilitates and initiates cross-border migration (Madsen and van Naerssen 2003). 
For example, the availability of Polish newspapers, food and drinks, and a Polish 
community will provide migrants with the feeling of being at home. In an earlier 
phase of the decision-making process, it might also lower the threshold of 
indifference. 
In the original model by Van Houtum and Van der Velde, after crossing the 
indifference threshold, the actor enters the active attitude part. Here a (bounded) 
rational process of decision-making is supposed, where all kinds of locational 
factors are taken into account. These factors can be connected to the place or 
region of origin, but also to the possible destination. Depending on this 
deliberation, the actor might decide to become mobile or stay put. We would like 
to introduce a second threshold here, the locational threshold. This threshold is 
not surpassed when the actor decides not to move although he/she might be 
engaged in an active search process. 
As was already mentioned in the introduction, we regard three constituents as 
fundamental to international migration, people, borders and trajectories. This is 
the third aspect that we also would like to introduce in our model. When 
someone has decided to move, he or she still has to determine the route to take. 
This is especially relevant in the case of undocumented migration. Where in the 
process of deciding on the trajectory, the outcome can be that the wish for 
mobility will not materialise, or as is more likely to be the case, the final 
destination will never be reached, because the migrant gets stuck somewhere en 
route. We would like to call these factors that either totally prevent mobility, or 
influence the destination, a trajectory threshold. 
Figure 9.1 tries to elucidate the ‘dynamics’ in trans- or international migration. 
The model suggests a sequence of decisions of thresholds, while allowing for 
several interactions and feedback mechanisms to take place. At the structural 
level, the differences and similarities on both sides of the border are extremely 
important for crossing the ‘threshold of indifference’. When these factors (such 
as income difference, unemployment rates) are considerable, one could expect 
people to be less ‘indifferent’, implying that the ‘there’ is considered an 
alternative option. Going beyond the economic factors at play, the social 
component of ‘here’ in ‘there’ is of major importance in decision-making. Space, 
distance, borders and place as comprehensively incorporated in our notion of 
‘trajectory’ are the geographical factors that play a role, and as such explicitly 
labelled as determining factors in the model. 
The original model has been developed in the context of an already highly 
integrated region like the EU 15, where contrary to the expectations, dismantling 
the border did not result in a major increase in labour market mobility. In such a 
situation explaining immobility instead of mobility is relevant, as, for example, 
is shown by Dikkers (2007) for the Roma. The model can also be used in  
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Figure 1: Determinants of individual spatial migratory behaviour (Partly based 
on Van Houtum and Van der Velde 2004) 
 
situations and at other levels where integration has not developed to the same 
extent, for example, the US-Mexico border or the outer border of the (enlarged) 
EU. However, and as a final note, as Hooper (2007) shows in the case of sex 
trafficking, all cross-border movements, migrant motives, borders and 
trajectories should be put in the context of power relations between states and 
regions which constitute the hidden dimension in the model. 
Conclusion: assessing the (un)desirability of borders for channelling 
mobility 
National borders do play quite different roles in different parts of the world. 
Sometimes they are not much more than symbolic markers between groups of 
people that feel somehow connected. In other places they function as an active 
protection against presumed threats of all kinds. Focusing on the EU, this is in 
essence the same. The Eurocrats would like to interpret the inner borders 
(especially the ones between the EU-15) as relics from the past, which we have 
to get rid of. At the same time they use the outer borders to literally establish 
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fences against the forces that in their view threaten the wealth and prosperity of 
the Union. 
Where the mobility-inducing differences are small, people will be indifferent 
to borders: they will not cross the threshold of indifference. This seems the case 
in the EU 15. Differences are small and much to the disappointment of the EU, 
mobility is low. Borders are not needed in their role as a control mechanism for 
human mobility. In this vein, potential mobility between the countries of the EU 
25 might be higher, as demonstrated in the case of the Poles. But even here it 
seems more a matter of a temporary shock to establish a new equilibrium. Within 
the context of the EU, performing a balancing act between national protection 
and EU integration has proven the difficulty of using the national borders as a 
control mechanism. Those that want to be mobile go to any length to reach their 
goal. To cite a recent example: in the Netherlands in the spring of 2006 there was 
a lively debate about whether or not the transitional measures with regard to 
labour mobility should be continued. Within the government the State Secretary 
of Social Affairs and Employment pleaded for the complete abolition of barriers. 
His main argument however was not so much that this will be beneficial to the 
Dutch economy, but that he was unable to enforce the existing measures. He was 
throwing in the towel so to speak.3 
When looking at the outer borders obviously the differences are bigger and 
therefore also the motivation ‘to get in’. Also in this case however, it is our 
conviction that we do not need to overestimate the mobility of people, In fact, 
mankind is not very mobile. Notwithstanding the fact that our hypothetical 
‘migration country’ would be the 5th largest country in the world, it would only 
account for three per cent of the world population. Of course, one could conclude 
that this shows that borders are functioning quite well. Comparable data for the 
EU (supposed to be a showcase for an integrated region without borders) shows 
that only 1.7 per cent of the EU nationals are living in another EU-15 country. 
Could this be an indication for the redundancy of borders when it comes to 
controlling human mobility? 
Along borders several outcomes are possible, resulting in mobility as well as 
in immobility. When a large group of people exhibit an indifferent attitude 
towards job opportunities on the other side of the border, immobility will be the 
rule. That situation is found along the Dutch-German border, perhaps as well 
other inner EU borders. The other extreme holds for borders such as those 
between the EU and Africa, where life itself is at stake for the workers from 
Africa, and people are ‘desperately’ seeking alternatives for their current 
situation. The greater the (spatial and mental) distance, the border control, and 
time to overcome between places of origin and destination, the greater the 
importance of trajectories acting as constraints or facilitators. Workers from the 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 apparently occupy the middle 
ground. From one of the European opinion polls it appears that they show no big 
desire to move (Bruinsma and Hakfoort 2005); for them keep and repel factors 
are already more important than the authorities in the old member states realise. 
The provocative question we would like to leave the reader with is, what 
would happen if we grant everybody unlimited freedom of movement (as stated 
in the Declaration of Human Rights)? When accepting the thesis that mankind is 
3 In May 2007 the transitional measures were officially abolished. 
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not particularly nomadic, are the current border control measures not like using a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut? We counsel a more reactive instead of proactive 
stance, but at the same time close monitoring to try to understand what makes 
people mobile. We would not be surprised if in the end the answer to the 
question of the desirability of undesirability of borders would be that we can 
discard borders as channelling instruments for human mobility and that we have 
to concentrate on the regions of origin and destination instead. 
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Remittances versus migrants: disjointed 
flows in a globalising world  
Joris Schapendonk and Lothar Smith 
Introduction 
The main quantifiable outcome of intensified levels of globalisation in the last 
decennia is a massive increase in the exchange of goods, capital, ideas and 
…people. However, there is a remarkable difference in the processes of 
regulation concerning these different flows. Where flows of goods, information 
and capital are explicitly deregulated by state and supra-state authorities, the 
flow of people is given much importance by these same actors. This has resulted 
in a fast increasing range of policies and instruments that primarily seek to 
constrain migration. In particular, migrant receiving countries are highly 
interested in measures which control, or at least reduce, the inflow of 
‘undesirable’ people. The quest of these countries to curb this inflow does not 
apply to all groups however, as highly skilled migrants are perceived as 
‘desirable’. Yet in many cases these skilled migrants may originate from the 
same countries as those who are regarded as less desirable. This selective 
migration interest has recently been formulated in the new policy term 
‘migration management’ reflecting the desire to keep the ‘unwanted’ from 
migrating while stimulating the ‘wanted’ to migrate. Subsequently, human 
mobility has become one of the most polarising factors of today’s globalising 
world (Bauman, 1998); we have global nomads and locally bounded people 
living in one and the same world. 
From a liberal economist perspective, it is often argued that restrictions on all 
kinds of flows between regions, including people as a form of ‘labour exchange’, 
are counterproductive. The basic argument is that market forces are best 
equipped to deal with inequalities between countries. Part of this equation is 
labour, which should then be allowed to efficiently move from one place to 
another where it is required, i.e. where demand for it is strongest. In addition, it 
is expected that the free movement of people will have a strong redistributive 
character, if unhampered by institutional barriers, for instance, through 
remittances which migrants send back to their countries of origin. Following this 
argument, it is paradoxical that in times of globalisation and economic 
liberalisation, which have enabled and intensified the mobility of all kinds of 
flows, the flow of people is increasingly restricted (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 
2005). 
In this contribution we focus on this globalisation paradox within the 
analytical framework of the debate on migration and development. Our argument 
is that the globalisation paradox has a strong influence on this debate; migrants’ 
money, i.e. remittances, is viewed as a valuable instrument for poverty reduction, 
whereas the people behind the money, i.e. the migrants, are often perceived as 
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economic threats. Our analysis focuses on sub-Saharan Africa and the challenges 
provided by current legislation on the relationship between migration and 
development. 
Africa’s position in the space of flows: key player or bystander? 
In economic terms it is often stated that Africa has largely been excluded from 
globalisation. Thus, its major cities, however large their populations, do not 
feature as prominent nodes in global circuits of trade and industry (with the 
exception, to some extent, of Johannesburg). Although global economic linkages 
certainly exist, the continued weak performance of the African economy vis-à-
vis other regions seems to prove that globalisation has only resulted in a 
marginalisation and polarisation of wealth for the African continent. Indeed, 
Africa is the only economic region in the world where investment and savings 
per capita has declined since the 1970s (Lundahl and Pienaar, 2004). Hence 
Lundahl and Pienaar (2004) also come to the conclusion that Africa, and sub-
Saharan Africa in particular, has remained a bystander rather than become a key 
player in the global economy. 
There are certain developments pointing towards possible change in the 
perspective of the continent. Recent World Bank reports suggest that Africa’s 
economy is beginning to change track, shifting to a faster, more sustained mode 
of economic growth (World Bank, 2007). The question is how this change has 
been brought about. There is a general consensus that the rise of the Chinese 
economy forms one of the main catalysts of this change. China’s insatiable 
demand for natural resources has changed prospects for many African countries 
with Chinese investment in mining industries of countries such as Zambia 
(copper) leading to certain reinvigoration of national economies which had noted 
declining GDPs for decades on end.1 And the global competition for natural 
resources such as oil (e.g. Nigeria) and cobalt (e.g. Democratic Republic of 
Congo) is unlikely to diminish. Yet, as in the case of the export of raw products 
to western countries, the question does need to be asked whether the interest of 
the Chinese for these resources is inciting sustainable development, or whether 
Africa is rapidly ‘selling off’ its main asset, its natural resources, at bargain 
prices. 
Cultural globalisation 
Flows of ideas and cultural exchanges are as important factors of globalisation as 
economic flows. In this framework, Africa has often been cited as being on the 
wrong side of the digital divide, namely as an example of relative backwardness 
in communication infrastructure. Obviously the divide is there; the density of 
telephone lines and internet connections across Africa is much lower than 
elsewhere in the world. Yet, at the same time, Africa does have the fastest 
growing number of mobile phone users and internet is now available in all 
African countries, notably in their urban areas (Cheneau-Loquay, 2007). 
Furthermore, Africa’s intrinsic cultural values of sociality and conviviality make 
1 In Chapter 5 of this book Ton Dietz, Annemieke van Haastrecht and Rudlog Scheffer discuss in 
greater detail the impact of the Chinese interest in Zambia’s copper on Zambia’s economy. 
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it possible for many Africans to gain access to the internet through others, i.e. 
without necessarily being connected themselves (Nyamnjoh, 2004). Therefore, 
cultural globalisation, if taken to imply an increased spread and exchange of 
ideas and values throughout the world, has also reached Africa in an intensive 
way. This is particularly noticeable in the evening when millions around Africa 
tune their televisions to football matches of the European Champions League or 
to one of many American soap series. Others, particularly the younger 
generations, spend many hours in internet cafes, exploring vast virtual worlds, 
seeking to establish exchanges with people around the world through e-mail 
exchanges, dating programmes, internet forums, etc.  
While critics worry that such focus may result in a monolithic mass culture, 
producing a perpetual loss of cultural diversity, the role of cultural globalisation 
is an important element that also helps to explain the migration of thousands 
from Africa to other continents. Thus, Gebrewold (2007) argues that young 
Africans often feel encouraged to migrate because images of modernity and 
western luxury are omnipresent in their societies. Yet the influence of cultural 
globalisation is too often neglected, the focus of national and international 
policymakers concerned with migration being on the economical and political 
motivations of migrants.  
Transnational flows 
‘Never before has the continent experienced such massive forms of mobility 
culminating in transnational and intercontinental movements of migration’ (van 
Binsbergen and van Dijk, 2004). This comment can be read in two ways. First, 
the volume of migration, within and beyond the boundaries of the continent, is at 
an unprecedented level. Second, this physical flow of people also produces a 
variety of other transnational flows: money, goods and ideas. Some are 
channelled through relationships that were already in place prior to migration, 
others are new. These flows, notably financial remittances, constitute a 
significant and increasing proportion of all international exchanges between the 
global north and south. Indeed, awareness of the volume of these transactions 
has led to a surge in interest from governments of countries of origin and 
countries of receipt of migrants, as well as related institutes, such as the 
International Organisation for Migration, who share a common goal in seeking to 
harness these remittances for development aid or, more generally, economic 
development (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers, 2008). 
Transnationalism has come to take on various definitions since its adoption 
within various disciplines from the late 1970s onwards. In essence, transnational 
theories sought to provide more satisfactory explanations for migration processes 
than existing theories, by perceiving migration as a continuous flow, rather than 
a discrete, stepwise, process. This refers notably to the ability of migrants to 
concomitantly engage in activities in geographic locations around the world 
through their transnational ties with local actors (Levitt and Sorensen, 2004; 
Madsen and Van Naerssen, 2003; Mazzucato et al., 2004). 
Recent contributions from transnational studies, notably multi-sited studies, 
reveal how migration is often entwined in existing economic, cultural and social 
practices and institutions, seldom constituting complete breakaways from prior 
practices (Smith, 2007; Kabki, 2007). Most migrants intend to go abroad for a 
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limited period of time only, seeking to accumulate savings with which to realise 
investments in their country of origin. During their period abroad, most migrants 
maintain social and economic ties with family, friends and business partners ‘at 
home’. These exchanges often provide significant support to the livelihoods of 
their families and close friends, and ensure that they remain part of their home 
society, by being involved in all kinds of cultural and social activities through 
transnational exchanges. Other transnational exchanges relate more directly to 
personal interests in establishing economic activities that will allow them to 
sustain their livelihoods upon return to their country of origin. Once these 
activities are successfully established, often with instrumental support from local 
counterparts, migrants are in the position to choose when to return to their 
country of origin. 
Migration and development: promises and pitfalls 
In academic research, and in several policy fields, it is acknowledged that 
international migration cannot be seen in isolation from development. 
Traditionally, emigration was merely regarded as an expression of poverty or 
hopelessness. Only recently, the perception of migration has changed and today 
it is often seen as an important instrument for development (Adepoju, van 
Naerssen and Zoomers, 2008). That migration has only recently come to be 
perceived as a poverty alleviating instrument overlooks the fact that migration 
was always a strategy for people to improve their lives. Indeed, according to the 
economist J. K. Galbraith, migration is ‘the oldest action against poverty.2  
Over-enthusiasm for remittances as Africa’s cure to poverty 
Africa has a long history in migrant remittances. Already under colonial 
regime, male members of households migrated to national or regional urban 
centres as wage labourers, sending money back to their families to augment their 
livelihoods, sustain agricultural activities and help realise certain investments. 
With an increased volume of migration by Africans, to destinations within and 
outside the continent, one might expect an increase in the volume of remittances, 
in relative and absolute terms. While in absolute terms increases in remittance 
volume have been recorded, African migrants send home fewer remittances than 
their compatriots from countries around Asia and Latin America. Thus, 
according to the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Fact Book, during the 
last 10 years sub-Saharan Africa has received a constant 5% share of all 
remittances received by developing countries (with the volume of outward 
remittances varying between 2 and 3 billion US dollars). Yet its percentage of all 
emigrants of the developing world is almost 11% (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005).3 
Notwithstanding these findings, the absolute volume of remittances has still 
resulted in the general view amongst governments of African countries that 
2 Cited in The House of Commons, The International Development Committee (2004) 
3 According to the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Fact Book, France receives more 
remittances than the whole of sub-Saharan Africa ($12.5 billion against $10 billion dollars). Indeed 
six European countries have made it into the top 10 of remittance-receiving countries, the other 4 
countries being India, China, Mexico and The Philippines.  
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remittances are their ‘greatest hope for development’ (Oucho, 2008:63). Indeed, 
over the last two decades ‘migrant money’ has come to surpass Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) in many countries. Moreover, the data of the 
World Bank only accounts for registered, formal transactions when it is 
generally acknowledged that a substantial part of African remittances –of either 
monetary or in kind nature- are sent through informal channels. 
However, the question needs to be asked whether remittances are to be 
regarded as the way to achieve development in Africa. Many scholars argue this 
not to be the case. Some of these scholars argue that this relates to the nature of 
remittances: they are predominantly used for consumptive rather than productive 
purposes, which limits their impact as monetary investments. We counter this 
argument by noting that a large part of this so-called consumptive spending goes 
into health care, education and nutrition; all crucial elements enabling 
developments at a micro level.  
Our critique on remittances as a resource for development concerns the 
continued misunderstanding that remittances are unconditional and non-
contextual flows of monetary funds that can be simply tapped into by 
governments of countries for their development agenda. This ignores the core 
reason for the very existence of these remittances: they resulted from the 
decisions of individuals, alone or with their families (or other sponsors), that 
migration would be the best way to secure funds with which to achieve a certain 
set of specific goals. Hence, while migrants certainly have a commitment 
towards their home countries, their migration, as an economic project, is 
primarily intended to benefit themselves and their immediate network. Their 
focus on personal advancement is hardly surprising given the investments they 
needed to make in order to go abroad. What this means however, is that no 
allusion should be made that remittances sent by migrants to their countries of 
origin, can be ‘harnessed’ and channelled into poverty reduction programmes or 
other development related projects. These remittances are private funds. 
Obviously, when migrants feel a moral obligation to support their country or 
community of origin, and provide financial or other means for particular 
development projects, this should be welcomed and supported. However, such 
initiatives should only be stimulated and not enforced as a moral obligation by 
governments of both countries of origin of migrants and where they reside at 
present. 
Instead we can, and should, try to provide an enabling environment to 
migrants to heighten the efficiency and sustainability of transnational 
investments they intend to make. This can take the form of training in 
entrepreneurship, providing loans, providing information on potential investment 
opportunities, etc. 
The perception that remittances are an open source for development also 
neglects the investments of those in the country of origin with whom migrants 
engage in transnational activities. Remittances continue to be perceived as a one-
way flow from North to South, which ignores the inputs of those with whom 
migrants engage in their country of origins. These include, for instance, 
investments of labour in migrant activities in their country of origin, such as 
businesses and houses (Smith, 2007). Such reciprocal flows, of labour or other 
kinds of investments, seldom show up in formal statistics on remittances, as 
these tend to only focus on financial flows.  
128 
                                                          
Remittances are therefore not unidirectional and we should, in the very least, 
broaden our perspectives towards remittances that flow out of developing 
countries. More properly stated; when the development impact of remittances is 
analysed we should not forget to also take into account outgoing monetary 
transfers from countries of origin of migrants..4 Thus, migrants, notably during 
their actual migration, are more often receivers of substantial amounts of 
remittances (to meet livelihood expenditures, travel expenses) than senders (van 
Moppes and Schapendonk, 2007). Furthermore narrow definitions of remittances 
exclude informal flows of money and other kinds of transnational flows often 
entwined with financial flows.  
Hence, the development impact of migration through remittances should be 
contextualised in two ways. First, they should be analysed in a broader 
perspective of in- and out-coming monetary flows, which nuances rather than 
neglects the positive impact of remittances on a society. Second, the analysis of 
financial remittances should be contextualised in a broader framework of 
migration related reverse flows to a country including non-monetary flows. This 
also positions migration within the larger framework of globalisation. 
The flow of people: African migrants in a bordering world 
The bulk of African migration takes place within the African continent; rural 
to urban migration and migration within sub-regions. These are, in quantitative 
terms, more important than intercontinental migration. Nonetheless, African 
migration to the North, particularly to Europe, is increasing. As European visa 
regimes and asylum policies are rather restrictive, many Africans lack the 
opportunity of going directly to their desired destinations. Consequently, 
migration processes have turned into long-lasting, often risky, undertakings with 
a strong stepwise character. As a cumulative policy effect, so-called transit 
countries are increasingly involved in European initiatives to control migration. 
This has shifted European borders southwards and has transformed North Africa 
from transit to ‘holding’ zone (Bensaad, 2007). As a result, many African 
migrants are living under vulnerable conditions near the European border, 
awaiting the moment to enter Europe (usually irregularly). Many others are 
discouraged to move further northwards by intensified border controls by 
countries such as Algeria and Morocco, and some are even detained in transit 
camps in the Sahara desert. This indicates that, in the African context, migratory 
flows to the North are more often fragmented and sometimes also stagnated 
efforts rather than fluent and smooth flows (Collyer, 2007; Schapendonk, 
forthcoming).  
The latest initiative to ‘manage’ migration does not aim to prevent Africans 
from entering the European Union, but goes one step further: It attempts to keep 
people from exiting their own country. In line with the migration and 
development agenda, several EU member states have offered development aid to 
African countries in exchange for cooperation on migration control (Adepoju et 
al., 2007). Moreover, development projects are explicitly designed as ‘the 
4 Remittances are defined as money transfers from migrants to their home countries. A reverse flow 
(family money to the migrant) can formally not be defined as remittances. 
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alternative’ to emigration.5 These initiatives overlook the fact that migration has 
always been a supplemental strategy for people to improve and diversify their 
livelihood, achieving higher levels of social security through diverse sources. 
With the rather paternalistic and simplistic argument of the EU that people are 
best off living their lives ‘at home’, remittances, as an important income source, 
are annihilated.  
The recent step-up in efforts of the North to control migration has resulted in a 
conflict of agendas within governments on migration. Whereas policymakers of 
developing cooperation departments may approach migration in terms of 
opportunities for the South, their perspective is overshadowed by the more 
dominant domestic agenda, which perceives migration pre-dominantly in terms 
of threats for national security. The dominance of the national security agenda 
and its implications for migration policies shows how globalisation is not a 
unidirectional and homogenous process towards social openness, unrestricted 
flows and inter-connections. It simultaneously contains elements of social 
closure, the blocking of access and the prevention of mobility (Shamir, 2005).  
Another element that needs to be part of this discussion is the impact of 
migrants’ formal status on their ability to send remittances and make an impact 
on development in their country of origin. It is widely believed that irregular 
migrants are less likely to send substantial sums of money to their home 
countries as they often lack access to the necessary infrastructure. This argument 
also extends to non-monetary remittances. Since irregular migrants generally 
encounter many more problems in their quest of climbing the ‘social-economic 
ladder’ of society, they are also expected to have less impact on their home 
communities, for instance in terms of knowledge transfer. In addition, modern 
modes of communication may also be relatively expensive for this group. 
Altogether, the immobilisation of (potential) migrants, the lengthening of 
migration processes and the enforcement of stricter (ir)regularisation policies 
have led to a weakening of the impact of migrants and their remittances. The 
extreme difficulties faced by African migrants not only during their migration, 
but also upon arrival in a host country, may sustain their fragile position as 
remittance receivers, rather than senders.  
In sum, the quest of northern states for limited and well-controlled migration 
management, concomitantly satisfying a need for higher levels of national 
security, have marginalised opportunities for migrants to play a role in 
supporting developments in their countries of origin through remittances.  
Discussion and conclusion 
In the introduction we asked ourselves why migration is perceived as a threat 
to development, notably by receiving countries (e.g. ‘waves of migrants’), but 
also by sending countries (e.g. ‘the brain drain’), when the monetary flows 
resulting out of migration are hailed as one of the greatest promises for 
development in the global south. How can these two trains of thought run along 
the same track without crashing into each other, because they are so obviously 
and strongly related? The answer is that states can only maintain these two lines 
5 A Senegalese example is a program called Retour Vers l’Agriculture 
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of thought if an artificial separation is created between, on the one hand, the flow 
of people, and on the other, the flow of goods, artefacts and money. Thereby it 
could be argued that the first flow is framed as a negative effect of globalisation 
which calls for strong and restrictive management to manage labour markets to 
ensure cultural integration, global security, balanced economic growth, etc. The 
second flow, on the other hand, is largely perceived as a positive effect of 
globalisation: namely the ability, due to technological advances and the 
liberalisation of markets, to send goods, money, etc, across geographical divides 
for the benefit of all –potentially leading to development. In our view, this 
artificial divide cannot be maintained and below we provide our main arguments 
why these two ‘types’ of flows cannot be viewed separately from one another: 
First, concerning migratory flows, we argue that migration is not looked at in 
its full context, instead, it receives political attention primarily with regard to the 
concern that an inflow of people, bringing along their culture (‘African’, ‘Islam’, 
‘Polish’, etc) will have adverse effects on local communities. We do not deny 
that an influx of people in a local community can have a (temporary) 
destabilising effect, yet this does not imply that migration can then be equated to 
a whole range of societal problems. Furthermore, there is a second angle to 
consider: the need to also take into consideration that migration is very often a 
reflection of global differentials brought about by a liberal economic agenda 
which has increasingly led labour to become a dynamic and active flow that 
closely follows economic developments around the world. It can no longer be 
seen as having the form of reserve pools that are physically bound to particular 
geographical locations.  
This, however, calls for a major step that is not likely to take place: If the 
liberal open economy agenda is to prevail at a global level then a systematic and 
complete tearing down of all kinds of man-made barriers –physical and 
institutional- is required to create an open market. Then labour, notably unskilled 
labour, can become part of the global flow. Such a liberalisation of the labour 
market, enabling migrants to easily migrate from one location to next, wherever 
their input is required, can help to give global accreditation to the value of their 
labour, reducing discrepancies between the values of a same type of occupation 
between one local economy and another. Such an open valuation of labour will 
also make the management of skilled migration much less ethically problematic; 
mechanisms can be put in place to ensure that transfer of labour from one 
location to another is compensated for. Then brain gain becomes a temporary 
problem –diminishing as the global market becomes saturated. And programmes 
around brain circulation, which at present are deemed to be window-dressing 
attempts of the global north rather than anything else, become redundant.  
Such a development will result in an open competition between labour forces 
across the globe. The insecurity of such an open, global economy, notably for 
those presently privileged by all kinds of market protection measures in 
developed countries, makes this unlikely to take place. Hence, multinationals 
will continue to move whole manufacturing and industrial plants rather than 
adjusting their source of labour from one continent to the next. The ‘guest 
worker’ programmes in Western Europe of the 1970s addressed just this issue, 
inviting cheap labour to temporarily work in Europe. Yet these initiatives were 
controlled by national governments, not by a dynamic, open market. 
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Second, with regard to flows of remittances, we have argued for the need to 
nuance the role of remittances as development panacea. Remittances have, in 
both the global north and south, been wrongly labelled as the cure to 
underdevelopment and poverty. Migrants should not be seen as development 
agents as this misinterprets the basic reasoning for migrants to go abroad and 
their entitlement to use their own resources as they see fit given that these are 
private funds that have been generated with the investment of private capital. 
Migrants are seldom the poorest in their own countries and will also seldom 
maintain links with the poorest in these countries. Therefore, there is a strong 
need to offset any engagement of governments and NGOs –in the north and 
south- with migrants in local development projects in their regions of origin, by 
also initiating development projects elsewhere in the same country. In these 
poorest parts, resources to enable people to migrate –notably to distant, foreign 
destinations might have been lacking altogether. This comment should not be 
taken to mean that we feel that migrants do not contribute to the development of 
their countries. To the contrary, private investments of migrants in their countries 
of origin (especially houses and businesses in urban areas) provide employment, 
have various multiplier effects for local economies, and provide opportunity for 
others in their country of origin to improve their lives by being engaged in these 
transnational activities. We also argued how support to the livelihoods of their 
families and close friends also needs to be seen as a form of development; 
sustaining and increasing human capital. With regard to these incentives and 
investments improvements can be realised, notably when this concerns returns to 
investment in businesses, as many migrants are entrepreneurs ‘by default’ rather 
than entrepreneurs ‘at heart’. It is in this field that development cooperation 
could play a supporting, capacity building role.6 Indeed, first initiatives have 
been initiated around Europe to this effect.  
African migrants biding their time all along the North African coast, 
apprehending their opportunities to reach Europe, is an image which can be used 
favourably by both pro- and anti-migration camps. It feeds into the arguments of 
the anti-migration camp to persuade the powers-that-be that more control 
measures need to be put in place to stop the influx of illegal migrants, and more 
campaigns need to be launched to dissuade potential migrants from leaving their 
countries. On the other hand, the pro-migration camp can use the same image to 
argue the case that there is a clear disjuncture between the demand of the 
European economy for (cheap, unskilled) labour and an apparent societal-
political demand to restrict this inflow. Given, as we indicated in our 
introduction, our choice to take a liberal perspective to understand the relation 
between migration and other flows within the global economy, we feel that the 
pro-migration camp has the stronger case. Albeit, in whose benefit? Obviously 
their stance will benefit migrants, but it also favours industries and other large 
employers. This is where the anti-migration camp can argue the case for a need 
to protect national/regional labour forces and their established rights to social 
benefits, minimum wage, etc against an outside, more flexible labour pool.  
Yet it is exactly the persistence of protectionist anti-migration laws that an 
informal labour economy has arisen all around Europe which seems to be 
undermining the position of the formal economy. This informal economy is 
6 In Chapter 8 of this book Tine Davids and Ruerd Ruben discuss the complexities surrounding 
migrant identity and the investments they seek to make in their countries of origin. 
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largely the result of a discrepancy between labour market demands and 
opportunities for migrants to legally work in Europe. The flexibility of this 
market may not be altogether disadvantageous to employers as their costs are 
lower while their labour force is dispensable, which is suitable if there are strong 
variations in labour demand. This development is to the disadvantage of local 
labour, which finds itself unemployed, being unable to compete with this pool of 
informal labour. By allowing legal labour migration, a consensual set of standard 
of employment conditions can also come into place and be monitored by all 
actors involved. Given the intentions of migrants to only stay in the global north 
long enough to accumulate sufficient funds with which to establish income 
generating activities in their country of origin, one can question the use of 
intensification of monitoring activities along Europe’s borders. Rather than 
dissuading people from migrating it seems to simply lengthen the period and 
resources required to reach Europe. This has ramifications for it implies that 
migrants, once they have managed to get inside Europe, will lengthen the period 
they need to recuperate from the significantly higher expenses they incurred 
before they can start saving money. Notably, if they remain in the informal 
economy their status may be precarious; given their lower and more insecure 
earnings they will take longer to reach their financial targets. This will also 
hamper their abilities to put their migration efforts into productive use; sending 
remittances to support their families and friends and engaging in investments 
which will allow them to return home. Given the arduous nature of the work they 
conduct, especially if they take on multiple jobs, their health runs at risk, which 
not only constitutes a personal liability but can also result in them becoming a 
financial burden to their host society. These are issues rendering invalid many of 
the arguments of the anti-migration camp. 
 
In conclusion, the debate on the impact of migration on countries of origin 
through remittances and the debate on the desirability of migration have run 
along seemingly separate tracks due to the political agenda within which they 
have been contextualised, and their seemingly different geographical impact. 
Yet, logically, the flow of people and the flow of remittances are strongly 
entwined, both the expression of development within an incomplete globalisation 
agenda. The seeming inability or unwillingness of policy makers, notably in the 
global north, to draw the intricate connection between these two kinds of flows 
has led to largely ineffective policymaking, both with regard to migration and 
with regard to remittances.  
For the two flows to be united into a concerted and objective policy approach 
that depoliticises migration and recognises it as an integral part of globalisation 
processes, a concerted effort in policymaking will be required from 
representatives of national states of the global north and south, the World Bank, 
the International Labour Organisation, the World Trade Organisation and the 
International Organisation for Migration. It remains to be seen whether these 
actors can be convinced to give up their own interests and convictions and take 
on this attempt. 
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10 
Door-to-door cargo agents: cultivating 
and expanding Filipino transnational 
space  
Marisha Maas 
Introduction 
Within the context of Philippine migration, enduring belonging to the country of 
origin and continuing care for the ones left behind, are turned into transnational 
merchandize. This article puts forward the door-to-door industry as a typical 
Filipino immigrant business industry, sprouted from, and commercially 
exploiting, Philippine-specific state policies to retain the loyalty of the overseas 
nationals while also being embedded in culturally defined normative 
expectations of migrants with regard to lasting responsibilities towards their kin. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to show how basically simple and small 
business ventures, initiated at grassroots level, can actively stimulate 
transnationalization beyond the narrow kinship systems that migration usually 
engender, as they expand these pre-existing social relations into a dense and 
varied web of cross-bordering ties. Encouraging exchange, diffused forms of 
solidarity, and generalized forms of reciprocity, business owners/operators thus 
contribute to the emergence of a transnational community.  
 
Nothing comes between you and your dream. Not the hardships that come with 
working in a foreign land. Nor the loneliness of being far away from home. No 
matter what the distance, Express Padala helps you keep your promises. Our 
reliable remittance service reaches your loved ones fast and efficiently so you’re 
never really far away. 
Within the context of Philippine migration, enduring belonging to the country of 
origin and continuing responsibility and care for the ones left behind are, such 
shows the above advertisement of a Philippine money transfer business1, turned 
into transnational merchandize. Quite directly, Express Padala (Tagalog for 
‘shipment’) alludes to a sense of duty among those who left the country to 
maintain and reinforce their cultural-ethnic identity and solidarity with their 
native soil. This paper examines a line of business that first and foremost thrives 
upon the Filipinos’ strong inclination to stay close to the country of birth, 
especially to family and friends left behind: the freight forwarding industry, in 
the Philippine context also known as the balikbayan box business. 
                                                          
1 This advertisement is repeatedly published in Munting Nayon (Tagalog for “little village”), a 
monthly publication published in The Netherlands, that discusses societal developments in the 
Philippines and within the Filipino community in the Netherlands. 
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While as a noun the term balikbayan refers to Filipino migrants coming home 
for vacation, as an adjective it is commonly used to denote the cardboard boxes 
in which overseas Filipinos send back goods to their loved ones left behind. The 
term was coined, and transformed into state policy, by President Marcos, during 
a major national speech in which he encouraged Filipino nationals abroad to visit 
their home country once a year during the holidays. Next to economic and legal 
means to facilitate the emigrants’ bodily return, he also promoted the sending of 
goods from out of their overseas residences through the instalment of discounted 
tax tariffs (Glick Schiller, et al. 1992, Szanton 1996). While the migrants’ 
monetary remittances have for long monopolized the attention of the Philippine 
government, who is renown for its extended state-led labour export program and 
has been in the leading top of remittances-receiving countries for years2, also 
“remittances in kind” are increasingly acknowledged for their importance for the 
country’s economy and the well-being of its citizens.  
Especially since in the last decades international transport and communication 
has become cheaper and easier, a massive industry has emerged in facilitating, 
maintaining and strengthening the long-distance linkages between the globally 
dispersed Filipinos and the stayers. Both within the motherland itself as well as 
beyond, Filipinos have seized this opportunity and put up cargo businesses to 
serve their migrated compatriots. Ranging from large, global carriers to micro 
companies operating bilaterally, these services are known to the consumers as 
“door-to-door (hereupon referred to as DrDr services” as they (usually) pick up 
the packages from the sender’s home and deliver them right to the beneficiary’s 
doorstep in the Philippines.  
This chapter puts forward the DrDr industry as a typical Filipino immigrant 
business industry, sprouted from and commercially exploiting Philippine-
specific state policies to retain the loyalty of the overseas nationals as well as 
embedded in culturally defined normative expectations on the migrants’ lasting 
responsibilities towards their kin. The primary aim is to show how basically very 
simple business ventures initiated at the grassroots level actively stimulate 
transnationalization beyond the narrow kinship systems that migration usually 
engenders, as they expand these pre-existing social relations into a dense and 
varied web of cross-bordering ties. Encouraging exchange, diffused forms of 
solidarity and generalized forms of reciprocity, the business owners/operators 
hereby contribute to the emergence of a transnational community.  
The material presented here draws upon personal fieldwork conducted for my 
doctoral thesis on Filipino entrepreneurship in the Netherlands. This fieldwork 
took place both in the Netherlands and in the Philippines, where I met with 
several “home country counterparts”, specifically the migrants’ families who 
were actively involved in the business operations3. While I may allude to 
findings among entrepreneurs in other commercial sectors, the obvious focus is 
2 In 2004, the country was fourth among the top recipients of remittances, after China, India and 
Mexico, with estimated remittances totalling US$13 billion in 2005 (World Bank 2006), and their 
contribution to the national economy steadily increasing; between 1990 and 2003 remittances, as a 
percentage of GNP, grew from 2.7 to 10.2 percent. 
3 The entire survey exists of 34 cases of Filipino entrepreneurship, involving 39 first generation 
Filipino immigrants. In The Netherlands, the main data gathering method were oral interviews, based 
on a life history approach. Further fieldwork was conducted in The Philippines. This concentrated on 
8 cases of ‘home country counterparts’, and took place in September-October 2001, January-July 
2003 and January-April 2005. 
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upon the nine Filipinos in the survey who ran a DrDr service4. This chapter is 
organized in the following manner: the next section describes the prevailing 
perceptions among the entrepreneurs of their own cargo company as “an easy 
business” and as “hardly business” As will be shown in the section thereafter, 
especially this latter perception ensues from the fact that the entrepreneurs 
generally would pursue a social and unselfish rather than a selfish, economic 
mission with their firm. Their social calling is to serve their compatriots and 
bridge the great physical distance between those in their adopted country and 
those who stayed behind. The chapter continues with the remarkable observation 
that some of these entrepreneurs, at the same time as their ventures uphold and 
expand a system of support and “giving back”, are, in fact, quite critical of this 
one-sided relation, and have established a structure of exchange in which also the 
stayers play an active, rather than a passive, role. The chapter then ends with the 
contention assertion that DrDr agents, and their transnational enterprises, can be 
seen as small though significant players in the consolidation and diversification 
of border-crossing ties and linkages, contributing to the emotional, symbolic and 
also material unification of a physically separated community. 
Filipino DrDr services in The Netherlands: “easy business” and 
“hardly business”  
Like in other destination countries, Filipinos have put up DrDr services in the 
Netherlands; in point of fact, it appears the sending of gifts (pasalubongs in 
Tagalog) of fellow countrymen to the Philippines is a fairly popular line of 
business here: during the fieldwork period I came across some 15 Filipino-
owned DrDr services. Considering both the small size of the Filipino population 
in this destination country and the few entrepreneurs among them5, this is a 
notable number, especially since nearly all of these 15 entrepreneurs 
simultaneously operated the same captive market (Kloosterman 2003, 315).  
Unquestionably, the attractiveness of this kind of business and, as a 
consequence, the relative crowdedness of this industry in The Netherlands can 
partly be explained by the general perception that it was “only a small step to 
become a DrDr agent themselves”, as one of the research participants phrased it. 
Each of the nine entrepreneurs interviewed repeatedly stressed the ease to set up 
and manage their transnational venture. Without exception, office was based at 
home, and while most enterprises were formally “woman-owned businesses”, 
nearly all were effectively run as husband/wife firms. Aside of (semi-informally 
employed) contact persons throughout the country, whose primary tasks were to 
call around within their own social network on the shipments’ schedule and to 
next inform the entrepreneur on where empty boxes were needed and/or filled 
boxes were waiting to be picked up, all business operations were carried out by 
the business owners themselves, usually together with the life partner. In this, the 
4 Seven of these services were owned by Filipina women, one by a Filipino man, while one was a 
formal partnership of a Filipina woman and her Dutch spouse. Names used in this chapter are fictive 
to protect the privacy of these respondents.  
5 In 2004, some 12.400 Filipinos resided in the Netherlands (CBS 2005). For the same year, Spaan, 
van Naerssen and Tillaart mention the existence of 194 Filipino enterprises and 238 Filipino 
immigrant (first and second generation) entrepreneurs (2005, 251). 
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most important activity comprised the distribution and pick up of the balikbayan 
boxes, which in point of fact generally involved more than merely the transaction 
of the box and related payment. When passing by their customers, the DrDr 
operators were often invited in for a drink and snack, and a friendly, yet more 
than once also fairly intimate, conversation. While these personal visits 
demanded much of the operators’ time and energy, they emphasized it to be an 
essential and integral part of their works that was generally also the most 
enjoyable. Besides, as they generally only shipped three to four times a year, in 
the end, the business did on average not ask for more than a couple of hours 
work a week.  
In the Philippines, all DrDr operators hired professional brokers to release the 
container from the customs. For the distribution and delivery of the boxes, some 
entrepreneurs contracted specialized services, while others had taken on relatives 
and friends to do the job, mostly on base of semi-formal arrangements.  
All in all, operating a DrDr business was, as the entrepreneurs repeatedly 
suggested, a rather straightforward pursuit. Little capital or specific skills were 
required, the basic equipment (a telephone, computer and car) was often already 
part of the household effects, and the well defined nature of the tasks provided 
opportunity to run the service from home and combine it with other roles. Hence, 
in their view, this line of business was, as one put it literally, “open to just 
anybody.” At the same time -and not surprisingly in view of the saturated 
market-, their businesses were rather insignificant in economic terms like size, 
profit, or turnover. In that sense, a DrDr business was, as one of them formulated 
it, not only “an easy business” but also “hardly business”.  
Yet, personal economic gain was seldom the main focus of the immigrant 
entrepreneurs. Only few (female) operators said they started their business to 
earn “something extra” next to the income of their spouse and/or their own 
earnings from a part time job. By and large, the entrepreneurs ran their business 
as a sideline and did not show an active interest to become involved in larger 
businesses. While some conveyed that the small market in the Netherlands and 
intense competition held back their opportunities to enlarge their business 
activities, the majority contended they did not wish to expand as they already 
had to juggle their time among a variety of occupations and interests - other (part 
time) jobs, hobbies, membership of organizations and their parental duties. Only 
three entrepreneurs seemed more “business minded” as they aimed for a bigger 
market share and had a more outspoken (though still not exclusive) economic 
goal setting. Yet, for none of the DrDr agents, “economics” comprised the sole 
rationale of their entrepreneurial activity; their motivations to start a DrDr 
service, or the objectives they pursued with it, were always accompanied by 
other non-economic motivations and objectives, which were usually held more 
important. This type of business thus appeared to offer opportunities not found in 
paid employment or any other kind of business. Indeed, as the following sections 
will show, the DrDr service lent itself exceedingly well for a variety of social 
missions.  
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The social calling: serving and connecting 
Helping compatriots: at home and abroad  
Unsurprisingly in view of the business premise, in all conversations I had with 
the DrDr agents, the poorer or more difficult living conditions in the motherland 
and the allegedly beneficial contribution of their transport activities on the well-
being of the stayers played a prominent role. Accordingly, many of the 
entrepreneurs advanced this as an important incentive for them to start a cargo 
business. One woman said: “their hard lives are brightened by the goods their 
remote relatives send back to them; and I wanted to help in that, be part of that. 
That is why I decided to do this.” Some put it even more sharply and intimated 
that their “fellows back home” needed the shipped goods for their daily survival. 
Yet, their role in “improving lives” was emphatically believed to be not only in 
the transfer of material aid to their compatriots, but also, sometimes considered 
even more important, in “sending the love” of their migrated relatives, as one 
entrepreneur romanticized the industry. As these entrepreneurs saw it, what is 
inside the boxes would not be as important as the idea of them: keeping the 
family close even over great distances. These immigrants’ choice of business 
therefore seemed strongly inspired by idealistic and/or romantic notions attached 
to the work, as well as by feelings of solidarity and a sense of duty towards their 
fellow countrymen back home.  
Interestingly though, the first thing that several entrepreneurs answered when 
asked why they had started this particular type of business, was that, in this 
manner, they thought to be of help to their compatriots in the Netherlands. 
Rather than the receivers of the balikbayan boxes, they notably considered the 
senders, i.e. the members of their own ethnic community in the host country, as 
the primary beneficiaries of their undertaking. As it appeared, taking on the task 
of a balikbayan forwarder was seen as a means to place themselves in the service 
of the community. Their ventures helped their migrated compatriots comply with 
the moral obligation to support the ones left behind. In the Philippines, assistance 
patterns within the family are reciprocal and carry a sense of obligation. 
Apparent in nearly all conversations I had with Filipinos, these moral obligations 
extend from the nuclear family to the extended family, including uncles, aunts, 
cousins, nephews, nieces, grandparents and even fictive kin, and form crucial 
part of their Filipino identity. Cultural values such as utang na loob or “debt of 
gratitude” (Tyner 2002) and pakikisama, or the “sentiments of collectivism and 
mutual obligation among kin” (Parreñas 2001, 109) are the basic premises of the 
Philippine family – whether its members live close together or dispersed across 
the globe. By offering their co-ethnics in The Netherlands, according to the 
entrepreneurs, the “best price”, “quickest delivery”, “highest security”, or “most 
reliable shipment schedule”, they helped maintain the traditional kinship 
relations and so preserved an important aspect of “being Filipino”, even when 
physically remote from the native soil. Transporting balikbayan boxes made 
tangible the sentiments of belonging and helped generate propinquity with the 
distant home front. 
 At the same time, as shows the quote below, it is also the personal contact 
between the entrepreneur and the customers that was considered a support to the 
latter: 
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It is just a little business, I won’t get richer. How can you get rich with this business? 
….But what really counts is the excitement of being in contact with your countrymen, 
you know… to have contact them en to help them. To be in contact with them is also 
one action of helping them. It really is a community thing you know… you give it to 
the Filipino community in Holland, Belgium, Germany…. So I put up this business 
because it is helping to my countrymen. (Jessica, interview, 08-01-04) 
Many of the business owners’ accounts highlighted how socializing with the 
customers comprised an important, if not the most important, part of the 
operations in this particular line of business. The business operators personally 
(often with their spouses) passed by their customers to pick up the filled boxes, 
which was most of the time accompanied by a invitation for a sociable talk and 
drink in the customer’s private realm. Accordingly, some of the entrepreneurs 
explicated that their business venture was in fact a kind of social work and they 
themselves were to be seen as social workers, rather than as businessmen: they 
assisted their co-ethnics not only in maintaining good relations with their 
relatives back home by sending their gifts, but also helped them by listening to 
their stories, telling about their own experiences, and giving them advice, often 
on life in The Netherlands. As the immigrant entrepreneurs could personally 
relate to the worries and needs of their customers and would practically as well 
as emotionally assist them in their adjustment process, in their perception, their 
DrDr service was not just a transport business but also functioned as a meeting 
place, or a help desk. While among all entrepreneurs in the survey, “the Filipino 
way of doing business” was commonly regarded to be “more social” than the 
“stiff and formal Dutch way” (Maas 2004), it seems especially the balikbayan 
box cargo industry is featured by close and personal relations between the 
business operators and the customers. In that sense, the strong sense of common 
identity/origin, and the shared migration experiences, was both a resource to as 
well as objective in business.  
Helping themselves: maintaining ties with those at home and abroad 
Many of the entrepreneurs thus advanced the desire to be of service to their 
compatriots, in The Netherlands and/or in The Philippines as the most important 
drive for their entrepreneurial engagement. Yet, while these entrepreneurs helped 
migrated co-ethnics adjust to life in the Netherlands and uphold ties with their 
loved ones back home, it also became clear from their stories that their 
businesses functioned in similar ways for themselves as well. Also for the 
operators themselves, the DrDr service served as a meeting desk with 
compatriots, as an outlet where they could vent their feelings and share 
experiences and through that cope with difficulties and hardships – which were 
often related to their migration and separation from home and family. 
Moreover, besides forming a platform for adaptation and a vehicle of social 
integration into the Filipino community in The Netherlands, the transport 
services also functioned to support the entrepreneurs’ own personal ties to their 
country of origin. They themselves regularly sent private gifts to their relatives 
and friends in The Philippines too; or they sent boxes for free for relatives or 
friends who also resided in The Netherlands. Notably, in more than one case, 
these non-commercial transfers of private goods turned out to over time take on 
an increasingly more prominent role in the total volume of their forwarding 
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activities, since often friends in The Netherlands started to give the entrepreneurs 
their second-hand belongings to donate in The Philippines.  
The DrDr business thus preserved not only the entrepreneurs’ own pre-
migratory social ties to their remote friends and relatives; it also strengthened 
and expanded their post-migratory social network within their adopted country. 
What is more, donations made by friends and associates contributed to the 
expansion of the scope of the business beyond the original DrDr connection, that 
is, beyond the transnational but nonetheless bounded and intimate kinship 
connections as the primary axis on which it had its original premises.  
Bridging beyond the nearest and dearest 
A notable number of the entrepreneurs I spoke with indicated that, besides 
sending balikbayan boxes with private goods (for their customers as well as for 
themselves), they had in the course of time also begun to ship (second-hand) 
goods to civil organizations or community projects in The Philippines. Either 
they collected these goods themselves, within their own social networks or by 
going to clearance sales and asking around among hospitals, schools or other 
institutions in The Netherlands; or they offered co-ethnic associations in The 
Netherlands free container space to ship their aid to selected beneficiaries. 
Forging collaborative relations with private donors, ethnic associations and other 
institutions in both The Netherlands and The Philippines, these immigrant 
entrepreneurs capitalized on their venture to practice cross-bordering solidarity. 
They not only serviced their co-ethnics in the country of settlement but also used 
their enterprise as a relatively cheap and practical instrument for altruistic and 
humanitarian activities directed at the country of origin. Their small-scale cargo 
companies so additionally functioned to pursue a social mission that 
emphatically stretched beyond the core activities of their business. As such, these 
Filipino business operators made themselves known not only as economic actors, 
but also as a “philanthropic resource” (Opiniano 2003).  
At the same time, transnational endeavours like these may provide immigrants 
political influence in the homeland. Flora, operating one of the older and 
seemingly more established DrDr services in The Netherlands, for instance 
explained that the charity activities she and her relatives back home carried out 
in their home village had certainly given her family more prestige and that her 
family was now, more than before, asked for advice or assistance in community 
affairs, such as in putting up an after-school child care program or equipping the 
new hospital. For some, eagerness to gain recognition, and some supremacy, in 
the immigrant community as well as in the place of birth may so have formed an 
incentive to engage in more dispersed acts of loyalty and solidarity.  
In conclusion, whereas the nucleus of the DrDr business is in the immigrants’ 
personal familial obligations and whereas the business operators were first and 
foremost driven by the wish to help sustain these closely-knit bonds across the 
miles, the wider benevolent efforts that many of them in addition carried out 
through their business were grounded in their general sense of reciprocity with 
the native soil, their ethnic/regional identity and feelings of solidarity with their 
place of origin, and –less altruistic perhaps- the desire to maintain or strengthen 
one’s personal influence, at home and/or abroad. Bridging “beyond the nearest 
and dearest”, their enterprises extended the specific reciprocity, traditionally 
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expected from migrants towards the home front, to generalized reciprocity (Faist 
2004, 19-21), and solidarity from a focused to a more diffused form. As such, 
these enterprises encouraged a more widespread set of cross-border alliances.  
One final way in which the DrDr business was used to link up with the former 
homeland – and, hence, provoked further transnationalization- moves beyond 
“giving back”, as it shifts the role of the stayers from passive aid receivers into 
active partners in the immigrants’ transnational endeavours.  
From giving back to exchange  
Apparently, while DrDr businesses first and foremost serve to maintain 
interpersonal relationships over long distances, they also give expression to and 
in fact promote a broader sense of solidarity and companionship, first and 
foremost within the Filipino immigrant community and with the country or 
origin, but stretching also, in as far as the immigrant entrepreneurs’ Dutch 
spouses, friends and/or native institutions are involved, into the adopted society 
at large. All the same, these enterprises still basically thrive upon a unidirectional 
sense of belonging and a one-way set of commitments and obligations from the 
immigrants towards their relatives and friends back home, and, as we saw, 
sometimes towards the wider home village. In the end, it is the immigrant who 
“gives back”, either to specific people, or to the motherland in general.6 
Fascinatingly then, several DrDr operators, at the same time as they in fact 
exploited their compatriots’ sense of duty and reciprocity towards the former 
home and also personally used their business as a means to contribute to better 
lives in the country of origin, voiced a rather critical stance on this one-way 
relationship between those abroad and those at home. As it seemed though, their 
resistance specifically centred on “sending money every time they [family and 
friends in the Philippines] ask for it” (Virgie, interview, 23-12-03). As these 
entrepreneurs explicated, for them, this request was just not always that easy to 
comply with, or else they simply did not consider it the desirable course to stay 
connected to the former home front. The transport of personal goods through the 
DrDr service can be seen within this context of ambiguity: 
The business is primarily a help. Not for me, for them [the stayers], you know. You 
know life in the Philippines, all help is welcome. And I can give them money, but 
then they do not buy food for it. That is a common grief among us Filipino migrants 
you know. They always send money but so often the money just disappears into 
nothing. So this is my way to help them. (Roberto, interview, 06-01-04) 
As can be read from Roberto’s argument, remittances in kind are deemed an 
appropriate or practical substitution for financial remittances and the balikbayan 
6 This is perhaps a somewhat myopic presentation of the situation. While presented here as a one-
way set of commitments, it should be realized that support and charity activities carried out by 
Filipino migrants, as they themselves see it, are in fact indeed an act of reciprocity: they hereby repay 
their parents and families for their upbringing but also, more generally, repay their society at large for 
the lives they had on their native soil. Moreover, these acts for their part do not need to go unpaid: 
they may function as an assurance of future assistance from the receivers of support to the migrant. 
Alternatively reciprocity can take the form of visual signs attesting to the contributions of migrants, 
as in the case of memorials in their home villages or awards presented to Filipino associations or 
individuals for their contributions to the progress of the Philippine nation.  
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box system can be seen as an arrangement that assures the immigrants that their 
money is used as intended. Thus, the sending of gifts – rather than “simply 
money”- may not only be a mere sign of enduring love or responsibility towards 
those left behind, it may also be an expression of the urge of immigrants to 
control the format of the support expected from them.  
More intriguingly however, the DrDr service also functioned to support the 
stayers in yet another way – and, while not openly expressed as such, likely the 
business owners themselves as well. Three DrDr agents explained that a DrDr 
business, more so than any other type of business, lends itself for active 
involvement of their relatives (and friends) back home: as an alternative to 
subcontracting professional forwarding businesses in the Philippines, these 
immigrants paid their own pre-existing social contacts to handle the delivery of 
the boxes. Employing the own relatives/friends supposedly helped save on 
overhead expenses, with contracting professional cargo enterprises most likely 
asking a higher price for their services. The entrepreneurs however first and 
foremost presented this business decision as an act of help to the ones left 
behind; as they explicated, providing the own relatives/friends with work, and 
thus offering them more or less steady wages, was a better way to help than by 
“slavishly” remitting money –as one of them put it - to them.  
The gains for these stayers were, as the entrepreneurs also emphasized, not just 
financial. In point of fact, the direct income generated by the handling of the 
balikbayan boxes was in all cases rather limited, comprising no more than a 
sideline income (although the number of people receiving such a sideline income 
could be quite substantial, as shown by one case where some 15 to 20 people 
living all over the Philippines were involved in the business operations). More 
importantly, as not just the immigrant entrepreneurs but also their relatives back 
home elucidated, their transnational cooperation and shared interest had resulted 
in strengthened family bonds, the attainment of (business) skills, a greater 
confidence in their capabilities and, related to that, higher hopes for the future 
(Maas 2005).  
This was directly observable in that the balikbayan forwarding linkages 
subsequently induced the formation of other, new businesses, put up and run by 
the immigrants’ close relatives. One sister, for instance, now felt confident 
enough to realize her dream of old, that is, to establish her own little shop in gifts 
and party goods. Whereas this woman purchased her merchandize on the local 
market and operated entirely on her own, the other newly established shops (in 
consumables, clothing and furniture) sold goods imported from The Netherlands 
and for that still relied upon the migrated relative. In point of fact, these 
businesses made use of, or were actually the direct offspring of the already 
existing balikbayan box linkage: the migrated relatives/DrDr operators in the 
Netherlands, also responsible for the purchase of the sales wares, simply added 
the merchandize in the shipments of these gift-cases. Remarkably, here too, the 
latter tended to portray this additional business activity first and foremost as a 
help to their families back home, and said they themselves “hardly earned” from 
the sales. Likely however, these material additions made their balikbayan box 
shipments at the very least less costly, and thus saved the entrepreneurs on their 
overheads.  
Still, irrespective of the actual (financial) benefits for the immigrants 
themselves, what these observations show is an interesting change in the scope 
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and nature of the actual business pursuit. Using the balikbayan box system, 
actually meant to send private support to the ones left behind, these immigrant 
entrepreneurs initiated a more productive, and in a way also more truly 
reciprocal, relationship with their loved ones back home. These immigrants used 
their overseas social capital to establish an enterprise in their adopted country; at 
the same time, they themselves formed a resource for employment and business 
activity in their home country. The fact that the immigrants brought up only the 
latter as the advantage of running a transnational family business – in fact, as the 
reason to put up such business- is most probably expressive of the traditional 
Filipino kinship relations in which unselfish support to the more needy ones 
(those left behind in the motherland) is the norm. Yet, while DrDr businesses by 
themselves show how, within the context of migration, the expected practice of 
giving back has become an institutionalized phenomenon, encouraged and 
fortified from above, the instances described above, operating on the base of 
exchange within the family, show how the same practice may also be challenged 
and in fact modified from below, by migrants themselves. In my forthcoming 
thesis, I develop this point further (Maas forthcoming). 
Conclusion: DrDr operators forge transnationalization  
Transnationalism, or transnationalization as the process towards more cross-
bordering alignments, is generally recognized to start at the level of the 
household or kinship. Reciprocity and familial obligations between those who 
left and those who stayed form the bedrock for initial transnational activities, 
which primarily centre on the –one-way- sending of money and gifts to the home 
front. Such primordial bonds form a lucrative base for business transactions. The 
focus of this chapter was on the Philippine DrDr industry, transporting 
balikbayan boxes full of pasalubongs (gifts) from abroad to back home, 
exploring why and how Filipino immigrants in The Netherlands run businesses 
in this field.  
As it appeared, these immigrant entrepreneurs were strongly driven by the 
very same values that their ventures cater to: social commitment, collectivism, 
reciprocity and solidarity, with compatriots both in the adopted country as well 
as “back home”, were commonly advanced as their prime reasons to be active in 
the DrDr industry. Listening to their stories, their business decisions were guided 
by altruism or compassion more so than by selfish objectives. As such, their 
enterprises both ensued from and projected values which to them were 
recognizably Filipino and evocative of Filipino culture. 
This chapter furthermore showed how the DrDr operators, and their grassroots 
transnational enterprises, while rather insignificant in terms of turnover or 
employment creation, were the vanguard of new and more substantial 
transnational ties. In the first place, these immigrant entrepreneurs thickened and 
diversified the economic ties with the home front, and in the process challenged 
traditional, obligatory kinship ties typical for first-generation migrants. Whereas 
the balikbayan box that formed the base and focus of their cross-bordering 
pursuits is emblematic of the enduring commitment of migrants towards those 
left behind, these immigrants used it to forge more truly reciprocal kinship 
relations. At the very least, they implicated the home stayers in the production 
145 
cycle, turning the role of the latter from mere “passive receivers of support” to 
“active participants” working for a shared interest. Moreover, actively involving 
the relatives back home in the business operations, and so using them as a 
resource to the business while simultaneously offering them a vehicle to social 
mobility, turned out to incite these “home country counterparts” to additional 
productive activity – with or without assistance of their migrated relative.  
Hence, while operating their businesses, these entrepreneurs, sometimes in 
close cooperation with their relatives who stayed behind, have discovered new 
opportunities and formulated new goals. Interestingly, these new opportunities 
and new goals more than once also moved beyond the original business realm. 
Empirical evidence provided in this chapter thus supports Portes’ claim that 
“while the original wave of these activities may be economic and their initiators 
can be properly labelled transnational entrepreneurs, subsequent activities 
encompass political, social and cultural pursuits as well” (1997, 15). Using the 
business linkages also for more humanitarian pursuits, the immigrants forged 
“generalized reciprocity” and “diffuse solidarity” among larger groups within the 
host country as well as in and with their former homeland, which complemented 
the “specific reciprocity” and “focused solidarity” (Faist 2004, 19-21) that 
initially formed the basis for their transnational involvement. Besides the 
symbolic value of these transnational ties and their contribution to local 
economic and social development of the former home region, the findings 
moreover suggested that immigrants’ cross-bordering pursuits may also 
constitute effective mechanisms for creating or upholding personal political 
influence in the locality of origin.  
All in all, these entrepreneurs have set in motion a cumulative process that in 
the end has led to a qualitatively distinct phenomenon: the transnational social 
space that they have created surpasses the strictly migratory chains of first-
generation immigrants, including more people from different sectors of society 
and more numerous and qualitative diversified linkages that carry more 
resources back and forth between home and host society. As such, the case of the 
Filipino DrDr services illustrates how immigrants may not only be participants in 
a transnational field, but also active contributors to, and catalysts in the 
emergence and consolidation of so-called transnational communities, in which 
more and more people build their lives. 
References  
Central Statistical Bureau (CBS) (2005), Bevolking naar herkomstgroepering en generatie, 
Voorburg: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.  
Faist, T. (2004), The transnational turn in migration research: perspectives for the study of politics 
and polity. In M. P. Frykman, ed., Transnational spaces: disciplinary perspectives, Malmö: Malmö 
University: 11-46. 
Kloosterman, R. (2003), Mixed embeddedness and post-industrial opportunity structures. Trajectories 
of migrant entrepreneurship in Amsterdam, in: S. Musterd and W. Salet (eds.) Amsterdam human 
capital, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press: 311-330. 
Maas, M. (2004), The place of space and place in human geography, seen from the perspective of 
Filipino entrepreneurship in The Netherlands, GSDR .2, Utrecht: KNAG. 
146 
Maas, M. (2005), Transnational entrepreneurship: exploring determinants and impacts of a Dutch-
based Filipino immigrant business, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 14(1-2):169-193. 
Maas, M. (forthcoming), Filipino entrepreneurship in the Netherlands: Beyond business, Nijmegen: 
PhD thesis. 
Opiniano, J. M. (2003), Migrants’ transnational philanthropy for rural development: cases from the 
Philippines, paper presented at the 2003 Asian Conference of the International Society for Third-
Sector Research (ISTR), 24-26 October, Beijing, China. 
Parreñas, Rhacel S. (2001), Servants of globalization. Women, migration and domestic work, Manila: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press.  
Portes, A. (1997), Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities, WPTC-98-01, 
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk (accessed August 27, 2007) 
Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, and C. Blanc-Szanton (1992), Transnationalism: a new analytical 
framework for understanding migration, in: N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch and C. Blanc-Szanton (eds.), 
Towards a transnational perspective on migration. Race, class, ethnicity, and nationalism 
reconsidered, New York: Annals of New York Academy of Sciences, 645:1-24. 
Spaan, E., A.L. van Naerssen, and H. van den Tillaart (2005), Asian immigrants and entrepreneurs in 
the Netherlands, in: E. Spaan, H. Felicitas and A.L. van Naerssen (eds.), Asian migrants and 
European labour markets. Patterns and processes of immigrant labour market insertion in Europe, 
London: Routledge. 
Szanton-Blanc, C. (1996), Balikbayan: A Filipino extension of the national imaginary and of state 
boundaries, Philippine Sociological Review 44(1-4):178-194. 
Tyner, J. A. (2002), The globalization of transnational labor migration and the Filipino family: a 
narrative, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 11(1):95-115. 
World Bank (2006), Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and 
Migration, Washington D.C., The World Bank.  
 Acting on Globalisation  
 
11 
African art and the Dutch art world –
reflections from a practitioner’s point of 
view 
Ankie van de Camp & Ben Janssen1 
 
We run a little art gallery in Oisterwijk, the Netherlands, called Tamai, where we 
trade in art and artistic craft predominantly from indigenous2 people 
communities according to the principles and practices of ’fair trade’. The art and 
craft products originate from outside the cultural sphere of Western Europe and 
Western English-speaking nations. Ankie van de Camp founded the gallery in 
2002 with a view to distributing art and craft from non-western societies. The 
name Tamai is a tribute to the Bushmen artist Thamae (Tamai) Setshogo. 
Initially there were two other initiatives like ours, one in Maastricht and the other 
one in Velp. Our gallery started out under the aegis of the Dutch Association of 
World shops (‘Vereniging van Wereldwinkels’), which considered fair art trade 
as a strategic expansion of its activities portfolio. We were able to obtain most of 
the craft and art products through importers that are assembled in the networks of 
EFTA (European Fair Trade Association) and/or IFAT (International Fair Trade 
Association). The fair trade import organizations turned out to be a useful 
starting point but they proved to be instable providers of quality art. Art products 
were just occasional by-products for the fair trade import organizations as their 
core business is importing craft, textiles and also food. The supply was too 
erratic for us with the result that we started to look elsewhere. At present we 
have succeeded in developing our own network of artists, artist communities and 
fellow galleries. Nowadays, the gallery focuses mainly on African indigenous 
arts; modern art paintings and prints from San artists from D’kar, Botswana and 
from Kimberley, South Africa. Furthermore, we trade in indigenous art from 
Uganda, Zimbabwe and Ghana as well as from Inuit from Chukotka in Siberia. 
We began as laymen, as real ‘amateurs’ in the business of both fair art trade 
and running a gallery with the result that when we started off setting up the 
gallery we came across many problems, one of which is the alleged position of 
African art and African artists. This essay is about the position of African visual 
arts in relation to the Dutch art world as we perceive it. It was Michel de 
Montaigne who initially coined the term ‘essay’ as an ‘attempt’ or ‘trial’ to put 
one’s thoughts on a particular subject into writing. This what we mean to do in 
this chapter. Our essay is like an essay in visual arts, which is a preliminary 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Fridoline Veering for her greatly appreciated editorial work and Sef 
Slootweg for his valuable comments. 
2 Amongst anthropologists and sociologists there is a debate on the notion of ’indigenous’, see Coates 
(2004). Kuper (2003) asserts that there is no theoretical ground to use the term. Following Guenther 
(2006) we use the term indigenous, because people themselves, e.g. the Bushmen, use the term to 
represent themselves and to define their ‘cultural identity . 
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drawing or sketch upon which a final painting or sculpture is based, made as a 
test of the work's composition. 
When we use the term art or arts, we are referring to the ‘decorative visual arts’ 
created for its own sake and comprising painting, drawing, printmaking, 
photography, sculpture, installations, design and fashion. Craft in this essay 
should be read as the ‘useful arts’ being objects produced for everyday use.  
The actual Dutch situation: negation and exploitation of African art 
In the “Summer (of) 2007” edition of the Dutch journal ZAM Africa Magazine 
(Veldkamp, 2007) a number of prominent people in the Dutch museum art world 
made the observation that African art plays only a very small part in the Dutch 
art market, because there hardly is a market. Neither is there a good 
infrastructure of distribution outlets or an adequate exposure. According to 
Mirjam Westen, head of the modern arts department of the MMKA museum of 
Arnhem, most Dutch museums of modern art show a particular narrow-
mindedness when it comes to modern art. African art is is considered to be 
exotic, moreover it is scarcely explored and often minimized as ‘primitive art’. 
Els van der Plas, director of the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development, 
observes that there is a strong Euro-American bias in the processes of buying and 
exposing modern art. She asserts that Dutch museums actually exclude great 
parts of the world. The knowledge and experience of most experts is on Western 
art development. Because of this particular bias Africa is still a dark, frightening 
continent to most experts on African art. However, coming to terms with the 
unknown is difficult since the concepts for understanding African art are lacking, 
which threatens the privileged position of the modern art expert. 
We have observed that African art does not only play a marginal role in the top 
segment of the Dutch art market. During six years of exposing and selling 
modern African art we have experienced that it also has an insignificant position 
in the middle segment of the market, with the exception of Zimbabwean stone 
sculptures. Only in the bottom segment there seems to be a market, albeit of a 
very particular character. Cheap imitations of African arts are sold in Dutch 
stores at ten times the price of the original copy, with the effect that African art is 
minimized as inferior and cheap mass art. 
Why is this? Why does African art not only play a marginal role in the top 
segment of the Dutch art market, but also in the middle segment of the art market 
in which we are active? Guided by our experience after six years of dealing with 
modern art from the Third World, in particular from specific regions in Africa, 
we will sketch an outline of a theoretical framework, which hopefully will lead 
to a better understanding of why African art also plays a marginal part in the 
middle segment of the Dutch art market, the segment we are in with our gallery. 
The framework consists of three concepts and concomitant lines of approach: 
• the ‘art world’ or, what are the social processes and institutions which 
define art? 
• ‘artistry’ or, how does one see artistic calling as a profession? 
• ‘infrastructure’ or, how are the processes of gaining access to the 
international art market organized? 
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We have drawn our inspiration from two sociologists: from Abraham de Swaan 
(2008 a and b) who has analyzed the development of modern art world and the 
rise of the professional artist brilliantly, and from Richard Sennett (2008) who 
has made a clear and lucid analysis of the value of craftsmanship in modern 
western society. In the second part of this contribution, using these concepts and 
the research of the anthropologist Guenther (2203), we will describe one 
particular form of African art: the art of the Bushmen in Botswana. But we will 
start with a very brief history of the development of sculpturing in Zimbabwe. 
The social development of Zimbabwean sculpture art 
Not all African art is unknown to the Dutch modern art market. Take for 
example sculpture art from Zimbabwe, in particular from Tengenenge. It is 
beyond dispute that some sculptures are amongst the finest of contemporary 
modern art. Namely sculptor Bernard Matemera who has achieved such 
international status that his works are shown at the Museum of Modern Art in 
New York and the Rodin Museum in Paris. In “Huis van Steen” (Stone House) 
Rob Rozenburg (1994) tells the story of the development of stone sculpturing in 
Zimbabwe. He shows that sculpturing already existed in the 14th century in this 
part of Southern Africa, alongside woodcraft and painting. Huts, tables, chairs 
and pots were decorated in colourful and vibrant manners depicting nature as 
well as the people’s culture and traditions. Art forms consisted of items used for 
celebrations or just for wearing such as jewellery and basketry.. These art forms 
were termed as artistic craft but when English discoverers took home artistic 
artefacts and displayed them, apart from their original social context, some of 
them became ‘art’. It was not until the 1930’s that a market developed for this 
artistic craft. International tourism grew and with it the trade in carved wooden 
giraffes, birds, hippos and elephants; detailed and naturalistically carved and 
produced in series. By the way, these products were not considered to be art by 
western art experts  
From the 1970’s onwards Zimbabwean sculpture became ‘hot’ and artists like 
Bernard Matemera were included in the Western modern art world. They were 
said to be no longer producing artistic craft but ‘art’. This distinction, however, 
is typically European and Western. In practice not many Zimbabwean artists 
make a clear cut distinction between art and artistic craft. To them art is not an 
autonomous realm. Many sculptors, some of them internationally renowned, 
consider mass production as a means of subsistence, allowing them to make a 
living as artist. ‘Art’ and ‘craft’ are not dissociated; they coexist but differ. In 
‘creation art’ the sculptor is free in making the sculpture, whereas in artistic craft 
the sculpture must be truly realistic. Most Zimbabwean artists are aware of this 
relation. They even consider making craft products more difficult than making 
pieces of art. Nevertheless, what the example of Zimbabwean stone sculpturing 
shows, is that there is a clear process of dissociation of craftsmanship and artistic 
creation. 
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An interpretative framework 
Art world 
De Swaan (2008a) has shown that this dissociation of arts and crafts is a general 
social process. Since the Renaissance arts have gradually dissociated from rituals 
and craft and gradually art has become autonomous. The development of 
markets and the rise of capitalist western societies have advanced the 
emancipation of art and artist. With the rise of a European bourgeoisie a ‘free’ 
market for art developed and alongside with it a world of people whose activities 
were related to the production and distribution of art; independent artists, gallery 
owners, art collectors, directors and curators of museums, art critics and 
theorists, art experts, arts publishers and the media. Social ethical standards in 
the production and evaluation of art declined and this has gone hand in hand with 
the increase of aesthetic criteria. More and more art became a means of ‘self-
expression’ with different styles and movements following each other rapidly. 
Artists, the public and those who commissioned and traded art were no longer 
bound by a set of evident (social) rules. They all became subject to ‘uncertainty 
of taste’ with the direct result that the appreciation of art became the task of so-
called ‘art experts’. Only ‘specialists in taste' are able to recognize and value the 
quality of art work (Oosterbaan, 2005). Following the American sociologist 
Howard Becker (1982), De Swaan (2008a,b) uses the concept of ‘art world’ to 
define this ensemble. According to Becker the art world “...consists of all the 
people whose activities are necessary for the production of the characteristic 
works which that world, and perhaps others as well, define art. Members of the 
art world coordinate the activities by which work is produced by referring to a 
body of conventional understandings embodied in common practice and in 
frequently used artefacts” In other words, the art world comprises the social 
processes and institutions which determine what is art and what is not, who is an 
artist and who is not, what is ‘high’ culture and what is ‘popular art’ or ‘folk art’. 
Or to use the terminology of the sociologist Manuel Castells (1997): the 
dominant western art and its ‘specialists in taste’ determine at the ideological 
level what is art and what is not, at the social level who is of included and who is 
excluded and at the professional level what is art making and what is not. 
This social approach of art lays more emphasis on the interdependence of 
evaluators, buyers, commissioners, gallery owners, museum directors, and 
magazine directors and so on. This social approach looks at the interdependent 
relationships between the processes of artistic creation and the community. 
Furthermore, as the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has shown, artistic 
preferences are very strongly functionally related to birth and education.  
Following these lines of thought we can conclude that it is the western art 
world that implicitly and sometimes explicitly defines which art is ‘high culture’ 
and which art is not. Obviously most African art and artists are not part of it. 
However, there is one particular way in which African art seems to be related to 
the modern art world. African art has been a source of inspiration for many 
modern artists. One only has to look at photos of Picasso’s studio to see the 
relevance of African art and craft. But in this perspective African art is 
synonymous with ‘primitive’ or ‘naive art’ and is associated with ‘dark mystery’. 
In many statements about African art this suggestive connotation can be heard. 
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African arts and artist are placed in a primitivist slot. A reason why Western 
collectors, experts but also the general public are doing this, is that African art 
and the African artist are viewed not as individual and singularized, freely 
expressive but as collective, traditional, culturally uniform and tribally ethnic 
(Guenther, 2003: 104). This is what the Western viewer will look for, and 
consequently this is what he will find mostly: some kind of tribal or ethnic art; 
thereby dismissing modern African art as also individually conceived, often 
extra-ethnic and surely modernist. 
Artistry, or artistic calling and craftsmanship 
In order to be able to value African art on its own merits, we do not only need a 
more social approach of the interrelationships between the processes of artistic 
creation and the community, but also a re-valuation of craftsmanship. To 
paraphrase Richard Sennett in his latest book (2008): what gives someone the 
right to judge whether something is art or not? The sociological approach of 
Becker and De Swaan gives insight into why in the western art world it is the 
privileged right of ‘experts’ to determine what is art is and what is not. It also 
answers the question how only an ‘inner circle’ has access to this relatively 
closed modern world art system and how prevailing principles and standards are 
set and reproduced. In order to become an artist or expert, one has to go through 
a long educational system in order to learn to ‘understand’ the principles of art 
and artistry. But this approach does not satisfactorily answer the question 
whether art really differs that much from (artistic) craft as is alleged. If we look 
at the skills and competences required, whether it is art as a product of individual 
free expression, or whether it is artistic craft, the production processes of both art 
and craft are only feasible by virtue of acquired good skills and competences. 
The contrast of art as a unique or at least distinctive product of work and craft as 
a product of a more anonymous, collective and continued production process, 
blurs this common characteristic. Originality, accuracy and expression can be 
present in both forms. Sennett therefore argues to soften the demarcation line 
between artist and craftsman. In fact he argues for the reassessment of ‘the 
craftsman’. Three basic abilities are the foundation of craftsmanship. These are 
the ability to localize, to question and to open up (Sennett, 2008:277). The first 
involves making a matter concrete, the second reflecting on its qualities and the 
third expanding its scene. We can see these processes taking place both in art and 
in craft making. By taking this broader view of artistry, including craft related 
skills, there will no longer be such a sharp delineation between artist and 
craftsman and between art and (artistic) craft. Then a large, intermediate area 
unfolds itself, making room in the art world for more cultural diversity. In this 
respect, we agree with Joost Smiers, who argues in favour of more manoeuvre 
space for artistic expressions which do not fall within the standards of the 
western global art world, amongst which many forms of African art (Smiers, 
2003). 
Infrastructure 
The concept of infrastructure relates to the question of how the processes of 
gaining access to the international art market are organized. Artists, in the 
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broadest definition, must be able to mobilize resources, to bring their products to 
the public and hence to support themselves. For this purpose the Western art 
world has developed a sophisticated distribution system with many 
intermediaries, forming part of the broader economy. We refer to this elaborated 
system as ‘infrastructure’. One could even argue that the educational system and 
the patronage system are also integral parts of the infrastructure, since it is the 
combination of all elements that determine the access to the (international) art 
market. Kennedy (1992) argues that one of the factors hampering the 
development of modern art and modern art movement in African countries was 
the colonial system of education, which emphasized Eurocentric values an 
viewpoints, employing European methods and curricula and which neglected to 
encourage ‘indigenous self expression’. Even in Uganda where there is now a 
lively modern art movement, Makerere University College in Kampala, followed 
the British pattern. 
One of the biggest challenges for most African artists is the lack of access to 
this infrastructure. No matter how talented and gifted an African artist may be, 
visual artists need some kind of exposure in order to sell to the market and earn a 
living. In most African countries much talent languishes due to poor 
infrastructure, but also because of the disinterested national authorities. 
According to Musoke –Nteyafas (2008) African artists suffer a triple blow: that 
of being denied the natural growth and development of an artist, that of few 
distribution outlets and the lack of a true national market, and that of very little 
exposure on the international scene. The national internal market is not big. Most 
African countries do not have a substantial art-buying public. Furthermore, 
production is often influenced by the need to survive. The fabrication of products 
is dictated by the ’taste’ of the market generating much ‘copycat’ production 
instead of independent art products. On the international market scene, Europe 
and North Americas are the rule, the rest is exception. Much African art is 
considered not to be quite up to the international standards. Njami (2008) speaks 
of the social and artistic invisibility of the African artist on the world market.  
Modern Bushmen Art 
Bearing in mind the perspective outlined in the two previous sections, we will 
now look at one particular form of African art, the Bushmen art from the Kuru 
art project in D’Kar, Botswana. For a thorough introduction into the cultures of 
the San or Bushmen people in Southern Africa, see Le Roux and White (2004). 
The Art World 
As said in the beginning, the main collection of our gallery consists of modern 
Bushmen art, mostly from the Kuru Art project. D’Kar is a village in the north-
western part of the Kalahari region with a population of approximately 1,000 
Nharo San. The art project is part of the Kuru Development Trust, a development 
agency which set up this art project in 1990. Although the number of artists in 
the project has fluctuated, it now remains constant, around 15 people, with an 
equal gender split. Prior to their artistic careers these men and women were farm 
labourers and domestics for Boer farmers. The central aim of the project was to 
give a selected number of men and women the opportunity to learn lino 
printmaking and silkscreen printing. Artists that began painting in acrylics on 
boards have moved on to oil painting. Many of them have become ‘artists’ and 
have been able to provide of a new means of subsistence. Another aim was to 
use art as a new way for Bushmen of self-representation and expressing their 
identity, in the same way as Bushmen use dance. In the first years the Bushmen 
received much (foreign) aid and support. Nowadays it is up to the Busmen artists 
community to support it self. Some critics use the fact that the project was 
subsidized as a pretext to say that the project was not a ‘real art’ project but 
charity. Would these critics use the same argument for the Dutch situation in 
which many artists are subsidized? Nowadays, subsidies are actually largely 
considered to be a formal recognition of quality  
Another problem of mis-representation has to do with tourist promotion by the 
national and regional authorities of Botswana. Modern Bushmen art is said to be 
related to rock San Art. But actually, this is not the case. In fact, it is surprising 
how modern Bushmen art is essentially free from cultural precedents. It is 
loosely connected to traditional forms of decorative art of the Bushmen such as 
bead work and etched or burned patterning of ostrich egg shells or wooden 
objects. It is immensely innovative in style and content, different from artist to 
artist and to a varying degree within the oeuvre of each individual artist. 
(Guenther, 2003:95-96). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: “Meerkats during the Rainy Season” 
(lino print, Qaetcao Moses, 1998) 
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The art of the Kuru Bushmen artists is tradition-orientated. It is strongly 
figurative but at the same time highly individualistic. Quite a few art pieces tell 
the story of the modern life of the Bushmen. Others depict the old way of life of 
the Bushmen in the Kalahari desert: the “veld food”, the bush, the plants, the 
animals, the hunt. Modernity is juxtaposed to tradition. It is “story telling art”: 
the Bushmen artist expresses how he or she experiences life and her or his 
immediate surroundings, and he or she does this in a direct and very personal 
way. In fact story telling in the Bushmen culture has always been highly 
individuated! Sometimes the pictures even look post-modern: new motifs and 
old motifs alongside each other. A Busmen artist not often paints people. And 
Bushmen art does not look political at fist sight, except perhaps for a piece by 
Qwaa (Xgóa Mangana) of the ‘occupiers’ of the Kalahari desert. But at a closer 
look, in nearly all Bushmen works there is a political dimension present in a very 
subtle way. The themes used can be seen as echos of growing self-identity and 
self-representation (Guenther, 2003:101).  
Artistry 
Nearly all Kuru Bushmen art bears signs of truly artistic craftsmanship. 
However, none of the artists has been formally trained or educated. Some are 
even illiterates. Their craftsmanship is the result of on-site training and informal 
learning. The men and women are highly individuated people, each with his or 
her own history, creative intentions and artistic skills. 
All are strongly related to the tribal history while at the same time most of 
them are acculturated, Westernized, politically alert and have travelled around 
the world; from 1990 more than 50 exhibitions worldwide (Gabarone, 
Johannesburg, New York, Tokyo, Sidney, The Hague). Bushmen artists see art 
and the Kuru art project as a way to preserve tradition and to re-construct their 
(self) identity in a very rapidly changing environment. They define themselves as 
artists who are convinced that they are producing ‘real art’, although not every 
Western expert and collector is inclined to define it as art, let alone modern art. 
The beauty of the Kuru Bushmen art is in the use of colours, the spatial 
arrangement of elements, the motifs and the themes. Visitors of our gallery are 
often struck not only by the harmony, the symmetry and the rhythm in the 
paintings and prints, but also by the high level of craftsmanship, of which the 
lino prints are an amazing example,. This artistic craftsmanship relates to the 
tradition of the carving and painting of ostrich egg shells and the ornamenting of 
leather bags and loincloths. The works of Dada (Coex’ae Qgam) and Thamae 
Setshogo are exceptional pieces of both high craftsmanship and individual 
artistic self-expression. 
Surprisingly, it appears that many of our gallery visitors associate Bushmen art 
with the art of the Aborigines of Australia. Perhaps it is the atmosphere of the 
bush, the desert animals and the plants depicted that generates this feeling. 
Although there is no parallel, either technically or figuratively speaking, a 
delegation of artists and other Kuru people did in fact go to Australia in 1997 to 
discuss art and politics with the Aboriginals. However, this fact is not generally 
known to the visitors of our gallery. 
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Infrastructure 
The Kuru Bushmen art is most favored by tourists, ethnological museums, 
Western collectors who cherish it for its alleged primitivism and by specialized 
galleries like ours. Kuru art exhibitions have always been an important 
component of conferences dealing with San or Bushmen identity and political 
rights. For instance, at the closing ceremony of the Decade of Indigenous People 
in The Hague in 2006 D’Kar artists were present with their works of art, 
alongside Sami and indigenous people from Surinam and Irian Yaja. One of the 
factors that hinder an effective distribution of Kuru art in the Netherlands is that 
Kuru art products is advocated not because of its inherent artistic qualities but 
from a charitable, and therefore, patronizing perspective. Another impediment is 
the ethnographic approach to Kuru art. It is positioned as ‘primitive art’ and the 
artist is viewed not as individual but as a representative of a collective, 
traditional, culturally uniform and tribally ethnic society. Kuru art is seen 
therefore, as some kind of tribal or ethnic art and in doing so, it is easily 
dismissed as not being modern art. One sees what one wants to see or has been 
taught to see, thereby completely neglecting what Frans Boas in his standard 
work “Primitive Art” (1955) said about art in different societies: art is a mental 
process, present in every society. 
Epilogue 
In 1972 one of the authors, Ben Janssen, took part in a collective reading of the 
book of André Gunder Frank “Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America” (1971). Ton van Naerssen was presiding this ‘reading collective’. It 
was Ben’s introduction into the theory on ‘dependence’ and ‘development of 
underdevelopment’. Later he followed courses by Ton van Naerssen on theories 
of unequal social and spatial development in the Third World. Ankie van de 
Camp has been trained as a sociologist, specialized in the relationships between 
labour, culture and organisation. This essay bears the signs of both academic 
educational histories, but also of their professional histories thereafter. What we 
have tried in this essay is to combine our education and professional 
backgrounds in order to analyse the relationship between African art and the 
Dutch art world in the context of the development of capitalist globalization.  
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Rocks and hard places: development 
research between neoliberal globalism 
and global neoliberalism 
Frans J. Schuurman  
Rocks and hard places: introduction  
 ‘It was always a bit of a lie that universities were self-governing institutions. 
Nevertheless, what universities suffered during the 1980s and 1990s was pretty 
shameful, as under threat of having their funding cut they allowed themselves to be 
turned into business enterprises, in which professors who had previously carried on 
their enquiries in sovereign freedom were transformed into harried employees 
required to fulfil quotas under the scrutiny of professional managers….. If the spirit 
of the university is to survive…the real university may have to move into people’s 
homes and grant degrees for which the sole backing will be the names of the 
scholars who sign the certificates’ (J.M. Coetzee in Diary of a Bad Year, 2007). 
At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s development studies in 
several European universities was established in the form of new academic 
institutes. Through time these institutes evolved from a highly differentiated 
amalgam consisting of leftist students and lecturers towards representatives of an 
established academic discipline. Lately, a number of these institutes are 
celebrating or are preparing to celebrate their 35 or 40 years of existence (like 
the IDS in the UK in 2006 and CIDIN in the Netherlands in 2008). It is 
interesting to notice that these celebrations are specifically dedicated to a critical 
introspection which in the case of the IDS resulted in a conference entitled 
Reinventing Development Studies. Also the Dutch CIDIN will use the celebration 
of its 35 years of existence to critically reflect upon the current status and future 
perspectives of development research in general and that of development studies 
in specific. 
There are reasons enough for these introspective exercises because the 
academic and political space wherein development studies moves is fraught with 
rocks and hard places.  
Firstly, there is an undeniable trend that academic institutes in general have to 
increasingly operate according to a market logic. Input and output in terms of the 
number of students, the amount of publications in peer-refereed top of the bill 
journals, the yearly count of large-scale research projects, quotation indexes, 
ratings indicating the academic prestige of universities, etc. are nowadays 
grudgingly accepted as part of academic survival.  
Secondly, this trend seems to stand in contradistinction to the original critical 
contents of the mission and scientific object of development studies. For 
example, it is increasingly difficult to find funds for development research which 
are either not directly related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or 
which try to critically assess the whole MDG-related media circus.  
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As such, thirdly, there is an increasing influence of neo-liberal thinking on 
determining the research agenda of development studies, making it increasingly 
difficult to maintain a critical research tradition.  
Fourthly, although on the one hand the geographical scale of development 
studies research nowadays incorporates Eastern and Central European countries, 
and also Western European countries for that matter, on the other hand with 
respect to research in the traditional development countries the geographical 
focus seems to be reduced to Africa (also a consequence of the focus on the 
MDG-issues; if this trend continues we better might rename development studies 
into Africanism).  
Fifthly, globalization (whether as an ontological phenomenon and/or as a 
discourse) has significantly challenged development studies in many respects (cf. 
Schuurman, 2001). Well, there are some reasons to suppose that globalization, 
theoretically that is, has currently turned from a challenge to critical 
development studies into a liability.  
Lastly, interdisciplinarity which always was a hallmark of development 
studies’ approach, has increasingly become under pressure and currently is 
increasingly being substituted by a multidisciplinarity which is quite another sort 
of animal.  
In short, there are enough reasons to indeed critically reflect upon the current 
status of development studies and to specify some of the most threatening rocks 
and hard places. 
Rocks and hard places I: market logic in academia and critical 
theory 
In his contribution to a Festschrift of the Mattersburger Kreis für 
Entwicklungspolitik Henry Bernstein (2007:20) vividly illustrates the tension 
between critical theory and the policy-orientedness of development studies. He 
quotes from an advertisement for Research Fellows at the University of 
Manchester’s new Brooks World Poverty Institute of which Joseph Stiglitz is 
Chair: ‘Successful applicants will have a demonstrated capacity to conduct 
innovative and rigorous research that refines and extends our understanding of 
poverty, while also identifying plausible and politically supportable options for 
what might be done to reduce it’ (Bernstein’s emphasis). 
What does it mean for a development studies institute to be functioning in an 
academic setting which is increasingly being invaded by a market logic? As 
mentioned before, in the current academic climate what is considered as 
important is: size (number of PhDs and staff, number of publications, amount of 
students), large-scale research projects (preferably in combination with large 
quantitative data-banks) in combination with outside funding (an indication 
apparently of the relevance of the research activities and at the same time 
thankfully appreciated by the financial bureaucracy of the university), and the 
amount of evaluation missions (in behalf of the Ministry of International 
Development Cooperation and/or Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations in the Northern countries). In practice this means for development 
studies institutes that in order to survive concessions have to be made. Original 
mission statements, which were strongly normatively inspired, increasingly 
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started to act as barriers in the survival strategy. For example, when the current 
Centre for International Development Issues (CIDIN) of the Radboud University 
in Nijmegen (the Netherlands) started functioning in 1973 as the Third World 
Centre, one of the first publications concerned the negative role of multinationals 
in maintaining poverty-related issues in the Third World. The name of Third 
World Centre was changed into CIDIN in the year 2000 as the term Third World 
was considered outdated and in the Dutch academic collective memory too much 
connected to ‘ThirdWorldism’. Currently one of the research projects of CIDIN 
concerns the measurement of the efficiency and impact of development projects 
(in collaboration with a Dutch NGO which is financing this research). The 
purpose of this project is to deliver academically sound advice to NGOs to 
improve their project efficiency and impact.  
In the 1970s, a common view in development studies circles was that 
development projects were an extension of Northern based imperialism (a basic 
view of ‘ThirdWorldists’ or ‘TierMondistas’) or at the most a way to evade more 
fundamental changes in North-South trade relations and political regimes in 
underdeveloped countries themselves. There is in fact little reason to believe that 
currently development cooperation has changed dramatically in its implicit 
intentions. Maybe this is an extreme example, yet it shows a number of dramatic 
shifts that the development studies went through in terms of its explanandum 
(object), explanans (explanatory framework) and subject (methodology). In 
terms of its object development studies (at least in this example but I venture that 
it is a general characteristic) went from a structural analysis of the mechanics of 
underdevelopment to studying the efficiency of development projects. In this 
shift an approach inspired by critical theory was entirely lost. In fact, in general 
the adjective ‘critical’ lost its original meaning. Many development studies 
students nowadays interpret ‘critical’ only in the dictionary sense of the word. In 
addition, the example also shows that there is an historic shift (not only in 
development studies but also in social sciences in general) from structural 
analysis to actor-oriented analysis. Studying c.q. evaluating development 
projects in terms of efficiency and impact means a shift from macro- to micro-
level analysis. Now, there is nothing wrong with actor-oriented analysis as long 
as the structural context is not lost from sight. But this is exactly the point, the 
broader context in project-based evaluation studies remains often outside the 
analytical framework (partly also because it falls outside the sphere of influence 
of the NGOs which finance these studies in the first place). Another example of 
the shift within development studies from structural to actor-oriented analysis is 
the way that concepts like poverty and inequality are looked at. We see here a 
historic shift in the level of analysis from macro to meso to micro. Poverty in the 
Third World used to be conceptualized in terms of differences between rich and 
poor countries. Admittedly, the definition of poverty has been much improved 
through the years (from a purely income-oriented definition to a much broader 
set of indicators) but poverty is now often brought down to an individual 
characteristic with individual solutions (e.g. through micro-credit schemes). This 
trend is also reflected in analytical frameworks like for example the currently 
much favoured livelihood approaches where individual actors are plotted into a 
matrix according to their access (or lack thereof) to assets or different forms of 
capital (financial, social, human, etc.). Now, the livelihood framework is very 
useful to point out the heterogeneity existing within a particular local space, 
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something which has always been a notoriously weak point in critical theory. But 
this can hardly compensate for the lack of an analysis of more structural 
components. In other words, the shift within development studies from research 
inspired by critical theory to research according to a neoliberal agenda is 
accompanied by dramatic shifts in object, subject and explanatory framework.  
Now the above probably are nothing more than the grumblings of an old 
development studies dinosaur. So let me turn to these issues from the student’s 
point of view (i.e. more precisely: my perspective on their perspective). 
Development studies still attracts a sufficient number of students. The reasons 
for studying development studies have not changed over the years. It is a genuine 
concern for the plight of the poor in the Third World, indignation about the 
unequal distribution of resources on a global scale and the urge to do something 
about this. Students also are still very active outside the university although the 
characteristics of their activities have changed somewhat. In the ‘old days’ 
students joined anti-imperialism working groups and as such were well equipped 
with theoretical knowledge which enabled them to discuss Marx’s 18th Brumaire 
on the same level with their professors. Nowadays students join United Nations 
Youth Forums and travel to Washington to meet their peers from other countries 
to discuss good governance. So, extra curricula activities still are there and still 
express a basic concern with the ‘Other’ which goes beyond studying at the 
university. In fact, these activities could be more appreciated than in the old days 
because a lot of students are working about 20 hours per week to earn their 
livelihood. The job market for development studies students is still largely 
composed of employment in the domain of international development 
cooperation although significantly less then before this means being sent 
overseas. Only a small percentage manages to proceed in writing a PhD-thesis. 
Although I mentioned earlier that development studies should not be reduced to 
development management and policy the reality is that a lot of the students end 
up in Ministries of Development Cooperation, NGOs, embassies or international 
development organizations which do nothing else then development 
management and policy-making. Here we have another reason why critical 
theory came increasingly under pressure, i.e. not only as a framework for 
research but also because of the knowledge required by future employers of 
development studies students. Of course the job market wants critical students 
but more in a generalized academic sense of the word. There is a need for 
students who know how to prepare, manage and evaluate development projects, 
who know how to measure efficiency and increase the impact of projects. The 
job market does not need students who think that the Millennium Development 
Goals are the latest example to depoliticize the development debate. All this does 
not mean the students are ignorant of what critical theory is but it seems to be 
more considered as something of the past than of any immediate use in research 
projects or in future jobs. Besides, by now every European university has 
implemented the Bologna Treaty which means that officially the academic 
period for students consists of a 3-year BA followed by a 1-year MA. Time for 
fieldwork is limited which means that students need a pragmatic ‘toolkit’ for 
local level research. Critical theory is rather abstract and needs a lot of 
operationalization to be used in short term micro-level MA-research projects. It 
can be considered as a major challenge for development studies to try to 
reincorporate critical theory into that pragmatic toolkit.  
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Rocks and hard places II: from inter- to multidisciplinarity 
Through time the interdisciplinarity of development studies has become one of 
its most important trademarks which, besides the obvious advantages, also has its 
drawbacks. The big advantage is that the object of development studies is a 
major social problem (let's keep it simple for the moment: widespread poverty in 
the Third World) and social problems in general can only be studied adequately 
from an interdisciplinary perspective. These problems always have economic, 
political and socio-cultural aspects and ditto contextual influencing factors which 
are interrelated among them. It is specifically the attempt to take into account the 
interrelations between these aspects which makes development studies 
interdisciplinary.  
For example, if we study the developmental role of civil society organizations 
(which is one of the hot topics nowadays) and one does not take into account the 
influence on the characteristics of civil society of 1) the type of the political 
regime (e.g. whether it is a weak or a strong state) and 2) the influence of modes 
of production (the relative importance of and the interrelation between a 
capitalist and a non-capitalist mode of production), then only a small part of the 
total picture can be captured. Just looking at a social problem from different 
disciplinary angles would make it multi- but not interdisciplinary.  
The disadvantage of interdisciplinarity is that the training of students in the 
academic field of each of the major sciences which are reflected in the corner 
points of the interdisciplinary triangle (i.e. political science, economy and 
sociology) is sometimes considered insufficient as development studies tries to 
keep various balls in the air at the same time. Development studies students are 
not economists, sociologists or political scientists pur sang yet they compensate 
this lack of specific disciplinary knowledge with a better insight in the 
complexity of developmental problems. Yet, it is not uncommon, although 
mistaken, that development studies is seen as an applied science narrowed down 
to development policy and management. Looking at development studies from 
the outside, specifically given its problem-oriented object definition, it is to be 
expected that its focus seems to be on policy-oriented research, contributing to 
further developmental processes in the Third World. As such, development 
studies is sometimes looked at by the other branches of social sciences as lacking 
in academic status, also because of its interdisciplinary character as discussed 
above. It is, however, a common mistake to reduce development studies to 
development policy and management, thereby emphasizing an empiricist and 
solution-oriented approach to the problem of underdevelopment. The object of 
development studies is much broader, i.e. it takes as its explanandum the 
structural causes of the lack of emancipation of people in the South as well as in 
transitional economies elsewhere and the strategies (at a local, national and 
international scale) which are employed to solve this lack of emancipation. A 
lack of emancipation refers to an inadequate access to material (e.g. income) and 
immaterial (e.g. education) resources which leads to widespread poverty, 
exploitation, inequality and injustice. The emphasis on structural causes does not 
imply just a structuralist approach but combines this with actor-oriented 
perspectives in order not to lose sight of the actors’ views. Strategies to solve the 
lack of emancipation involve various actors in the South as well as in the North: 
social movements, NGOs, and national and international governmental 
164 
organizations. Of course, this is a subjective definition of development studies 
but one which I feel does more justice to what development studies is all about 
without reducing it to development policy and management. 
A recent addition to the geographical scale of development studies shows that 
besides countries in the South and transitional economies in for example former 
Eastern Europe, also the emancipatory problems in multicultural societies in the 
North are increasingly incorporated into the object of development studies. 
Students of development studies are very much interested in the emancipatory 
problems related to multiculturality in their own societies. Also in this case, an 
interdisciplinary approach is the most awarding. 
Nevertheless, the (short) history of development studies reflects a dialectical 
relationship between the advantage and disadvantage of an interdisciplinary 
approach. In the first place, climbing over the fence of the neighbouring sciences 
can lead to muddy feet. The paradigms and theories which are 'imported' from 
the three major social science disciplines (economy, political science and 
sociology) could for a long time only be fruitfully combined by development 
studies because of their common denominator which is the linch-pin behind the 
interdisciplinarity, i.e. the role of the (nation)state. The bulk of the paradigms 
and theories from these three major domains of the social sciences has its roots 
in the 19th century with an emphasis on the role of the (nation)state in, 
respectively, the establishment of national markets and international trade 
relations, the establishment of democratic governments, and the aim of these 
governments to create a national identity (thereby suppressing other forms of 
identity based, for example, on regional or religious affiliations). In short, 
development studies' interdisciplinarity reflected right from the start the 19th 
century roots of other social sciences with the nation-state as the main actor in 
development processes and as the main geographical referent. These 
paradigmatic views on the role of the (nation)state have changed as we move 
closer to the so-called global era. Globalisation challenges the interdisciplinary 
character of development studies. Many globalisation authors agree on the 
decreasing, or at least changing, economic, political and cultural importance of 
(nation)states. A shift in analytical perspective from the nation-state to 
transnational social space does not make it any easier for the interdisciplinary 
approach of development studies. On the other hand, the ‘global-local’ as the 
new binary has surplus value above the established dichotomies of core-
periphery and developed-underdeveloped exactly because it is less spatial and 
allows for inequality within the binary code. Leo Ching (2000) speculates that 
under globalisation traditional binary models of social analysis and political 
struggle (colonizer-colonized, First World-Third World, centre-periphery) are 
inapplicable to a spatial economy of power irreducible to geographical 
dichotomies. In the same line Appadurai is in favour of a ‘process’ geographies 
instead of a ‘trait’ geographies which considers areas as relatively immobile 
aggregates of traits (values, languages, material practices, ecological adaptations, 
marriage patterns, etc.) with more or less durable boundaries. A process 
geography sees areas as precipitates of various kinds of action, interaction and 
motion (trade, travel, warfare, colonization, exile, etc.). Current area studies, 
says Appadurai, consider areas as permanent associations between space, 
territory and cultural organization. It is not only that the globalisation debate 
gives reason to suppose that the role of the (nation)state has been and still is 
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declining but also that, as a consequence, the former conjunctive dynamic (i.e. 
following the same spatial and time paths) of economy, polity and culture - upon 
which the interdisciplinary character of many a development theory was based - 
has been replaced by a disjunctive dynamic (Appadurai, 1990). In a 
deterritorialised world the nation-state would have lost its role as a connecting 
linch-pin between the economic, political and cultural domains which now 
largely follow their own disjunctive dynamics which are only partly interrelated. 
The traditional interdisciplinary approach of development theories which, for 
example, used to draw upon the interrelation between national economic growth 
and processes of democratisation through the role of the (nation)state is now 
confronted with domains which follow different logics that are not necessarily 
interrelated as they form part of different transnational scopes. For the time being 
development studies seems obliged to withdraw towards a multidisciplinary 
approach (i.e. without a clear theoretical view on the interrelations between the 
economic, political and cultural domains).  
Rocks and hard places III: glob-talk 
‘It is time to tear of the neutral mask of globalization and make visible the raw 
imperialism beneath it’ (David Harvey). 
Allow me to give the basic argument in this short paragraph in the following 
(perhaps overly simplified) proposition: ‘by following the culturalist turn in 
globalization discourses (shortly: glob-talk) development studies has allowed 
itself to be manoeuvred away from critical theory.’ 
Development studies has wholeheartedly embraced concepts like 
interconnectedness, network of networks, cosmopolitanism, hybridity, 
syncretism, deterritorialization, reterritorialization, glocalization, civil society, 
etc. Political economy seems to have disappeared almost completely in this 
culturalist turn; ‘culture matters’ a la Harrison and Huntington (2000), certainly, 
but not by substituting culture for political economy (cf. Rowbotham). 
Development studies has allowed itself to embrace the Millanium Development 
Goals’ (MDGs) approach to poverty in absolute terms instead of in relative terms 
of power inequality. It has been seduced to accept research projects meant to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of MDG-related development efforts 
without questioning too much the depoliticizing nature of the MDG-circus. 
Samir Amin has condemned the MDG-project in no uncertain terms as an 
imperialist project: extreme privatization, opening up new fields for the 
expansion of capital within a context of maximum deregulation, and, above all, 
no state interference in economic affairs. In fact, the way that development 
research has been involved with the MDGs is a fine example of what can be 
called academic governmentality in Foucauldian terms, i.e. the MDGs are used 
to discipline development research.  
In the previous paragraphs I have attempted to explain a number of reasons 
why development studies finds itself in this non-critical cul de sac. In the last 
paragraph I will discuss the question whether the concept of neo-imperialism 
offers a way out of this cul de sac. 
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Beyond rocks and hard places: the neo-imperialist route? 
In terms of the old imperialist theories, development originally was about core 
states monopolizing accumulation opportunities. In order to do this, these states 
used to establish at home a social order conducive to capitalist development, but 
at the same time established exploitative relations with colonies and if need be to 
engage in inter-imperialist wars with other core states which tried to protect their 
accumulation opportunities. 
After the WWII the concept of development became used in the aftermath of a 
speech of the US president Harry Truman as a discourse in the context of the 
Cold War to lure nation-states in the Third World into the Western camp. No 
matter the degree of anti-democratic, exploitative, brutal and corrupt 
characteristics of a particular regime it was welcomed with open arms into the 
Western bloc and the development discourse was used to mystify the imperialist 
nature of these relations. The East should be contained with a cordon of 
countries not only to prevent Russia and China to export the communist ideology 
to the Third World but also to ensure access to vital resources and to bloc access 
to these same resources for the communist core countries. Development 
assistance was an important instrument in this imperialist strategy. So, we could 
add, in terms of motives to engage in development assistance, geopolitical 
arguments next to humane or humanist and economic arguments. 
The wars in Korea in the 1950s and in Vietnam in the 1960s (in the latter case 
first by the French and then by the Americans) were essentially geopolitical 
wars. The current involvement of the US in Iraq and Afghanistan is a mixture of 
economic (securing access to oil, in the case of Afghanistan to secure the oil 
pipe-line from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea) and geopolitical causes. During 
the so-called Developmentalist Era (which in McMichael’s 2000 interpretation 
extends from the 1940s to the 1970s)) the most abhorrent African and Latin 
American dictatorships were thusly welcomed with open arms into the Western 
bloc. Also the famous US development aid program in the beginning of the 
1960s Alliance for Progress (where the development discourse played an 
important role) under president Kennedy was meant to prevent socialist 
revolutions in Latin America in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.  
The decolonization period of the 1960s changed the scene somewhat but not 
enough to change the imperialist relations between North and South. The 
difference being that some European countries lost a privileged entrance to their 
former colonies which further established the hegemony of the US (something 
which led the US to support the decolonization process in order to diminish the 
competitive edge that European economies had based on their cheap access to 
labor and resources in their former colonies).  
Although McMichael divides the post-WW II era into the period of 
Developmentalism (the 1940s-1970s) and the period of Globalism (the 1970s 
and beyond) there are at least two remarkable commonalities which apparently 
escape McMichael. The first one is that Developmentalism as well as Globalism 
are intimately linked to the dynamics of capitalism based as it is on the 
extraction of surplus value from workers (in Marxist jargon called exploitation of 
labour value), on accumulation and class conflict but always within the context 
of a firm belief in endless growth.  
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The second commonality is that these basic characteristics of capitalism lead 
to different institutional arrangements which, however, do not change the basic 
characteristics though and that what binds these institutional arrangements is the 
imperialist relations between core capitalist countries and the periphery. So, 
imperialist relations continued to exist (starting as they did in the 19th century, 
and before that period we had of course colonialism with its own dynamics also 
tied to an incipient capitalist system basically constituted by plunder and at a 
somewhat later stage by unequal exchange) and as such continued to characterize 
in the developmentalist as well as in the globalist era the relations between rich 
and poor countries. 
However, the specific characteristics of these imperialist relations changed 
through time as part of the changing dynamic of capitalism, i.e. from Fordism to 
Post-Fordism. Seen from this perspective Developmentalism as well as 
Globalism are both legitimizing discourses for the imperialist character of 
globalizing capitalism which currently is among other things characterized by 
the subordination of social reproduction to the reproduction of capital (the end of 
the welfare state in the West), the deregulation of the labor market (and we do 
not have to look specifically at developing countries to see how that functions: 
take the latest initiative of the Dutch Cabinet to ease the conditions for laying off 
workers), the globalization of liquid capital, the outsourcing of production to 
cheap labor markets, and the transfer of local capital intended for social services 
into finance capital for global investment (leading to disinvestment in health and 
education). 
Now, what are the characteristics of the imperialist structure of globalizing 
capitalism which make some authors (cf. Biel 2000 and Harvey 2005, 2006) 
label this as New Imperialism. Before I come to that it is important to demystify 
at least one so-called globalization myth which is that nation-states have lost 
their erstwhile priority status. This is important because talking about new 
imperialism begs the question about the units of analysis. All the old imperialist 
theories referred to the relations between states or nation-states for that matter. 
If, however, globalization discourses are correct in pointing out the demise of the 
state as a component of neoliberalism and that to understand global capitalism it 
is the market as an institutional arrangement and not the relations between 
nation-states as actors then the imperialist perspective would lose its spatial and 
geopolitical connotations which still belong to its core definition. Mind you, this 
is a tricky issue even among authors which adhere to notions of imperialism such 
as Negri and Hardt (2000) in their best-seller Empire which represents in their 
view a globalized imperialist capitalism without a clear geopolitical center. 
Permit me to dwell not too long in an attempt to demystify this particular 
globalization myth about the demise of the role of nation-states in global 
capitalism by referring to Leo Panitch (2001, p. 10): ‘…globalisation is a 
process that is authored by active states; states that are not victims of the 
process but active agents of making globalisation happen, and are increasingly 
responsible, I would argue, for sustaining it, and even burdened with the 
increasing responsibility of managing its contradictions and crises.’ 
Panitch adds the following (and we're now already moving into one of the 
characteristics of new imperialism):  
‘… there was certainly a restructuring of states (but not a bypassing of states) in 
relation to: the rapid movement of capital; the changing balance of class forces 
transnationally towards financial capital; the increasing orientation of each of the 
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world’s nation-states to external trade.’ [What was taking place in that context 
was]… a shift in the hierarchy of state apparatus, whereby those state departments 
that were more closely associated with the forces of international capital – 
treasuries, central banks, and so forth – were increasing their status at the cabinet 
table, if you like, vis-à-vis departments of labour or departments of welfare that were 
more closely associated with domestic subordinated class forces.’ (Panitch 2001, p. 
10) 
This remark of Panitch makes you think by the way about what this meant for 
the status in the Dutch cabinet of a department like International Development 
Cooperation. Recently, Minister Koenders was invited to give a short talk in 
Nijmegen to shed some light on the outlines of his thoughts on how to structure 
international development cooperation in the new cabinet. What struck me was 
that he cast Dutch international development cooperation primarily in terms of 
tasks which belong to other Ministries: humanitarian aid by sending troops to 
conflict areas (Ministry of Defence), to actively engage in diplomatic missions in 
order to convince the warring parties to gather around a conference table and to 
solve their differences there instead of shooting each other to Kingdom come 
(the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and to establish trade relations with developing 
countries (Ministry of Economic Affairs). What is left for a Ministry of 
International Development Cooperation one wonders.  
Another defining characteristic of new imperialism (in reference to older 
variants of imperialism) is that we have to take a new perspective on inter-
imperialist rivalries which in the past has led to military conflicts between 
imperial powers (such as the first and second World Wars). In spite of the inter-
imperialist economic rivalries between European, American and Japanese capital 
this did not result (as in ‘the old days’) in military conflicts between the 
imperialist powers. What is interesting concerning this particular issue is that 
imperialist powers have joined forces in some military operations in developing 
countries (although not always wholeheartedly) and that, what is considered as a 
specific characteristic of new imperialism, the US has taken the lead in many of 
these military campaigns. Columnist Thomas Friedman approvingly wrote in the 
New York Times in 1999 (March 28) the following: ‘.. The hidden hand of the 
market will never work without the hidden fist . . . and the hidden fist that keeps 
the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the US Army, Air Force, 
Navy and Marine Corps.’ The increasing unilateral political ideology in the US 
(to go for it alone, so to speak, to boycot international treaties to regulate 
environmental pollution, to boycot the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague, etc.) is seen as an important characteristic of the new imperialism. 
According to Michael Peters Europe and the US not necessarily join a common 
strategic culture any more. He quotes neo-conservative Robert Kagan (senior 
associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) who stipulates 
that: 
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 ‘… Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between 
friends and enemies…They favour coercion over persuasion, tending towards 
unilateralism. They are less inclined to act through the United Nations or other 
international institutions and more skeptical of international law. By contrast, 
Europeans see a more complex picture. ..They are both more tolerant of failure and 
more patient, preferring peaceful solutions, ‘negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion 
to coercion.’ (Peters, 2008, p. 9) 
At the same time Kagan points out that the EU with the new members from 
Eastern Europe and possibly Turkey could become involved in a process of a 
changing identity, the importance of national priorities and changing 
international agenda's. 
Let me move on to another characteristic of the new imperialism and that is 
that spreading the gospel of democracy and good governance should be 
interpreted as an ideological instrument meant to detain the poor, marginalized, 
exploited masses in the Third World from engaging in political upheavals. 
Political transformations through revolutionary changes do not form part of the 
game anymore once a so-called democracy is in place. Once the people are 
convinced that democracy is a sine qua non for progress, and once the political 
elites are convinced that by at least accepting the good governance discourse, 
they are assured of acceptance by the international community, then 
circumstances continue to exist through which surplus value keeps being 
transferred from the periphery to the center either through the production 
process, unequal exchange or consumption of marketed goods. Once the idea is 
established that economic progress can only take place through access to the 
market (also at the individual level, an ideology pushed forward for example by 
micro-credit projects) and that democracy is the best political institutional 
arrangement to guarantee that progress, imperialism has created the necessary 
conditions to solve the ever continuing threat of social conflicts as a result of the 
continuing threats of overaccumulation and falling rates of profit.  
What is specifically interesting here is the role that civil society is supposed to 
play in this whole setup. Much has been said and can be said about the role of 
civil society, specifically in the context of the support it receives through 
international development assistance. Supposedly strengthening civil society 
forms part of good governance (empowering the powerless through participation 
in national or local forms of governance). In the context of a perspective from 
new imperialism the notion of civil society is created and supported by 
international donors, and functions (if it functions) as a means to keep a check on 
the state becoming too independent from the international community. Through 
supporting civil society imperialist powers can indirectly influence how 
government policies are shaped. According to Henry Veltmeyer (2005, p.91): 
‘Radical political economists … tend to view NGOs as instruments [Trojan horses], 
oftentimes unwitting and unknowing, of outside interests and regard both economic 
development and democracy as masks for an otherwise hidden agenda: to impose the 
policy and institutional framework of the new world order.’ 
Let me try to sum up the most important characteristics of the new imperialism 
perspective as follows:  
1. There is no reason to agree with one of Ankie Hoogvelts (1997, p. xii) 
notions that ‘The familiar pyramid of the core-periphery hierarchy is no 
longer a geographical but a social division of the world economy.’ There 
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definitely still is a clear geopolitical spatiality attached to the core-periphery 
hierarchy. 
2. At the same time it is true is that the units within the triangular power 
hierarchy are not just nation-states but consist of an amalgam of actors 
among which supranational institutions, multi national corporations, Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and social movements. However, 
nation-states can still be regarded as major actors. 
3. The US take up a primordial position in the globalized power triangle. There 
has been an increasing unilateralism in how the US manifests itself based 
upon its military hegemony. 
4. The dynamics in this power triangle are based upon changing characteristics 
of the capitalist mode of production which produces imperialist, exploitative 
relations between North and South and increasing worldwide inequality 
between and within countries. Imperialism by necessity was and still is 
closely attached to the survival strategy of the capitalist mode of production. 
5. These imperialist relations are sustained on the one hand through an 
ideological legitimation in the form of Globalism and on the other hand 
through direct military intervention, specifically in a unilateral way by the 
US.  
6. Methods of absolute surplus appropriation seem to have returned: 
intensifying work regimes, reducing real wages, and restructuring 
employment away from full-time and secure employment into part-time and 
insecure work, something which David Harvey ( 2005, ch. 4) has labelled as 
accumulation by dispossession which relies on ‘… power, with the use of 
numerous techniques, ranging from stock market manipulation, through debt 
crises, to the commodification of nature, and open military conquest.’ 
7. Development assistance, currently with the emphasis on good governance, 
democracy and the involvement of civil society depoliticizes the 
development debate and prevents the rise of alternative forms of social order 
with an emancipatory potential for the world’s poor. 
 
So, does new imperialism offer interesting perspectives to development studies, 
wedged as it is between global neoliberalism and neoliberal globalism? From the 
point of view of critical theory the answer is potentially affirmative. However, 
there are a number of drawbacks attached to adopt new imperialism as a 
paradigm for development studies in the 21st century. To conclude this chapter 
let me mention these drawbacks in arbitrary order: 
 
1. In building up a scientific paradigmatic perspective based on the concept of 
new imperialism one has to take care not to be dragged into conspiracy-like 
theories which are often fascinating but cannot form the basis of a 
reconstruction of critical development studies. However, the same, can often 
be said about globalization theories which have been labelled by Justin 
Rosenberg (2000) as complete follies. 
2. The second drawback is that the new imperialist perspective in order to lead 
to empirical research, has to be operationalized. In other words, if new 
imperialism exists at a paradigmatic level it should be connected to middle-
range critical theories to enable research ‘on the ground’. There are some 
examples of how to do that but it needs more systematic attention. An 
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analysis of power relations is undoubtedly a central element in such an 
exercise. For example, research focussed on local government and the 
participation of the local community through participatory budgets could be 
organized by using concepts of Gramsci and Foucault where power relations 
within the local community and between the local community and local and 
or national governments is central instead of using a frame of analysis 
inspired by the likes of Robert Putnam who focus on social capital.  
3. If new imperialism, together with radical political economy and critical 
theory, is incorporated into the academic curriculum of development studies 
there will be issues of strategy and tactics involved. Rocks and Hard Places 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs make a cautious routing necessary. 
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Global governance, NGOs and the politics 
of scale 
Bas Arts 
Introduction 
“Globalization currently means liberalization and privatization of the means of 
production, but this does not necessarily need to be. Particularly social movements 
can change today’s world.”  
The above citation is typically Ton van Naerssen’s (2002: 186), being a critical 
thinker and a normatively involved analyst at the same time. The citation is 
analytical in the sense that current globalization patterns are criticized (with a 
legacy of neo-marxist jargon) and it’s normative in the sense that an alternative 
is believed in (especially in the potential of the anti- or other-globalization 
movement). My contribution to this Liber Amicorum builds on this ‘double’ 
perspective of Ton. On the one hand, global governance as a mode to deal with 
planetary issues is critically assessed by confronting it with the politics of scale 
literature. The latter puts the ideas of ‘global scale’ and ‘top down governing’ – 
so easily implied in the notion of global governance – into critical perspective. 
By doing so, NGOs as bearers of another type of political globalization – or 
better: glocalization – are addressed at the same time. Also, a rather 
(post)positivist approach is replaced by a social-constructivist one, preventing 
the analyst to fixate and reify notions such as ‘scale’ and ‘politics’.  
To illustrate my argument, I will go into the case of forests. Since 
deforestation (particularly of topical rainforests) has reached the global agenda in 
the 1980s, all kind of international initiatives have been undertaken to address 
this topic, e.g. from FAO, UNEP, ITTO, EU and others. Together, these 
initiatives can be considered forms of ‘global forest governance’. Yet from a 
‘politics of scale’ perspective, another picture emerges. Now the framing of the 
issue itself comes to the fore (the definition of local deforestation as a global 
issue), the scaling aspect (from the local to he global level and vice versa) as 
well as the constitution of the forest arena by various stakeholders, including 
NGOs. To my mind, the politics of scale approach is better able to fully and 
critically grasp the nature of international forest politics than the notion of 
‘global governance’. 
The format of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, the notions of governance and 
global governance are introduced as well as critically assessed. Particular 
attention will be paid to the role of NGOs and the different theoretical 
perspectives in this regard. Then the politics of scale perspective will be 
elaborated upon and subsequently applied to the case of global forest 
governance. The chapter will be concluded with a short résumé. 
Although my analysis below is probably not (entirely) synonym with Ton’s 
ideas and convictions, I am sure he will like both its critical-normative undertone 
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and the themes that are addressed, such as environmental governance, 
glocalization, politics of scale and social movements. Themes that color his work 
too. With that, Ton, I hope to show you my deepest respect, both personally and 
professionally. 
Governance and its global dimension 
The buzzword of the late 1990s and early 2000s in political sciences, public 
administration and management sciences alike is the concept of governance 
(Held and McGrew, 2002; Héritier, 2001, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 
Pierre, 2000). To most, it refers to a ‘paradigm shift’ in the way we govern 
(post)modern societies and organizations. Due to processes such as ‘relocation of 
politics’ (from the state to international and sub-national organizations), ‘de-
territorialization’ (the emergence of new political spaces beyond the territorial 
nation state), ‘diffusion of political power’ (from public authorities to semi-
public and private actors) and ‘de-legitimization of the state’ (crisis of the 
welfare state, state failures, lack of performance), the old ‘paradigm’ of top-
down, state-led, command and control ways of steering do no longer suffice 
(Bovens et al., 1995; Dubbink, 1999; Hajer, 2000). Instead, we find new forms 
of governance and policy instruments: network-like arrangements of public and 
private actors, self-regulation by business organizations, public-private and 
civic-private partnerships, emission trading schemes, certification programs, etc 
(Kickert et al., 1997; Kolk, 2000; Meidinger, 2002; Bendel, 2000). Some refer to 
this as a ‘shift from government to governance’ or as ‘governance without 
government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).  
The concept of governance knows many definitions. For example, Pierre 
(2000) distinguishes three meanings, Hirst (2000) five and Rhodes (2000) seven. 
Analytically, however, one may distinguish between ‘old’, ‘new’ and ‘all’ types 
of governance (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002; Pierre, 2000). ‘Old’ refers to 
traditional state steering, ‘new’ to innovative modes of governance, and ‘all’ to 
both categories. Normatively, one may add a fourth category, namely the 
promotion of a renewal of public and/or private management under the banner of 
good governance. Examples are new public management (NPM) and corporate 
governance (Table 1).  
In the study of international relations (SIR), the concept of governance has 
become popular too and is generally referred to as ‘global governance’ (Nye & 
Donahue, 2000; Held & McGrew, 2002). In this domain, it has a slightly 
different meaning and has provoked some other debates, because the 
international system lacks a central authority anyway, so that we always deal 
with ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). Even in 
the traditional meaning of international diplomacy, organization and law, one 
may speak of global governance, since we lack an institution like a global 
government. Yet some theorists make similar distinctions as in the above, 
because we observe similar innovations in policy making and public steering at 
the global level compared to the domestic one. Therefore, Heritier (2001), for 
example, distinguishes between two meanings of global governance: one 
‘restricted’, referring to only new governance mechanisms (such as global issue 
networks of public and private actors, for example on climate change) and one 
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‘broad’ conceptualization, referring to all modes of public and private co-
ordination in the global arena (Heritier, 2001). Also, good governance is often 
distinguished in the SIR literature too. Under this label, programs of the World 
Bank and of IMF to promote democratic, effective and transparent government 
in Third World countries are referred to. 
 
Table 1: Four conceptualizations of governance 
Conceptualization  General definition  Global dimension 
‘Old’ governance ‘state steering’ 
(top-down, command & 
control) 
‘intergovernmental 
arrangements’ 
(international diplomacy, 
organization and law) 
‘New’ governance ‘new modes of 
governance’  
(from public-private 
partnerships to private 
self-regulation) 
‘new modes of global 
governance’ 
(from issue networks to 
private standardization)  
‘All’ governance 
 
 
‘co-ordination mechanisms 
to provide for public 
goods’ 
(either public, private or 
mixed) 
‘co-ordination 
mechanisms to provide 
for global goods’ 
(either public, private or 
mixed) 
‘Good’ governance ‘programs to renew public 
or private management’ 
(new public management, 
corporate governance) 
‘programs to renew Third 
World government’ 
(World Bank, IMF) 
 
Most conceptualizations of global governance include the (potential) relevance 
of so-called non-state actors (NSAs) – for example NGOs, firms and epistemic 
communities – for governing global issues. Even more so, most approaches 
consider NSAs as being internal to the global governance system. This position 
not only transcends state-centred approaches, such as neo-realism, but also the 
classical pluralist view on international politics, in which NSAs are considered to 
be external, influential lobbyists at best (Reinalda, 1997; Willetts, 1982, 1996). 
However, formally and informally, NSAs are ever more an intrinsic part of 
international networks of governance.  
Non-state actors (NSAs) are all those actors that are not (representatives of) 
states, yet that operate at the international level and that are potentially relevant 
to international relations (Arts et al., 2001; Furtak, 1997; Higgot et al., 2000). 
Generally, five groups of NSAs are distinguished in the literature: 1. 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs such as UN, OECD, WTO, etc.)1, 2. 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs, which are non-profit, non-violent 
pressure groups), 3. Corporate Interest Groups (CIGs) and Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs), 4. Epistemic Communities (international networks of 
experts) and 5. a remainder category (including terrorist networks, professional 
                                                          
1 Not all would agree that an IGO is an NSA. Some consider an IGO as an ensemble of states, thus 
being a state actor; others believe that IGOs exhibit degrees of autonomy and authority vis-à-vis 
states, thus constituting a non-state actor. 
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organizations, scouts, churches, etc.). In this chapter, however, we are mainly 
interested in the role of NGOs (given the professional background and scientific 
interest of the author; see for example Arts, 1998). 
Governance critique 
The concept of (global) governance is contested. Particularly its lack of 
theorizing about power, the state, non-state actors and scaling is criticized (Arts 
et al., 2008; Gilpin, 2002; Hewson and Sinclair, 1999). Too easily, relationships 
between public and private actors in different arenas and at different levels of 
policy-making are considered ‘free of power games’. If politics are to be placed 
on a continuum between ‘rationality’ and ‘power’, which is often done so, then 
the governance literature is definitely at the ‘rational side’. But the governance of 
(controversial) issues is more often than not going beyond rational 
argumentation and technocratic management, including interest-driven 
bargaining and crude power games.  
Another criticism concerns the role, power and transformation of the nation 
state, which remain under-theorized. All too often, it is (implicitly) assumed that 
an increase of (new) governance practices is accompanied by a ‘retreat of the 
state’ (Albrow, 1996; Pierre, 2000; Strange, 1996). Although it is certainly the 
case that the state has (partly) retreated from certain domains, like economics or 
environmental policy, this claim cannot be hold true in general. As Hirst (2000) 
makes clear, the state remains dominant in those fields where it is traditionally 
considered ‘the sovereign’, such as the legitimate monopolization of collective 
violence, internal and external security, taxation and currency, law and order and 
social consensus-building (although we may observe some shifts in these fields 
too, like UN peace forces, private armies, the introduction of the Euro, and 
private initiatives to maintain law and order in neighborhoods). Even more so, 
the power of the state has increased in some instances, the Internet being an 
example (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002). All this points at the fact that we do not 
witness a general retreat of the state, in the light of governance, but a 
transformation of the state.  
At the same time, the role of non-state actors, including NGOs, is not well 
articulated too. Although the (global) governance literature acknowledges their 
inherent relevancy for the management of social and political issues, they are 
often considered new players in a sort of ‘given’ governance arena (Held and 
McGrew, 2002). The idea that NGOs might also have played roles in the 
constitution of these (new) governance arrangements is however hardly 
recognized. Again, this does not mean that NGOs have become more important 
than – or even overrule – states, on the contrary. The point here is to neither 
over- nor underestimate the role of both states and non-state actors in global 
governance. On the one hand, states remain the key power containers in 
international politics, given their power resources, formal authority and social 
legitimacy (Hirst, 2000), but that does, on the other hand, not necessarily exclude 
a (co)constitutive role – either formal or informal – for NGOs in the emergence 
of new governance practices (Arts et al., 2001). 
Finally, although the (global) governance literature does acknowledge the 
multi-level setting of governance practices, its view on the scale issue is quite 
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static in general. In many cases, the traditional hierarchies of sub-national, 
national, European and international politics is rather uncritically reified as is the 
search for the optimal scale for the governance of certain issues (Arts et al., 
2008). With that, the formation of issue-specific multi-scalar practices as well as 
the emergence of new state and non-state spaces in global governance, beyond 
the ‘given’ levels of public administration, remain under-theorized. 
Below, we will introduce a perspective on global governance that seems to 
overcome the above shortcomings. In the politics of scale perspective (see 
Brenner, 2001), the structuration of scale(s) is put central. As a consequence, 
multi-level governance is not perceived as a fixed theatre in which both states 
and NGOs can play their pre-given roles, but as a dynamic universe that is 
continuously (re)constituted during plays with open ends. Such a metaphor also 
gives room for the inclusion of power games. Who constitutes what? At whose 
expense? Or jointly with whom?  
Intermezzo: different perspectives on NGOs  
As written earlier, this chapter particularly focuses on the role of NGOs in global 
governance. At this point, it is good to realize that this role is conceptualized 
very differently by various theorists and their schools of thought (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Four perspectives on NGOs in global governance 
Theory  NGO perspective  
Neo-realism NGOs are irrelevant in international politics 
International 
pluralism 
NGOs may be effective lobbyists in international 
politics 
Global governance NGOs are an internal part of the global governance 
system 
Politics of scale NGOs have co-constituted the multi-scalar, global 
governance system 
 
This is already touched upon in the above, but needs some further clarification. 
Traditionally, within the study of international relations, NGOs are considered 
epiphenomena. They are active in international relations, that fact is of course 
not denied, but they do not really matter for political outcomes. When the crunch 
comes, as neo-realists claim, states make the rules and determine the outcomes 
by which other actors, including NGOs, have to operate (Waltz, 1979). Theorists 
who have focused on international organizations, however, have nuanced this 
position. Research showed that NGOs could for example make a difference in 
decision-making within the United Nations (Willetts, 1982, 1996). Still, NGOs 
are conceptualized as external actors within this perspective, namely as political 
lobbyists who try to penetrate political arenas from which they are officially 
abandoned. Governance theorists have further radicalized this pluralist view, 
now considering NGOs as an intrinsic part of global governance arenas (Held 
and McGrew, 2002). As research shows, NGOs do not only lobby decision-
makers (something they still do), but have become formally accepted policy and 
rule makers themselves within various issue arenas. As argued in the above, 
much of the governance literature however takes such arenas as pre-given 
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theatres, neglecting the potential (co)constitutive role of NGOs in the formation 
of such arenas in the first place. Here the theory of the politics of scale 
introduces the fourth perspective on NGOs (see below). 
The politics of scale perspective 
In defining the concept ‘politics of scale’, I follow Brenner (2001), who 
distinguishes two meanings. In the singular meaning, politics of scale refers to 
the structuration of socio-spatial organization - e.g. a household, place, locality 
or nation - within one bounded geographical arena, e.g. the local, urban, national 
or global. In that sense, the analysis is horizontal in nature, at one level of scale. 
However, the plural meaning of politics of scale refers to the structuration of 
socio-spatial organization - e.g. a global city, an EU member state or an NGO-
network - among geographical scales. Here the analysis is vertical in nature. 
According to Brenner, this second meaning should be the primary one, because 
within one level, the ‘scalar content’ of socio-spatial organization cannot be 
presupposed. In other words, it does not necessarily play a relevant role in 
shaping socio-spatial organizations within the boundaries of one level, whereas it 
does by definition so in multi-level settings. Moreover, one does not need the 
vocabulary of the politics of scale to analyze socio-spatial organization within 
one bounded geographical arena. Other concepts, which are already broadly used 
in human and political geography, suffice, according to Brenner, e.g. territory, 
locality, space and place. I think Brenner’s distinction is a useful one, and his 
choice for a plural interpretation of the politics of scale is correct. Moreover, it 
fits this article’s objective very well, which is the analysis of NGO networks and 
activities in multi-level governance settings. 
Before theorizing on the role of NGOs in the politics of scale, the basic 
concept of ‘scale’ vis-a-vis the one of ‘level’ should be given attention to. 
Following Collinge, Brenner (2001:597) defines ‘scale’ as the vertical ordering 
of social systems and relations within a hierarchical scaffolding of intertwined 
territorial units, stretching from the global/worldwide, the supranational and the 
national downwards to the regional, the metropolitan, the urban, the local and 
even the individual body. It is important to realize that such ‘scales’ are neither 
pre-determined nor fixed in any social organization. They are produced, 
reproduced and transformed in human activity and history. In contrast, ‘level’ as 
used in concepts such as ‘two-level games’ and ‘multi-level governance’, refers 
to vertical orderings of interdependent political-administrative units – from the 
international to the domestic (two-level games) or from the EU to the Euregion 
to the member state (multi-level governance) – which are generally, but not 
necessarily, related to territory and territorial authority (Hooghe and Mark, 2001; 
Putnam, 1988). In this literature, the notion of ‘political-administrative level’ is 
generally interpreted in a rather static and pre-fixed way.  
To sum up, ‘scale’ particularly refers to dynamic socio-spatial organization 
within a hierarchy of units, whereas ‘level’ particularly refers to pre-given 
political-spatial organization.  
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NGOs and the politics of scale 
Having elaborated upon the concept of the politics of scale in the previous 
section, the following question still remains: How does all this relate to NGO 
practices? Below, three claims will be identified, namely that NGOs have: (1) 
linked scales, (2) re-articulated scales and (3) organized beyond scales during 
their short-lived history so far. To start with the first claim: it is obvious that 
many NGOs had an international focus right from the start, given the nature of 
the issues dealt with, while their establishment and action radius was mainly 
local in nature, at least in the 1960s and 1970s (Korey, 1998; McCormick, 1989). 
One might think of human rights groups, nature conservation organizations, 
environmental organizations, developmental groups and peace organizations. For 
example, the green movement has been very well known for grass-root activism 
since the early 1960s, while propagating a worldwide view at the same time 
(Nelissen et al., 1997). “Think globally, act locally” has been their famous 
slogan. Later on, environmental NGOs, together with scientists, were the first to 
define the ‘new’ global environmental issues in the 1980s: the ozone layer, 
climate change and loss of biodiversity (Arts, 1998; Benedick, 1991). They also 
propagated for political action to combat these problems at different levels, 
including the global one. Consequently, they now upgraded their action radius, 
expanding their slogan to “thinking and acting globally, as well as locally”. Also, 
at domestic levels within countries, the impact of foreign and international NGOs 
has grown as well (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-kappen, 1995; Risse, 2000). 
Here we observe ‘multi-scalar games’, by which governments are put under 
pressure, from above and below, to change their policies, or even prepare for 
regime change. Hence, the local-global nexus operates in two ways, from the 
global to the local as well as from the local to the global. In either way, the 
national level has become ‘sandwiched’. 
But there is more than that. NGOs did not simply link up different socio-
geographical scales and political levels, they also challenged their definitions. 
Traditionally, in international politics, certain issues are considered to be covered 
either by national politics and jurisdiction or by international politics and law 
(Putnam, 1988; Ray, 1987). Desertification, for example, seems of national 
origin; it simply occurs within the boundaries of nation states and therefore it 
seems bound to national jurisdiction (Correll, 1999). Yet NGOs (and others, e.g. 
African states) have argued that desertification is a regional, if not a global 
problem. For example, the problem is caused by transboundary processes – such 
as adverse water management and agricultural practices in neighboring countries 
in sub-Sahara Africa – and even by global processes, such as climate change. 
Therefore, according to NGOs, it is legitimate to consider desertification as a 
regional and global issue. In making this claim, NGOs have not only 
interchanged arguments with mainstream politics, but also interchanged local 
and global political interests. For example, victims of so-called local problems 
were brought or invited to international fora to tell their stories (Princen and 
Finger, 1994). Also, those who (unconsciously and unintended) caused problems 
at the other end of the globe have been confronted with the victims of their acts. 
For example, Greenpeace invited indigenous chiefs whose forests had been 
ruined by commercial logging in Canada to the Netherlands, where ‘their’ 
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tropical timber was in fact used, making people aware of the global nature of this 
so-called local issue. 
This above went along with an ‘glocalization’ process of the NGOs’ 
organizational structures. Ever more, international NGOs and networks have 
been established. Examples are the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
Human Rights Watch, Climate Action Network, A SEED, Jubilee 2000, World 
Rainforest Movement, etc. In the late 1980s and 1990s, however, an opposite 
trend emerged too, whereby the global movement has involved ever more 
national and local groups in its global practices. An ‘institutional expression’ of 
this trend has been the acceptance of ‘non-international’ NGOs as observers and 
participants at UN meetings and organizations since the middle-1980s (Willetts, 
1996). As a consequence, the movement has built up very complex local-global 
links and networks around the world, with which it has created an own niche in 
international diplomacy (Princen and Finger, 1994). It could be argued that, due 
to the ICT-revolution, this multi-scalar mobilization capacity of social 
movements has increased (Hajnal, 2002). A dramatic expression of this trend has 
been the so-called anti- or other-globalization movement, initially organized 
around thematic, local and regional groups. These have intensively 
communicated through the internet in preparing protest marches at global 
meetings of international institutions, such as the WTO, World Bank, IMF, G7/8, 
World Economic Forum and EU (Seattle, Washington, Nice, Quebec, Genua, 
Davos, etc.; Dale, 2001; Fisher and Ponniah, 2003). Although this movement is 
much broader and, in general, much more radical than the NGOs referred to in 
the above, many of these have nonetheless established links with it (such as 
Greenpeace, Oxfam and Amnesty International).  
Of course, it should be stressed that NGOs – while linking, re-articulating and 
organizing beyond scales – ‘contribute to’ outcomes and that they do not 
‘determine’ them. They are just part of much broader social and political 
networks of states, intergovernmental organizations, firms, epistemic 
communities, etc., that together constitute the politics of scale. Also, NGOs have 
been challenged and counter-forced by others. For example, countries are not 
always happy when – in their eyes – local issues, such as human rights or 
environmental deterioration, become globalized.  
Global forest governance: an example of multi-scalar politics 
The issue of deforestation hit the international political agenda in the early 1980s 
(Humphreys, 1994). At that time it became clear that for several reasons – 
commercial logging, cultivation of agrarian lands, mining activities, building of 
infrastructure, lack of forest regulations, large-scale burning, unjust land rights, 
etc. – huge areas of forests had disappeared. Special attention drew the tropical 
forests, and the region of Amazonia in Brazil in particular. Figures (although 
always contested) pointed at an area of forests of the size of the Benelux which 
disappeared in this region each year (Kolk, 1996). Later on, unsustainable forest 
management practices in other countries (Canada, Ivory Coast, Russia) and other 
types of ‘endangered’ forests (boreal forests, ancient forests in general) became 
part of the agenda.  
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These problems led to a number of responses. First, NGOs like Greenpeace, 
WWF and the World Rainforest Movement started world-wide campaigns to 
stop these practices. Second, timber importing and exporting countries 
established the International Timber Trade Organisation (ITTO) in 1986, to deal 
with trade problems as well as environmental issues, and launched the voluntary 
ITTO 2000 target. This target aimed at basing the entire global timber trade on 
sustainable forest management practices in the year 2000, but obviously failed 
(Kern et al., 2001). And thirdly, governments in the United Nations decided that 
a global forest treaty to enhance conservation and sustainable management 
should be decided upon. However, this initiative also became a failure, due to 
fierce contradictions between developed and developing countries, the former 
emphasizing the need to conserve (tropical) forests, the latter the need to exploit 
them for economic reasons (Humphreys, 1994).  
In the meantime, given these regulatory failures, several environmental 
organizations had expressed their wish to do business with industry on 
sustainable forestry themselves. As one NGO-leader said: “You cannot just sit 
back and wait for governments to agree, because this could take forever” 
(Bendel, 2000, p. 69). For example WWF started a dialogue with industry under 
the slogan Forests are your business in the UK in 1991. At global level, similar 
developments – dialogues between NGOs and industry – took place. In 1993, 
150 organizations from the business sector, the environmental sector and the 
human rights movement founded the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 
Toronto (Kern et al., 2001; Meidinger, 2002). Today, its headquarters are in 
Bonn, Germany. The main merit of the council is the design of a certification 
program for sustainable forest management, based on certain FSC values, criteria 
and standards and recognizable through its trademark. 
The overall aim of the FSC is to stop large-scale deforestation and 
unsustainable forestry around the world by certifying those management 
practices which enhance the conservation and sustainable use of forests. After 
certification, forest owners and timber producers may use the FSC trademark, so 
that wood processors and consumers can recognize this timber. With that, the 
FSC promotes sustainable forestry through the market mechanism. Therefore 
Cashore (2002) labels the FSC forest certification program as a ‘non-state 
market-driven’ governance system. This system is based on ten principles 
(Meidinger, 2002): forest management, property rights, rights of the local 
community, labor rights, sustainability, ecology and biodiversity, planning, 
control of adverse social and ecological effects, conservation of forests with high 
ecological value, and plantation. These principles are elaborated upon in a 
number of more practical criteria.  
FSC standardization can follow two routes, the national or the global one 
(Kern et al., 2001). Either national sustainable forestry standards can be 
developed, e.g. by national NGOs and businesses (and in co-operation with 
governments), which at a later stage apply for FSC accreditation. Or national 
standardization groups immediately take the global FSC principles and 
guidelines as the starting point to formulate their own standard, adapted to 
national circumstances. In that sense, the FSC certification program is quite 
flexible. Besides the accreditation of national initiatives and standards, the FSC 
also operates as an accreditation organization for certifiers and verifiers 
(Cashore, 2002; Kern et al., 2001). In order to be able to monitor and enforce in 
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a credible and trustworthy way, an independent system has been set up by the 
FSC. This means that certification and verification are undertaken by 
independent private organizations, such as KPMG in Canada, SKAL in the 
Netherlands and Smart Wood in the USA. 
The FSC initiative has, according to several observers, been successful (Kern 
et al., 2001). It started in Mexico in 1991, where a forest area of nearly 90.000 
ha. was certified. Today, about 6000 products and 900 forest areas in nearly 80 
countries around the world have been certified.2 This amounts to about 100 
million ha. in total, which is about 25 times the size of the Netherlands. To 
mention another success indicator: about 13% of the Dutch timber market, both 
primary and secondary products, was certified in 2005. In addition, FSC has 
become a so-called first mover in the certification market. It has challenged 
mainstream industry to design its own standards too. Examples are the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) of the American Forest and Paper 
Association and the Pan-European Forest Certification (PEFC), initiated by 
European forest owners and companies in the context of the intergovernmental 
Pan-European Helsinki process (Cashore, 2002; Meidinger, 2002). These 
business-originated standards come close to ISO-type environmental 
management systems and are therefore less demanding than FSC.  
If one reads the above case with the three ‘claims’ on linking-up scales, re-
articulating scales and organizing beyond scales by NGOs in mind, the following 
conclusions remain. NGOs were the first to politicize the issue of deforestation 
through their (international) campaigns. They also re-framed it into global terms, 
although the process of deforestation itself takes place within the boundaries of 
individual countries. In other words, they globalized the issue. Moreover, when 
governments failed to agree upon international regulation, NGOs took over the 
initiative. They became policy makers themselves, together with some parts of 
the forest industry. This process took place at two levels at the same time, within 
countries, linking local initiatives to global processes, and internationally, the 
other way around. The final result was the establishment of the FSC. Also the 
implementation of the standard knows two routes: the national and the 
international one. In that respect, it really represents a system of (private) multi-
scalar governance.  
Conclusion 
The main challenge of this chapter was to confront the global governance 
literature with the politics of scale perspective in order to further scrutinize the 
role of NGOs in – for example – global forest governance. The reason to do so 
was unease with (mainstream) global governance thinking, in which the issues of 
scale and politics, including the role of NGOs, are (often) under-theorized. These 
are generally considered pre-given and static facts, while their constitution is 
neglected. The politics of scale perspective does nonetheless take these issues on 
board, thus providing another account of NGOs in multi-scalar, global 
governance. The forest case, in a next step, validated these topics empirically. 
This leads us to draw the following conclusion: NGOs are not just external 
2 Source: www.fsc.org  
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lobbyists or internal networkers seeking for political influence in multi-level 
governance. They are also change agents (co)constituting new social realities, 
including multiple, intertwined scales of activism and political regulation.  
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A tale of two countries: perspectives from 
the South on the coherence of EU policies 
Paul Hoebink 
Introduction 
Coherence of European development policy with other European policies has 
been in the debate for a series of years. This debate started, as we will see later, 
with the introduction of the concept in the Treaty of Maastricht. As such it was 
taken up by some Member States, but also by European development NGOs. At 
the end of April 1993 for example European NGOs started lobbying against the 
meat exports to West Africa (or rather the subsidies on such exports). They 
maintained that these exports could be regarded as dumping and that they 
therefore disrupted the local meat markets. Over the years it has been in 
particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was in the middle of 
the debate,1 strengthened in the last years by criticisms from international 
development institutions, like the World Bank, and by the Doha-round of 
negotiations in the World Trade Organisations (WTO), in which groups of 
producers and exporters of agricultural products filed several complaints against 
protectionist policies and market distortions of the EU. 
In this debate voices from the South are mostly heard indirectly, via NGOs in 
Brussels or in the capitals of the Members States, via their lawyers in the WTO. 
It is the intention of this paper to show some Southern perspectives on the 
coherence of European policies vis-à-vis developing countries. This research 
started from the question: What kind of incoherencies in European policies with 
regard to developing countries are identified by important actors in developing 
countries themselves? It is based on a series of interviews with high ranking 
officials of government institutions and civil society organisations, like 
employers’ federations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, women’s 
organisations and human rights NGOs. Since we are restricted in space in this 
article, I will in contrast to the larger report in both case studies concentrate the 
analysis on trade and fisheries. 
Policy coherence: Definitions and background 
Policy coherence is a relatively new concept both in politics and in the political 
sciences. There is in fact no mention of it in the standard textbooks on the social 
sciences. Even in dictionaries on European politics it is absent. To arrive at a 
                                                          
1. The effects of the CAP on export possibilities for developing countries of course has been under 
discussion from the end of the 1960s, from the beginning of Ton van Naerssen’s academic career, in 
particular via the cane versus beet sugar campaigns, but only partly under the denominator of ‘policy 
coherence’. 
188 
                                                          
definition we must therefore first consult the dictionaries. As said these suggest 
that (in common parlance or philosophy) coherence is synonymous with 
consistency. Consistency and coherence of thought and statement therefore mean 
‘free from self-contradiction’. Policy coherence could therefore be defined as:  
‘The non-occurrence of effects that are contrary to the intended results or 
objectives of this policy’. 
For this purpose coherence can be defined either narrowly or broadly (see 
below). A narrow definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular 
field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities in this field. 
And a wide definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular field may 
not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities of government in that 
field or in other policy fields.  
The concept of policy coherence gained influence or, to put it more correctly, 
was introduced into European policies by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty 
referred to coherence/consistency in its foreign policy in Article C (see below), 
but for development cooperation policy Article 130U and 130V were in 
particular important. Article 130 V of Title XVII of the Treaty on European 
Union - the Maastricht Treaty - states that [CEC/CEC, 1992:61]: The Community 
shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130 U in the policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’ 
This article could be called the Maastricht Treaty's ‘coherence article’ in the 
field of development co-operation. It was sustained in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
under Title XX as Article 178.  Article 130V refers to Article 130U.  
There are different ways to classify coherence. We will not go into detail 
here,2 but it is important to present a classification to be able to define the 
different elements of policy coherence and the causes for incoherence. This 
classification of coherence stems from the perspective of the viewer. Coherence 
can have a narrow or restricted angle, or a broad one. With regard to policy 
coherence this means that it can focus on one terrain or field of policy only, or 
try to make links with other fields or domains of policies. The restricted 
definition places coherence within one terrain of government policy. We could 
also call this internal coherence, because the assessment of policy coherence 
stays here within the limits of the domain of a given policy. At a contrast, the 
broad definition will look at the way the attainment of a given set of goals of 
government policies in a certain field are stimulated or hampered by government 
policy or policies in another field or other terrains. 
The restricted (2) or internal (2) type is incoherence between different sets of 
foreign policy and development co-operation policy, e.g. between trade policies 
and development co-operation, between security policy and development co-
operation, between human rights policies and development co-operation. 
The third type is the broad or external one, including incoherence between 
development co-operation policies and policies in other fields, which can in 
theory, be all parts of European policy making. In principle it will be those 
policies most likely to affect also developing countries. In effect this will mean 
the CAP, CFP, certain consumer protection policies, parts of (global) 
environmental policies, industrial policies. 
2 For a more detailed overview see. Hoebink (1999 and 2004). 
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 Notwithstanding the efforts to achieve coherence of policy, incoherence is 
often a given. First, as government has to deal with many parties and pressure 
groups, it may well be impossible to find optimal solutions that satisfy all parties 
concerned and achieve all objectives. This is, of course even more so in the 
European Union, where the number of stakeholders and parties is much larger 
than at a national level. Second, government is not a unitary whole, but generally 
consists of a large number of departments, institutions and corporations.3 These 
departments and institutions take a large number of policy measures, monitor 
their implementation and are quite often faced with conflicting interests. Third, it 
is difficult to weigh all the factors, interests and parties and their reactions to an 
initial policy decision and even more difficult to weigh them on prognostics of 
an unknown future. Consequently, it is often unclear what will be the precise 
effects or side effects of the policy.  
Morocco and EU Policy Coherence 
Morocco and the EEC after the Treaty of Rome.  
Morocco has a long standing relationship with the EEC/EU. Morocco’s strong 
historical and cultural links and its economy heavily dependent on the French 
market, integrated in the Franc zone, should have led to an early association with 
the Community. Such an early association should also have been in line with the 
Joint Declaration of Intent to the Treaty of Rome, in which it was promised to 
start quickly with negotiations with Morocco (and Tunisia) to safeguard 
traditional trade flows. It nevertheless lasted thirteen years after Morocco’s 
independence before in 1969 the first limited special association agreement 
(under Article 238) came into force. This could be seen as symbolic for the 
relationship between Morocco and the EEC/EU, or even for the incoherent 
policy of the EEC/EU vis-à-vis the Maghreb/Mediterranean countries. 
Cooperation with the Mediterranean countries started with a case by case 
approach, allowing for full association with Greece and Turkey at the beginning 
of the sixties and limited association with Tunisia, Morocco (end of the sixties), 
Malta and Cyprus (beginning of the seventies). Other countries (Yugoslavia, 
Israel, Lebanon) however got non-preferential agreements. Morocco and Tunisia 
were said to be in the midst of the Pyramid of preferences competing with its 
citrus and olive oil directly with Italian producers. Negotiations were often 
difficult, in particular with those wine, citrus and olive oil producers, from which 
Italy feared competition. The Community was thus not able to ‘follow a coherent 
policy vis-à-vis this important neighbouring area’.4 The general line was that 
industrial products could freely enter into the Common Market, what was also in 
line with the reallocation of European textiles, clothing and shoe production to 
for example Spain, Tunisia and Morocco, but that agricultural products faced 
high tariffs or quota limitations. Its is clear that production in the Maghreb 
countries was and is not complementary to (southern) European production as it 
is with most ACP countries and thus led to a more protectionist policy from the 
3. Weatherford [1994], emphasises that in the economic literature government is, however, often 
regarded as a unitary actor. 
4 Grilli (1993: 181). 
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side of the EEC/EU. This was reinforced with the accession of in particular 
Spain to the EU and has more or less been the line since then. Political elements 
weighed heavily in the relations what in particular can be read from European 
reluctance to go into deeper relations with authoritarian regimes in Greece, 
Spain, Morocco and Turkey. Aid was very limited in this period up to 1979, 
consisting mainly of loans. 
A second phase in this relationship with the Mediterranean began, when in 
Paris in 1972 the European Council adopted the so-called ‘Global Mediterranean 
Policy’. ‘Global’ only meant in this case that the treatment of the Mediterranean 
countries should become more systematic, but this new policy also included 
cooperation agreements that had a bit broader scope, including next to trade 
issues also aid. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria signed more or less identical 
cooperation agreements in 1976. The negotiations were described as being 
‘bitter’, in which the Northern partners were willing to extend more concessions 
to industrial products, while Morocco and Tunisia were looking for better 
prospects for their agricultural products. With Greece, Spain and Portugal as 
newly coming EC-members, it could not be expected that many concessions with 
regard to agricultural products could be made. It meant that in particular Tunisia 
and Morocco lost out. It meant also that quantitative restrictions on textiles and 
clothing imports from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were introduced. The trade 
preferences thus stayed far from the French proposal at that time of establishing 
a free trade area in the Mediterranean. In the so-called ‘pyramid of privileges’ 
the southern Mediterranean countries were clearly lower than the ACP countries. 
A series of Cooperation Agreements though and financial protocols attached to 
them allowed for a modest increase in technical and financial grants and loans. 
But due tot the economic crisis of the seventies, it meant also that the amounts of 
aid stayed modest.5 
In those years Morocco filed a formal application – after an informal one was 
rebuffed in 1984 – to become member of the EC in 1987. The Moroccan 
application was rejected on basis of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which is 
said to reserve membership to European countries.6 At the positive side of this 
application was that it gave Morocco a better place at the European agenda with 
a first visit of Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1987. 
Europe’s little coherent policy vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean had a new 
change in 1989. After the second enlargement which brought the 
‘Mediterraneans’ Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Community the focus of 
the EU was clearly more southward. Added to this was that the economic crisis 
of the 1980s did hit countries as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt heavily. Morocco 
was hit in particular by a strong reduction in aid from the Gulf States and by low 
phosphate prices on the world market. Europe’s so-called ‘New Mediterranean 
Policy’ initiated in 1989 should address the problems of youth unemployment, 
growing poverty and immigration. The new policy aimed at introducing market 
reform (and in this following at a distance IMF policies), stimulating private 
investment and giving better market access. At the same time when European 
5 Under the first financial protocol for four years (1978-1981) it was ECU 659 million for eight 
countries, for a major part EIB loans. Egypt was the main receiver with about ECU 43 million a year; 
Jordan received ECU 10 million a year. Under the third financial protocol (1987-1991) the total 
amount grew to ECU 1.5 billion. (Cox/Chapman, 1999: ch.4). 
6 Haddadi, 2002,  pp.151-152. 
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institutions came with quite substantial criticism on European protectionism vis-
à-vis the Mediterranean countries (in particular with regard to agricultural 
products and textiles) however, very little changed in this respect. Aid flows did 
grow between 1987 and 1991 with 62 per cent, but still clearly lagged behind 
what was invested in other programmes.  
After the Luxembourg Council declaration on human rights (1991) the 
European Parliament voted in favour of a freeze of development assistance to 
Morocco on ground of human rights abuses in the Western Sahara and in 
Moroccan prisons. The discussion was fuelled by international NGOs and by 
Gilles Perrault’s book about human rights violations, Notre Ami le Roi, 
published in 1990. Morocco answered strongly by cutting of the negotiations on 
a new fishing agreement.7 It all led to more diplomatic exchange, to more 
discussions in Europe on its relationship with the southern Mediterranean 
countries and finally a Spanish proposal to intensify relations with the Maghreb. 
The Euro-Maghreb Partnership quickly lost momentum but found its way to 
Cannes and Barcelona. Also at the Moroccan side Hassan II introduced 
democratic reforms, amongst others creating a Consultative Council of Human 
Rights. 
This all is said to have become part of the past in 1995. The European summit 
in Cannes in June 1995 and the following Barcelona Summit with the 
Mediterranean countries in December in the same year are in the European 
Union’s documents described as a ‘watershed’, a major change in which issues 
as: common security, peace and stability, an ‘area of shared prosperity’, the 
development of human resources and relations between civil societies are said to 
be integrated into a broad cooperation. What is clear is that the fear for the 
upcoming Muslim fundamentalism in particular in Algeria, forced the European 
Union to take a new position vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean countries. In 
the follow-up of the Barcelona Summit negotiations again appeared very 
difficult. Only small steps were taking into the direction of a free trade area that 
should be created in 2010. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements are replacing the old cooperation agreements. Each of these 
agreements contains articles on a gradual elimination of custom duties, but for 
agricultural products special provisions are made. The agreements are thus more 
comprehensive and covering all areas of the Barcelona Declaration, but are not 
going very far or deep. 
After a Euro-Mediterranean Summit in 1991 and the Barcelona Summit aid 
commitments and disbursements did gradually grow again in the second half of 
the 1990s, since the Council in 1995 devoted € 3.4 billion up to 2000 for the 
special MEDA I budget line, created in October 1996 as a follow up of the 4th 
financial protocol. The main aid receiver stayed Egypt, with in a second echelon 
Morocco. Water supply was the main sector for European aid, where it was 
agriculture in earlier years.8 Morocco signed its European Mediterranean 
Association Agreement (EMAA) already in 1996 and thus, with Tunisia, was the 
first to become part of the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). 
The MEDA programme has been substituted by the Neighbourhood 
Programme and Morocco is by far the biggest receiver in this programme. The 
7 Idem, p.153. 
8 Also this is seen as an example that the EU is not willing to allow competition in this sector with its 
southern Member States. 
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European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument  (ENPI ) is endowed with €11.9 
billion for 2007-2013. For the period 2007-2010 the funds allocated to the 
Moroccan government amount to € 654million. As the Commission puts it: 
‘These funds will be spent in contributing to Morocco's ongoing economic 
reform’.  
Trade between Morocco and the EU.  
The EU is Morocco’s biggest trading partner. In particular the export 
dependency of Morocco is standing out with between 66 and 75 per cent of its 
exports directed at the European market. In terms of imports more than half 
stems from the EU. The balance of trade is still positive at the EU side. Trade 
between the EU and Morocco did grow fast in the 1990s. EU imports from 
Morocco grew with 85 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (growing from € 3,394 
million to € 6,265 million). Since 2002 trade stagnated. EU imports from 
Morocco went up to € 7.8 billion in 2007.  EU exports to Morocco grew a bit 
slower with 80 per cent between 1993 and 2002 (from € 4,237 million in 1993 to 
€ 7,624 million in 2002), but went up quicker after 2002 to € 12 billion in 2007. 
Morocco’s traditional and main exports to the EU are still food products 
(citrus fruits, vegetables like tomatoes and fishery products). The export of citrus 
fruits is more or less stagnant, while fish and crustaceans exports are increasing 
and vegetable exports are more important than fruits. More recently also flowers 
became an important agricultural export product, but exports are dwindling. 
Agricultural products account for a fifth of the EU's total imports from Morocco, 
and 6 per cent of its total exports. In 2002, the EU imported agricultural products 
from Morocco for a value of over € 1,318 million, while it exported for a worth 
of € 428 million. Industrial products exported are mainly textiles and clothing, 
although recently also automotive parts gained in importance. Textiles and 
garments represent about the same value as agricultural products. Main imports 
are fabrics for the textile and clothing industries, various types of machinery and 
equipment, chemicals, and wheat. Industrial products enter the EU duty-free. 
Agricultural export products are bound to quotas, seasons and duties. Under the 
Association Agreement the EU and Morocco granted each other some trade 
concessions for certain agricultural products. In Article 18 of the Agreement it is 
stipulated that discussions should be held with the objective to come to a further 
reciprocal liberalisation of agricultural trade. 
Problems with Exports 
According to the entrepreneurs, the Moroccan economy can potentially profit 
tremendously from trade liberalisation. They esteem that (internal and external) 
liberalisation that has already taken place over the past decade has boosted the 
Moroccan economy, created jobs, and decreased poverty. Main opponents of 
liberalisation are those with stakes in the former economic state monopolies, 
which produced low quality products for high prices. Since the internal 
liberalisation, prices have gone down and quality has gone up. Decreased import 
tariffs and a reduction of corruption have also had positive effects. The 
association agreement is positively evaluated as such, but on the condition that 
its functions well. There are severe doubts on the ‘equity’ principle: Up to now, 
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concrete policies like agrarian protection, the very difficult circulation of 
business people, and the de facto low support to increase competencies of 
Morocco’s labour force (e.g. through education, internships, etc.).  
Tariff and non-tariff protection is a problem, but this can eventually be solved 
through negotiations. EU support for sectors like agriculture is seen as a much 
bigger problem. However, the most fundamental problem is the lack of 
competitiveness of the Moroccan economy. Entrepreneurs esteem that it is 
absolutely necessary to improve competencies of Morocco’s enterprises and 
labour force. This so-called mise à niveau operation is not only important to 
increase efficiency of production, but also – and which is equally important – in 
the interest of the vital process of standardisation. The latter means that Morocco 
will be able to comply with EU’s quality standards for export commodities (to 
circumvent non-tariff protection), that management processes comply with ISO 
standards, harmonisation of commercial law, juridical procedures, and 
accountancy standards, and mutual recognition of diplomas. This can only be 
achieved through support from outside and through education and training of 
Moroccan professionals.  
In general industrial products have a duty-free access to the European market, 
but the exceptions are in sectors that are of particular importance for Moroccan 
industries. High tariffs, in comparison with ACP-countries, still prevail on 
textiles, apparel, and footwear. Duties are double in comparison with ACP-
countries. The ‘production-complementarity’ with the southern European states 
also in these sectors plays a negative role as seen from the Moroccan 
perspective. 
No cases of unfair competition from European imports were reported. The 
general fear of ‘rough’ competition from China is much more prevalent among 
officials and employers, but also from the side of independent economic 
analysts. 
Fisheries 
Most probably the most contested dossier in the relation between Morocco and 
the EU are the fisheries agreement or, better formulated, the negotiations on the 
fisheries agreement. It is a general feeling among Moroccan officials as well as 
Moroccan NGOs and entrepreneurs  that during the negotiations ‘the door was 
slapped in the Moroccan’ face’, because it was more lucrative in the final end for 
Spain not to come to an agreement. Spain then would be able to look for 
financial compensation in Brussels. From the other side the general statement is 
that Moroccan demands were too high to being fulfilled by the Union. But the 
issue is so sensitive and delicate that for example officials from DG Fisheries 
hardly dare to touch it. What is clear, is that a compensation of about € 72 
million a year was already paid in 2000 to Portuguese and (mainly) Spanish 
fishermen. 
The third Fisheries Agreement between Morocco and the European 
Community expired on 20 November 1999. Under this agreement nearly 500 
vessels in total and more than 400 Portuguese and Spanish vessels were fishing 
in the Moroccan waters. The financial went to € 500 million over the life of the 
agreement, making it the most important and most costly fishing agreement. 
These agreements could be seen as an extension of the agreement Spain had with 
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Morocco before. In discontent with the results of the agreements the Moroccan 
government tried to get a larger compensation at the same time reducing the 
number of European (Spanish) vessels in the Moroccan waters. Therefore a first 
agreement was concluded already in 1988. In the 1990s Morocco ‘absorbed 
about 40 per cent of the EU budget for third countries agreements and accounted 
for about 54 per cent of the total value of catches. Of the 477 vessels allowed to 
fish in Moroccan waters 404 were Spanish, coming mainly from Andalusia, 
Galicia, and the Canaries). With the second agreements of 1992 compensation 
were already increased with 50 per cent. The negotiations on a new agreement 
were already very difficult in 1995 and nearly collapsed. In the third fisheries 
agreement financial compensation took a new height and € 145 million were 
added for projects of scientific research, training and co-operation. 
During 1999 and 2000 continuing negotiations took place in Brussels as well 
as in Rabat. The Moroccans offered several options to the Union. The first was 
an agreement at cost of € 90 million a year with increased landings and a reduced 
number of European vessels. The second contained an agreement with 100 
percent landing obligations in Morocco. The third and the fourth offered fishing 
rights only on non-sensitive species with proportional or no financial 
compensation at all. It was in particular the high financial compensation that was 
seen as disproportionate by the Community. It was suggested that on the number 
of vessels, landing obligations, fishing zones and biological rest periods 
agreement could be reached. In line with Morocco’s discontent on the low level 
of cooperation and landings in Morocco, it offered the Community a choice 
between a high compensation and a low level of cooperation or limited and 
largely reduced access. Finally the negotiations went into a deadlock in March 
2001. According to Commissioner Franz Fischler ‘the Moroccan expectation 
went far beyond any reasonable evaluation’. It was stated that the EU was keen 
to conclude an agreement which would also take account of Moroccan interests 
and was also willing to accept that most EU vessels would have to land their 
catches in Moroccan ports. 
A main point of divergence was said to be the fishing levels (vessels, 
biological rest periods, gear) for ‘key commercial fisheries, notably cephalopods 
and shrimps’. Morocco wanted a reduction for these species of 60 to 80 per cent. 
It was concludes that what Morocco was offering, was ‘not interesting to major 
sections of the fleet’, e.g. Spanish vessels. Under the earlier agreement 113 
shrimp trawlers and 86 cephalopod vessels did have access to Moroccan waters. 
Two opinions can be heard on the collapse of the negotiations. One states that 
Morocco negotiated too hard and overplayed its hand. It now lost as well the 
compensation as well part of the landings. It is said that Morocco misses the 
economic and technical capabilities to operate a large scale fishing fleet. Now 
Japanese, Korean and Russian ships are seen fishing in the Moroccan waters. 
Some state partly illegally because the Moroccan marine is not able to control 
the Moroccan fishing waters, but at least with little financial compensation to 
Morocco. Recent figures of the Ministry show that in particular catches of 
crustaceans and cephalopods have gone down in recent years. 
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Another observation most heard in Rabat and Casablanca states that it was the 
EU, in casu Spain, which blocked the negotiations.9 Moroccan officials all 
indicate that they were disillusioned with the three earlier agreements in the light 
of the limited development benefits they brought to Morocco. The agreements 
were seen as exploitative alone, offering European vessels the richness of the 
Moroccan waters for just a financial compensation not on a basis of cooperation 
for development. The fear was underlined that Morocco would sell the riches of 
its seas and that it would end being overexploited and empty as the 
Mediterranean. 
What struck the Moroccans hardest – and is seen as the ultimate example of 
the hand of Spain in these negotiations – that as a result of the collapse of the 
negotiations also fisheries projects were ended. If these projects are part of the 
development cooperation relation between Morocco and the EU, why then would 
they be suspended, if negotiations on a commercial agreement can not be 
concluded, is the question most commonly asked. If the EU is serious about the 
support of 200.000-250.000 small fishermen10 why then stop the technical 
support? Why stop the support for research on fish stocks? 
Senegal and the EU 
Senegal, the Treaty of Rome, and the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions 
Senegal has been part of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions from the 
beginning. It was already part of the group of Associated African and Malagasy 
States (AAMS) consisting mainly out of French and Belgian colonies in Africa 
(in total 18 states in 1963), which together with the Overseas Territories were the 
negotiating body with the Community after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. 
With the independence of several African states at the end of the 1950s and the 
beginning of the 1960s, Articles 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome were not 
binding them anymore. Negotiations started on new forms of association with 
the EC. Senegal became independent in 1959 and is said to be also one of the 
very active members of the group in these negotiations which finally resulted in 
the Convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 (with 18 African states) and six years 
later to Yaoundé II, which was mainly a copy of Yaoundé I. Unilateral 
association thus became ‘negotiated association’ (Grilli 1993:19) and Senegal’s 
Leopold Senghor, as one of the more moderate African leaders played an 
important role in it. 
Since the 18 of Yaoundé I, mainly former French and Belgian colonies, did not 
have to fear the competition of former British colonies yet, aid levels and access 
to the European market remained more or less unchanged. It did put the AAMS 
group of countries in a privileged position. In exchange European access to their 
markets and rights of EC citizens put the EC in a favourable position. Senegal 
9 It has to be noted that Spain received € 170 million (Portugal € 24) in 2000 and 2001 alone as 
compensation for fishermen and vessel owners affected by the non-renewal of the Morocco 
agreement. 
10 One of the sensitive issues at stake here is of course the fact that most of the artisanal fishermen 
fish in the coastal waters of the Western Sahara. 
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took part in all this, as also in all the structures  (Association Council, 
Parliamentary Conference) that were created alongside 
Senghor also played a pivotal role in the negotiations on Lomé I in the 
beginning of the 1970s. Under his leadership and that of the Nigerians the 
AAMS group quickly found themselves in a ‘cohesive and aggressive 
negotiating group’ (Grilli 1993:27) of ACP-countries. It led to an inclusion of the 
export revenue stability instrument Stabex financed by the Community and the 
abandonment of reciprocity in trade relations between the ACO and the EC. 
Furthermore the Sugar Protocol, making a first small inroad in European 
agricultural protectionism was part of these ‘aggressive’ negotiations. 
The privileged position of West-African, Sahel and other Francophone 
countries however changed little after in 1975, when in Lomé I Eastern and 
Southern African countries were integrated. Aid per capita, also to Senegal, 
stayed on average four times higher. Lomé II and Lomé III also brought only 
minor changes in this position. This became even more obvious in the second 
half of the 1980s when Senegal (and Ivory Coast) were hit by economic 
recession. Both countries, which economically did quite well since 
independence, then suffered from their integration in the Franc zone, weakening 
their position in the international commodity markets. As a consequence direct 
EU aid to Senegal in that period increased tenfold, from $ 6 million tot $ 65 
million in 1988. 
In the line-up for the negotiations on the Cotonou Convention also criticisms 
on Senegalese economic policies grew. It was indicated that Senegal lost a fifth 
of its export markets since the 1980s, because its exports made no progress at 
all.11 It was one of the signs that trade preferences in the Lomé Conventions only 
worked for a small number of states. The Economic Partnership Agreements are 
one of the new instruments of the Cotonou Convention to foster trade between 
the EU and the ACP-countries and among regional groups themselves. New 
Country Strategy Papers should also in the case of Senegal in anew format plan 
for old and new instruments and be a monitoring instrument to follow progress. 
Several local participants, among which Civil Society organisation should take 
part in the process of the formulation of the new CSPs. 
There is also quite some discussion on the EPAs. One of the issues put forward 
is about the necessity of the institution of an EPA, when there is already a WTO 
which is already covering issues as reciprocity and market access. Some NGOs 
also indicate that there are two types of countries in the region, Least Developed 
Countries and others, and that, if the LDCs get a better access to the European 
Market, this might lead to dislocation of a certain set of activities to these LDCs. 
Whereas cooperation between these countries is a major goal of the EPAs this 
could lead to collisions. The situation in West-Africa is seen as even more 
complicated as one has to deal also with differences between Anglophone and 
Francophone countries (apart from Arab phone) with all the differences in 
culture attached to it. 
Also the philosophy behind the EPAs is criticised. It suggests that free trade 
leads to more economic growth and that thus what African countries are going to 
gain  by it will be more than they are going to loose by the termination of the 
11 Statement of the EU-delegate Manuel Lopez Blanco, Le Soleil, 5 June 2004. It is important to note 
that Lopez Blanco was the main architect of the trade paragraphs of the EU Green Paper containing 
the EU’s proposals for the renegotiation of Lomé. 
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trade preferences. This philosophy is qualified as dubious. What African 
countries might win on some products, they are certainly going to loose on 
others. These losses might be compensated within the EPA, but this is at the 
level of the state and is not a compensation for producers and labourers. In this 
respect in particular European protectionism in agriculture is under criticism, 
with which we will deal later. 
Trade 
Exports 
Senegal’s exports are highly concentrated in the primary sector and primary 
products represent 90% of export income. Its exports consist mainly of 
groundnut, phosphate and fisheries. Of them fisheries is the most important, 
contributing between 35 and 40% to export income. Fisheries exports even 
contributed 56% to total exports in 1995. In the first five 1990s there was only a 
very slight growth of exports of manufactured goods, concentrated in a very 
limited number of firms and a negligible impact on employment.12  
Over the years since independence Senegal lost considerably in market share. 
Its per capita exports are among the lowest in the world. In the 1990s there was 
even a drop in export incomes of about 2 per cent per year, while at the same 
time other SSA countries saw a growth of on average 5 per cent per year.13 This 
drop was in particular caused by the high and unrealistic exchange rate of the 
CFA. In money terms exports regained from 1995, after the devaluation of the 
CFA. But in the second half of the 1990s in particular reduced prices and 
reduced volumes of phosphate, vegetable oils, shrimps and lobster caused a new 
slide in exports. Fisheries exports fell dramatically again in 2000 and 2001, good 
prices however kept income more or less stable. Also the groundnut (oil) exports 
did relatively well. 14 
Traditionally 40-45% of the Senegalese exports have Europe as destination. 
But exports to the EU are going down in relative terms and are less then 30% at 
the moment. This is mainly due to the fall of fisheries exports. Main European 
importers are France, Italy and Greece. About 30% of the exports are going to 
African countries, mainly to the ‘Hinterland’, countries in West-Africa. The 
market of the Americas is negligible and collects not more than 1% of the 
exports. Senegal’s exports to the EU were thus reduced from € 453 million in 
2001 and € 521 million in 2005 to € 372 million in 2007. 78% of these exports in 
2007 were still agricultural products. The EU exports to Senegal were € 1.8 
billion in 2007. 
Groundnuts are the most important product for cash income for the rural 
population. Whereas more than half of the Senegalese population is considered 
to be poor, 75 to 80% of the rural households were poor. Growth in agriculture is 
stagnating and also is the production of groundnuts, although since the 
devaluation of the CFA franc (1994) is slight increase occurred from 1997 to 
2001. Half of primary sector output comes from agriculture. Since the 
12 World Bank (1997: 20-25). 
13 Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2003 : 133-161). And : Le Soleil, 17 December 2002. 
14 Ibidem. 
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millennium there was strong growth of agricultural production, but this growth is 
seen as very fragile and with little effect on rural poverty yet. In 2000 agriculture 
contributed 21% to exports and 17% to Senegal’s GDP, while half of the labour 
force was employed in agriculture. Senegal is the 6th producer on a world scale 
behind China, India the USA, Nigeria and Indonesia. Its share in world 
production however was more than halved between 1970 and 2000, from 5.5% 
of world production to 2.3%. 
It is a general feeling under Senegalese producers that European agricultural 
policies need to be restructured. This holds for the problems Senegalese 
producers are confronted with when European products are ‘dumped’ on the 
Senegalese market (see below), but also with regard to the access for Senegalese 
(African) products to the European market. Access of agricultural products might 
be without problem ‘off-season’, but they are directly confronted with high 
tariffs at moments that European products are harvested and brought onto the 
market. Senegalese tomatoes (and Moroccan beans) are quoted as examples. 
Phyto-sanitary regulations are a second problem here. The EU-regulation of 
aflatoxin is quoted as the main example here. The EU regulation allows for much 
lower levels of aflatoxin than the Codex Alimentarius. It has been argued that 
maximum levels set in the Codex stem from a deliberate legislative process of 
weighing by international health experts in the FAO and WHO, while European 
levels were set as an average of levels set by the Member States.15 These higher 
levels cause serious problems for producers of nuts, groundnuts and dried fruits. 
In the legislative process the EU did not take did not take their interests into 
account, not in terms of what are reasonable maximum levels, neither in granting 
developing countries a transitional period. Senegal, as an important producer of 
ground nuts, is one of the victims. Of course reducing aflatoxin levels is a matter 
of training and improvement of agricultural practices of Senegalese farmers, but 
changes in these practices, as has been concluded in the quoted study on this 
case, take time and a huge effort of extension services. It is suggested that the 
EU could have been more complaisant. The introduction of the new phyto-
sanitary regulation by the General Food Law coming into force from January 
2006 show the same lacunae as those observed in the aflatoxin case. 
Imports 
There are a series of imports stemming from Europe which are said to be 
incoherent with European policies. The two main incoherencies indicated are: 1 
that import hamper or even destroy local Senegalese production; 2. that some 
imports are bad for the environmental conditions in Senegal. In both cases NGOs 
and employers federation state that the Senegalese government has not the will 
or the power to regulate these imports better. It is said to be under pressure of 
WTO trade-rules or that it does not want to complicate relations with the EU and 
thus not is able or wants to counteract on these imports. 
To the first type of imports belong in particular imports of agricultural 
products. Some stem from Asia. The liberalisation of the world market also for 
food products makes competition with rice imports from Asian countries very 
difficult for producers in the Fleuve region. Import surges from Europe, in 
15 I.Moonen (2004:6 and Chapter 4). 
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particular from the Netherlands, most recently have created serious problems for 
Senegalese producers. They were reported not only by some NGOs but also in 
the Senegalese newspapers. Most strongly brought forward is the case of chicken 
legs. Other cases appearing in the local press in Senegal are onions and potatoes. 
Other products quoted, but not sustained with case material, are milk powder and 
wheat. 
In the 1990s food imports in Senegal more than tripled.16 One of the main 
reasons is said to be the general reduction of import tariffs by the successive 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes. Tariffs on poultry meat 
imports were thus in several steps lowered from 55% to 20%. The Senegalese 
government requested the WTO for a waiver to maintain a system of reference 
prices for a series of 20 food products, including poultry and milk powder. This 
request was partly granted. While imports of poultry meat were negligible at the 
mid 1990s they grew to more than 11,000 tonnes in 2003,17 mainly consisting of 
frozen cuts (legs) from the Netherlands (about two thirds) and Belgium. At the 
same time local production declined. Imports thus grew from only 1% of local 
consumption to 19% in 2002, according to the FAO statistics. A similar pattern 
can be established with the imports of milk powder (from France), but here local 
production remained fairly stable. Producer organisations indicate that 70% of 
broiler farms around the urban areas have closed and that the sector is in a crisis. 
A spokesman of the Ministry of Agriculture reports a production decline of 30%. 
Up to mid-2003 small export restitutions were given by the EU on about a third 
of the total volume exported in the last seven years. The Senegal case, together 
with similar cases from West-Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ivory 
Coast) served as an example in a campaign of French and Belgium NGOs under 
the title ‘L’Europe plume l’Afrique’. 
Similar problems are reported on onions and potato imports. Imports of onions 
have surged to 30.000 tonnes in the last years, 50% more than in 2002. In 
principle Senegal is self sufficient with a production of 100,000 tonnes and a 
consumption of 70,000 tonnes. Post-harvest losses however are rather high. 
Imports of potatoes have increased to more than 10.000 tonnes. In the case of 
potatoes local production stagnated and there were also problems with 
conservation. Urban consumers in these cases seem to prefer the quality of 
imported potatoes and onions, because prices of these are reported to be 25% to 
50% higher than those of local products, according to the season.18 Recent 
reports indicate that local products show a better resistance to foreign imports. 
The second incoherence is addressing the import of second hand cars and 
computers. Total imports of second hand cars were around 24.000 a year 
16 FAO, Committee on Commodity Problems, Impact of import surges: country case study results. 
Rome, April 2004. See also: Agir Ici a.o., Exportations de poulets: l’Europe plume l’Afrique, Paris 
2004. Sufa International, Impact des importations de volailles en Afrique de l’Ouest. Bruxelles : 
InfoSud, Avril 2004. It should be indicated also that Senegal doesn’t seem to be self sufficient in 
poultry production at the moment. 
17 According to the FAO study it was 16,600 tonnes. Other figures indicate 11,950 tonnes in 2003. 
This last figure seems more reliable, looking at the national production of about 25,000 tonnes in 
2003. 
18 Pomme de terre et oignon locaux snobés au profit des importations. Le Soleil, 1er mars 2003 ; 
L’oignon fait pleurer les producteurs. Le Quotidien, 7 juillet 2004 ; Campagne horticole 2003 : les 
importations menacent la production locale, Le Soleil, 8 mars 2003 ; Echos des marchés : La pomme 
de terre et l’ oignon locaux résistent aux importations, Le Soleil, 3 juillet 2004. 
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between 2000 and 2004. A decline has been reported in 2004, due to new 
legislation on imports.19 Senegalese NGOs indicate that these imports create 
enormous environmental problems in particular in Dakar. They see it as dumping 
of European of European garbage in African countries. The Senegalese 
government is preparing a law which should stop the import of second hand cars 
that are more than five years old, but at the other side these imports are 
generating quite some custom revenues for the Senegalese government. Custom 
revenues on second hand cars were estimated at more than a quarter of total 
customs income of the Senegalese government in the first three years of the new 
millennium.20 
Fisheries 
‘The Fisheries Agreement is a commercial agreement and those who state that it 
isn’t, is not honest’, is a statement one can hear from fisheries officials in Dakar: 
‘Europe has bought itself access to Senegalese fishing waters for its vessels’. 
They also stress that there is a total incoherence between the agreement and its 
goals at the one side, and the goals of conservation of fishing resources and of 
development at the other side. Senegal has limited possibilities to control foreign 
vessels. Even the money that the EU offers in return for the access is seen as a 
danger, since the Ministry of Fisheries now had to fight with the Ministry of 
Finance for every penny to develop the sector and for conservation. It is then 
easy to conclude, stresses a spokesmen from the Ministry that there is a total 
incoherence between the official discourse and the practice.  
The situation in the Senegalese fisheries is very complex. To describe it as a 
competition between Senegalese artisanal fishermen and modern Spanish 
vessels, as is sometimes done, is a clear simplification. There are several actors 
involved and a series of species that are not all overexploited. Its is important to 
keep in mind that one out of 6 active Senegalese tries to earn his money in 
fisheries. 
The demand from Europe is growing not only for the noble species, but also 
for other fish to be reproduced into fish meal and to be integrated into cattle feed.  
All this is said to create heavy pressure on the Senegalese resources. All 
Senegalese actors indicate that it should be the central goal of Senegalese 
fisheries policy to enlarge the added value and to have landings and 
transformation to take place in Senegal as much as possible. 
The export conditions for the Senegalese fisheries are rather difficult. The 
Senegalese position in the international competition is not very strong, since 
production costs are high, due to the high level of employment and low per 
capita production. 600.000 people work in the fisheries sector. Production costs 
are also high because, the Senegalese banks are not fit to finance this sector and 
thus are loans expensive. Interest rates are high and high bank guarantees are 
needed to get finance. Furthermore prices of electricity and water make it 
difficult for the Senegalese fisheries to compete. Also in this sector there is a 
general feeling that Senegal has much to loose with the institution of an EPA. 
19 Les importations des ‘venants’ tamisées par la nouvelle réglementation : de 1500 à 300 voitures par 
moi. Le Soleil, 23 juin 2004. 
20 Le Quotidien, 8 April 2003. 
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Now Senegal is in the advantage, since Asian producer have to pay a 24% 
customs tax and Senegal nil. It is afraid of loosing this advantage. 
Phyto-sanitary regulations present another problem. European regulations are 
rather strict, but clear. They are not tested under the conditions of a tropic 
country though. Beside that the way the regulations are put into practice in the 
Member States might differ quite substantially. Member states should comply 
with the norms and standards of Brussels is the general feeling. The European 
Commission itself does not have a control bureau in Senegal. France is quoted to 
have supported projects in this sector to make it easier to comply with norms and 
standards. 
The negotiations on a new agreement in 2001-2002 were depicted as ‘very 
tough’. Nine rounds of negotiations were necessary to come to an agreement. 
The EU started the negotiations by demanding a 60% increase in tonnage 
compared with the former agreement. The Senegalese from their side wanted a 
reduction in tonnage and fishing zones and no fishing rights for European vessels 
for some socially sensitive (sardinelles) or overexploited species. Other sensitive 
issues in the negotiations were technical matters as duration of the licences, 
fishing gear, biological rest periods, boarding of fishermen and controllers, and 
fishing zones. The negotiations were blocked during six months over Senegalese 
propositions to change the fishing zones. For the first time Civil Society 
organisations as organisations of fishermen and of the fish industry took part in 
the negotiations. This strengthened the negotiating position of the Senegalese, 
forced the EU to several concessions and led to an agreement on several 
technical matters. But in the last negotiation round as well the negotiator of the 
Ministry of Fisheries was substituted and the Civil Society organisations were 
not welcome anymore. There are suggestions that the EU forced the Senegalese 
government to change negotiators, as happened later, in 2004, also in the 
negotiations with Mauritania.  
The agreement was finally signed in June 2002 for the period July 2003 until 
30 June 2006. It gives 68 European vessels, of which 45 tuna trawlers, the right 
to fish in Senegalese waters. Additionally some 84.000 tonnes per year of 
demersal species could be fished, of which a small part should be landed in 
Senegalese ports. Compensation paid for the agreements amount to 16 million 
per year (from € 12 million in the former agreement). This was far less than what 
Senegal originally demanded. € 3 million of that amount is reserved for special 
activities to foster sustainable fisheries (€ 500,000), for security in artisanal 
fisheries (€ 500,000), for research (€ 500,000) and for inspection and control (€ 
700,000).21 
Criticisms on the agreement focus on four aspects. The first is that the 
compensation that the EU pays is only for a small part reserved (€ 3 million) in 
the fisheries sector in research and training. The ‘décaissement’ of these projects 
is very slow, because there are rather strict rules on counterpart funds. The 
Ministry of Finance is said to use the existence of these special funds to curtail 
the Ministry of Fisheries  organisation complain that two years after the signing 
of the agreement the Senegalese government did not start any project yet for the 
development of the fisheries sector. Several organisations indicate that the 
Senegalese government lacks a strategy for the development of the sector. 
21 Règlement (CE) No. 2323/2002, Journal Officiel des Communautés européennes, 349/4, 24 
Décembre 2002. 
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Organisations of fishermen and industrialists indicate that in their opinion a 
major part of the compensation that the EU pays, should be invested in the 
fisheries sector. The EU does finance also, together with the French AFD, the 
project PAPA Sud which is meant to promote a better quality of fish products. 
The second point of critique is that the agreement also gives access to fishing 
grounds and species which are overexploited, like most wanted species as the 
thiof. These are species which are of interest in particular for Senegalese 
fishermen and are in majority exported to France to be consumed by African 
immigrants. Access to the coastal zone for European vessels is thus seen as 
incoherent with European development cooperation policy but also with those of 
sustainable fisheries. These zones should have been left for artisanal fisheries to 
have these more involved in the export game. 
The so-called ‘compagnies mixtes’ are seen also as a way to transfer 
overcapacity in Europe to a developing country. But the situation is complex 
here also, since it are not alone European ship-owners which create this type of 
companies. Also some Koreans are reported to be involved, in particular in the 
‘bateaux de rammassage’, which go out with a number of pirogues on their deck 
to fish also in Mauritanian waters. 
In general, by all Senegalese actors, the fishing agreement is seen as a 
commercial agreement, with little to no comprehension for the sustainability of 
Senegalese fisheries or for development goals. It is indicated however that the 
‘pauses biologique’ in September and October in the Senegalese case are well 
defined, but at the same time people interviewed pointed at the Mauritania 
Agreement in which after quite some pressure from the European side the 
biological rest period is October and November, with the effect that European 
vessels can stay in the region to fish. It should be noted that the biological rest 
period in the former agreement was only optional. The more general comment 
here is that it is still very difficult for Senegal, with its limited technical 
capabilities,22 to control European  (and other third countries’) vessels. 
The general conclusion then is that the European Commission is forced by the 
European Parliament which follows this dossier quite closely, to use a ‘langue du 
bois’, when it present the fisheries agreements. The Commission promotes them 
as ‘partnership agreements’ while in effect and on basis of a closer analysis they 
are purely commercial and negotiated in an intransigent way. 
Conclusions 
Policy coherence is a relative new concept both in political science as well as in 
the formulation and implementation) policy itself. It is defined in this article as 
‘the non-occurrence of policies or the results of policies that are contrary to the 
objectives of a given policy’. You don’t need to be a visionary or utopianist 
thinker23 to assess that there are many causes for incoherencies to exist. One of 
the most important ones is that the interests of important producer groups or 
consumers are at stake and that these have a heavier weight in the formulation 
and implementation of policies then the interests of producers in developing 
countries. 
22 It is said that there is only one plain for surveillance, but that this is not functioning. 
23 As van Naerssen (2006) depicts Mao Zedong: a visionary thinker and merciless leader. 
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In Morocco incoherencies that were presented by the respondents dealt in 
particular with external coherence issues. Incoherencies that were put forward in 
most obstinate form were in the fields of migration, market access and fisheries. 
In its relations with the EEC/EU Morocco has in the last 48 years been a victim 
of a lack of complementarity in production structures with Southern European 
member states. Morocco had to try to get access for a series of the same products 
(citrus fruits, vegetables, textiles and clothing) for which old and new member 
states were looking for protection in Brussels. From this perspective European 
policies vis-à-vis Southern Mediterranean countries like Morocco and Tunisia 
have not been very coherent giving priority first to member states’ interest at cost 
of old trade links and the development of these with Morocco and Tunisia. 
In particular Europe’s agricultural policies did hamper the development of the 
agricultural sector in Morocco, giving all the chances to citrus production in 
Spain, not leaving any space for Morocco’s production to develop and extend its 
export. Since Morocco stayed most of the time in the midst of Europe’s trade 
preferences pyramid, clearly behind the ACP countries, the EU was also not very 
coherent in its own stated goals with regard to Article 138 of the Treaty of 
Rome, safeguarding old trade relationships, neither to its regularly stated 
objectives of creating a zone of peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean.  
Fisheries is one of the most sensitive dossiers in the European-Morocco 
relationship. The Moroccan side sees a clear incoherence here between the stated 
objectives of Europe’s Mediterranean policy and the way the EU gave preference 
to Spanish interests. A second hotly debated theme is immigration. It is generally 
felt in Morocco that the EU connects immigration too much with security and 
ignores the development issues that are at stake also. 
In Senegal respondents put forward a mix of Internal and External coherence 
issues. Again fisheries and migration issues, but also ‘calendar incoherence’ 
(long time delays) and problems with dumping of agricultural produce. The 
Senegalese fisheries sector is very complex with a large number of actors on the 
stage. The depletion of fisheries resources, of some species, is clearly at stake. 
Since Senegal is one of the few African states with a huge fishermen population 
and an important position of fish in the daily diet, the EU should not have 
allowed – an in this sense its policy is incoherent - that under the Fisheries 
Agreement European ships again got access to fishing grounds close to the coast. 
Senegalese producers clearly suffer from import surges of agricultural 
products from Europe, leftovers of a ‘spoilt’ market and dumped in Africa. Most 
cited examples are onions, potatoes, and chicken legs. The latter are sold in 
Dakar’s supermarkets in plastic bags, frozen without any specification of country 
of origin and limit of consumption dates. If the EU at the same time tends to 
foster agricultural development in Senegal, its policies could be considered as 
incoherent when it subsidizes these exports in direct or indirect ways. 
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The geopolitisation of natural resources in 
an era of global transition - the EU 
response 
Cor van Beuningen 
Introduction 
The world map is being overhauled. The new scarcities of raw materials, energy 
and food have direct consequences for the relative position of countries on the 
economic as well as the geopolitical world map. This conflict ridden process 
adds up to the ongoing global transition process from a unipolar to a multipolar 
world. If not properly managed, these two interacting processes will be 
accompanied by and generate large scale scarcities, poverty, climate disaster and 
destruction of biosphere; as well as strife and conflict between competing power 
blocks. A spiral of distrust is threatening global viability. What is the EU 
response? 
New scarcities and power shifts 
Shifts in the economic domain do not fail to have their impact on international 
relations. Political leaders in energy rich countries such as Russia and Venezuela 
show a renewed self confidence, both internally and on the international scene. 
Inversely, the governments of the countries that depend on others for their 
supplies of energy or food are increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities involved, 
and they set energy and food security high on their agenda. Subsequently, their 
policy intentions – such as a substantial increase of renewable energy – are 
reflected in the prices on the different markets. Biofuels compete with food for 
scarce resources, cross-integrating both markets at the global level. Increasingly, 
public concerns about climate change and loss of biodiversity are making 
themselves felt in the economic and political landscape as well. 
Strategic commodities – connecting market and power 
What is really new, though, is the sudden realization – after two decades in 
which the liberalization paradigm reigned supreme - that energy, water and food 
(EWF) are not just commodities, of which supply, demand and pricing are mere 
data to politicians. Of course, they effectively are commodities, traded on 
markets which are more and more globally integrated. But they are much more 
than that. EWF have become strategic commodities, perceived by states as 
crucial to national interests, security and sovereignty and thus deserving their 
direct monitoring and intervention: national energy and food security. At the 
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international level, they are assets in negotiations, power relations, alliances and 
conflicts: re. the scramble for resources, blood for oil, the energy weapon, the 
food weapon. The conduct of states is increasingly influenced by the access to 
and control over those commodities, and by the ongoing shifts in the structure of 
prices and incomes. The current price increases may well continue for some time 
to come, before settling at new, high levels. On the demand side new parties such 
as China and India are swiftly developing, while the supply side is hampered by 
a number of structural limitations. Energy and food are peculiar commodities, 
the production and supply of which will follow price changes only with a certain 
delay. Fossil energy sources are not inexhaustible, and the increase of energy and 
food production is bound by natural, physical and climatic constraints. At the 
same time, EWF are peculiar commodities in the sense that they satisfy primary 
needs and that as such they are irreplaceable. Increased scarcity has an 
immediate and eventually disastrous impact on the life of persons – first of all, of 
those with limited purchasing power - and of societies. 
In fact, these peculiar features of EWF have since long been recognized by 
politicians and states, that have treated them as strategic goods that deserve their 
close attention. This political definition of EWF, i.e. beyond their strictly 
economic definition as commodities, was unquestioned well into the 20th 
century. It is evident, for example, in the 1957 Treaty of Rome (establishing 
what was to become the European Union), and the CAP - Common Agricultural 
Policy,  with its stated objective to secure food supply at reasonable prices, next 
to increasing agricultural productivity and ensuring a fair living standard for the 
farmers. In a similar way, the supply of energy and water at reasonable prices 
was the responsibility of state owned public utility enterprises in most countries.  
Neoliberal depolitisation 
Only towards the end of the 80’s this state of affairs began to be questioned, 
triggering a broad trend of liberalisation of the markets for energy and water and 
privatisation of public enterprise. As for food, its political definition (i.e. in terms 
of food security) was first questioned in the context of the Uruguay round of the 
GATT (later: WTO) of 1986. Subsequently, the CAP was stripped of its initial 
focus, i.e. to secure food supply at EU level, and it was reduced to income 
support to farmers; not anymore in their function of food suppliers, but 
motivated by social and environmental considerations. As with energy and 
water, food supply was left to the globalizing market, where the invisible hand 
was supposed to optimize allocation and innovation, thus securing the best 
outcome for both consumers (lower prices) and society as a whole. Government 
could withdraw to a role of overseer, with the specific task of securing open 
market conditions and a level playing field, intervening only in case of obvious 
market failure. In short, during the 90’s EWF lost their political definition and 
became to be seen as commodities like any other one.  
Strategic and green repolitisations 
Of course, this shift of policy paradigm was never uncontested. But a real 
challenge to neoliberalism only built up in the last couple of years. A number of 
major power cuts in the US and the UK raised the question whether energy 
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supply could be left to profit driven market forces. The climate debate increased 
the urgency of the energy transition (from fossil to renewable) and raised the 
question whether this revolution was in the right hands with oil and energy 
multinationals. In the energy market, already flawed with oligopolistic 
imperfections, new parties made their appearance, with the peculiar feature of 
being state owned and controlled: Gazprom, Petro China, Petrobras, Venezuelan 
PDVSA… The US led war in oil rich Iraq; Putin and his political use of the 
supply of gas to neighbouring and other countries; China’s way to procure 
energy and raw materials in African countries; Chávez’ petrocheques for friends 
in Latin America and elsewhere – facts like these further triggered politicians all 
over the world to reframe energy again as an issue of state interest, in terms both 
of supply security and of international power correlations.  
The efforts of energy poor states to reduce their dependency on outside 
sources of fossil energy are gaining momentum now that they converge with 
policies to increase the use of biofuels as a response to international agreements 
to reduce CO2 and check global warming. The strategically motivated 
repolitisation is fused with the green repolitisation and it is increasingly difficult 
to disentangle the two policy discourses in actual political practice. In turn, these 
new policies themselves reshape the markets for fossil energy and for biofuels, 
as well as for competing soil based / agricultural products such as food. Its 
impact is felt amongst both consumers and producers, creating new social and 
political facts (cf. the corn belt boom in the Mid West and the tortilla crisis in 
Mexico). In short, what we are witnessing is a fundamental (re-)politicisation of 
energy cum food issues, propelled by both geopolitical and green purposes; and 
this, both at the domestic, regional and global level. 
Complexity and policy dilemmas 
At the present conjuncture, EWF are the object of both depolitising and 
repolitising policy discourse. This explains the current atmosphere of 
misunderstanding and avoidance in the policy arenas. On the one hand, free 
marketeers are struggling with the remnants of governmental interventionism, 
left over from a period marked by nationalism, welfare statism and 
protectionism. These remnants are to be removed as soon as possible, as they 
generate inefficiencies, higher consumer prices, suboptimal allocation and 
hampered innovation. On the other hand, a variety of policymakers - strategic, 
nationalist, leftist and green - insist on the pitfalls and risks of short sighted 
neoliberalism and reintroduce a number of political policy definitions.  
Scarcities, the emerging world system and the EU  
The EU is heavily dependent on outside supply of energy: 76% of its oil and 
49% of its gas is imported, and these figures are expected to further increase – as 
a matter of fact, to 94 and 81%, respectively, in 2030. Energy security declaredly 
has become a priority issue in the EU foreign policy, and intense activity is 
deployed, ranging from policy papers to treaties and agreements with a number 
of third countries (See European Commission 1996, 2006, 2007). The core of the 
EU external policy on energy is the promotion of rules-based behaviour on open 
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markets (i.e. a perfect extension of its constitutive internal policy). This involves 
doing away with obstacles to the well functioning of the market, such as lack of 
transparency, corruption, monopolies and cartels, as well as with physical 
impediments, promoting the interconnectedness of energy systems; while other 
rules refer to legal frameworks, the promotion of foreign investment in the 
energy sector and to safety and environment considerations. 
A contested policy paradigm 
In reality, however, it is precisely in the energy sector that EU policy making is 
encountering major obstacles, both internally and externally, as well as 
opposition, both from within and from outside. The internal energy market is far 
from being completed, neither physically (interconnections) nor policy wise, and 
de facto various member states obstruct  the opening up of energy markets, 
especially with regard to the ‘unbundling’ of production/transport and 
distribution, and to free foreign investment in, and the ownership of energy 
companies (energy nationalism).  
Externally, a unified EU policy is effectively undermined by the fact that 
member states prefer to further their own energy security interests through 
bilateral deals with supplier third countries. On the other end, those same third 
countries are very hesitant or even outright refuse to incorporate the EU rules 
package in their agreements: the cases of Russia, Algeria, the Middle East 
countries. 
In the face of those obstacles, the EU policy paradigm itself has become the 
object of second thoughts and outright criticism by policymakers from member 
states as well as from inside the EU bureaucracy. The policy paradigm is 
considered to be unworkable and ineffective, because it is both politically 
idealistic and geopolitically naïve. In fact, alternative policy proposals have been 
brought forward, which follow these two – diverging – points of critique. 
Politically idealistic; so the first alternative proposal is to depoliticise the EU 
external energy policy, in the sense of disconnecting simple commercial 
transaction (the buying and selling of oil or gas) from difficult talk on 
democracy, good governance or human rights: i.e. a plea for economic ‘realism’. 
Geopolitically naïve; thus the second alternative proposal is to effectively 
geopolitise the EU external energy policy, in the sense of approaching the energy 
issue as set within the framework of international power relations, and in this 
way respond in kind, directly and unequivocally to the geopolitical definition of 
energy as practised by the major producing and consuming countries. This is a 
plea for geopolitical ‘realism’ and for an EU that is self-consciously playing the 
geopolitical power game in the global arena.   
No choice 
So the EU policy paradigm – i.e. rules based market liberalisation, a combination 
of market and governance principles - risks to be overtaken and made obsolete 
by actual developments both from within and from outside. In fact, the EU is 
confronted with the fact that this paradigm (nothing less than its own constitutive 
paradigm) presupposes a certain amount of trust between all concerned parties; 
and where and when this trust is absent, its proposal will not ‘work’ but be 
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perceived as naïve and unviable. This of course is just another illustration of the 
problem connected to collective action: trust is needed for parties to refrain from 
individual degrees of freedom now, for a better outcome for all in the future. In 
the absence of trust, parties are left with negotiation or conflict, with the market 
or the battlefield; with either economic or geopolitical realism.  
But the EU has no choice but to stick to its original proposal, and clearly 
should reject both alternative proposals. The first one, short sighted economic 
‘realism’, because it implies mayor risks of instability and disruption both of 
their energy supply and of the economy. Energy can not anymore simply be left 
to the market, in the face of the complexities of the energy transition and of the 
scarcities-related political and geopolitical vulnerabilities in a period of 
fundamental transition in the world order. The second proposal, geopolitical 
‘realism’, is even riskier, as it reinforces tendencies that are already generating 
increasing instability and the disruption of the world system as a whole. It is hard 
to see how the geopolitical power game would ever more produce a peaceful, 
viable and rules based international order, encompassing a functioning global 
market and a functioning energy system. 
If not through short sighted ‘realism’, how then connect policy wise the energy 
issue to the actual developments in international and geopolitical relations? How 
to understand and process the geopolitisation of the energy issue and its 
implications for EU policy making? 
Geopolitisation of the energy issue and its implications for EU policy making 
The geopolitisation of energy – and of other scarce natural resources, food and 
water - is to be understood as the product of two coinciding developments. On 
the one hand, there is the rather sudden imbalance between the sharply 
increasing demand for, and the only slowly responding supply of, these essential 
but peculiar commodities, giving way not only to steeply rising prices but also to 
political sense-making in terms of power and national (in-)security. On the other 
hand, these scarcities are produced in a quite peculiar period of world history; 
i.e. one that is marked by the transition of the world order, from a unipolar 
system as we have known it since 1989, to a multipolar system. The unipolar 
world was ideologically dominated by  western liberalism, and geopolitically by 
the US as the only one superpower. This period is now believed to be closing to 
an end, but the features of the situation to come are not yet clear. The 
geopolitisation of natural resource scarcities is to be understood in the context of 
this transition process; in turn, those geopolitised scarcities influence this same 
transition process from uni- to multipolarity with regard both to its rhythm and 
its direction.  
The new world system  
Regarding the new world system, there is a growing consensus among 
researchers about its economic features. In about ten years time, the world 
economy will be dominated by three mayor blocks, China, the US and the EU, 
each one accounting for 15 - 20% of the Gross World Product, followed by India 
with about 10% and Japan, Brazil and Russia each with 5%. 
210 
Now, the big question is of course how this new economic configuration will 
be processed in the ideo-political domain; that is to say, how the present and 
future political actors will react to and manage the complex process of change 
and re-accommodation at the global level. Will they be willing and able to 
facilitate a peaceful transition to a viable and sustainable new world system, or 
are we in for a prolonged period of rivalry and conflict? To illustrate the point, 
we might refer to Mark Leonards interesting thesis according to which four 
political blocks are presently evolving and already competing for supremacy 
(Leonard, 2007). Those blocks are, one, the US and two, the EU. The difference 
between the two is that while the US rely on a ‘realist’ security approach and a 
balance-of-power order, the EU would favour a rule based international order 
and an effective multilateral system with well functioning international 
institutions. The third block then would be composed of the autocratic axis 
China-Russia, two countries that put much emphasis on national identity and 
sovereignty but which share with the EU the option for a rule based international 
order – perceived in their case as a protective device against Western 
domination. The fourth block would be the Islamzone, stretching from Morocco 
to Indonesia, not bound by democratic procedures nor eventually by international 
institutions.  
Such a scenario, of evolving and competing geopolitical blocks, might well be 
an extremely bleak one, first of all because it might go along with the 
strengthening of nationalist and militarist tendencies, including eventually the 
massive use of energy, food and/or water as weapons; producing, if not outright 
military conflict, a world wide economic recession, shortages of energy, food 
and water, and the spread of poverty and hunger. And secondly: in an 
atmosphere of generalized and spiralling distrust, the solution of the present time 
world problems – problems which typically presuppose collective action in order 
to be tackled with any chance of success: climate change, loss of biodiversity, 
security and poverty – will be illusionary. 
EU: soft power for the good 
Such is the context and the challenge for the design of a EU policy for energy- 
and food security. All efforts should be directed now to divert the ongoing 
process of combined geopolitical block formation and polarization; but instead, 
to facilitate a peaceful transition to a viable and sustainable new world system, 
necessarily multipolar by nature, and one in which the different actors feel 
recognized in their existence and in their legitimate interests, generating and 
fostering a broad willingness to accommodate, negotiate and participate, and 
eventually commit themselves to a rule based order and functioning international 
institutions. This is, of course, the proper and original EU model, and in order to 
promote it, the EU should act and behave consistently as the champion of 
multilateralism, of international rules, order, institutions and cooperation. The 
EU is to be the force for the good, and it should be willing to go as far as it takes 
in denying to accept the power and polarisation game, in generating and 
fostering trust although this implies increasing its own vulnerability, in 
convincing and connecting, in applying soft power only. It cannot behave 
otherwise, if only because the fate of Europe – and its security and prosperity, 
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including energy and food security – is dependent upon a viable international 
order and world system. 
The EU - Latin America partnership and alliance 
In this perspective, the first partner for Europe in this enterprise – and one that 
could prove to be of invaluable importance – should be Latin America. For too 
long now, Latin America has been the big absentee in the EU foreign policy. The 
continent possesses almost one third of the world’s fresh water, favourable 
physical conditions for the production of food and biofuels, the most important 
oil reserves outside the Middle East, gas, copper, iron – you name it. These 
assets will not only be important for the economic development of the LA 
countries and – eventually – the EU. They will also be crucial in addressing and 
solving some of the global problems of our times: energy and food security, 
climate change and biodiversity, and poverty reduction. But most importantly, 
LA shares with the EU its preference for multilateralism, for a rule based 
international order and institutions. On a more profound level, Europeans and 
Latin Americans share a common set of beliefs and convictions regarding how 
we should live together and what kind of society we really should strive for, both 
at the national and at the global level. It is easy to recognize the real existence of 
such a shared value base, as soon as we compare it with Chinese, Slavic or even 
Anglosaxon basic beliefs. Surprisingly however, Latin Americans seem to be 
much more aware of this fact than Europeans. Also, to Latin Americans, the 
strong historical and cultural ties that connect the two are much more alive. From 
their side, there is still a very real interest to develop a partnership and alliance 
that goes much deeper than the rather sterile negotiation ritual of the EU-LA 
summits. What is required is dialogue, mutual trust, the will to invest in a 
durable partnership and in an alliance for the good on the world scene. The 
issues that used to frustrate the Latin Americans – the agricultural protection and 
the fact that the Europeans are partners with the US on this crucial issue in the 
WTO, the migration issue, the way Spain is enabled to use the EU to further its 
own interests in Latin America – should be dealt with immediately, as a sign 
announcing a new era in the relationship. Both sides should be working within 
an integrated framework that gives due weight to the interests of each partner as 
well as to the pursuit of common purposes. Thus, energy policy should be made 
part of a framework that incorporates security and defence, food production and 
poverty reduction, economic and commercial relations, and political and 
institutional cooperation. 
Latin America: energy and distrust   
This new partnership/alliance between LA and Europe might also be 
instrumental in addressing a number of problems that LA societies are currently 
facing. These problems have been given different names: bad governance, young 
democracies, fragile states, or better fragile societies. The bottom line is that LA 
societies suffer from a growing lack of public trust; and that distrust is gaining 
the upper hand in the relationships between groups, between citizens and their 
government, as well as between the nations on the continent. Of course, this 
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problem is not new, and it is not exclusive to LA; but it is becoming more 
serious. Where distrust is spreading, social unrest will block economic growth. 
Nationalism and militarism will frustrate development and fruitful regional 
cooperation, and protectionism will come in the place of profitable exchange on 
open markets. And where distrust is spreading, the common effort to address the 
shared challenges of our times: energy and food security, climate change and 
biodiversity, and poverty reduction, will turn into a hopeless enterprise. The 
logic of distrust and confrontation is a spiralling process, one that is self feeding 
and self propelling. 
Problems related to spreading distrust and inflammable societies threaten to 
interfere with a rational and fruitful use of the rich natural resources of the 
continent - for growth and development, and for the fruitful integration of LA 
economies and societies in the world community. In stead, energetic resources 
are used as an asset in a spiralling process of distrust, of hegemonic power and 
conflict. And when distrust comes to dominate the relationships, the vicious 
circle of distrust – when left to its own - will end up producing widespread 
energy scarcity on the one hand, and conflict and war on the other hand. Let us 
illustrate the point with a few concrete cases, taken from LA reality in the last 
couple of months (second semester of 2007). 
One. Last June, July, in the southern winter, Santiago was confronted with 
power cuts and with heavy air pollution. Its power plants received only a small 
fraction of the gas that it has contracted with Argentina, so they had to return to 
expensive imported diesel and coal. Argentina itself had a shortage of gas, 
receiving only a fraction of the gas that it has contracted with Bolivia. So it had 
to buy expensive electricity in Brazil, and it had to subsidize the owners of gas 
driven cars to compensate for the price differential with gasoline, in order to save 
gas needed for residential heating. The gas shortages also seriously affected 
Brazil, especially its industrial zone and power plants in Sao Paulo and Rio. 
Chile, Argentina and Brazil are currently building gasification plants, to import 
and process LNG that is much more expensive than the gas from Bolivia.  
All these problems are being caused by the fact that Bolivia is not able to fulfil 
its contractual obligations for the delivery of gas to Argentina and Brazil. The 
reason behind this is, that since three years now, no investments have been made 
in exploration and exploitation. Foreign investors and companies are very 
cautious to invest because of the political situation in the country. In October, the 
Bolivian Minister of Energy made a trip to Miami, Washington and Brasilia, 
trying to attract new investments, but he met with a lot of distrust. Now, finally it 
seems that Brazilian Petrobras will come to rescue and invest in a mixed 
enterprise for the exploration and exploitation of gas. Petrobras felt that it was 
the principal victim of Evo Morales so-called nationalisation, so they were 
reluctant to deal with Bolivia; but Petrobras itself is under heavy pressure to 
deliver gas to Rio and Sao Paolo. But also, there was political pressure, through 
the intervention of Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula’s principal political advisor on 
external relations. His motive is a geopolitical one: not leave Bolivian gas to the 
PDVSA, that is to Chavez’ mercy.  
Second case. on gas in Bolivian society. Gas is a hot issue in Bolivia for some 
years already. Former president Sánchez de Lozada’s plan to sell gas to Mexico 
and the US (involving eventually Chile) produced a popular uprising that led to 
his retreat and flight from the country. The present crisis in the country is, again, 
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related to the control and distribution of gas revenues between central 
government and the opposition concentrated in the regions where the gas is 
produced. In Bolivia, gas has become the fuel for a spiralling process of distrust 
and conflict. Gas, that should be an essential asset for the development of the 
poorest country of the continent, is setting the country on fire. 
Three, on energy nationalism and regional confrontation. In November, Lula 
proudly let the world know that Brazil had found huge reserves of oil and gas, in 
the deep sea in front of Rio. It should be clear by now, he said, that God is 
Brazilian, referring to the Brazilian wealth of natural resources.  
Just a few days later, Lula announced a 50% increase in the defence budget for 
the acquisition of new weaponry in 2008 and following years. Already in 2008, 5 
billion dollar will be spent on this item. Brazil, Lula said, is the happy owner of 
fresh water, of energy, minerals and food, and those are exactly the things that 
the world now is in great need of; so we have to be able to protect ourselves and 
these valuable assets. In that same week, the magazine Veja published the results 
of a survey conducted among high army officials: it turns out that almost two-
thirds of them consider that an armed conflict with neighbouring Venezuela and 
Bolivia is very well possible. In the past two years, as a matter of fact, Venezuela 
has bought Russian armaments for more than 4,5 billion dollar. The point here is 
not, of course, to picture Brazil as a warlike country, as it would probably be the 
last one on the continent that is interested in promoting instability; but Brazil’s 
behaviour might be seen as expressive for a sense of alertness that is spreading 
all over the continent.  
Four, more on regional hegemony. In the first week of August, Lula and 
Chávez both made a trip to a number of LA countries. Lula visited Mexico, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Jamaica. In Mexico he promoted an 
agreement between Pemex and Petrobras for the deep sea oil exploration and 
exploitation in the Gulf of Mexico; an idea, by the way, that was heavily 
criticised by opposition leader Lopez Obrador who warned for the sell out of 
national interests. Lula’s other mission in Central America was to promote 
partnerships for the production of ethanol and biodiesel, or, in his own words, ‘to 
promote a world market of clean, cheap and renewable fuels, and to diversify the 
energy mix, generate new jobs, democratize the access to energy sources’. Of 
course, Brazil is in need of CA partners because these countries have free access 
to the US market, while the Brazilians pay a tariff of 54 cents per gallon of 
ethanol.  
Chávez for his part visited Argentina (where he signed a contract to build a 
LNG plant), Uruguay (where he signed a treaty on energy security), Ecuador 
(where he committed to invest 5 billion dollars in a new refinery in Manabí) and 
Bolivia (establishing a new mixed enterprise, starting with an investment of 600 
mi in new explorations). 
Quite a spectacle: two leaders simultaneously on an energy tour through the 
continent! 
While the Brazilians are very careful not to address any matter of competition 
for regional leadership let alone confrontation with Chávez, Chávez himself is 
not so shy. According to Chavez this is however not a dispute on continental 
leadership but a confrontation of different energetic models. Venezuela promotes 
regional integration on the basis of sharing petroleum and gas, while Brazil is 
fighting for a model based on agrofuels, similar to the model that is promoted by 
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the US. Indeed, Bush made a biofuel trip in LA in March, after signing a 
cooperation agreement with Brazil on the production and commercialisation of 
biofuels, in January 2007. The Brazilians of course hope that this cooperation 
eventually might lead to the lifting of the US import tariff on ethanol; which 
would involve a significant geopolitical re-alignment in the Western hemisphere. 
To sum up: 
Latin America  is to occupy a prominent place on the new world map. 
• Energy and politics are intricately intertwined, both in the EU and in LA and 
elsewhere. 
• The energy issue threatens to disrupt integration and development processes 
both in the EU and in LA 
• A solid EU-LA partnership, covering topics such as energy, biofuels and 
food; institutional development and regional integration; and technology and 
scientific research, will be of great benefit to both continents  
• At the same time, there is an urgent need for a EU-LA alliance on the global 
scene, marked by the geopolitisation of the new scarcities (the redefinition of 
energy and food commodities in terms of national security and strategic 
power) and the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.  
• Together, the EU and LA should act as the force for the good. They may 
divert the ongoing process of geopolitical block formation and polarization, 
and act and behave consistently as the champions of multilateralism, of 
international rules and institutions. 
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Walking the middle path: contested 
democracy in Thailand 
Luuk Knippenberg en Saskia van Bruchem 
 
Despotism then, which is at all times dangerous, is more particularly to be feared in 
democratic ages. The legislators of America did not suppose that a general 
representation of the whole nation would suffice to ward off a disorder at once so 
natural to the frame of democratic society, and so fatal. They thought that it would 
be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory. The plan was a wise 
one (Tocqueville, 1835). 
Preamble 
Ton van Naerssen and I (LK) share a passionate interest for South-East Asia. In 
1998, we published an article about the causes and consequences of the Asian 
crisis. The impact of that crisis was huge: financially, economically and socially, 
and politically. This article is about some of those political consequences, i.e. its 
effect on the democracy in Thailand.  
Good soldiers never lie: good governance or democracy. 
Thailand has a constitution since 1932. This constitution stipulated that the 
country formally is a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy. This introduction 
of parliamentary rule, however, also signalized the start of a long period of 
military coups. Since 1932 Thailand has had more (semi)-military governments 
than democratic ones. The economic boom of the mid eighties seemed to change 
this. The democratic forces gained power. The aftermath of the military coup of 
1992 showed that the military were no longer able to run a fast developing 
country. They had to resign. Thailand entered a period of democratic rule, based 
on a revised, very democratic constitution. This development was welcomed by 
everyone, including parts of the military and the monarchy. Then Thailand was 
hit by the severe economic crisis of 1997 (see Naerssen, 1998). The crisis 
tempered the economic and political optimism. It unveiled serious flaws in the 
governance structure of Thailand, and forced the government to give all its 
attention to economic and financial issues, whereas boosting the new frail 
democracy should have been its main focus.  
In 2001 a populist leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, won out of the blue a landslide 
victory on the promise that he would overcome the consequences of the crisis. 
He introduced a Keynesian economic reform program, partly based on the policy 
to transfer from money from the city to the countryside. This program was 
successful, especially for people living in the countryside. The social problems 
caused by the crisis of 1997, problems that first and for all hit the poor living on 
the countryside, or retuned to their home village because they had lost their jobs, 
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were mitigated and even partly resolved. But Thaksin did not restrict himself to 
economic reforms; he also used his popularity and position to amass more and 
more political power and eliminate his political competitors.  
In 2005 Thaksin was re-elected. His party gained an absolute majority, a unique 
event in Thai history. His reelection was, however, not undisputed, especially in 
the capital, Bangkok. Protesters against and in support of him flocked the streets. 
In September 2006 his regime was toppled by a military coup, the 11th successful 
one since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932.  
The military who staged the coup declared that it had become necessary to 
oust the government of Thaksin because of the disproportional corruption of him 
and his cronies, and his undemocratic behaviour. Both arguments are weak.   
The allegation of disproportional corruption and cronyism could be made and 
has been made against almost every administration, military of civilian, in 
Thailand, since the end of the absolute kingship in 1932. See for instance (Anek, 
1992; Baker, 2005; Callahan, 2005; Chai-anan, 1997; Handley, 1997; K. 
Hewison, 1981, , 1989a; K. e. Hewison, 1997; Knippenberg, 1998, 2003; Likhit, 
1973; Olle, 1983; Pasuk Phongpaichit, 1995; Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996; 
Prudhisan, 1992; Suehiro, 1989; Sungsidh, 1983; Suthy, 1982; Thitinan, 1999). 
This implies that this allegation probably is fake and invalid as long as the real 
underlying cause is not addresses, i.e. the reason why every Thai government can 
be accused of being corrupt. But there also is an even more fundamental 
objection. Corruption can never be an argument to topple a chosen government, 
and replace it by a non-chosen one. A non-chosen administration is by definition 
less transparent and accountable than the worst democratic one. It is predestined 
to create favourism, nepotism, plutocracy, and as a result corruption. This is 
inevitable in all situations where controllers themselves are not controlled. 
The other argument of the Thai military for toppling the elected government of 
Thaksin, the argument that they did this to safeguard democracy, is even 
stranger. It resembles the reasoning of that military commander who was pleaded 
that he had to demolish the village he was supposed to protect, in order to defend 
it. Even downright abuse is in a democracy no viable reason to overthrown a 
regime. There is no possible democratic argument to do this. The idea that it is 
defendable to topple a democratic government by non-democratic means, can by 
definition only be based on a non-democratic notion of good-governance, i.e. the 
conviction that democracy is just means to a higher, non-democratic, idea of 
political justness. From a democratic perspective this viewpoint is illegal and 
immoral. In a democracy content and procedure are completely and irresolvable 
interlinked. In a democracy there is no pre-given or definitive definition of the 
morally good, except for the basic-premise that the people as a whole of a given 
society have to decide that in permanent interaction and debate with each other, 
on the basis of given democratic principles and thresholds. Content and 
procedure refer to each other. They jointly define what is good, to what extent, 
and under what circumstances, and for how long. In a democracy the question of 
what is politically just and fair is a matter of permanent debate. The answer 
differs according to the circumstances, the wishes of the people, the possibilities, 
etc. There is in short no middle path between democracy and any other form of 
political governance. You are either a total democrat or you are no democrat at 
all (Robert A. Dahl, 1989; R.A. Dahl, 1998; Rawls, 1971; Schumpeter, 1942).  
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But that is not the whole problem. Opting for a non-democratic interpretation 
of political fairness and good governance generates a very tricky problem. You 
have to define what (political) fairness is and what a good society is. For this you 
need criteria. But in order to that you already need criteria to select these criteria, 
or to select persons to select these criteria. In other words you already need a 
solid conception of what is fair from the start on, but that notion is always 
randomly selected and questionable. This is an insolvable problem. You are in 
the middle of a Catch-22 situation.  In a democracy this problem does not exist 
(See also (Kuflik, 1984; Rawls, 1971, , 1993). 
The implication of the above reasoning is that the people who staged the recent 
coup in Thailand either had a vision on supra-democratic vision on political 
fairness or no interest whatsoever for political fairness, whatever their arguments 
were.  
Let’s for a start suppose the first. The aim of the Thai military, so they said, 
was to repair flaws in the existing democratic procedures and the existing 
constitution. After that was done, new elections would be held, and the army 
would withdraw into their military barracks. The by the military appointed 
government was only a temporary one, a caretaker.  
The problem with this reasoning is not only that it was unconstitutional it was 
also contradictory. The military defined political rightness in democratic terms, 
and in notions that refer back to the ‘wellbeing of the people’. However, only the 
people themselves can define and decide what their wellbeing is. This makes it 
also a democratic notion. All the arguments of the Thai military to topple the 
elected government of Thaksin and suspend the democracy are in the end based 
on democratic arguments. The military stalled democracy for the sake of 
democracy. A strange line of reasoning, even stranger if one realizes that this is 
completely unacceptable in a democracy. All types on non-democratic 
intervention in a democratic process are prohibited. The stagers of the coups 
must have known this. So, what extra political valid argument could they have 
had?  
Was there perhaps an immediate threat that the country was disintegrating? 
There was indeed political turmoil, but such a danger was not imminent. At least, 
there is no prove, or even a plausible indication. In that case Thaksin could not 
have got such an overwhelming majority, at least without forging the whole 
election process, which he did not do. Besides, notwithstanding this majority, 
Thaksin accepted to write out new elections and stepped down. Whether or not 
he did this totally out of his own choice, or with a hidden strategy to come back 
later, is of no importance. He did this, which is even more than he had to do. 
What even more imminent thread could there be? Were the perhaps signs that 
Thaksin was planning to change to constitutional fundaments of the Thai state? 
If so, the first remark would be that this was in principle his legitimate right, as 
long as he did it according to the procedures laid down in the Constitution. There 
are, however, some extra remarks to be made. What was the worst path Thaksin 
could take; if we postulate – which is not the same as knowing - that he had that 
intention?  
Let us discuss some Dutch examples to go into this, and explain why a Dutch 
government cannot and will not put through certain constitutional reforms, even 
if the legal possibilities are there. No Dutch government will remove the 
constitutional article that guarantees the freedom of organisation and speech. 
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Doing that would be the same as destroying the constitution itself, and the 
underlying fundament on which that constitution, indeed every constitution, is 
build. A Dutch government also never will try to abolish the monarchy, at least 
in the foreseeable future. There is a constitutional rationale behind this, but that 
is not the main reason. The monarchy still is for the overwhelming majority of 
the Dutch an integral part and of their identity and that of their society and 
country. It is an untouchable symbol.  
Monarchy and democracy are a strange combination. The founding fathers of 
the Dutch constitution understood hat the only way to combine the two was to 
shield the democracy from interventions of the monarchy and to protect the 
monarchy against democratic erosion by strengthening its symbolic function. 
They had a clear insight in the problems generated by their efforts to combine 
democracy and monarchy, problems that could simultaneously damage the 
monarchy, the democracy, and the cohesion of the society.  
Democracy is based on the need and possibility to disagree, oppose and 
criticise, and the possibility to elect and to vote down political leaders. A 
monarch who is involved in democratic politics will become an object of debate 
and opposition. This will undermine the possibility of the monarchy to function 
as a neutral national symbol. But it can also easily harm the democratic process, 
and in the end even destabilise the country. A monarch cannot be voted down, 
nor would many people accept that. A political active monarchy will, in a 
democratic setting, damage itself or undermine the democracy. That is the why 
the Dutch constitutionalists did everything they could to keep the Dutch 
monarchy aloof from politics, as well legally as practically.  
In Thailand, the role of the monarchy a symbol and fundament of society is 
perhaps even more essential than in The Netherlands. It is unthinkable that any 
Thai politician would even consider changing that. It is beyond his capabilities 
and interests. This was also true for Prime Minister Thaksin. If there is some 
truth in the accusation, that he was planning to diminish the role of the 
monarchy, than this could only refer to possible efforts to reduce the political 
and economical influence of the monarchy. This implies that the monarchy was 
in fact involved in daily politics. Non-involvement would protect it adequately 
against the assaults of any politician, regardless of his intentions or power. No 
politician would dare to undertake any action against the symbol of the nation, 
nor would he in fact have any reason for it.  
Trying to take on a political active monarch is a dangerous venture, even for a 
very powerful politician. Protecting a politically active king against this kind of 
attacks is, however, even more dangerous, although it may appear easier. The 
only way to achieve this in a democracy is to discredit elected politicians or stall 
democracy. This solution solves nothing; on the contrary, it generates new even 
deeper problems. The allegations against the politicians have to be false, for a 
monarch should in fact not be politically active in a democracy, whereas stalling 
the democracy in order to rescue a constitutional monarchy is the same as killing 
the patient to cure him; moreover, it compromises the monarchy, legally and 
morally.  
This implies that all the legal and moral arguments of the stagers of the coup 
were flawed. It is highly unlikely that the military intervened for the sake of 
good governance or democracy. Perhaps they did it to protect the monarchy or to 
be more precise a certain influence of the monarchy, because the monarchy as 
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such needed no protection. That would be an understandable reason, but a 
defective one, and also one that had to be concealed 
The above-mentioned defects are so obvious and far reaching that it seems 
highly improbable that the stagers of the coup and their advisors did not signalize 
them. That is even more disturbing. It means that the coup probably was not 
staged out of moral or legal reasons. They perhaps only were used as a cover-up. 
The real reasons must be sought elsewhere, such as the aspiration to protect or 
expand certain particular interests and power positions.  
Good soldiers never try: democracy as good governance 
There is nothing strange about this line of reasoning. Power struggles between 
and within factions about power and income have marked the history of 
Thailand, since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, and even long before 
that time. Since the study of Riggs (Riggs, 1966), who depicted Thailand of the 
1950s as a country ruled by self-appointed bureaucrats, only accountable to 
themselves and permanently mixed up in internal struggles, students of Thai 
political history are used to see politics in Thailand as a kind of permanent power 
struggle. The main players are high-ranking bureaucrats, the military, the 
monarchy, the police force, and from the 1970s onwards, Bangkok based big 
business, provincial strongmen, and politicians. Those politicians often came out 
of the ranks of above-mentioned groups, or were financed, supported or 
appointed by them. Politics in Thailand is a struggle to get control over and 
access to the most rewarding fruits of the economic growth. That ambition also 
forms the cement that keeps political parties together. A successful political 
leader guarantees his party members access to economic resources. Ideology and 
political programs are not important. A leader who fails to deliver loses his 
support. His party can even dissolve overnight or move over to more promising 
competitor.  
This is the reason why normally every Thai administration is based on a 
coalition of several parties, organised around strong leaders. It is also the reason 
why corruption is so pervasive. There are simply too many competing groups, 
competing for the same positions. That is also the reason why everybody was so 
alarmed when the party of Thaksin won an absolute majority. The fact that was 
able to attract and bind so many politicians, voters and businessmen seemed to 
imply that he was on the brink of controlling everything and everybody.  
This implies that the coup against Thaksin perhaps just was staged to break the 
power of Thaksin and protect the interest of some or more of the above-
mentioned groups. There are, however, some reasons to doubt this. 
In 1991, the Thai army also staged a coup. This coup, at first broadly 
welcomed, especially by parts of the Bangkok middle classes, ended as a 
nightmare for the military. They ware visibly no longer able to rule the country, 
and had to resign. After that period, the army lost much of its influence and 
access to the economic resources. They did not seem to care.  
The military probably did not stage a coup to protect and strengthen their own 
interests. They already had lost most of their economic influence, certainly since 
the coup of 1991which had made it very clear that were no longer able to run the 
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country. Already in the 1980s the Thai economy and society had become far to 
complex to be controlled by the military (Knippenberg, 2003).  
The coup also was not staged for the sake of the rural poor; in the old time the 
main supporters of military rule. The rural poor now supported Thaksin. He had 
done far more for them more than any previous administration. Nor was a 
request of certain influential Bangkok based businessmen the rationale behind 
the coup -based business?  
The relationship between the corporate sector and the Thai military never has 
been warm, and many of the big businessmen had rallied around Thaksin.  
This leaves us with only one plausible explanation. The coup was ordered by 
acting or high ranking retired military commanders who thought that the stability 
of the nation was or could become in danger, not so much because of political 
turmoil, which could be easily controlled without staging a coup, but because of 
in their eyes unacceptable political reforms of Thaksin, or just the other way 
around, because necessary political changes could in their eyes not take place 
without disturbing the national stability as long as Thaksin was in charge.  
The last reason is the most probable one. The present king of Thailand rules 
more than sixty years. His succession is imminent but at the same time very 
problematic. His person and position is as undisputed as the person and position 
of the heir to the thrown is disputed. The succession has to be carefully 
orchestrated, preferably in period without political turmoil and without the 
possibility for overactive strong politicians to manipulate the process.  
This brings us back to our first line of reasoning. It implies that the military 
staged the coup for the sake of a principle, for what they believed to be a just 
cause. Believing in the justness of a case, does, however, not imply that the 
cause is just, or that an alleged just cause justifies the means. There is no way to 
stage and defend a coup in contemporary Thailand, even the grounds that it is 
only a temporary measure to rescue the democracy. That is why we again and 
again hear the same allegations, see the same solutions, and witness the same 
failures. The stagers of coups have no constitutionally or legally defendable 
arguments. They have to use pseudo arguments, or more precisely arguments 
that only partly touch the real reasons and causes. Moreover, they have to spend 
a lot of their time after the coup to cover up the fact that they know this, and that 
they know that that everybody else knows this. The misfortune of it all is that 
democracy does not work well in Thailand, also a fact know by everyone. But it 
is a problem that cannot be solved by coups or other autocratic measures.  
The real underlying tragedy, however, is that the stagers of the coup had an 
extra, in theory defendable cause, one that is as important for the functioning of 
Thai society, as democracy, i.e. safeguarding (the future) of the monarchy. The 
only problem is that this cause and the underlying arguments cannot be put 
forward, without destroying precisely that what is to be protected, as already 
explained above, by referring to The Netherlands. 
But, the main, and in fact really disturbing factor is that the only valuable 
solution, also mentioned in that example, i.e. reducing the political role of the 
monarchy, cannot realised in Thailand, even if the will is there. There is not 
enough time, the democratic preconditions are lacking, and it is even taboo to 
talk about it.  
It is yet another Catch-22 situation. There is no way to guarantee and 
legitimize good government in Thailand outside a democratic setting. The is true 
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because of the already mentioned reasons, and because a non-democratic form of 
good governance will always compromise the monarchy, in one way or another, 
and in the end start to undermine it. But democracy, as it functions in Thailand, 
has the tendency to undercut good governance and even its own functioning. 
There is also no way to repair this destitution by autocratic means, and no 
solution to be found in an appeal to the good will and intentions of politicians.  
Good citizens always act: civil society and democracy 
It is a stalemate, but not one that cannot by broken. The solution has not be 
sought in the stalling, redrafting or restricting of the existing democracy, but 
exactly in the opposite direction, in strengthening and enlarging democracy by 
strengthening citizenship and civil society. A democracy without a functioning 
and blossoming civil society is bound to end in despotism, as De Tocqueville 
already made clear, a long time ago (Tocqueville, 1835). Democracy requires 
permanent involvement of the citizens of a state, but that is only possible if they 
have the possibilities, awareness and will to do this.  
Those possibilities have to be created by the government. The first step is to 
decentralise the government where possible, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, i.e. the idea that governmental matters should be handled by the 
lowest competent authority, and if possible the citizens themselves. Citizens 
have to be empowered to organise themselves, take decisions, and undertake 
action wherever this serves their interests, does not undermine the higher public 
good, or blocks the possibilities of other citizens to do the same. In other words: 
citizens have to be enabled do all those things themselves which they can best or 
better do themselves, individually and collective.  
This is, however, up to a certain extent, another Catch-22 situation. Central 
governments will only create the needed conditions after strong societal pressure. 
But this pressure is often absent in societies with a strong central, authoritarian 
government, whereas in states with a weak government both the possibilities and 
the pressure often are lacking. It is also not very probable that local politicians 
will be inclined to support this process. They often are the linking pins between 
local interests and the central government. It is not in their interest to empower 
the people they represent.  
The best solution is to start at the other end, and foster awareness and will 
amongst the citizens. This starts with the presence of a middle class. The middle 
class is seen as the backbone of society, economically, socially, politically, and 
ideologically, and the main buttress of democracy. But it is also a very 
heterogeneous category. Members of the middle class are inclined, educated and 
even permanently informed to see themselves as individuals, as persons who can 
and have to make free choices and create their own future. But precisely those 
reasons predispose them to overlook the fact that in reality their freedom of 
choice is rather moderate. The mutual competition is to strong, if only because of 
the presence of so many ‘equals’, i.e. people in the same position who think and 
act the same and want the same things or positions. Their real strength, at least 
politically, rests not in their individual capability but in the fact that there are 
with so many, equally looking for the same things. But that it is a potential they 
neglect, often even deliberately. Members of the middle class are so busy with 
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their own life and so focussed on their own business, and so possessed by the 
idea that this attitude is best guarantee for sucess that they are inclined to transfer 
this attitude to the political domain. This easily engenders indifference for supra-
personal issues. This kind of public apathy easily creates room for populism and 
even despotism, as De Tocqueville and Hannah Arendt already made clear 
(Arendt, 1958, , 1972; Tocqueville, 1835).  
This problem is perhaps even more urgent in societies that only recently have 
become rich and where the middle class is a new phenomenon. But this is no 
longer true for Thailand. Its middle class is neither that new nor that small. 
Thailand no longer is a bureaucratic polity. There is no hidden conspiracy to 
keep the majority of the people poor and powerless, although the powerful and 
the rich have a lot of space to do as they please It is the middle class that fails to 
take its political responsibility, and develop a real functioning countervailing 
power, more in special their intellectual vanguard.  
Someone has to clarify to them what they have to do to have a functioning 
democracy, what they have to gain by taking part and to loose by just minding 
their own business. Someone has to elucidate hat good political solutions never 
come from above or originate spontaneously. They need a joint and permanent 
dedication of all layers of society in an ongoing process of trial and error, based 
on permanent discussion and reflexion, within a political framework that rests on 
a balance of powers. There are no given, no quick and no perfect solutions. That 
is what democracy is about and that is where its real strength lays. Procedure and 
content go hand in hand. Every effort to break this up -for instance to speed 
things up- will destroy the whole and everything in it (Dahl, 1989, 1998). 
Democracy is debate, about the right and the plight to disagree about ideas and 
solutions, between equals on an equal basis, and within certain limits, with as 
most important ones: no physical violence, no military coups and no 
democratically unaccountable political leaders. 
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Associationalist regionalism: from 
‘powers of association’ to ‘associations of 
power’ 
Bas Hendrikx and Arnoud Lagendijk 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s there has been an important shift in thinking about territorial 
governance. This involved both a move away from technical, hierarchical modes 
of government towards more open and participatory forms of decision-making 
(governance), and a rethinking of multi-level governance contexts in general. In 
response to (global) economic, technological, political and intellectual 
challenges, policy-makers in the western world therefore increasingly turned to a 
previously underexposed level of territorial governance: the region. Being 
attuned to the level of daily socio-economic interaction, regions would be better 
able to achieve the twin goals of economic competitiveness and socio-political 
cohesion than the traditional governance frameworks dominated by the central 
state (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Keating, 1998; Keating, 2001; Storper, 1997). 
Within this new current of thought, two general trends of ‘new regionalism’ can 
be distinguished. 
First there are the attempts of national states to scale up their economic and 
political authority through the development of multi-lateral systems of 
cooperation and coordination. Structures such as the EU economic zone, the 
NAFTA and Mercosur are examples of these. The second strand of ‘new 
regionalism’, which is perhaps more dominant in the western world (MacLeod, 
2001), aims at the development of regional governance structures at the sub-
national scale. By decentralising political decision making processes to regional 
agencies, policy makers aim to achieve more flexible structures of governance 
that can design and deliver policies better attuned to local circumstances. 
In this chapter we explore the development of regional governance structures 
of the latter sort. We are particularly interested in the rhetorical and discursive 
grounds that are at the basis of these new regionalist strategies. What claims are 
made and how do such claims affect the actual practices and performances of 
regional governance institutions? Building on the idea that the region has 
become an overloaded concept to which too many (often conflicting) tasks and 
goals are ascribed, we will discuss the limitations of associational approaches. 
Employing a discursive exploration of new regionalist practices and a brief 
empirical analysis of the multi-level governance framework in the Netherlands, 
we will illustrate that tensions between the substantive and political grounds for 
regional governance are severely hampering the performance of regions in multi-
level frameworks. 
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Associationalist regionalism: substantive and political claims for 
regional governance 
Over the last decades, a myriad of extolling theoretical accounts, broad 
observations and political laudations has emerged in favour of regional 
governance. Alongside this, a great number of policy initiatives has been 
launched to try out new forms of regional governance and to learn and circulate 
the ‘lessons’ drawn from policy innovation. Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) 
speak of the development of a ‘regional development industry’ in this context, a 
mushrooming of development agencies, technology transfer centres, consultancy 
companies and research centres focusing on improving the competitive positions 
of regions through new forms of (regional) governance. In line with Thrift’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘cultural circuits of capitalism’ (Thrift, 1999; Thrift, 
2005), Lagendijk and Cornford explore what could perhaps be best labelled as 
the cultural circuits of regionalism - an important discursive apparatus of 
academics, consultants, EU officials and policy makers that engages in the 
circulation of regional governance concepts, discourses and practices across 
Europe. The impact of this discursive apparatus on the field of regional 
governance practices is considerable. Blending theoretical ideas with success 
stories of regional development, these circuits of regionalism bring concepts and 
‘stylised facts’ such as ‘innovative milieus’, ‘clusters’ and ‘learning regions’ into 
the field. Through ‘endless presentations and representations in seminars, 
conferences and publications’, together with many practical applications and try-
outs, such concepts and discourses have circulated widely and have influenced 
the working and setting up of a wide array of regional governance practices 
across Europe (Lagendijk, 2005; Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). Generally 
speaking, regional governance is favoured on two grounds. First, there is the 
substantive case for regional governance where the region is described as the 
most apt level of governance to address spatial-environmental problems in a 
common governance framework. Second, there are the political claims 
(organisational-administrative) for regional governance, providing a means to 
facilitate a shift from government to governance. Both strands will now be 
discussed in more detail. 
The substantive case for regional governance 
The region plays an important role in discussions about the ways to approach 
substantive policy problems and goals. It features here as a more flexible scale of 
governance that is better able to confront problems arising from external trends, 
such as globalisation and growing global economic competition, and is believed 
to be a more appropriate site for policy coordination and collaboration. A wide 
variety of arguments and narratives on the substantive tasks and roles of regional 
governance circulates through policy making circuits and many of them are 
influencing regional governance practices across the world.  Sorting the core 
claims from strong to more modest, the following summary emerges: 
Political: Regions are endowed with political significance in scalar accounts 
on political power and competencies and accounts of ‘destatisation’ (Jessop, 
2004). In such accounts, economic globalisation and the enhanced mobility of 
capital produce selective processes of (induced) ‘hollowing out’ and (intentional) 
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devolution. The result is a shift in power from the national towards the sub-
national level, as well as to other governance arenas such as the market and 
associational structures. In a positive sense, regions feature here because, they 
are pictured as the nexuses of interdependencies between state and non-state 
bodies that come up with novel, potentially radical, solutions and models 
sustaining regional performance (cf. Storper). In a more negative sense, regions 
are considered suitable places to carry the brunt of globalisation in terms of 
coping with rising social inequality and deprivation, ecological problems and the 
urgency of providing and maintaining a well-oiled, and hence competitive, 
infrastructure (e.g. high-profile business estates, luxury housing and amenities, 
modern consumption spaces, congestion-free transit and global connections) 
Economic: Close in line with the political story, regions are presented as 
economic powerhouses, partially or largely substituting for the significance of 
national economies, due to a shifting basis of economic competitiveness. As the 
story goes, in the past, macro stability, basic infrastructures (e.g. education) and 
major state projects (and ‘national champions’) were key; now it is the relational 
synergy between spatially concentrated and embedded networks of businesses 
and knowledge organisations that is seen as the key to wealth (Keating 2001). 
The latter is fostered, moreover, by the specialisation of the local labour market 
and the educational sector that, together with economic specialisation, supports 
the development of particular regional clusters. 
Policy-making: The latter role also draws on a notion of the region as an 
‘integral’ site of policy making and customisation. A crucial shortcoming of 
what is considered as the old-style, technocratic and centralised policy making is 
sectoral and territorial fragmentation. Together with other spatial levels, notably 
the neighbourhood and the municipality, the region is thus considered as a 
suitable site for developing area-based policies, that, through integrating multiple 
sectorally defined fields of policy in an encompassing spatial framework can 
deliver more effectively in a way more in tune with local needs and conditions 
(Herrschel and Newman, 2002). 
Territorial collaboration: Yet, picturing the region as a site of policy 
integration is not only a response to the alleged shortcomings of fragmentation 
between top-down sectoral policies. It is also seen as a solution for another form 
of territorial fragmentation, namely that between adjacent municipalities. In the 
most basic form, regionalisation can stem from the need for (or simply the 
benefits arising from) the co-ordination of services such as health, police, 
education et cetera. Another problem is that of inter-municipal rivalry, which, 
especially in larger city-regional areas, often presents serious bottlenecks for 
addressing local problems and shaping strategic policies. To address these 
problems, the municipalities involved, often assisted by the central state, embark 
on processes of shaping regional forms of governance that, in a negotiated style, 
produce shared views and common solutions. 
The political case for regional governance 
Regional governance also features as a response to debates on political decision-
making and representation. Recent moves from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, 
and, in this wake, from technical to participatory forms of policy-making, can be 
seen as manifestations of a dominant transformation in political and policy 
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processes. Was the past, in broad terms, characterised by top-down, technocratic 
and sequential modes of decision making and policy implementation, over the 
last decades we have witnessed the rise of more inclusive and recursive models 
that aim at balancing bottom-up initiative and responsibility and top down 
facilitation, monitoring, and the provision of knowledge exchange (Bruszt, 
2005). Subsequently, it is a small step from such a move towards inclusiveness 
and participation towards the interest in the sub-national level as a key arena of 
policy-making and even political initiative. Healey’s work on collaborative 
planning, for instance, portrays the region as a core level to forge inclusive 
networks to promote broad engagement and the infusion of new ideas. After a 
period of strong top-down national control, the growth in co-operation between 
regional authorities, professional organisations and civil society groups is seen as 
an expression of a move towards bottom-up, participative forms governance and 
hence from technocracy to democracy (Herrschel and Newman, 2002). 
Regions, according to Keating (1998), should thus be interpreted as nexuses of 
interchanges, involving government and civil society. Regions function as 
meeting places and systems of action, but they also present the basis for the 
shaping of identity and political mobilisation. As ‘social constructs of a relational 
nature’ (Gualini, 2001:7), they are “a meeting place and an arena for 
negotiation of functional and territorial systems of action, in economics, society 
and politics” (Keating, 1998:184). Through such dynamics they acquire a more 
stable and recognised institutional shape. The consequence is that regions 
increasingly have to compete with national and other levels of government not 
only for resources but also: “in the provision of solution of policy problems” 
(Keating, 1998:185). 
The latter conclusion bears directly on a second issue, that of legitimacy. In 
addition to policy change in a substantive sense, regions in a multi-level 
governance setting are to provide a response to what is conceived as a major 
governance gap, namely that between systems of representation and actual 
processes of decision making (Heinze and Schmid, 1994; Herrschel and 
Newman, 2002; Keating, 1998). Regions are thought to close this gap by 
building two bridges, namely between different state levels and between state 
and non-state actors. The EU, in particular, has embraced regional governance as 
part of a wider set of multi-level governance strategies to promote the 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability of its actions. From this perspective, 
participatory approaches at the regional level can serve to enhance the legitimacy 
of policy actions that have a national or international scope. Especially 
interesting in this respect are the way the ‘bottom-up’ cross-border initiatives of 
the EU are part of the European project of territorial integration and cohesion. 
At the national level, issues of legitimacy often stem from problems local and 
national authorities face when trying to develop and implement major 
infrastructural projects. It is no coincidence that regional governance structures 
often stem from the need to find support, both amongst state and non-state 
actors, for major transport investments and business estates (Jensen and 
Richardson, 2004; Vigar et al., 2000) Regions as part of a wider multi-level 
governance framework then serve to find an appropriate structure for wheeling 
and dealing between the various agents and scales, in such a way that sufficient 
levels of resources and commitment can be mobilised to carry on particular 
projects. However, as many cases show (e.g. Horan and Jonas, 1998), such 
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models do not always manage to stem the problems of political fragmentation 
and territorial conflicts. On the contrary, the search for administrative fixes 
always turns out to be illusive. While new forms of governance are able to 
address certain issues more efficiently and effectively, they also create new 
tensions and conflicts. In other words, whatever the ‘logic’ followed, governance 
remains deeply political. There are no simple administrative fixes for complex 
social, economic and spatial problems. 
Irritatingly Full? 
One can take the discussion one step further. As shown above, various 
‘functional’ logics serve to ascribe regions with many virtues. However, regions 
are not outcomes of these logics; they result from political projects and ambitions 
that employ these logics, although they generally fail to endow regions with clear 
cut objectives and mandates. The leading imaginary of the region is one of a 
synergetic powerhouse that is economically, socially, environmentally, 
politically, democratically and spatially rewarding. But taking it all together, the 
region appears as over-determined and ‘irritatingly full’ (Miggelbrink, 2002). In 
reality the narratives, notably in the action they imply, are fraught with tensions 
and ambiguities. As an example, the political account of regions against 
globalisation inspired Amin and Thrift (1995) to call for nurturing “powers of 
association” that present “an attempt to set up networks of small firms and 
intermediate institutions that can act as a counter to the power of the networks of 
large corporations and dominant institutions”. The more policy-oriented 
perspectives, on the other hand, present an image of horizontal and vertical 
collaboration, based on a more consensual notion of the overall (economic, 
social, environmental) aims of regional development. Where they see 
oppositions to address, it is more in the area of administrative competencies and 
‘petty’ rivalry between adjacent territories and scales than in the struggle against 
the ‘forces of capitalism’. 
Partly in response to these tensions, state actors and policy-makers have turned 
to approaches that present the local/regional as a kind of learning ‘laboratory’ for 
developing joined-up solutions, within a broader (inter)national setting 
producing overall aims and conditions, facilitation, monitoring and learning (cf. 
Gualini, 2004). This translates into a policy learning ecology that, through cycles 
of variation and selection, may overcome the problem of mono-cropping that 
characterises many fields of policy-making. According to critical voices, for 
instance, the field of regional development policy is replete with ‘boilerplate 
approaches’ that even frequently succeed in repeating previously failed 
approaches (Storper and Scott, 1995). Such configurations can be found in 
national policy programmes in which the development and implementation of 
area-based policies is guided by interregional or national ‘centres/networks of 
expertise’.  
An interesting question is now to what extent such an ‘irritatingly full’ region 
can meet the promise of moving from ‘old’ top-down, technocratic and 
sequential modes of decision making and policy implementation. On the one 
hand, these configurations can be labelled as ‘non hierarchical’ in the sense that 
they have generally more scope for offering bottom-up and novel perspectives 
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with the potential of uprooting mainstream notions and practices of policy-
making, at least at the local/regional level. In the words of Bruszt (2005:4), 
regions are thus presented “as sites of institutional experimentation to counter 
deficiencies of the defunct hierarchical steering of development and correct 
market failures.” On the other hand, the central level (national or international) 
continues to set the broader conditions of local action and, most significantly, the 
lessons and consequences drawn from that. In the end, state action will always be 
strategically selective in what is facilitated and what is reproduced (Jessop). This 
raises, once more, the issue of legitimacy and democratic support. Are regions 
indeed sites of governance that acquire legitimacy and power through 
associationalist practices? Or is it the way certain associative discourses are 
employed, through the powers-that-be, that counts? 
Responding, in particular, to the policy challenges arising in the late 1980s and 
1990s, the so-called ‘New Regionalist’ literature shifted from a critical political-
economy perspective to a ‘softer’ institutionalist approach (MacLeod, 2001). 
Building, in a relational manner, ‘institutional capacity’, regions could nourish 
‘associational modes of economic organisation’ that would sustain, in turn, a 
region’s competitive and innovative capacity (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Storper 
(1997), in his elaboration of the notion of a ‘Regional World’ that acts and 
interacts on the basis of locally embedded ‘conventions’, emphasises the crucial 
role of talk between regional agents to shape regional political and economic 
strength. Yet, such attempts to move to more constructive and developmental 
perspectives on the region have not really managed to address the issue of 
fullness. Also the broader literature appears to be lacking in this respect. Rather 
than critically examining, conceptually and empirically, how the different stories 
fit together in concrete cases of region formation, the literature tends to focus on 
advocating overarching concepts that, in different configurations, selectively 
draw on the regionalist narratives. For instance, planning oriented accounts tend 
to take the economic and political accounts as ‘received wisdom’, employing 
these to inform and support conceptualisation of strategic regional governance 
(Healey et al., 1997). Economically oriented accounts, on the other hand, often 
invoke relatively simple notions of spatial governance to elaborate notions of 
spatially embedded ‘collective learning’ and systematic innovation. Detailed 
empirical work, furthermore, is often lacking in theoretical reflection, often 
rather simply presenting a case as an endorsement of the wonders of 
associational practices. Below, we will assess these issues by exploring 
associationalist regionalism in the Netherlands, first in a broader historical 
context, and then focusing on more specific recent developments. 
Associationalist regionalism in practice: the case of regional 
governance in the Netherlands 
Since the early 1800s the Dutch governance system has been dominated by the 
central state. The lower level authorities (the provinces, water boards and 
municipalities) are endowed with competences devolved to them by the central 
state. At first sight, the provinces are the closest thing to a regional government 
in the Netherlands, but their role in the Dutch multi-level governance system 
remains limited (Hulst, 2005). Moreover, the province mainly acts as an 
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intermediary agent between the central state and local government and has little 
power on itself (Vries, 2008; Peters, 2007). Until recently (the early 1990s) no 
other powerful body of regional governance existed in the Netherlands. 
Although some developments go back to the early 1900s, claims for regional 
governance have really become more pressing in Dutch policy-making circuits 
from the 1970s onwards. It was believed that a system of regional governance 
would provide better and more flexible means for integral-strategic intervention, 
regional cooperation and territorial governance than the traditional state-
province-municipality framework (ROB, 2003; Hulst, 2005). A specific claim 
put forward drew on policy discourses on territorial collaboration (see Hulst, 
2005). Because of the weak mandate of the Dutch provinces, cooperation and 
coordination between municipalities to address problems and issues of supra-
local scale proved to be extremely difficult. The main reason was that the 
provinces simply lacked the power or the interest to overrule individual 
municipalities. As a result, municipalities often let their individual interests 
prevail over the regional interest, often leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ between 
municipalities. So, instead of bolstering benefits from regional cooperation, the 
competition between individual municipalities actually hampered regional 
development on the whole (see for instance Gualini, 2007:304; VNG and 
Pröpper, 2008). 
However, these pressures did not directly lead to institutional change. There 
would be no significant changes in the Dutch governance framework until the 
mid-1980s (Hulst, 2005). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many municipalities 
therefore decided to build upon the existing institutional infrastructure to develop 
ways to cooperate regionally. The most important legal context was provided by 
the Joint Provisions Act (WGR) of the early 1950s, which was enacted to 
stimulate and regulate territorial collaboration amongst municipalities. Inspired 
by discourses on territorial collaboration -that stressed the importance of 
achieving higher levels of efficiency through functional cooperation- 
municipalities set up a wide variety of regional, single-purpose agencies aimed at 
coordinating and integrating different public services regionally. This often 
involved functional cooperation between municipalities in the field of collective 
waste disposal, fire fighting, disaster contingency plans, ambulance services et 
cetera. 
The concept proved to be popular and in the mid-1980s a heterogeneous and 
scattered patchwork of over 1500 regional, single purpose agencies existed in the 
Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005). At one moment there were even more 
regional collaborative arrangements than municipalities in the Netherlands! This 
created problems in terms of policy-coordination and transparency. Different 
single purpose agencies in the same area had different definitions of the region 
and its boundaries, and the wide variety of different agencies active in the same 
area created an almost chaotic institutional environment. This heavily 
complicated the synchronisation and coordination of regional policy, leading to 
many conflicts, tensions and inefficiencies (Geelhoed, 2002). These problems 
demanded a more integral and coordinated approach to regional cooperation. 
In the mid-1980s therefore, the national government revised the Joint 
Provision act of the 1950s (WGR+), now forcing municipalities to integrate the 
different single purpose agencies into one larger multi-purpose regional 
governance body. The latter would also have a democratic body consisting of 
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members of the elected councils of the participating municipalities. Under the 
new scheme, the regional agencies delivered some satisfactory results with 
respect to cooperation on public services. However, as the basic premise of 
regional cooperation remained one of voluntary participation and cooperation, 
not much happened in the field of economic development (Andeweg and Irwin, 
2005). Municipalities in the Netherlands were rather reluctant to give up their 
autonomy on economic matters and they were certainly not willing to transfer 
these competences to regional agencies (Nota kaderwet, 1994). 
The need for regional cooperation and coordination in the field of economic 
development was expressed more urgently in the early 1990s. Under the 
(alleged) pressure of growing economic competition, especially with other 
European (urban) regions, the Dutch national government initiated a project 
which was directly concerned with regional economic development, aimed in 
particular at the main urban regions in the Netherlands (Geelhoed, 2002). The 
city regions of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven/Helmond, 
Arnhem/Nijmegen and Enschede/Hengelo were the main targets of this new 
policy. The temporary framework act ‘Kaderwet Bestuur in Verandering’ (the 
Act Administrative Change 1994) obliged municipalities that partook in a 
regional governance framework to transfer several of their competences (in 
particular on the field of economic development) to the regional agency. The act 
provided a firmer institutional basis for regional governance, endowing regional 
agencies with more competences, in particular, in the field of spatial planning 
(notably infrastructure) and economic development. The main competences 
ascribed to regional governance agencies involved (obligatory) collaboration in 
the fields of spatial planning, housing, transport and infrastructure, economic 
affairs and environmental issues. Yet, because the ‘obligatory collaboration’ in 
regional governance agencies was still based upon consensual politics, 
municipalities still pulled the key levers (Hulst, 2005; Geelhoed, 2002:39). As a 
result, regional governance agencies remained rather indecisive and powerless. 
Regional governance in practice: problems and discrepancies, the case of 
Arnhem-Nijmegen. 
As Hulst remarks, in theory, the new context constituted regional agencies with 
sufficient power to coordinate local governments and create coherent regional 
policies. In practice, however, these agencies did not fulfil the series of tasks that 
were the very reason of their existence (Hulst, 2005). First of all, there were 
many discrepancies between policy competences and decision making 
procedures of regional governance agencies. This relates, in particular, to the 
conflicts between the democratic/ representative structure of the regional 
governance agencies (based upon the polder model/ consensus) and the need to 
go beyond the interests of individual municipalities in favour of regional interest. 
The design of the democratic structure and the processes of decision making 
within these governance bodies has severely hampered their output. As the 
management of the regional agencies mainly lies in the hands of indirectly 
elected representatives from the participating municipal councils, municipalities 
are still pulling the most important levers. This has led to major legitimacy and 
accountability gaps and a vast indecisiveness of these regional agencies which 
made them unable to address the urgent matter of regional policy integration and 
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the development of coherent and strong regional economies. Instead of 
generating a powerful proactive regional authority with sufficient capacities to 
deal with major economic, political and societal changes (Gualini, 2001), 
decision-making within the regional governance agencies was severely bound by 
the self-interest of municipalities (Geelhoed, 2002:42). This has hugely negative 
effects on the overall sharpness and decisiveness of regional governance 
agencies. 
Another set of problems comes out of the tensions between the different 
substantive goals for regional governance. Most important to mention here are 
the conflicts arising from tensions between political-economic claims for 
regionalism and the policy-making/collaboration discourses. Such problems are 
mainly caused by the different economic interests of the municipalities involved 
in regional governance. Whereas most regional governance areas in the 
Netherlands are dominated by one or more core cities, they also consist of 
several smaller, often more sub-urban or even rural municipalities. As major 
cities tend to have different (economic) interests than rural and sub-urban 
municipalities, there is often more competition over regional economic 
development policies than one that can actually speak of real territorial 
‘collaboration’. Rather, instead of pursuing regional policy coordination and 
cooperation, struggles over economic policy (notably competition in providing 
business parks and attracting firms) are actually producing territorial 
fragmentation. Such tensions are also intensified by the different hierarchical 
positions that municipalities take up in regional governance agencies. As Dutch 
regionalist policy is first and foremost targeted at city regions, it is often the core 
cities that have the dominant voice in regional governance agencies, at the 
expense of sub-urban and rural municipalities. This often leads to conflicts (see 
the discussion in Geelhoed, 2002). 
An illustrative example of this is the case of the city-region Arnhem-
Nijmegen. Via the regional governance agency (the KAN) the core cities 
Arnhem and Nijmegen aimed to set up a multi-mode transport centre in the rural 
area of the municipality of Elst (which is located just between the two core 
cities). For both Nijmegen and Arnhem, the setting up of this transport centre 
was a matter of economic urgency. Through its development, the cities tried to 
hook on to an international trade-route from Rotterdam to Germany and Eastern-
Europe. The municipality of Elst and some smaller rural/sub-urban 
municipalities in the region agreed to the importance of such a development but 
also feared the impact it would have on the local environment and infrastructure. 
In other words, they supported the idea but operated on a ‘not in my backyard 
strategy’. Despite this opposition, the cities of Arnhem and Nijmegen pushed on 
with the planning of the development of the transport centre using their power 
over the regional governance agency (in which they had the most powerful 
votes). However, they did not succeed. The municipality of Elst, together with 
some of the smaller municipalities in the region, resisted the development of a 
transport centre in their proximity by linking up to citizens groups, 
environmental NGOs and activists. This created widespread public opposition to 
the plans. When they finally appealed against the project in the higher court, the 
court ruled against the project (on the basis of environmental law) and the 
development came to a complete stop. This also led to political fragmentation in 
the city-region’s governance agency. At present, the regional agency continues to 
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coordinate, in particular, regional housing and transport planning. It is also 
investing more in region-marketing. The region now sells itself under the label of 
‘cool region’, see http://www.coolregion.nl). This presents, to some extent, a 
move away from primarily economically oriented discourses and towards issues 
that may appeal more to local citizens, like housing, education and leisure. The 
future will tell what this will mean for the position of the regional agency in 
terms of legitimacy and capacity to act. 
Conclusion 
Regional governance has emerged as an increasingly popular concept. It has 
been represented as a synergetic and coherent mode of governance that embraces 
a variety of policy discourses of both substantive and political character, notably 
through its capacity to enrol a variety of resources and to harness public support. 
Cherished even by the traditional territorial ‘powers’, notably the central state 
and the municipal administrations, the region features as a cure-for-all, meeting a 
broad set of policy challenges. 
However, as the case of associationalist regionalism in the Netherlands shows, 
in real life, regions seem to be severely hampered by way they are loaded with 
tasks and goals. Behind its powerful and appealing image, regional governance 
has become replete with contradictions, ambiguities and tensions. In particular, 
in contrast to its function as a lubricator and catalyst, the comprehensive and 
associative character of regional governance often appears to be a major 
stumbling block. To achieve their goals, regional agencies therefore often resort 
to the strategic use of the powers-that-be without much attention to the broader 
governance context in which they operate. 
The question then arises as to whether regions could still become the highly 
potential ‘associations of power’ as initially represented. Are regions actually 
able to fulfil the wide array of tasks and goals set out for them, in an open and 
democratic way, as expected? In the current state of affairs, we are inclined to 
answer this question negatively. The region has become an intrinsically 
ambivalent concept and many (internal) conflicts arise from tensions between the 
multiplicity of tasks and discourses it has been associated with. Not only are 
there many conflicts between the many substantive claims for regionalism and 
accounts of political legitimisation, the specific governance settings in which 
regions operate make it far from easy to adopt democratic and associate 
practices. What we thus see is that the myriad of appealing narratives on 
regionalism, the various consultancy practices which spawn out of it and the 
legion of examples, texts, lectures and presentations that circulate have perhaps 
been too enthusiastically establishing the region as a governance panacea. 
What is required, accordingly, is a greater sensitivity in both academic work 
on and policy experiments with regionalism. Rather than overloading regional 
governance practices with ‘stylised facts’, appealing concepts and promises, 
there is a need to approach things more reflexively. In order to create regions that 
have sufficient political standing, policy makers and academics should better 
consider how ideas and theories about regional governance will actually work 
out in the field. This asks for a closer relationship between discursive knowledge 
and governance practice. Only through such reflexive practices will regions be 
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able to meet the promise of ‘power of association’ beyond a mere performance 
of ‘associations of power-that-be’. 
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Urban governance for development. 
Recent trends in Latin America 
Paul van Lindert 
Introduction 
In the year 2008, for the first time in history the world’s population has become 
more urban than rural. Small wonder that urbanization and the immense 
implications of urban growth in the next few decades are being recognized by 
academics and policymakers alike as a crucial challenge for future sustainable 
development. As such, the current debate on urban development focuses not only 
on the many problems and opportunities of urbanization but also, and in 
particular, on the vulnerability of the urban poor and on the social and 
sustainable use of space. At the same time, it is to be expected that an ongoing 
process of localization and decentralization will affect the exercise of urban 
governance in future, especially because most urban demographic growth will 
occur in intermediate cities and small towns. Local governments will need to 
develop, together with local stakeholders, a longer-term vision on development 
that should guarantee the growing numbers of (poor) people’s rights to the city.  
In this paper, I will focus on current trends of decentralisation and urban 
governance in Latin America. Although it is often maintained that local 
governments traditionally are the weakest link in the public sector (UNFPA 
2007: 67), Latin America shows a growing variety of promising and innovative 
initiatives that lead to improved urban governance. The paper finishes with an 
overview of the key areas for a longer-term vision on urban development policy 
that is pro-poor and uses a rights-based approach.  
Decentralisation and the new role for local government 
Over the past few decades, in association with region-wide decentralisation 
processes, the public sector in many Latin American countries was substantially 
restructured, which in turn led to new relationships between the central and the 
local state, as well as between the public sector and civil society. An important 
precondition for these decentralisation processes was the fact that popularly 
elected governments came to replace the once so powerful military-controlled 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. In the year 1980, the crisis of state legitimacy 
was still reflected by the fact that out of the 18 countries in Latin America only 6 
had regular elections. The democracies of 3 of these countries – Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela – were still based on one- or two-party systems (Lora 
2007: 2). In contrast, at the start of the new millennium, all nations of the region 
had elected governments and they had pluriform party structures put in place. 
Admittedly, during much of the 1980s and even in the next decade, armed 
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conflicts, state repression and violation of human rights continued in too many 
parts of the region, especially in Colombia, Peru and in some of the poorest 
Central American countries that were still ruled by patrimonialist governments. 
In other countries, the transition to representative democracy had triggered the 
participation of marginalized social groups, albeit often channelled through new 
political movements with a notorious populist flavour, causing high levels of 
political instability which in some cases resulted in the deposition of consecutive 
presidents (e.g. in Bolivia, Ecuador). Thus, while it is a fact that as of the 1980s 
most Latin American nations have restored their representative democracies, 
many struggle with the challenges ‘to reduce the democratic deficits’ (Greig et 
al. 2007: 229).  
An important step on the road towards a gradual consolidation of democracy 
in Latin America was the introduction of municipal elections. The unequivocal 
link between the transition to democracy and the introduction of municipal 
elections is clearly established by Daughters and Harper (2007:218-219; see 
Table 1.1). Between 1991 and 1995, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama 
were the last countries in the region to make the change from appointed to 
elected mayors and councillors. In addition to that – and depending on preceding 
municipal arrangements – new administrative and territorial municipal 
jurisdictions were defined through the promulgation and implementation of so-
called ‘organic laws’1. In some countries, such as in Bolivia, these laws indeed 
tackled one of the traditional democratic deficits by directly incorporating the 
formerly excluded rural populations in the municipal political structures, which 
hitherto had always been dominated by the urban population. In the next step 
towards the consolidation of democratisation, the central governments 
transferred more political power to the sub-national governments and 
reformulated the respective public responsibilities for each of the various tiers of 
government.  
Now that the reforms of the public sector have done away with the tradition of 
appointed mayors who might be tempted to act primarily in the interest of the 
president and the party, the ‘new’ local government is in many cases less 
authoritarian and exclusive than before. Under the current conditions of elected 
mayors and councillors, local political autonomy has increased vis-à-vis the 
central state. At the same time, there is more potential for local authorities to 
include a larger scope of actors in their decision-making and to open up spaces 
for social participation than there was under a centralist regime. This 
arrangement thus offers enhanced possibilities to establish multi-sector 
partnerships for local development, enabling and promoting participation of a 
wide range of stakeholders.  
On the other hand, even if there is increased political autonomy from the 
centre, this does not mean that decentralisation policies also have brought 
financial autonomy to the local governments. According to the principles of 
subsidiarity, the various roles and functions of the state at the different levels of 
government should be mutually complementary and decentralised to the lowest 
administrative level at which their implementation is the most effective. In many 
cases of service provision, the local/municipal level would be the most 
appropriate. In practice, however, the required transfer of fiscal resources from 
1 A ‘ley orgánica’ in Latin America creates a new institutional regime. 
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the national to the local governments, combined with measures to increase 
revenues from local taxes, did not keep pace with the delegation and devolution 
of responsibilities. As Nijenhuis (2006: 116) shows, fiscal decentralisation in the 
countries with a federal state structure primarily focused on strengthening the 
intermediate levels, such as the provinces (Argentina) and the states (Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela). In the unitary states of the sub-continent, the main focus 
of decentralisation policies was on the municipal level. Whereas in the federal 
states sub-national spending varies from 20 to 50 per cent, the equivalent in the 
unitary states is quite modest. Even today, after roughly two decades of 
decentralization in Latin America, the share of national resources that is 
reassigned to municipal budgets is in most nations still lower than 10 per cent of 
the central state budget, while only a few countries (e.g. Colombia, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Guatemala) show a fiscal decentralisation from the central to the local 
governments of  15 to 25 per cent (IDB, 2000; Nijenhuis, 2006). Evidently, the 
decentralisation of functions and responsibilities to the municipalities only 
occasionally coincides with a new distribution of resources, diverting resources 
from the central government to the municipalities.  
Table 1. Central and South America: Year of Democratic Transition and 
First Municipal Elections 
Country  Year of  
Democratic 
Transition 
Year of First 
Municipal  
Elections 
Mexico 
Costa Rica  
Colombia 
Venezuela 
Ecuador  
Peru  
Belize 
Bolivia 
Honduras 
Argentina 
El Salvador  
Guatemala 
Uruguay 
Brazil 
Paraguay 
Panama 
Nicaragua 
Chile 
1917 
1949 
1958 
1958 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1917 
1949 
1988 
1989 
1983 
1980 
1981 
1985 
1982 
1983 
1985 
1985  
1966 
1985 
1991 
1995 
1992 
1992  
 
Source: Daughters and Harper (2007: 218-219) 
 
In recent academic literature there has been quite some attention for the 
promising experiences of public management in for example Bogotá (Gilbert 
2006), Monterrey (Paiva, 2003), Buenos Aires (de Luca et al., 2002), 
Montevideo (Canel, 2001; Chavez, 2004), and – perhaps most notorious of all – 
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Curitiba (Schwarz, 2004) and Porto Alegre (Abers ,1998; Fedozzi, 2001; Souza, 
2001). These studies show that the municipalities that cover the large 
metropolises of Latin America can at times demonstrate an admirable 
performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in urban planning and 
management, despite the existence of interlocking and overlapping structures 
within metropolitan areas which makes coordination among the local 
governments a challenging task indeed (Paiva, 2003).  
Many of these municipalities have also been successful at generating funds. 
They have been able to use their newly established or increased powers to raise 
local taxes directly, obtain funds from other sources, and attract national or 
foreign investment After a thorough and systematic comparison of governments 
in some important capital cities of the region, Meyers and Dietz concluded that 
citizens become less resistant to paying taxes when they perceive that the 
municipal apparatus is likely to act in a fair and accountable way: ‘in a few 
cases, elected municipal governments in capital cities have gained, at least 
momentarily, the reputation for collecting taxes honestly, impartially, and 
transparently – and for using tax revenues to fund needed urban improvements’ 
(Meyers and Dietz 2002: 336).  
Finally, some of these cities also stand out for their innovative ways to include 
citizen participation in their (budgetary) planning cycles. Having said this, 
however, we should also add that tensions between the old-style centralised 
practices of clientelism and more transparent forms of public management 
continue to exist in many of Latin America’s major cities.   
In the smaller towns of the region, not to mention the predominantly rural 
municipalities, the municipal balance sheets tend to show quite a different 
picture. Here, the transfer of financial resources from the central government is 
vital for the local governments if they are to perform their new roles properly, if 
only to cover the expenses of services now provided to the citizens by them on 
behalf of the central government. This is even more important as many 
municipal authorities in Latin America lack the necessary capacities to raise their 
own revenues (van Lindert and Verkoren, 2004). By and large these local 
administrations suffer from a lack of competent staff, who would normally be 
held responsible for setting up and maintaining administrative information 
systems, analyzing local development opportunities, project planning, providing 
infrastructure and public services, collecting local taxes, development fees and 
user charges, etc. On top of that the small municipalities do not have the same 
opportunities as their big sisters to engage in debt financing (e.g. through 
municipal development funds) in order to contract additional means for 
investment. As the lion’s share of the small local budgets is spent on personnel 
costs (in some cases up to 70-80 per cent), it is hardly surprising that many of the 
tasks that were transferred from the central government to the local government 
cannot be carried out properly (Van Lindert, 2005). A truly functioning 
subsidiarity principle calls for more than ‘just’ political decentralisation; it must 
be completed with a true and meaningful form of fiscal decentralisation. 
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Local governance 
One of the traditional primary roles of local government is to secure a smooth 
and efficient functioning of the public services, which are generally managed by 
its technical-administrative apparatus. As a matter of fact, this was one of the 
fundamental arguments of the first generation of decentralisation proponents, 
who also claimed that it would be easier to tailor local-level services to local 
needs and preferences. Implicitly, however, this raises the question as to how 
such local needs and preferences are to be identified. The current 
decentralisation doctrine firmly holds that ‘the only feasible way is to have an 
inclusive process of local governance through which each segment of the 
population can express and fight over their preferences’ (Osmani, 2000: 6).  
At the same time citizen participation has gained recognition as an essential 
principle, the vital role of the local government in development has also come to 
be generally acknowledged. In the current international development debate, 
local government is held to be the key agent both with respect to local 
sustainability and to the eradication of poverty. The poverty reduction strategy 
papers of the most indebted countries, for example, generally include a strategic 
focus on local government, which is to become the main facilitator for the 
effective provision of social services and the creation of a productive 
environment. Also, capacity strengthening projects for local governments are 
now part and parcel of many international development aid programmes.  
Most of such programmes focus on how local governments can become 
efficient, effective agents for the improvement of local production and living 
conditions. In this respect, it is revealing that the World Bank, in its latest 
‘Strategy for Urban Development and Local Government’, highlights such 
concepts as liveability and good governance, together with notions of 
competitiveness and bankability (World Bank, 2000).  
The notion of liveability includes the social and environmental dimensions of 
development, such as adequate housing, safety, security, health and education. 
The competitiveness of the local economy relates to the efficient functioning of 
factor markets (capital, labour, land); bankability refers to sound municipal 
finance, i.e. the competent and transparent management of municipal budgets 
(Van Lindert, 2006). Together with an established integrity in local government, 
bankability and creditworthiness are important prerequisites for municipalities to 
be eligible for World Bank loans. Again, it is not surprising that such attributes 
and competences will be more readily available in the bigger cities (with larger 
tax bases and a more qualified staff) than in the rural municipalities.  
As mentioned above, the new developmental role of the local governments 
implies that they really open up to their constituencies for participation in 
decision-making, not only during election times but especially when they have 
taken office. Latin America presents many interesting experiences which 
demonstrate how local government may become the prime mover for civil 
society to effectively participate in matters that concern their own living and 
production environments. Such restructuring of the relationships between 
government and citizens is crucial to ‘good governance’. According to Mitlin 
(2004:3), governance ‘encompasses the institutions and processes, both formal 
and informal, which provide for the interaction of the state with a range of other 
agents or stakeholders affected by the activities of the government’. Many 
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authors, including Mitlin (2004), Gaventa (2001), Osmani (2000), and Schneider 
(1999), use the notion of participatory governance, which appears to carry a 
similar meaning as an earlier term: participatory democracy (as opposed to 
representative democracy). Both terms imply institutionalised processes through 
which stakeholders participate in activities such as needs assessments, agenda 
setting, decision-making, inspection and monitoring. Defined in this way, 
participatory governance is a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition for 
good governance. In addition to fostering participatory action, governance 
should also be transparent, accountable and contribute to equality before it would 
duly deserve the good governance certificate (UNDP, 1998; Nijenhuis, 2002). In 
this respect, Andrews and Shah (2005) use the concept of citizen-centered 
governance. They give the following three distinguishing features: citizen 
empowerment through a rights-based approach, bottom-up accountability for 
results, and evaluation of government performance (as the facilitator of a 
network of providers) by citizens (in their multiple roles as governors, taxpayers, 
and consumers of public services). Box 1.1 presents the key elements of this new 
role of local government, as summarised by Shah and Shah (2006) 
 
Box 1. – The role of local government under the new vision of local governance 
 
‘old view’ (20th century) ‘new view’ (21st century) 
¾ Based on residuality and local 
governments as wards of the state 
¾ Focused on government 
 
¾ Agent of the central government 
 
¾ Responsive and accountable to 
higher-level governments 
 
¾ Direct provider of local services 
¾ Intolerance for risk 
¾ Depends on central directives 
 
¾ Bureaucratic and technocratic 
 
 
 
¾ Coercive 
 
 
¾ Fiscally irresponsible 
 
¾ Exclusive with elite capture 
 
¾ Based on subsidiarity and home rule 
 
¾ Focused on citizen-centered local 
governance 
¾ Primary agent for the citizens; and leader 
and gatekeeper for shared rule 
¾ Responsive and accountable to local 
voters; assumes leadership role in 
improving local governance 
¾ Purchaser of local services 
¾ Innovative; risk taker within limits 
¾ Autonomous in taxing, spending, 
regulatory, and administrative decisions 
¾ Participatory; works to strengthen citizen 
voice and exit options through direct 
democracy provisions, citizens’ charters, 
and performance budgeting 
¾ Focused on earning trust, creating space 
for civic dialogue, serving the citizens, and 
improving social outcomes 
¾ Fiscally prudent; works better and costs 
less 
¾ Inclusive and participatory 
 
Source: A. Shah and S. Shah (2006: 43) 
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When applied to the role of the local government as to development and poverty 
reduction, participatory governance is seen to have considerably more potential 
than purely bureaucratic-technocratic forms of governance. Schneider (1999) 
emphasises that joint decision-making by politicians, civil servants and the 
relevant stakeholders (including the poor and other intended beneficiaries) leads 
to more efficient (and just) outcomes, since decisions and policies will be based 
on information that is more complete and of a better quality. A second rationale 
for citizen-centered governance that is stressed by Schneider is the fact that all 
actors are accountable vis-à-vis all stakeholders, and if effective mechanisms of 
sanctioning have been put in place, participatory governance will result in high 
levels of commitment to poverty reduction and development (Schneider 1999: 
523).  
The accountability issue, including the associated sanctioning mechanisms, is 
also identified by Blair (2000) as one of the major conditions for participatory 
governance to succeed. From an analysis of six countries with relatively 
successful track records of decentralisation and participation (including Bolivia 
and Honduras) this author also stresses the importance of having a critical mass 
to participate in the political process. Participatory democracy only works if 
participation is general, and not limited to only a few interested stakeholders or 
the male segment of the population (Blair, 2000).  
Another important lesson learned from the Brazilian participatory budgeting 
experience is that the process of participatory democracy is not sustainable or 
irreversible by itself. One condition for irreversibility is that the population at 
large is aware of the importance of the process and its benefits (Cabannes, 2004: 
45). This is demonstrated in the case of Porto Alegre, where, contrary to what 
several other municipalities in Brazil have experienced, participatory budgeting 
proved to outlast a change in government. Here, in the cradle of the participatory 
budgeting (PB) experience, the Workers’ Party, who had introduced PB, had 
governed for an uninterrupted period of 15 years since 1989. The year-round PB-
meetings involved ever-increasing numbers of participants who knew exactly 
what their entitlements were and also noticed that there had been a substantial 
shift in spending towards the poorest areas of the city. When eventually a new 
government came into power in the year 2004, it was decided – most likely out 
of fear that the new government would otherwise lose legitimacy – that the 
process would be carried on as before. 
Whereas in Porto Alegre the PB process was institutionalised following its 
successful practice, and not imposed by rules from above, Bolivia presents a 
different case. In Bolivia, the central government promulgated various laws in 
order to force participatory governance unto the local governments (Van Lindert 
and Nijenhuis, 2002). After a hesitant start and some initial resistance from the 
organised peasants’ segment in Bolivian society, the new legal and regulatory 
frameworks were soon followed by a massive transformation of the country’s 
socio-political landscapes (Assies, 2003). Most importantly, the municipalities 
received relatively large amounts of money transferred from the central 
government, provided that they would follow the mandatory participatory 
planning procedures and follow up with formal municipal development plans. 
Today, local governments in Bolivia receive 20 per cent of all central 
government revenues. Some of the chapters that will follow will go into the role 
246 
of local governments, citizen participation and development in Bolivia more 
specifically.   
In sum, local governance ought to be intimately related with a well-defined 
decentralisation program which, apart from its local development goals, is 
specifically aimed to tackle democratic deficits (such as human-, gender-, 
democratic/political rights), to achieve a proper transition from a representative 
democracy to a participatory democracy and to bring about effective local 
decision making (see e.g. Gill, 2000; UNDP, 2002; Greig et al., 2007). 
Pro-poor urban management and governance 
The ongoing urbanisation of the developing world should no longer be 
considered as a threat or a problem for sustainable development, but instead as a 
potential solution and opportunity for development (Lerner, 2007; UNFPA, 
2007). Urban areas are agents of change (UNCHS, 2001) and both the large and 
the smaller cities are engines of growth for the national or regional economies. 
The cities of Latin America also provide for the livelihoods of three out of every 
four households living in the region. Yet, it must be recognized that the cities of 
the South – even more than those of the North – are characterised by acute forms 
of socio-economic polarisation, residential segregation and environmental 
degradation. The very existence of slums and squatter settlements, often located 
in ecologically vulnerable parts of metropolitan areas, is a symptom of urban 
poverty; but even more so it is the result of urban policies that fail, of legal and 
regulatory frameworks that are inadequate or inappropriate, and of land- and 
housing markets which are far from functional. On top of that, it should be 
mentioned that political will is just lacking in too many city governments. In 
noting these challenges, Tannerfeldt and Ljung (2006) explain that sustainable 
urban development requires action on many fronts, including those of policy 
frameworks at all levels of government, land- and housing markets, urban 
transport systems, environmental management, local economic development, etc. 
Like some of the authors mentioned above, they also hold that policies designed 
to foster dynamic processes of sustainable urban development need to be 
inclusive and pro-poor (Box 2). 
 
Box 2. Key areas in pro-poor urban development 
 
GOVERNANCE AND URBAN MANAGEMENT 
¾ decentralization policies, local self-governance, democracy at the local level 
¾ transparent and efficient municipal administration, measures against 
corruption 
¾ comprehensive and inclusive local development strategies (involving all 
stakeholders, including economic development, land use, infrastructure, 
environment, culture etc.) 
¾ pro-poor policy and broadened opportunities for participation by the poor 
¾ land management, in particular to ensure the provision of serviced land for 
housing, cadastral systems, physical planning 
¾ strengthened municipal finance 
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INFRASTRUCTURE AND BASIC SERVICES 
¾ reforming of public utilities including regulatory frameworks, tariff 
structures and the promotion of market-oriented and demand-driven 
approaches to service provision 
¾ enabling of private sector participation, especially local firms and 
community initiatives 
¾ development of affordable solutions to water, sanitation and energy in poor 
settlements including subsidized connection fees for the poor 
¾ urban transport, especially non-motorised traffic and public transports 
 
HOUSING AND SLUM UPGRADING 
¾ housing policy 
¾ secure tenure, legalisation of squatter settlements 
¾ revision of obsolete planning and building regulation 
¾ improved land and housing markets 
¾ legal protection of tenants 
¾ promotion of self-construction and incremental housing 
¾ housing finance including micro-finance for low-income households 
¾ integrated improvement of slum areas 
¾ education and health facilities even in informal settlements 
 
ENVIRONMENT 
¾ improved sanitary conditions through better infrastructure and service 
delivery 
¾ reduction of air pollution 
¾ waste water treatment and industrial water management, ecological 
sanitation 
¾ solid waste management and promotion of recycling concepts 
¾ management of the historic environment including its protection and 
sustainable use 
¾ ‘greening of the city’ 
¾ energy conservation, particularly with regard to heating of housing and the 
use of renewable energy sources 
¾ education and information on health and environment 
 
LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
¾ promote efficiency in the economy through improved infrastructure and 
service provision and through removal of obstacles and disincentives such as 
obsolete regulations and corruption 
¾ enabling environment for self-employment and micro-enterprises 
¾ pro-poor financial services 
¾ employment generation, e.g. labour-intensive methods for infrastructure 
works 
¾ urban agriculture 
  
SAFETY AND HEALTH 
¾ prevention of crime through institutional development, training of the police 
and support to neighbourhood actions 
¾ inclusion of youth and support to youth activities 
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¾ storm water drainage to prevent landslides and other measures to reduce 
damage caused by hurricanes, earthquakes, etc 
¾ safer environment for women like lighting of walkways, improved urban 
transport, etc 
¾ improved traffic safety 
¾ risk reduction as part of urban planning and management 
¾ programmes to prevent the spreading of HIV/AIDS 
¾ accessibility for disabled 
 
 
Source: G. Tannerfeldt and P. Ljung (2006: 136-137) 
 
It will be clear to everyone that no blue-print solutions for urban development 
planning, management and governance exist. Urban development planning 
should always be based first on a clear analysis of the political economy of the 
social, spatial and institutional context. That is why this paper focused on the 
theme of urban governance and management in the specific context of Latin 
America, which in itself already presents a huge variety of practices and policies 
– not to mention how different the experiences of cities in other macro-regions 
will be. Such ‘context-dependent’ approach is advocated in particular by Jenkins, 
Smith and Wang (2007), who also underpin the crucial importance of a (planning 
and housing) approach “that is politically aware, applies critical analysis and is 
proactive” (p.184). These authors are especially critical as to the conventional 
transfer of ideologies, theories, policies and practices from the already 
‘urbanised world’ (i.e. the North) to the ‘rapidly urbanising world’ (the South). 
In this paper, I have emphasized some recent trends in decentralisation and local 
governance in Latin American cities. It may be held that urban governments of 
the North indeed may learn a lot from the many innovative forms of local 
participatory democracy that have developed over the last fifteen years in Latin 
American cities. It is telling that between 2000 and 2006, more than 50 cities in 
Europe have adopted a participatory budgeting approach, and in other continents 
many initiatives are under way (Perlman and O’Meara Sheenan, 2007: 181). 
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Environment and health in an urbanizing 
world 
Franςoise Barten and Geert Tom Heikens 1 
Introduction 
The social and physical environments have long been recognized as important 
determinants of health and the rapid change in these environments is affecting 
people worldwide. Despite major advances in knowledge, unprecedented gains 
in wealth and important policy commitments such as the MDGs, health 
inequities both within as well between countries and regions are deepening 
(Marmot, 2006; UNDP, 2005). These inequities not only affect the poor but the 
whole of society (Wilkinson, 1996; Wilkinson, 2005)  
This paper firstly describes the unprecedented challenge posed by rapid 
urbanization and the deepening inequities presently seen within and between 
urban settings (KNUS, 2007). It explores in particular some implications of the 
increasing informalisation of the economy for worker’s health and safety. The 
paper argues that there is a need for a systems’ (or ‘integrated’) approach of 
health in order to address not only the proximal risk factors but above all the 
structural and underlying determinants. The paper focuses attention on the role 
of meaningful participation, empowerment and participatory governance in these 
approaches. The paper finally examines the implications for health policy and 
systems’ research and argues that there is an urgent need to reorient research 
priorities, and to enhance interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches in 
research.  
Urbanization and growth of informal settlements 
The world is becoming increasingly urbanized and herewith is poverty  
becoming an increasingly urban phenomenon. If current demographic trends 
continue, most of the projected growth in the next two decades is to take place in 
the less developed regions of the world, where cities and towns will absorb 95 
percent of urban growth and will be home to almost 4 billion people, or 80 per 
cent of the world’s urban population by 2030. The growth of densely populated, 
squatter settlements or “slums” often equals urban growth. According to recent 
projections, the population living in informal settlements in low and middle-
income countries is likely to double in less than 30 years (UN Millennium 
Project , 2005; UN-Habitat, 2006). Throughout history, cities have provided new 
opportunities for income growth, improved living conditions and health 
                                                          
1 This paper is partly based upon an earlier paper presented by F. Barten at the workshop: 
Responding to Global Challenges. The role of Europe and international science and technology 
cooperation. Brussels, 4/5 October 2007  
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development (Hall, 1998; Leon, 2008). However, it is worth noting that Africa 
and Asia were still almost wholly rural in 1950 and that at present, the annual 
urban growth rate in Africa has become more than twice the global average, 
which is comparable to urban growth rates in the towns of 19th century Europe. 
Current urbanization differs from what the world has experienced so far and this 
has implications for health equity, sustainability and development policy.  
In many cities urban services and infrastructure have not kept pace with rapid 
urbanisation and an increasing proportion of the people in urban areas will live 
without adequate social infrastructure, especially housing, water supply, drainage 
and sanitation facilities (People's Health Movement, GEGA, and Medact, 2008). 
People are exposed to a variety of health hazards, that are inter-connected and 
often produce synergy in health effects (Barten et al., 2006; Heikens et al., 
2008). Risks, exposure and vulnerability differ according to socio-economic 
status, gender, place etc. and the health impact is mostly felt by the most 
vulnerable, marginalized and excluded population in the informal settlements. In 
Sub-Saharan towns, children living in informal settlements are more likely to die 
from respiratory and waterborne illnesses than children in rural areas (UN-
Habitat, 2006), while HIV prevalence in the urban population is on average 1.7 
times higher than among those living in rural areas (UNAIDS, 2006) 
Already in the early 1980s Rossi-Espagnet drew attention to the fact that the 
urban poor are at the interface between “underdevelopment” and 
industrialization and that their lifestyle and disease patterns reflect the problems 
of both. While still exposed to the traditional health hazards related to poverty, 
un- and underemployment, malnutrition, poor shelter and inadequate 
environmental and social services, the urban poor are also more exposed to 
hazards related to “modernization”, such as unhealthy urbanization and pollution 
- while the lack of social support systems in cities and social exclusion increases 
the risk of mental health problems (Rossi-Espagnet, 1983, 1984).  
Many urban centres face problems related to a rapidly increasing socio-
economic-cultural differentiation, deteriorating living conditions and social 
polarization. A study in 23 countries highlighted the fact that generally 
inequalities are higher in urban areas relative to rural with the exception of 
countries in which rural economies are structured around plantation agriculture 
(Mitlin, 2004). In Nairobi the average infant and child mortality rates are lower 
than in Kenyan rural areas; however, in the informal settlements of Kibera and 
Embakasi these rates are three to four times the Nairobi average (APHRC, 
2002). The deepening inequalities and polarization within urban settings appears 
to be increasingly associated with conflict and insecurity. 
Informal employment and working conditions 
As urban growth rates in some cities equals those of the towns in 19th and early 
20th century in Europe, many similarities exist with respect to the developmental 
problems, living and working conditions common in many European towns of 
that period (Szreter, 2005). A critical difference is the fact that rapid urbanization 
in many cities has not been accompanied by a similar growth in employment and 
production activities. The recent waves of economic reforms in many poor 
countries have added to the complexity of informal labour markets, where high 
and sustained growth rates are not necessarily accompanied by increased growth 
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in formal employment (Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur, 2006). In both poor as well 
as rich countries, there are now more “flexible” employment arrangements, 
fewer institutional protections, and greater job insecurity(Hogstedt, Wegman, 
and Kjellstrom, 2007) and the number of informally employed, unprotected and 
low-income workers is rapidly increasing. There is also increasing evidence that 
the expansion of precarious employment and job insecurity over the past three 
decades has had serious adverse effects on workers’ health, both directly and 
indirectly (by undermining regulatory and other protections) (Barten, 1993; 
Kivimaki et al., 2003; McDonough, 2000; Quinlan, Mayhew, and Bohle, 2001a; 
Quinlan, Mayhew, and Bohle, 2001b; Vosko, 2003).  
Gender is an important variable. Gender-based inequity influences 
responsibilities, benefits and vulnerability and it conditions the types of exposure 
at the workplace with consequent health impact and health inequalities (WHO , 
2006). While women – relative to men – have been restricted in their access to 
jobs, from 1960 onwards, and in particular over the last two decades, they have 
increased their participation in remunerated employment (Social Watch , 2008; 
UNRISD, 2005; Wamala, and Kawachi, 2007;World Bank, 2001). However, 
these employment gains are often precarious and many women work in the 
informal sector (Arroyo Aguilar, et al. 2005; Cedeno and Barten, 2002). Work is 
often invisible or carried out under poor working conditions. It often entails no 
direct payment, is excluded from social protection and has implications for 
workers’ health and safety. Moreover, the position of women influences child 
health outcomes (Acevedo, 2002; Barten et al., 2008; Social Watch, 2007). 
Women are also less organized in unions (Kolk et al. 1999; WHO, 2006). 
Another challenge is the rapidly increasing numbers of illegal migrants, who 
often end up in hazardous work and lack rights to health care, education or 
decision-making. Informal work is not limited to informal urban settlements 
(Werna, 2001). However, workers that survive in the informal economy in urban 
settings are a more vulnerable group. The workers’ health and that of the wider 
community cannot be considered in isolation of the rapidly changing context in 
many cities.  
The capacity to address these challenges in a context of climate change, global 
economic slow-down and energy crisis, long-term and emerging violent conflict, 
food insecurity and weak global governance appears limited and demands urgent 
strengthening. Clearly, there is an urgent need to move beyond a “symptom-
treatment mode” and to develop a systems approach that addresses not only the 
proximal risk factors, diseases and individual health effects – but in particular the 
upstream driving forces of this urbanization and of deepening health inequity. 
An important and so far neglected historical lesson is the role that was played 
by the state and public services in improving living conditions and health in 
Europe (Szreter, 1988). An important institutional impact of globalization on 
cities has been the weakening of national and local public institutions, relative to 
the arrival of powerful, informed and decisive multinational external private 
sector companies. Effective government power had already been reduced since 
the 1990s, when essential public services, such as water supply, sanitation, waste 
collection; health, education and other social services in many countries were 
privatized and outsourced from government to private companies.   
Local authorities are under pressure to attract private investment in order to 
create job opportunities and generate income in the city, while external private-
254 
sector companies enjoy wide freedom to establish themselves where conditions 
such as wage rates, tax breaks and other incentives, and national regulatory 
framework are most beneficial. When these conditions change, or become more 
favourable elsewhere, the companies can quite easily move to another more 
favourable location (Barten, Mitlin et al., 2006). As a group, women suffer more 
from competitive pressures and are usually the first to be laid-off when labour-
intensive manufacturing jobs move to even lower-wage countries (Fussel, 2000; 
Joekes, 1995). They often have limited possibilities for skill acquisition and 
advancement and have inadequate security coverage in terms of old-age 
pensions, whereas their work as carers of family-members often continues into 
old age (ILO, 2002; Social Watch, 2007). In some rapidly industrializing 
economies or export-processing zones, women’s share of employment has fallen 
and apparently no sustained improvement in labour market status has been 
achieved (Berik, 2000; Fontana, et al., 1998; Jomo, 2001). Although the 
relevance of capacity enhancement and empowerment is increasingly recognised, 
these changes imply that a fundamental shift in employment relations and power 
is taking place. This has implications for long-term health outcomes at individual 
and societal levels (Marmot et al.,  1997). 
The major consequences of these changes are increased urban poverty and a 
widening gap between the rich and the poor in cities. The twin processes of 
increasing poverty and deepening inequity need to be understood as a process of 
increased socio-economic differentiation in cities (National Research Council, 
 2003) and this also occurs in cities of more developed economies, where this 
differentiation is significantly increased by transnational migration (Beall, 2002). 
Participatory governance, information and health systems 
Considering the complexity of and linkages between health, poverty, working 
conditions, urban environment, it is clear that improvements in health and health 
equity need to move beyond fragmented interventions. These conditions are not 
addressed by health interventions that prioritize single issues, vertical disease-
programmes, curative care above prevention or that focus on changes in lifestyle 
only. Although essential, universal access to health services is insufficient to 
improve the health of communities and to reduce health inequities under such 
circumstances (see Box 1).  
In 1978 the Alma Ata conference defined health as linked to the living and 
working conditions of the population and acknowledged the role of community 
participation in health (WHO, 1978). This was underlined again by the Ottawa 
Charter for Health Promotion, which focused on processes of advocacy, 
enablement and mediation and on strategies to build healthy public policy, 
empower communities, create supportive environments and reorient health 
services. Healthy Cities and healthy settings (districts, neighbourhoods, 
workplaces, schools, etc) were seen as “a means to take these broad concepts and 
strategies and applying them at the local level”(WHO Ottawa Charter, 1986).  
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Box 1. Moving beyond a symptom-treatment mode…? 
Environmental lead exposure of children in low-income neighbourhoods in 
Managua has since long been a neglected urban health problem. Already in the 
1980s several children died of lead poisoning and hundreds of children upon 
examination appeared to have unacceptably high blood lead levels (Barten, 1988; 
Barten, Sousa Santana et al.,  2008). They were living in the vicinity of a car-
battery factory and in cottage factories involved in the recycling of car batteries 
(see map annex). In those years, the population of the capital city doubled due to 
the tidal wave of refugees from the war-zones in the rural area. Many people 
ended up working in the informal sector as a survival strategy. While the war and 
trade embargo created a high demand for car batteries, water was rationed and 
hygiene therefore limited. Malnutrition increased the vulnerability of young 
children. Thanks to the preventive focus of the universal health care system a 
screening of all children living in the vicinity of the car-battery factories was 
conducted despite severe resource constraints in order to identify children at high 
risk. However, and as raised by the Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health (Solar and Irwin, 2005), “what sense does it make to cure a person and 
then to send him or her back to the same environment that caused the illness in 
the first place…” Participatory action enabled a better understanding of the 
fundamental issues at stake and the need to address this problem at all levels. 
 
Improvement in health and health equity demands not only change in physical 
and social environments of cities, it also demands an integrated long-term multi-
sectoral approach which takes into account the wider socio-economic and 
contextual factors affecting health (Barten, et al.., 2008). Integrated or multi-
level approaches that involve the public sector and civil society should address 
not only the immediate, but also the underlying and particularly the basic causes 
at societal level of related health issues (Barten, et al., 2006; KNUS, 2007). 
However, in order for comprehensive approaches such as healthy settings to 
address the upstream determinants of health inequities effectively and at multiple 
levels, they need to tackle issues of participation, governance and the politics of 
power, decision-making and empowerment explicitly (Barten, Mitlin et al., 
2006; Barten et al., 2002; van Naerssen and Barten, 2002a, 2002b; Perez Montiel 
and Barten, 1999). 
Participation is considered crucial to the social transformation necessary for 
development as, among other factors, it would contribute to building ownership 
and commitment, to shaping avenues for involvement in decision-making 
processes and to allowing for sustainability of development processes, outcomes 
and decisions (Stiglitz, 2002). Although the relevance of participation has been 
recognized by many agencies, in practice it has been more difficult to achieve 
and often took place in name only (Arnstein, 1969). Priorities in global health 
policy are often set at international level (Ollila, 2005) and local political 
commitment for long-term participatory planning processes is limited in a 
context of limited resources and heavy donor dependency.  
Access to information is an essential precondition for participation and it is 
worth noting that information systems played a critical role in improving health 
and health equity in cities of 19th century Europe (Szreter, 2005). However,  
 
 
Figure 1. Estimated ‘Exposure levels’ in dependence of distance to industry and 
cottage factories in the districts Domitila Lugo, Riguero Norte and Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro in Managua 1987.  
 
information systems in many cities often do not capture the living and working 
conditions, environment and health status of their societies, let alone in 
communities living in unplanned and informal settlements and urban poverty in 
low and middle-income countries is still under-estimated (David et al., 2007; 
Satterthwaite, 2004).  
Implications for research and policy 
The manner in which any problem is framed, inevitably affects the type of 
response that is developed to address it (Ambert, et al., 2007). Although the 
funding to and profile of global health has increased in recent years, through new 
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initiatives like MDGs, Global Fund, GAVI, PEPFAR etc., and development of 
new diagnostics, vaccines and drugs has led to increased  numbers of clinical 
trials,  research into the fundamental drivers of problems is still neglected, 
including but not only health systems research. Even more limited are the geo-
political interests to reverse the outcomes of such studies. As long as these 
knowledge gaps are not addressed, progress however will remain limited 
(Marmot, 2008).  
Also, a system analysis of health differs from an analysis of health systems as 
this involves a set of actors and processes, change over a large period of time and 
the important historical, social, economic, cultural and political determinants 
(Lawrence, 2003; Pearce and McKinlay, 1998). Equity, solidarity, universality 
and access to good quality care have long been common values and principles 
that have oriented health systems’ and policy development in Europe (EC, 2007). 
Research therefore should be made more responsive to the challenges of 
deepening and new inequalities and pay more attention to the upstream driving 
forces of population health equity, and its interface with social structures and the 
health system (McCoy et al., 2004).  
It is particularly important to strengthen the evidence-base of and role of 
public policies. Applied public health research is essential to evaluate public 
policies and practice as well as e.g. the nature and outcomes of changing 
arrangements in urban governance, human resources development, economic and 
climate change. This implies the need to study the reasons of planning failures as 
well as of effective policies and actions at national, regional and global level. It 
is compelling to develop an evidence-based research agenda on these topics. 
Comparative studies may enable relevant lessons to be learned and governments 
have an important responsibility to ensure cross-sectoral public health research 
for the public good.  
However, it continues to be neglected and while the “10/90 gap” has come to 
symbolise the mismatch between the south and the north in health research, it is 
important to acknowledge this other critical 10/90 gap that exists in Europe: the 
mismatch between biomedical pharmaceutical research and public health 
research(McCarthy, 2008). To date, biomedical research on specific diseases has 
dominated, and the implications of transferring this “European” focus and bias 
into research partnerships with the South deserves further scrutiny. The present 
dominance of translational pharmaceuticals research is surely not in the public 
interest(McCarthy, 2008) and it is urgent to acknowledge the public health 
dimension of the rapid and chaotic urbanisation, migration, the growth of 
informal settlements, the changing arrangements in governance, the 
informalisation of the economy, the commercialisation of health care and the 
implications of global warming. Large knowledge gaps still remain.  
What should be done? Firstly, there is a need to mobilize knowledge from 
different disciplines, to better integrate the natural and social sciences and to 
engage with different knowledge systems and its actors. So far, disciplinary 
research has dominated and knowledge institutions should have a crucial role in 
facilitating interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. Countervailing 
knowledge and power, and innovative approaches in research cooperation are 
needed; not only to increase the relevance of research for communities, but also 
for reducing health inequities in the society. Secondly, which policy 
methodologies are at our disposal? How will the modes of conducting research 
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and of research cooperation condition and set our research agenda? Reverse 
which determinants and mode of investigation determine our research agenda? 
Have we drawn the correct lessons from past health research, have we been able 
to develop new paradigms or have we followed the traditional scientific paths? 
Did we carry out real participatory action research and involve all relevant actors 
in our studies, or did we leave those who are studied out for the convenience of 
our publications? What is the role of civil society in establishing the research 
agenda and become participatory and owner of real participatory and action 
based health systems research? It has become evident that the context, the 
values, the politics of power and the unequal access to resources in research 
partnerships are essential and preconditions for health systems research if it is to 
improve equity and health in communities.  
In summary,  the problems of the urban social and physical environment posed 
by the current trends of urbanization, uneven development, political motivated 
development assistance and global warming are immense and the public health 
dimension of these challenges are still largely neglected. Consensus should be 
achieved on a value-based approach to health and on an new integrated or 
systems approach in public health and urban planning that addresses above all 
the upstream underlying and structural determinants - and not only the proximal 
individual risk factors and/or health effects. There is an urgent need to 
incorporate these essential values in the upcoming agenda for global health 
research only than will we address in a meaningful and effective manner  the 
political and economic changes needed to address the determinants of health and 
health equity in urban settings. Such an approach requires vision, leadership and  
engagement in an interdisciplinary manner. Ton van Naerssen, and his 
colleagues in Nijmegen, had such a vision as they joinedly established the 
interdisciplinary Nijmegen Urban Health Group and the international civil 
society programme Health and Environment in the Cities. Over the last 15 years 
applied research on the determinants of urban health, health equity and 
development in health have become effective means to inform the highly needed 
changes in public policy to achieve health for all in an equitable manner.  
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